Youth labor in transition: inequalities, mobility and policies in Europe by unknown

   i
Youth Labor in Transition
 
ii
International Policy Exchange Series
Published in collaboration with the
Center for International Policy Exchanges
University of Maryland
Series Editors
Douglas J. Besharov
Neil Gilbert
United in Diversity? 
Comparing Social Models in Europe  
and America 
Edited by Jens Alber and Neil Gilbert 
The Korean State and Social Policy: 
How South Korea Lifted Itself from  
Poverty and Dictatorship to Affluence  
and Democracy 
Stein Ringen, Huck- ju Kwon, Ilcheong Yi, 
Taekyoon Kim, and Jooha Lee 
Child Protection Systems: 
International Trends and Orientations 
Edited by Neil Gilbert, Nigel Parton,  
and Marit Skivenes
The Age of Dualization:
The Changing Face of Inequality in 
Deindustrializing Societies
Edited by Patrick Emmenegger, Silja 
Häusermann, Bruno Palier,  
and Martin Seeleib- Kaiser
Counting the Poor:
New Thinking About European Poverty  
Measures and Lessons for the United States
Edited by Douglas J. Besharov  
and Kenneth A. Couch
Social Policy and Citizenship:
The Changing Landscape
Edited by Adalbert Evers  
and Anne- Marie Guillemard
Chinese Policy in a Time of Transition
Edited by Douglas J. Besharov  
and Karen Baehler
Reconciling Work and Poverty Reduction:
How Successful Are European Welfare States?
Edited by Bea Cantillon  
and Frank Vandenbroucke
University Adaptation in Difficult 
Economic Times
Edited by Paola Mattei
Activation or Workfare? Governance and  
the Neo-Liberal Convergence
Edited by Ivar Lødemel  
and Amílcar Moreira
Child Welfare Systems and Migrant Children:
A Cross Country Study of Policies and Practice
Edited by Marit Skivenes, Ravinder Barn,  
Katrin Kriz, and Tarja Pösö
Adjusting to a World in Motion:
Trends in Global Migration and Migration Policy
Edited by Douglas J. Besharov  
and Mark H. Lopez
Caring for a Living:
Migrant Women, Aging Citizens, and Italian 
Families
Francesca Degiuli
Child Welfare Removals by the State:
A Cross- Country Analysis of Decision- Making 
Systems
Edited by Kenneth Burns, Tarja Pösö,  
and Marit Skivenes
Improving Public Services:
International Experiences in Using Evaluation 
Tools to Measure Program Performance
Edited by Douglas J. Besharov, Karen J. Baehler, 
and Jacob Alex Klerman
Welfare, Work, and Poverty:
Social Assistance in China
Qin Gao
Youth Labor in Transition:
Inequalities, Mobility,  
and Policies in Europe
Edited by Jacqueline O’Reilly,  
Janine Leschke, Renate Ortlieb,  
Martin Seeleib- Kaiser, and Paola Villa
Decent Incomes for All:
Improving Policies in Europe
Edited by Bea Cantillon, Tim Goedemé,  
and John Hills
 
1   iii
YOUTH LABOR IN TRANSITION
Inequalities, Mobility,  
and Policies in Europe
Edited by 
JACQUELINE O’REILLY
JANINE LESCHKE
RENATE ORTLIEB
MARTIN SEELEIB- KAISER
PAOLA VILLA
 
1iv
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2019
Some rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in 
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, for commercial purposes, 
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly 
permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate 
reprographics rights organization.
This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of a
Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivatives 4.0
International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), a copy of which is available at
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Data Names: O’Reilly, Jacqueline, 1964– editor. | Leschke, Janine, editor. | 
Ortlieb, Renate, editor. | Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin, editor. | Villa, Paola, 1949– editor. 
Title: Youth labor in transition : inequalities, mobility, and policies in Europe / 
edited by Jacqueline O’Reilly, Janine Leschke, Renate Ortlieb, 
Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, and Paola Villa. 
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2019] | 
Series: International policy exchange series | Includes bibliographical references and index. 
Identifiers: LCCN 2018028252| ISBN 9780190864798 (jacketed : alk. paper) | 
ISBN 9780190864811 (epub) | ISBN 9780190864828 (online component) 
Subjects: LCSH: Youth—Employment—Europe. | Young adults—Employment—Europe. | 
Labor policy—Europe. | School-to-work transition—Europe. 
Classification: LCC HD6276.E82 U6645 2019 | DDC 331.3/47094—dc23 
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018028252
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
 
v   v
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
Abbreviations and Acronyms xiii
Contributors xvii
1
Comparing youth transitions in Europe: Joblessness, insecurity,  
institutions, and inequality 1
Jacqueline O’Reilly, Janine Leschke, Renate Ortlieb,  
Martin Seeleib- Kaiser, and Paola Villa
PART I. COMPARING PROBLEMATIC YOUTH TRANSITIONS TO WORK
2
Where do young people work? 33
Raffaele Grotti, Helen Russell, and Jacqueline O’Reilly
3
How does the performance of school- to- work transition  
regimes vary in the European Union? 71
Kari P. Hadjivassiliou, Arianna Tassinari, Werner Eichhorst,  
and Florian Wozny
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi CONTENTS
vi
4
Stressed economies, distressed policies, and distraught young 
people: European policies and outcomes from a youth perspective 104
Mark Smith, Janine Leschke, Helen Russell, and Paola Villa
5
Labor market flexibility and income security: Changes  
for European youth during the Great Recession 132
Janine Leschke and Mairéad Finn
6
Policy transfer and innovation for building resilient bridges to  
the youth labor market 163
Maria Petmesidou and María González Menéndez
PART II. TRANSITIONS AROUND WORK AND THE FAMILY
7
How do youth labor flows differ from those of older workers? 195
Vladislav Flek, Martin Hála, and Martina Mysíková
8
How can young people’s employment quality be assessed dynamically? 237
Gabriella Berloffa, Eleonora Matteazzi, Gabriele Mazzolini,  
Alina S¸andor, and Paola Villa
9
Youth transitions and job quality: How long should they wait and what 
difference does the family make? 271
Marianna Filandri, Tiziana Nazio, and Jacqueline O’Reilly
10
The worklessness legacy: Do working mothers make a difference? 294
Gabriella Berloffa, Eleonora Matteazzi, and Paola Villa
11
Stuck in the parental nest? The effect of the economic crisis  
on young Europeans’ living arrangements 334
Fernanda Mazzotta and Lavinia Parisi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS vii
   vi
12
Income sharing and spending decisions of young people  
living with their parents 358
Márton Medgyesi and Ildikó Nagy
PART III. TRANSITIONS ACROSS EUROPE
13
What happens to young people who move to another country  
to find work? 389
Mehtap Akgüç and Miroslav Beblavý
14
Europe’s promise for jobs? Labor market integration of young  
European Union migrant citizens in Germany and the United Kingdom 419
Thees F. Spreckelsen, Janine Leschke, and Martin Seeleib- Kaiser
15
How do labor market intermediaries help young Eastern  
Europeans find work? 443
Renate Ortlieb and Silvana Weiss
16
What are the employment prospects for young Estonian  
and Slovak return migrants? 461
Jaan Masso, Lucia Mýtna Kureková, Maryna Tverdostup,  
and Zuzana Žilincˇíková
PART IV. CHALLENGING FUTURES FOR YOUTH
17
Origins and future of the concept of NEETs in the European  
policy agenda 503
Massimiliano Mascherini
18
Youth overeducation in Europe: Is there scope for a common  
policy approach? 530
Seamus McGuinness, Adele Bergin, and Adele Whelan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii CONTENTS
vi
19
Do scarring effects vary by ethnicity and gender? 560
Carolina V. Zuccotti and Jacqueline O’Reilly
20
Do business start- ups create high- quality jobs for young people? 597
Renate Ortlieb, Maura Sheehan, and Jaan Masso
21
Are the work values of the younger generations changing? 626
Gábor Hajdu and Endre Sik
22
How can trade unions in Europe connect with young workers? 660
Kurt Vandaele
23
Integrating perspectives on youth labor in transition:  
Economic production, social reproduction, and policy learning 689
Jacqueline O’Reilly, Janine Leschke, Renate Ortlieb,  
Martin Seeleib- Kaiser, and Paola Villa
Index 707
 
 
 
 
 
ix
   ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Writing at a time of ongoing Brexit negotiations, we cannot understate what an enormous privilege it has been to work with so many intelligent, dil-
igent, and good- humored people on this project from across Europe. From 
Ireland to Turkey and from Greece to Estonia, we have had the pleasure and 
intellectual stimulation of discussing this work with research organizations from 
19 countries and 25 research partners, alongside external academic reviewers 
and policy stakeholders. The chapters in this book are only a small part of the 
vast quantity of work produced during the course of the project. An extensive 
round of working papers, policy briefs, and videos are available on the project 
website, Strategic Transitions for Youth Labour in Europe (STYLE; http:// www.
style- research.eu), via EurActiv, and in contributions to the STYLE e- handbook 
(http:// www.style- handbook.eu). Thank you to all of you who have made this 
such a vibrant and productive project.
This book would not have been possible without the generous investment 
provided by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, 
technological development, and demonstration under grant agreement No. 
613256. We are very grateful for the careful guidance and support provided by 
our project officers at the European Commission, Dr. Georgios Papanagnou and 
Marc Goffart. Their support was excellent on many dimensions, ensuring not 
only that we achieved our contractual and administrative obligations but also 
that our endeavors contributed to a high- quality international academic debate. 
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily re-
flect the official opinions of the European Union. Neither the European Union 
 
x ACKNOwLEdgMENTS
x
institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held re-
sponsible for the use that may be made of the information contained therein.
We extend a massively warm thank- you to the people who kept the big ad-
ministrative and financial wheels on this project turning, allowing us to roll on 
with the heart of the academic endeavor. You really have been a great team to 
work with. Providing good- humored and outstanding professional support, 
that so often went well beyond the call of duty, and your job descriptions, thank 
you:  John Clinton, Francesca Anderson, Chris Matthews, Alison Gray, Rosie 
Mulgrue, Andrea Mckoy, and Prof. Aidan Berry from the University of Brighton 
Business School.
The editors are grateful to the contributors for their patience in responding 
to our numerous requests for revisions to their original manuscripts. All the 
contributors have expressed their gratitude to us for the excellent English lan-
guage editing provided by Niamh Warde. She was always meticulously con-
structive and good humored in helping transform our (at times impenetrable) 
academic prose into readable English, together with the careful support of 
Daniela Benati in preparing the manuscript.
The editors and authors also thank the following individuals for participating 
in STYLE project meetings and providing critically constructive feedback on draft 
chapters:  Brendan Burchell (University of Cambridge, UK), Günther Schmid 
(Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), Germany), Colette Fagan (University of 
Manchester, UK), Maria Jepsen (ETUI, Belgium), Glenda Quintini (Organization 
for Economic Co- operation and Development, France), Jochen Clasen 
(University of Edinburgh, UK), Mark Stuart (University of Leeds, UK), Bent 
Greve (University of Roskilde, Denmark), Marge Unt (Coordinator of EXCEPT, 
Tallinn University, Estonia), Chiara Saraceno (Collegio Carlo Alberto, Italy), 
Paweł Kaczmarczyk (University of Warsaw, Poland), Jan Brzozowski (Krakow 
University of Economics, Poland), Claire Wallace (University of Aberdeen, UK), 
Traute Meyer (University of Southampton, UK), Nigel Meager (IES, UK), Marc 
Cowling (University of Brighton, UK), Fatoş Gökşen (Koç University, Turkey), 
Niall O’Higgins (ILO, Switzerland), Ruud Muffels (University of Tilburg, the 
Netherlands), Marc van der Meer (University of Tilburg, the Netherlands), Eskil 
Wadensjö (SOFI, Stockholm University, Sweden), Ute Klammer (University of 
Duisburg- Essen, Germany), Jale Tosun (Coordinator of CUPESSE, University 
of Heidelberg, Germany), Katarina Lindahl (European Commission, DG 
EMPLOY), Thomas Biegert (Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), Germany), 
Zeynep Cemalcilar (Koç University, Turkey), Torild Hammer (Norwegian 
Social Research, Norway), Agata Patecka (SOLIDAR), Ramon Pena- Casas (OSE, 
Belgium), Karen Roiy (Business Europe), and Giorgio Zecca and Clementine 
Moyart (European Youth Forum). We thank our commissioning editor at 
Oxford University Press, Dana Bliss; the series editor, Neil Gilbert; and particu-
larly Doug Besharov, who provided very valuable advice when he attended our 
meeting in Krakow in January 2017.
ACKNOwLEdgMENTS xi
   xi
We are also grateful for the further comments on earlier drafts provided re-
motely by Jose Luis Arco- Tirado (University of Granada, Spain), Jason Heyes 
(University of Sheffield, UK), Anne Horvath (European Commission), Maria 
Iacovou (University of Cambridge, UK), Russell King (University of Sussex, UK), 
Bernhard Kittel (University of Vienna, Austria), Martin Lukes (University of 
Economics, Prague, Czech Republic), William Maloney (Newcastle University, 
UK), Emily Rainsford (Newcastle University, UK), Bettina Schuck (University 
of Heidelberg, Germany), Peter Sloane (Swansea University, UK), Nadia Steiber 
(University of Vienna, Austria), Robert Strohmeyer (University of Mannheim, 
Germany), Mihaela Vancea (Pompeu Fabra University, Spain), Jonas Felbo- 
Kolding (University of Copenhagen, Denmark), Mihails Hazans (University 
of Latvia, Latvia), Felix Hörisch (University of Heidelberg, Germany), Øystein 
Takle Lindholm (Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences, 
Norway), Tiiu Paas and Andres Võrk (University of Tartu, Estonia), Magnus 
Paulsen Hansen (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark), and the Q- Step Team 
(University of Kent, UK).
Earlier versions of the chapters were presented and discussed at project 
meetings kindly hosted by the following partner organizations:  CROME, 
University of Brighton (UK), Koç University (Turkey), Grenoble École de 
Management (France), Institute for Employment Studies (UK), Copenhagen 
Business School (Denmark), University of Turin (Italy), and the Krakow 
University of Economics (Poland). Thank you for making our serious discussions 
so convivial.
Some of the chapters have been presented at numerous international confer-
ences, including the International Sociological Association in Yokohama, 2014; 
a mini- conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio- Economics held 
at the London School of Economics, July 2015, held in conjunction with the EU- 
funded cupesse.eu project; a special session at the Council for European Studies 
meeting in Philadelphia with former EU Commissioner László Andor, 2016, and 
held in conjunction with the EU- funded negotiate- research.eu and Livewhat 
projects; a special session at the Work, Employment and Society conference at 
the University of Leeds, 2016, held in conjunction with the EU- funded except- 
project.eu and cupesse.eu; and a special stream at the European Social Policy 
Association conference (ESPAnet) at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 2016, held 
in conjunction with the EU- funded negotiate- research.eu.
In addition to the expert academic advice, authors also benefited from 
discussing their early findings with local advisory boards across Europe; these 
boards were composed of a number of non- governmental organizations, 
charities, public policymakers, and trade union and employers’ organizations. 
In particular, we are grateful for the regular participation and discussions with 
Christine Lewis (UNISON), Katerina Rudiger (CIPD), Edward Badu (North 
London Citizens, UK), Menno Bart and Even Hagelien (EUROCIETT), Alvin 
Carpio (Young Fabians, UK), Abi Levitt and Ronan McDonald (Tomorrow’s 
xii ACKNOwLEdgMENTS
xi
People, UK), Liina Eamets (Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information 
Board), Tomáš Janotík and Mária Mišečková (Profesia, Slovakia), Aime Lauk 
(Statistics Estonia), Anne Lauringson and Mari Väli (Estonian Unemployment 
Insurance Fund), Martin Mýtny (Oracle, Slovakia), and Tony Mernagh 
(Brighton and Hove Economic Partnership). Supporting this communica-
tions platform, Natalie Sarkic- Todd and Irene Marchi have been wonderful 
partners in helping promote the results of this research through EurActiv. We 
thank you all very much for your participation in this project; it has really 
enriched our discussions.
Last but not least, the fecundity of our research team was evidenced not 
only in their numerous publications but also in the arrival of 11 babies born to 
researchers on this project (2013– 2017)— a vibrant testament to the youthful-
ness of our researchers and their ability to combine academic careers alongside 
making transitions to having families of one, two, and, in some cases, three chil-
dren. I hope the parents look back on the time spent on this project as a good 
investment, and that when their own children grow up, they can see what their 
mums and dads were up to late at night.
We hope that some of the findings from this research will be of benefit to 
young people making their way through the challenging transitions from youth 
to adulthood in Europe and further afield. All royalties from the printed version 
of this book will be donated to the Child Development Fund (www.childfund- 
stiftung.de) to support the educational needs of disadvantaged children in East 
Africa through school and vocational school fellowships that are particularly fo-
cused on supporting young girls.
This has been an enormously rewarding project, and we feel very privileged 
to have had the opportunity to contribute some of our energy to understanding 
and explaining the problems that need to be addressed concerning youth labor 
in transition.
Jacqueline O’Reilly, Janine Leschke, Renate Ortlieb, 
Martin Seeleib- Kaiser, and Paola Villa
Brighton, Copenhagen, Graz, Tübingen, and Trento, July 2017
xiii
   xi
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
COUNTRIES
AT Austria
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
CH Switzerland
CY Cyprus
CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany
DK Denmark
EE Estonia
EL Greece
ES Spain
FI Finland
FR France
HR Croatia
HU Hungary
IE Ireland
IS Iceland
IT Italy
LT Lithuania
LU Luxembourg
LV Latvia
 
 
xiv ABBREVIATIONS ANd ACRONYMS
xiv
MK Macedonia
MT Malta
NL Netherlands
NO Norway
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RO Romania
SE Sweden
SI Slovenia
SK Slovakia
TR Turkey
UK United Kingdom
US United States
ALMP active labor market policy
BHPS British Household Panel Survey
CCI cultural and creative industry
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CSRs country- specific recommendations
DG Directorate General
EC European Commission
ECB European Central Bank
EES European Employment Strategy
EMCO European Commission Employment Committee
EPL employment protection legislation
ESS European Social Survey
EST employment status trajectories
ETUC European Trade Union Confederation
EU European Union
EU- LFS European Union Labour Force Survey
EURES European Employment Services
Eurofound European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions
Eurostat Statistical Office of the European Union
EU- SILC European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions
EU2 2007 accession countries to the EU: Bulgaria and Romania
EU8 2004 accession countries to the EU: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
EU28 European Union 28 countries
EVS European Values Study
EWCS European Working Conditions Survey
FTE full- time equivalent
ABBREVIATIONS ANd ACRONYMS xv
   xv
GDP gross domestic product
HPAC hierarchical age– period– cohort (regression model)
ICT Information/ Communication Technologies Sector
ILO International Labour Organization
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education
ISCO International Standard Classification of Occupations
ISEI International Socio- Economic Index of Occupational Status
KM Kaplan– Meier (estimator)
LABREF Labour Market Reforms Database
LFS Labor Force Survey
LIFO last- in, first- out
LMI labor market intermediary
MISSOC Mutual Information System on Social Protection
NACE Statistical Classification of Economic Activities
NCDS National Child Development Study
NEET not in employment, education, or training
NGO non- governmental organization
OECD Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development
OLM occupational labor markets
OM optimal matching
OMC open method of coordination
ONS- LS Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study
PES public employment services
PIAAC Programme for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies
PPS purchasing power standards
R&D research and development
SES Structure of Earnings Survey
STW school- to- work
STYLE Strategic Transitions for Youth Labour in Europe (FP7 project)
TCN third- country national
TLM transitional labor market
UK- LFS UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey
VET vocational education and training
WVS World Values Survey
YEI Youth Employment Initiative
YG Youth Guarantee
A glossary of labor market terms is available from the European Union at 
http:// ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/ statistics- explained/ index.php/ Category:Labour_ 
market_ glossary.
xvi
xvii
   xvi
CONTRIBUTORS
Mehtap Akgüç
Centre for European Policy Studies
Brussels, Belgium
Miroslav Beblavý
Centre for European Policy Studies
Brussels, Belgium
Adele Bergin
Economic and Social Research Institute
Dublin, Ireland
Gabriella Berloffa
Department of Economics and 
Management
University of Trento
Trento, Italy
Werner Eichhorst
Institute of Labor Economics
Bonn, Germany
Marianna Filandri
Department of Culture, Politics and 
Society
University of Turin
Turin, Italy
Mairéad Finn
School of Social Work and Social Policy
Trinity College Dublin
Dublin, Ireland
Vladislav Flek
Department of International Relations 
and European Studies
Metropolitan University Prague
Prague, Czech Republic
Raffaele Grotti
Economic and Social Research Institute
Dublin, Ireland
Kari P. Hadjivassiliou
Institute for Employment Studies
Brighton, United Kingdom
Gábor Hajdu
Institute for Sociology
Centre for Social Sciences of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, Hungary
 
xviii CONTRIBUTORS
xvi
Martin Hála
Department of International Business
Metropolitan University Prague
Prague, Czech Republic
Lucia Mýtna Kureková
Slovak Governance Institute
Bratislava, Slovakia
Janine Leschke
Department of Business and Politics
Copenhagen Business School
Frederiksberg, Denmark
Massimiliano Mascherini
European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions
Dublin, Ireland
Jaan Masso
Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration
University of Tartu
Tartu, Estonia
Eleonora Matteazzi
Department of Sociology and Social 
Research
University of Trento
Trento, Italy
Gabriele Mazzolini
Department of Economics, Quantitative 
Methods and Business Strategy
University of Milan- Bicocca
Milan, Italy
Fernanda Mazzotta
Department of Economics and Statistics
University of Salerno
Salerno, Italy
Seamus McGuinness
Economic and Social Research Institute
Dublin, Ireland
Márton Medgyesi
Institute for Sociology
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, Hungary
María González Menéndez
Department of Sociology
University of Oviedo
Oviedo, Spain
Martina Mysíková
Institute of Sociology of the Czech 
Academy of Sciences
Prague, Czech Republic
Ildikó Nagy
Institute for Sociology
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, Hungary
Tiziana Nazio
Department of Culture, Politics and 
Society & Collegio Carlo Alberto
University of Turin
Turin, Italy
Jacqueline O’Reilly
University of Sussex Business School for 
Legal Reasons
University of Sussex
Brighton, United Kingdom
Renate Ortlieb
Department of Human Resource 
Management
University of Graz
Graz, Austria
Lavinia Parisi
Department of Economics and Statistics
University of Salerno
Salerno, Italy
Maria Petmesidou
Department of Social Administration and 
Political Science
Democritus University of Thrace
Thrace, Greece
CONTRIBUTORS xix
   xi
Helen Russell
Economic and Social Research Institute
Dublin, Ireland
Alina Şandor
Department of Economics and 
Management
University of Trento
Trento, Italy
Martin Seeleib- Kaiser
Institute of Political Science
University of Tübingen
Tübingen, Germany
Maura Sheehan
International Centre for Management and 
Governance Research
Edinburgh Napier University
Edinburgh, Scotland
Endre Sik
TÁRKI Social Research Institute
Budapest, Hungary
Mark Smith
Department of People, Organizations and 
Society
Grenoble School of Management
Grenoble, France
Thees F. Spreckelsen
Department of Social Policy and 
Intervention
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
Arianna Tassinari
Institute for Employment Studies
Brighton, United Kingdom
Maryna Tverdostup
Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration
University of Tartu
Tartu, Estonia
Kurt Vandaele
European Trade Union Institute
Brussels, Belgium
Paola Villa
Department of Economics and 
Management
University of Trento
Trento, Italy
Silvana Weiss
Department of Human Resource 
Management
University of Graz
Graz, Austria
Adele Whelan
Economic and Social Research Institute
Dublin, Ireland
Florian Wozny
Institute of Labor Economics
Bonn, Germany
Zuzana Žilinčíková
Slovak Governance Institute
Bratislava, Slovakia
Carolina V. Zuccotti
Mighraion Policy Centre
European University Institute
Florence, Italy
x
1   1
1
COMPARING YOUTH TRANSITIONS IN EUROPE
JOBLESSNESS, INSECURITY, INSTITUTIONS,  
AND INEQUALITY
Jacqueline O’Reilly, Janine Leschke, Renate Ortlieb,  
Martin Seeleib- Kaiser, and Paola Villa
1.1. INTRODUCTION
In the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession (2008– 2009), European 
youth joblessness soared, especially in those countries facing the largest financial 
difficulties. Youth were particularly hard hit in Southern Europe, Ireland, and the 
Baltic countries. For some countries, this was not a new problem. For decades 
preceding the crisis, they had struggled with the problem of successfully inte-
grating young people into paid work (Furlong and Carmel 2006).
The Great Recession exacerbated early career insecurity, which had already 
been evident before the crisis. Unstable, short- term, and poorly paid jobs have 
resulted from regulatory trends that began in the early 1990s. Employment pro-
tection legislation (EPL) was weakened in order to enhance labor market flexi-
bility, enabling firms to respond quickly to changes. This was achieved through 
the liberalization of temporary contracts and in some cases a reduction of ben-
efit entitlement for young people (Smith et al., this volume; Leschke and Finn, 
this volume). Measures to render labor markets more flexible have been actively 
supported by policy recommendations at the European Union (EU) level, with 
limited concern about the consequences for youth, both before and during the 
economic crisis (Smith and Villa 2016). The analyses presented in this volume 
show that focusing solely on youth unemployment is not enough to understand 
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the consequences of the Great Recession for young people; we also need to 
understand how employment insecurity affects youth labor transitions, their 
long- term impact, and how these are mediated by labor market institutions and 
policies.
Institutional settings for the integration of youth differ remarkably across 
Europe, despite attempts made in recent years to overcome national and regional 
weaknesses following recommendations made at the EU level (Wallace and 
Bendit 2009; O’Reilly et al. 2015). Countries with more robust and embedded 
vocational education and training (VET) systems and with integrated em-
ployer involvement have traditionally been able to create more stable transition 
pathways from education to employment (Hadjivassiliou et  al., this volume; 
Grotti, Russell, and O’Reilly, this volume). Those with more fragmented coordi-
nation have faced greater challenges and in some cases inertia (Petmesidou and 
González Menéndez, this volume).
The current evolution of youth labor markets reveals traditional and emerging 
forms of segmentation along education/ class, nationality/ ethnicity, and, to some 
degree, gender dimensions. Some countries are better able to contain labor 
market segmentation between well- protected prime- age workers and poorly 
protected younger workers. In others, segmentation has resulted in the involun-
tary concentration of young workers in temporary and precarious jobs, or it has 
left them without hope of finding a decent job.
In this chapter, we outline the key problems and challenges associated with 
analyzing youth joblessness and employment insecurity from a cross- European 
perspective.1 First, we briefly contextualize European youth employment trends. 
Second, we identify how the problem of youth unemployment has been defined in 
both research and policy frameworks. Third, we outline comparative approaches 
to evaluating countries’ performance. Fourth, we discuss how we conceptualize 
and compare sustainable youth transitions. Fifth, we consider how inequalities 
among youth vary by the intersection of gender, parental background, and eth-
nicity. Finally, we conclude by summarizing the contributions to this volume and 
suggesting that a more comprehensive approach to policymaking requires un-
derstanding both the dynamics of economic production regimes and the effects 
of inequalities emanating from the family sphere of social reproduction.
1.2. CONTEXTUALIZING EUROPEAN YOUTH 
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS
Some of the trends in youth employment during the Great Recession could be 
contextualized in relation to broader global and historical changes to the organ-
ization of work resulting from technological change, globalization, and demo-
graphic transformation, but these only tell part of the story. These three trends are 
major drivers affecting aggregate labor demand and supply, in addition to policy 
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decisions in advanced industrialized countries, but their effects on youth labor 
markets are not unilinear. The impact of global trends is mediated through labor 
market institutions, and distinctive patterns of local demand for young workers 
have their roots in employers’ behavior before the Great Recession (Grotti et al., 
this volume). Although youth unemployment soared after the economic crisis, 
the causes of this are complex and vary between different categories of youth, as 
well as between different countries.
From a long- term perspective, the decline of manufacturing jobs in the 
northern hemisphere has decimated sectors that traditionally supported the 
integration of large cohorts of young men through apprenticeships. The speed 
of recent technological change is reshaping work on new digital platforms, but 
the impact of these changes on employment is neither theoretically nor empiri-
cally fully understood (Vivarelli 2014), and the consequences for young people 
are ambivalent. On the one hand, youth have an advantage over older gener-
ations if systems of VET adequately respond to the technological trends and 
changing job opportunities, where labor market entrants benefit from their 
up- to- date competencies. On the other hand, as low- skill jobs diminish, young 
people with few or limited qualifications encounter higher barriers to entering 
the labor market. Although the digital economy opens up new opportunities 
for consumers, it raises various challenges for workers, related to the types of 
jobs it generates and how these are regulated. This includes questions about re-
muneration, social protection, and, more generally, externalization of risks to 
workers— for example, in the emerging gig economy, in which young people are 
increasingly finding employment (Jepsen and Drahokoupil 2017; Lobel 2017; 
Neufeind et al., 2018). In addition, occupational choice becomes more difficult 
for young people because job profiles continuously change and investment in 
a specific vocational training or university study program may quickly become 
outdated. As a result, certain groups of young people may be “left behind” in the 
process of accelerated technological change.
Processes of globalization allow companies to relocate more easily and to 
reap the benefits of low- cost production regions. Although many jobs have been 
moved to the Far East, in the European context firms do not have to move to 
very distant shores. Instead, they can often relocate to destinations in Central 
and Eastern Europe and thereby create employment for young people in Europe’s 
periphery. Nevertheless, unemployment continues to be high in these eastern 
regions, and it is unclear to what extent offshoring and globalization affect 
the overall volume of youth labor in Europe. Firms relocate not only due to 
wage– cost differences but also as a consequence of lower labor standards and 
more employer- friendly labor law. Relocations or the threat of relocations to 
regions with low labor standards pose a challenge for national and European 
policymakers by restricting the policy options available. Nevertheless, despite 
these global trends, Grotti et al. (this volume) show how young Europeans are 
more likely to find work in service sector jobs of retail, accommodation and 
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food, and health and social work— sectors involving face- to- face delivery that 
are not as vulnerable to offshoring strategies.
We might expect demographic changes would have a favorable effect on 
youth employment opportunities because the number of workers per retiree is 
projected to decline substantially in the EU28 (Eurostat 2015). Projected popula-
tion trends indicate an uneven distribution of where these are rising or declining 
across individual EU member states: Half of the EU member states are projected 
to show rising population trends and the other half declining trends between 
2014 and 2080. Population numbers are predicted to rise by more than 30% in 
8 of the 28 EU member states, whereas they are predicted to decline by approxi-
mately 30% or more in 6 member states (for details, see Eurostat 2015). To meet 
potential future labor shortages, immigration trends can only partly compensate 
for declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy, so it should, in theory, 
be easier for young people to find work. But as Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) 
and Gruber and Wise (2010) show, these demographic trends have not resulted 
in more jobs for youth across the Organization for Economic Co- operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. What is more likely is that young people will 
have to work longer and are likely to receive lower pensions in the future.
Although these global trends of accelerated technological change, globaliza-
tion, and demographic transformation mark a significant change to the world 
of work, it is not easy to untangle their specific impact on youth employment. 
The relationship between cause and effect is complex and varied, not only in 
explaining the differential outcomes between groups of countries but also in 
explaining the outcomes among different groups of young people in these coun-
tries. Rather than viewing “youth unemployment” as a unitary problem, a more 
refined understanding of what kind of problem this is needs to be specified.
1.3. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM OF YOUTH 
UNEMPLOYMENT
Endeavors to define the “problem” of youth unemployment have generated 
a number of contested interpretations as to its causes and possible solutions; 
these interpretations also affect the way policy is developed to address the 
problem. Some countries have attributed the rapid increase in youth unemploy-
ment to a “deficit model” in their school- to- work (STW) institutions or to the 
nature of segmented labor markets, in which young people are institutionally 
marginalized, or they have allotted blame to a “welfare dependency” culture, 
which may be producing young people without sufficient “grit” or the right set 
of mental skills to find employment (Pohl and Walther 2007; Wallace and Bendit 
2009). The consequences of the economic crisis have prioritized the problem of 
youth employment and underemployment for policymakers. The solutions de-
veloped have included reforms of (pre)vocational training and a modernization 
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of educational institutions. Countries have pursued various paths of “activation,” 
either through enabling active labor market policies (ALMPs), such as training 
measures, or through more coercive steps that include obligatory activation and 
job take- up with benefit sanctions in the event of noncompliance (Hadjivassiliou 
et al., this volume). Despite diverse experiences across Europe, the distinction 
proposed by Scarpetta, Sonnet, and Manfredi (2010) between “poorly inte-
grated new entrants” and young people who are “left behind” offers a very suc-
cinct means to identify the key universal trends and policy issues examined in 
this book.
Poorly integrated new entrants are young people who, although qualified, ex-
perience persistent difficulties in accessing stable employment. They are caught 
in a series of short- term, insecure, and poorly paid jobs that frequently do not 
correspond well to their qualifications (McGuinness, Bergin, and Whelan, this 
volume); such insecure employment is often interspersed by intermittent periods 
of unemployment and/ or inactivity. This group of poorly integrated new entrants 
accounted for approximately 20%– 30% of all youth aged 15– 29 years in OECD 
countries in 2005– 2007; these youth are particularly prevalent in France, Greece, 
Spain, and Italy (Scarpetta et al. 2010).
The second group of youth left behind is made up of young people who are 
characterized by inability, discouragement, or unwillingness to enter the labor 
market; who face multiple disadvantages; and who are more likely to have no 
qualifications, to come from an immigrant/ minority background, and/ or to live 
in disadvantaged/ rural/ remote areas (Eurofound 2012; TUC 2012; Roberts and 
MacDonald 2013). The size of this group can be estimated by the number of 
young people not in employment, education, or training, known as “NEETs.” 
Although the concept of NEETs has been highly contested for covering a very 
diverse group of young people— including unqualified early school- leavers, 
qualified graduates taking time off to find work, and youth with family caring 
responsibilities— it has become a widely recognized international benchmark for 
measuring country performance (Mascherini, this volume).
According to Eurostat data, the share of NEETs among the 15- to 29- year- old 
age group in the EU28 was 13.2% in 2007; it reached its peak at 15.9% in 2013 
and then fell slightly to 14.8% by 2015 (for 2015, see Figure 1.1).2 Country vari-
ations in the share of NEETs in the EU28 range from less than 8% (DK, LU, SE, 
and NL) to more than 25%. The highest NEET rate is found in Italy— 25.7% in 
2015; Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania all have NEET rates greater than 20%. The 
NEET rate for Turkey is as high as 27.9%.
In addition to national NEET rates, Figure 1.1 also presents youth unem-
ployment rates and youth unemployment ratios. These three indicators are to be 
viewed as complementary in that they measure different phenomena.
The unemployment rate is the proportion of youth actively searching for a job 
as a percentage of all those in the same age group who are either employed or 
unemployed; students are excluded from this measure. The unemployment ratio 
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Figure 1.1 Youth unemployment rates, unemployment ratios, and NEET rates in 2015 (young people aged 15– 29 years).
Source: Eurostat EU- LFS.
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includes students as part of the total population against which youth unemploy-
ment is calculated. Because they are measured against a wider population, unem-
ployment ratios are lower than unemployment rates. Ratios provide an indicator 
of the proportion of youth searching for a job vis- à- vis the relative share of youth 
in education. The NEET rate is the percentage of the youth population not in 
education or training among all young people in the same age group, including 
those who are working or studying or both; it can be interpreted as a measure 
that reflects the fragility of STW transitions in a particular country.
These three indicators vary significantly between countries (see Figure 1.1). 
Countries with similar NEET rates can have very different levels of youth un-
employment rates or ratios. For example, if we compare Sweden, Portugal, and 
the United Kingdom— three seemingly different countries— we find some inter-
esting points of comparison. The youth unemployment rate in Portugal is very 
high at greater than 20%. However, Portugal’s youth unemployment ratio is fairly 
similar to that of Sweden at approximately 10%– 12%, and these are both higher 
than the ratio of approximately 7% in the United Kingdom. This tells us that 
there are relatively more students in the United Kingdom than in Sweden or 
Portugal compared to those who are unemployed. But the NEET rates in the 
United Kingdom and Portugal are fairly similar at approximately 13%, which 
tells us that transitions to work or education and training are more effective in 
Sweden than in the former two countries. It is the careful interpretation of these 
data and the interrelationships between them that shape priorities on policy 
agendas.
Debates about which indicators should be used are both political and aca-
demic in nature. They are academic in terms of how we should appropriately 
measure and interpret the phenomena of youth unemployment and underem-
ployment, and they are political in terms of emphasizing their significance and 
the importance of different policies developed to address the particular problem 
that is measured. These indicators also reflect the varying performance of coun-
tries, the overall macroeconomic and labor market conditions, and the effec-
tiveness of institutional settings— particularly labor regulation— in facilitating 
young people’s transitions to sustainable employment.
1.4. COMPARING COUNTRY PERFORMANCE
A comprehensive comparison of developments in youth labor market transitions 
across Europe presents a number of challenges. Early comparative work either 
tended to focus on a small selection of countries (Marsden and Ryan 1986) or 
emphasized the distinctive profile of particular types of countries associated with 
coordinated market economies (e.g., Germany) in contrast with liberal market 
economies (e.g., the United Kingdom). The varieties of capitalism approach 
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emphasized the more successful integration and higher skill trajectories of youth 
in more coordinated economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). The key dimension of 
comparison was the relationship between business organizations, VET systems, 
and policymakers— the institutions that comprise the economic sphere of pro-
duction (O’Reilly, Smith, and Villa 2017).
Variation across countries as regards occupational, company- specific skills, 
or generalist skill regimes also has very different effects on the speed, type, 
and quality of transitions that young people make (Russell, Helen, and Philip 
J.  O’Connell 2001; Brzinsky- Fay 2007). In their comprehensive volume on 
transitions from education to work in Europe, Gangl, Müller, and Raffe (2003) 
find that countries in which youth have higher levels of education, and those with 
large- scale systems of vocational training, provide young people with a better 
start in their working lives. Van der Velden and Wolbers (2003) take a broader 
view of the impact of institutional conditions on transition outcomes. These 
authors test for the effects of various institutional indicators, including meas-
ures for the structure of training systems, the structure of collective bargaining 
and wage- setting mechanisms, and the stringency of employment protection. In 
this direct comparison between competing institutional hypotheses, the struc-
ture of training systems again turns out to be the most important predictor of 
cross- national differences in transition patterns. Boeri and Jimeno (2015), in 
a study on the divergence of unemployment in Europe, stress that youth un-
employment is a main driver of these cross- country differences. According to 
their findings, the divergence is largely caused by differences in labor market 
institutions (including collective bargaining, wage- setting mechanisms, EPL, 
and labor market regulation) and their interactions with demand shocks, in-
cluding fiscal consolidation.
One way to approach large, cross- national comparisons has been the use of 
welfare regime typologies with a number of aggregate indicators and dimensions 
to distinguish between different families of countries with related practices (for a 
critical summary of these approaches, see O’Reilly 2006; Ferragina and Seeleib- 
Kaiser 2011; Arts and Gelissen 2012). Ferragina and Seeleib- Kaiser argue that 
the main point of contention in these debates is that typologies are usually based 
on ideal types, not on real types. Two further critiques of regime approaches are 
that (1) they assume an overarching rationale rather than focusing on specific 
and sometimes contradictory policy logics and structures (Keck and Saraceno 
2013) and (2) typologies tend toward a more static picture of regime types that 
overestimates path dependency (Hadjivassiliou et al., this volume). Despite these 
limitations, typologies are often used as pragmatic heuristic devices that allow us 
to make summary comparisons of a large number of countries. More recently es-
tablished approaches have been adapted to specifically address the issue of youth 
transitions (Wallace and Bendit 2009).
Walther and Pohl (2005) put forward a typology of youth transition regimes 
building on established welfare regime typologies. They include dimensions that 
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go beyond social protection measures and consider, in particular, education and 
training, the regulation of labor markets, the role of occupational profiles, and 
job mobility in structuring labor market entry, as well as mechanisms of “doing 
gender” (Pohl and Walther 2007, 545– 46). They distinguish between five youth 
transition regimes: universalistic (DK, FI, and SE); employment- centered, which 
is primarily based on dual training (AT and DE), both school- based (FR) and 
mixed (NL); liberal (IE and UK); subprotective (EL, ES, IT, and PT); and post- 
socialist (BG, PL, RO, SK, and SI) (Pohl and Walther 2007).
This regime typology provides a useful analytical framework that is specifi-
cally focused on youth transitions. However, as a number of contributors in this 
volume show, youth transition regimes are in flux because of the impact of the 
Great Recession; policy reforms have created new forms of regime hybridization 
as countries attempt to adjust to these shocks (Hadjivassiliou et al., this volume; 
Petmesidou and González Menéndez, this volume).
The impact of the Great Recession on country performance is well illustrated 
using the most common measure— youth unemployment rates (Figure 1.2). 
Although most countries have started to show decreases in youth unemploy-
ment since it peaked in approximately 2013, youth unemployment rates were 
on average still 4 percentage points (pp) higher in 2015 for 15- to 29- year- olds 
than before the crisis. Whereas the difference between countries recording the 
lowest and those recording the highest youth unemployment rates (for 15- to 
29- year- olds) was 14.1 pp in 2008, the difference was 34.8 pp in 2015 (see Figure 
1.2). Some countries are beginning to improve their performance since the eco-
nomic crisis, including some countries in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and 
the United Kingdom and Ireland; however, for Southern European countries, the 
situation has deteriorated even further.
Despite the diversity of labor market conditions and the youth unemploy-
ment rate across Europe, there is a universally shared experience of growing 
early career insecurity associated with youth labor transitions. Drawing on a 
range of different methodological approaches and data sources, the chapters in 
this volume present evidence on youth transitions and policy interventions for 
a range of countries within these various regime “types.” The chapters are not 
exclusively inspired by STW transition regimes; rather, they also frequently cite 
more general welfare regime typologies in order to capture a broader perspective 
that goes beyond immediate STW transitions and also covers the effects of early 
career insecurity.
1.5. CONCEPTUALIZING AND COMPARING SUSTAINABLE 
YOUTH TRANSITIONS
The concept of sustainable youth transitions can be traced back to the notion of 
transitional labor markets developed by Schmid (2008). His work has a broader 
 
10
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
*
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
i
a
G
r
e
e
c
e
S
p
a
i
n
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
I
t
a
l
y
C
y
p
r
u
s
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
F
r
a
n
c
e
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
E
U
 
2
8
*
T
u
r
k
e
y
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
S
w
e
d
e
n
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
P
o
l
a
n
d
L
a
t
v
i
a
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
M
a
l
t
a
*
N
o
r
w
a
y
*
I
c
e
l
a
n
d
*
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
2008 2011 2015
Figure 1.2 Evolution of youth unemployment rates (% total labor force, aged 15– 29 years): 2008, 2011, and 2015.
Source: Eurostat EU- LFS.
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focus than this volume in examining transitions ranging from early entry to par-
enthood and later- life transitions out of the labor market. A key preoccupation 
of this approach with a view to social risk management is to identify policies 
and institutions that enable integrative and maintenance transitions (which en-
able people to stay in employment by moving between different forms of flexible 
employment) in contrast to exclusionary transitions (which result in unemploy-
ment or inactivity) (O’Reilly 2003). In particular, it considers the interfaces of 
education and the labor market, the labor market and private life, and transitions 
between different employment statuses within the labor market. In identifying 
innovative policies that focus on supporting employment continuity rather than 
job security— by securing transitions over the life course and thereby man-
aging social risks— Schmid’s perspective is a precursor to more recent debates 
on sustainable employment and the flexicurity approach (see Smith et al., this 
volume; Leschke and Finn, this volume; Petmesidou and González Menéndez, 
this volume; Berloffa et al., this volume).
As the conceptual focus on measuring transitions has become more perti-
nent, it has been facilitated by the availability of large- scale, cross- national, 
and, in some cases, longitudinal data sets. Labor market research has increas-
ingly moved from comparing stocks of employed and unemployed people to-
ward an analysis of flows between a large set of different labor market statuses 
and life states. There has been a rising level of sophistication in terms of data 
and methods in how transitions have been examined (Brzinsky- Fay 2007; Flek, 
Hála, and Mysíková, this volume; Berloffa et al., this volume). These have ranged 
from simple year- on- year comparisons of transitions from one state to another 
using cross- sectional data to more complex longitudinal analysis that follows 
individuals over a longer time period (Zuccotti and O’Reilly, this volume).
As well as tracing these patterns, attention has also been given to qualita-
tive distinctions between integrative, maintenance, and exclusionary transitions 
around employment (O’Reilly, Cebrián, and Lallement 2000; Schmid 2008; 
Leschke 2009). The use of sequence analysis to measure youth transitions has 
enabled distinctions between countries in which speedy or delayed transitions 
are more common (Brzinsky- Fay 2007; Quintini and Manfredi 2009; Berloffa 
et al., this volume; Filandri, Nazio, and O’Reilly, this volume). This type of anal-
ysis can identify universal trends as well as dominant patterns within particular 
countries.
Alongside the growing sophistication of the measures used to capture youth 
transitions, there is also some debate concerning the age limits to youth. The 
chapters in this volume use a variety of age ranges, depending on the focus of 
their research question. The decision to go beyond an upper age limit of 24 years 
that is often used arbitrarily or by statistical convention provides a more com-
prehensive picture of the longer term consequences of early career insecurity for 
youth trajectories. Using a broader age band is particularly relevant given the 
increasingly extended duration of participation in education and the raising of 
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the school- leaving age. Furthermore, it allows us to take into consideration not 
only STW but also labor market transitions and the quality of employment in 
the early phase of youth working life. Early career insecurity can also have effects 
on young people in their early thirties— and not only in Southern Europe (Flek 
et al., this volume; Berloffa et al., this volume). Depending on the analytical aim 
of the respective chapters and the underlying data used, contributors here take 
into account youth up to the age of 34 years. Some of the chapters also stress the 
relevance of disaggregating youth either by age group (Hadjivassiliou et al., this 
volume; Leschke and Finn, this volume) or by the phase in their working life 
(Berloffa et al., this volume).
The volume’s emphasis on transitions also highlights the importance of devel-
oping a dynamic analysis of labor market trajectories that goes beyond conven-
tional analysis of stocks of labor. Several authors propose innovative solutions to 
overcome static approaches and commonly used indicators such as temporary 
jobs. These approaches include an analysis of longitudinal data and labor market 
flows (Flek et  al., this volume) and a composite analysis of multidimensional 
features of job insecurity (Berloffa et  al., this volume) or job quality (Russell, 
Leschke, and Smith 2015; Filandri et al., this volume).
Comparisons of youth trajectories presented in the volume include 
dimensions of occupational class, education, gender, age, and parental back-
ground. A novel additional dimension is the comparisons of youth trajectories 
that take account of ethnicity, nationality, and migration status, as well as more 
established cleavages and patterns of segmentation.
1.6. ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING FORMS 
OF SEGMENTATION AND INTERSECTING INEQUALITIES
Youth labor markets are a particularly apposite space for identifying both es-
tablished and emerging forms of labor market segmentation. We are able not 
only to compare contemporary divisions between young people’s labor market 
trajectories but also to trace the longer term legacies related to their parents’ 
labor market experiences by drawing on extensive comparable cross- national 
data sources to identify patterns of commonality and difference in intersecting 
inequalities (Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa, this volume; Zuccotti and O’Reilly, 
this volume). In terms of gender differences, young women had higher levels of 
educational attainment than men before the Great Recession, but they also had 
slightly higher rates of unemployment. By 2015, young men (aged 15– 29 years) 
had marginally overtaken young women’s unemployment rates on the EU28 
average (16.5 vs. 15.7, respectively), with 17 countries having more favorable 
outcomes for women than for men. During the Great Recession, unemploy-
ment rates increased for both young men and young women; however, the trend 
was steeper for men in male- dominated sectors, particularly in construction 
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and manufacturing (Eurostat 2017; Grotti et al., this volume). In 2015, young 
women (aged 15– 29 years) were still more likely than young men to be NEET 
(16.7% compared to 13.0%, respectively) for EU28 (Eurostat 2017; Mascherini, 
this volume). Gender differences have decreased during the economic crisis not 
because of increasing gender equality but, rather, because of the rising shares of 
male NEETs.
Youth unemployment is also disproportionately higher, employment rates 
are lower, and working conditions are poorer for those from certain Black and 
minority ethnic backgrounds, as well as for some migrant workers (Akgüç and 
Beblavý, this volume; Spreckelsen, Leschke, and Seeleib- Kaiser, this volume). 
Some authors conflate ethnic differences as being largely attributable to mi-
gration, whereas others recognize that there is a long- standing community of 
non- White nationals within their societies that experiences very different em-
ployment trajectories depending on their ethnicity (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 
2012; Zuccotti and O’Reilly, this volume). Individuals with low levels of edu-
cational attainment or with disabilities also have more difficulty entering and 
remaining in employment in all countries (on educational attainment, see Gangl 
2003; on disabilities and vulnerability, see Halvorsen et al. 2017; see also Hart 
et al. 2015).
One of the underlying reasons for poorer labor market integration of some 
ethnic and migrant youth and— more generally— of youth from low- income 
families is that they are less likely to participate in further formal education than 
their peers, although some ethnic groups have a higher propensity to pursue 
higher education (Zuccotti and O’Reilly, this volume). Gendered and ethnic seg-
mentation in the take- up of particular vocational pathways can perpetuate these 
inequalities, with transitions taking place into less valued and less rewarded 
occupations, while those not participating in VET systems become labor market 
outsiders (Charles et al. 2001; Becker 2003; Alba 2011; Gundert and Mayer 2012; 
Gökşen et  al. 2016). The specific institutional and societal context— in inter-
play with effectively implemented policies to address intersecting inequalities— 
affects the quality of youth transitions (Krizsan, Skjeie, and Squires 2012; Gökşen 
et al. 2016).
The research presented in this volume shows that we cannot assume that 
disadvantage in the labor market can be simply read off from a series of par-
ticular socioeconomic characteristics of an individual. The experiences of un-
employment and labor market transitions vary by the intersection of gender 
and parental background (Filandri et al. this volume; Berloffa, Matteazzi, and 
Villa, this volume; Mazzotta and Parisi, this volume; Medgyesi and Nagy, 
this volume). This analysis constitutes the components of the sphere of so-
cial reproduction of labor (O’Reilly et al. 2017). It is in this realm that family 
differences, as well as those of ethnicity, migration status, and educational 
attainment, influence and interact with the inequality in youth transitions 
observed in the sphere of economic production (Spreckelsen et  al., this 
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volume; Mascherini, this volume; Zuccotti and O’Reilly, this volume; Ortlieb, 
Sheehan, and Masso, this volume). The effect of these disadvantages depends 
on institutional arrangements supporting equality of integration (Gökşen 
et al. 2016; Hadjivassiliou et al. 2016). Policies can be targeted at institutions 
of economic production such as VET systems, EPL, and employers; they can 
focus on the sphere of social reproduction by seeking to improve individual 
young people’s “employability” skills and attitudes and by addressing disad-
vantaged families (or not); or they can have a more integrated focus on the 
two domains (O’Reilly et al. 2017).
The youth transitions examined in this book look at different groups of young 
people, the way they feel about their options (including their attitudes toward 
and values about work), and how policy communities can enable them to over-
come the negative consequences of disengagement. Collectively, the research 
presented here illustrates the importance of policy initiatives directed at labor 
market institutions, such as VET systems, EPL, and unemployment benefits, 
as well as focusing on employers’ patterns of recruitment and the role of trade 
unions.
This research also goes beyond conventional perspectives focused solely on 
the sphere of economic production by drawing attention to the very signifi-
cant role of the family in shaping young people’s futures and the social repro-
duction of labor (O’Reilly et al. 2017) and also to the more recent evidence on 
youth migration trajectories as a distinctive characteristic of the recent phase 
of youth unemployment in Europe (O’Reilly et  al. 2015). Moving beyond 
STW transitions, this broader approach includes an analysis of the longer 
term consequences of insecure employment and how these consequences are 
shaped by institutions. We also distinguish between different categories of 
youth, which allows us to identify both universal trends and country- specific 
differences that affect transition trajectories. As a result, these findings provide 
a more nuanced and informed approach with regard to effective policymaking 
in different countries.
1.7. ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
The book is organized into four parts. Part I  examines problematic youth 
transitions into employment and recent trends as to where young people find 
work, how well countries perform, and how this affects policy responses. In 
Part II, we examine how the family shapes youth labor market transitions. The 
chapters in Part II use different methodological approaches to address two key 
transitions for youth: finding work and leaving home. Part III examines youth mi-
gration transitions across Europe. Using quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
the chapters in Part III focus on the situation of young EU migrant workers 
abroad, when they return home, and the role of labor market intermediaries in 
 
 
Comparing Youth Transitions in Europe 15
   15
shaping these transitions. Part IV identifies some of the key policy challenges 
emerging from our analysis. Chapters in Part IV critically assess the concept 
of NEETs and vulnerable transitions for disadvantaged men and women from 
ethnic backgrounds, the challenges posed by overeducation, new forms of self- 
employment, the values and attitudes of young people, and their propensity to 
engage with trade unions. Drawing on this extensive evidence, we argue that 
the increasing levels of precariousness, mobility, and inequality in youth labor 
markets require a comprehensive raft of policies targeted at the spheres of eco-
nomic production and social reproduction to engage employers more effectively 
and address inequalities stemming from the family.
1.7.1. Part I: Comparing Problematic Youth  
Transitions to Work
In Part I, we examine problematic youth transitions into employment. This 
opens with Chapter 2 by Grotti, Russell, and O’Reilly, which examines the sectors 
in which young people (aged 16– 24  years) are most frequently employed be-
fore and after the Great Recession. Drawing on data from the European Union 
Labor Force Survey (EU- LFS) for 23 countries between 2007 and 2014, the 
authors find that youth employment continues to be unevenly distributed across 
sectors and that regardless of the different proportions emerging, many coun-
tries share striking similarities in this distribution. The authors ask whether the 
decline in jobs for youth is attributable to shrinkage in these sectors related to 
long- term trends in the overall structure of the economy or to the effects of the 
Great Recession (i.e., a hiring freeze, as in previous recessions, and the dissolu-
tion of temporary contracts, which are mainly held by young workers). Using a 
shift- share analysis, they identify the sectors in which young people have been 
most vulnerable to job losses so as to assess whether or not jobs for youth have 
deteriorated by examining where the changing employment status of these jobs 
has seen a decline in full- time permanent opportunities and a growth in part- 
time and/ or temporary work. The evidence is sobering:  Job opportunities in 
“youth- friendly” sectors have declined during the recession, and the quality of 
this employment has deteriorated.
Adopting a comparative perspective to assess STW transition regimes, 
Chapter 3 by Hadjivassiliou et al. asks how well countries have performed during 
the Great Recession and whether lessons can be learned from these experiences. 
Drawing on Pohl and Walther’s (2007) comparative framework of STW tran-
sition regimes, the authors assess the youth labor market performance of eight 
countries (SE, DE, FR, NL, ES, TR, EE, and PL) belonging to five different in-
stitutional clusters and the effect of recent policy innovations. They analyze 
the cross- cluster variation by key institutional dimensions: youth employment 
policy governance structure (e.g., level/ mode of policy coordination and social 
partners’ role); the structure of education and training systems (e.g., VET and 
 
16 YOUTh LABOR IN TRANSITION
16
apprenticeships) and the nature of linkages with the labor market; and dom-
inant labor market and welfare policy models (e.g., EPL, wage- formation sys-
tems, ALMPs, and the structure of social assistance and benefits systems). Their 
findings indicate that the institutional configurations of STW regimes in Europe 
are currently experiencing a degree of flux and hybridization. Evidence of conver-
gence in policy instruments emerges, although differential performance persists. 
A  combination of institutional and macroeconomic factors, together with a 
common trend of progressive deterioration in the quality of youth transitions 
across the board, are likely to present significant obstacles for the future.
Providing a critique of recent labor market policies and institutional outcomes 
in Europe, Chapter 4 by Smith et al. identifies challenges to attempts to engage 
in a coherent reconceptualization of European employment policy from a youth 
perspective. First, they argue that there has been an over- reliance on supply side 
policies to address labor market challenges. Second, the external pressures of 
macroeconomic stability (including fiscal consolidation), rather than a coherent 
strategy toward sustainable labor market outcomes, have driven labor market 
reforms. Third, reform has been based on a downward pressure on job security 
(i.e., EPL) and a strengthening of employability security through ALMPs, despite 
slack labor demand. Fourth, because of over- reliance on quantitative targets, there 
is a lack of consideration of the impact of precariousness and early career insecu-
rity on young people. Finally, reforms have failed to integrate a gender and life 
course perspective to reflect the realities of labor market participation. In terms of 
policy implications, the authors call for a renewed perspective on what constitutes 
an “efficient” labor market, alongside the integration of quality outcomes. They 
seek to identify policies that could develop durable and resilient labor markets for 
postcrisis Europe, particularly for the generation entering work.
Using a dynamic version of the flexicurity matrix, Chapter 5 by Leschke 
and Finn analyzes trade- offs and vicious and virtuous relationships between 
external and internal numerical flexibility and income security for youth (aged 
15– 24 and 25– 29 years). In all European countries, youth are more likely to be 
unemployed than adults; they also have a higher likelihood of being in tempo-
rary employment. Moreover, young people have more difficulty fulfilling eli-
gibility criteria for unemployment benefits, including minimum contributory 
periods and means testing in secondary benefit schemes. Drawing on EU- LFS 
data for 2007, 2009, and 2013, Leschke and Finn estimate the access of young 
people to unemployment benefits and also their participation in short- time 
working schemes. This analysis is complemented by an institutional analysis 
to chart recent changes in unemployment benefit criteria that are directly or 
indirectly targeted at youth. The results show that after initial improvements 
geared toward making unemployment benefit systems more encompassing, 
benefit coverage among youth has once again decreased in a number of coun-
tries in the wake of the crisis, highlighting the deficits in protection of young 
people against economic shocks.
Comparing Youth Transitions in Europe 17
   17
To address these concerns, Petmesidou and González Menéndez in Chapter 6 
disentangle and critically examine the complex routes of policy learning and 
policy transfer within and between different regimes of youth employment 
transitions. Their stringent analysis provides practical insights differentiating be-
tween successful innovations at different regional, national, and European levels. 
They comparatively examine the possibilities of, and barriers to, policy transfer 
and innovation between different STW transition regimes in Europe. Examining 
the policymaking machinery, they ask whether or not this facilitates experimen-
tation with new, proactive youth employment measures. Their analysis shows 
that factors related to policy development and operational delivery (e.g., the role 
of evidence, the ability of decision- makers to tolerate risks, and the role of spe-
cific actors in forging learning and transfer) are crucial in enabling or hindering 
effective policy innovation. They conclude by calling attention to the usefulness 
of cross- national analysis for understanding the interplay between institutional 
and process factors that drive or hinder knowledge transfer and policy innova-
tion for building resilient bridges to the labor market for young people.
1.7.2. Part II: Transitions Around Work and the Family
A particularly innovative contribution of this volume is its inclusion of an 
analysis of the sphere of social reproduction related to the role of the family in 
shaping youth labor market transitions. In Part II, we bring together a number of 
contributors who use diverse methodological approaches to focus on patterns of 
flows as well as on the quality of employment into which young people can move. 
A key element shared by these contributions is to provide innovative approaches 
to examining transitions and to situate these in relation to family circumstances. 
For some young people, unemployment is a frictional experience; for others, 
long- term vulnerability is part of a generational family legacy. The chapters de-
ploy different methodological approaches to address key transitions for youth in 
finding work and leaving home.
Examining flows between labor market statuses, Chapter 7 by Flek, Hála, and 
Mysíková compares youth (aged 15– 34 years) and prime- age individuals (aged 
35– 56 years) over various stages of the Great Recession (2008– 2012). They ex-
amine youth labor market dynamics in four countries (Austria, France, Poland, 
and Spain) that are illustrative of very different institutional settings and mac-
roeconomic shocks. A particularly novel aspect of this study is the decompo-
sition into “inflows” into and “outflows” out of unemployment for youth and 
prime- age individuals. The main result is that young workers are more likely to 
move between employment and unemployment— in both directions— compared 
to prime- age workers. This is instructive for assessing the gap in the labor market 
prospects of the two age groups. In summary, the authors find that young people 
“churn” through the (secondary) labor market relatively more frequently than 
their prime- age counterparts. These patterns are consistent across countries 
with substantially different labor market performances, institutions, and EU 
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membership history, although the length of time it takes unemployed youth to 
find work varies from country to country. Higher levels of schooling and work 
experience are key factors influencing the probability of exiting unemployment 
and moving into employment.
Using a dynamic approach to evaluate youth labor market performance, 
Chapter 8 by Berloffa et al. illustrates an innovative methodology for grouping 
employment status sequences and also proposes a new definition of employment 
quality based on four dimensions: employment security, income security, eco-
nomic success, and a positive match between education and occupation. The 
authors use longitudinal data (2006– 2012) for 17 countries from the European 
Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU- SILC) to examine youth 
(aged 16– 34  years) employment outcomes in two different phases of their 
working life: labor market entry and approximately 5 years after exiting educa-
tion. They analyze how the quality of employment obtained and the trajectory 
followed vary according to gender, education, country groups, and time periods 
(i.e., before and during the Great Recession). Their findings suggest that there 
is still a pressing need to enhance women’s chances to remain continuously in 
employment and to enable them to move up in the labor income distribution. 
Loosening the rules on the use of temporary contracts actually generates more 
difficulties for women and low- educated individuals; it also appears to worsen 
youth employment prospects in general.
Asking how long young people (aged 19– 34 years) should wait to find the right 
job, Chapter 9 by Filandri, Nazio, and O’Reilly examines the difference the family 
makes in this “waiting” decision. They use cross- sectional and longitudinal EU- 
SILC data (2005– 2012) for five countries (Finland, France, Italy, Poland, and the 
United Kingdom), which are illustrative of different transition regimes. They also 
compare whether taking the first available opportunity or holding out for some-
thing better affects the quality of jobs that young people are able to secure. In 
addition, they explore whether early experiences of unemployment affect later 
occupational conditions in terms of pay and skill levels. Comparing the impact of 
family status on the transitions and timing affecting young people, their findings 
show reinforced patterns of stratification: Young people from work- rich, higher 
occupational status families were able to make better transitions in terms of job 
quality than was the case for lower status families. These results raise significant 
questions about the locus for policy interventions in addressing the legacies of 
family inequalities for young people today.
Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa undertake an analysis of intergenerational ine-
quality and social mobility in Chapter 10. They investigate how this transmission 
varies for young men and women (aged 25– 34 years) across a range of different 
groups of countries. Using the 2011 EU- SILC ad hoc module on the intergener-
ational transmission of disadvantages, they estimate the extent to which parents’ 
employment during young people’s adolescence affects their employment status 
at approximately 30 years of age. They find that having had a working mother 
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during adolescence reduces the likelihood of being workless for both sons and 
daughters at approximately age 30  years in all country groups, except in the 
Nordic countries; the effects of fathers’ working condition are less widespread 
across countries. This suggests that the consequences of different labor market 
institutions, family models, and welfare regimes on the intergenerational trans-
mission of worklessness are not very clear- cut. In all country groups (except the 
Nordic countries), policies should pay attention to mothers’ employment— not 
only when their children are in their early years of life but also during their ad-
olescence. Helping mothers to remain in or re- enter the labor market might 
have important consequences for the future employment prospects of both their 
daughters and their sons.
Considering the decision by young people (aged 18– 34 years) to leave or to 
return to the parental home, Chapter 11 by Mazzotta and Parisi examines the 
effects of partnership and employment before and after the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis (2005– 2013) for different groups of countries. They find that the 
Great Recession has reduced the probability of leaving home and increased the 
probability of returning, with differences across country groups. The probability 
of leaving home decreased in Continental countries at the beginning of the Great 
Recession, but it remained stable in Southern and Eastern Europe. Southern 
European countries show an increase in returns home throughout the entire pe-
riod. Finally, leaving and returning home seem more closely linked to partner-
ship than to employment; at the same time, starting a new family is indirectly 
affected by employment.
How young adults (aged 18– 34 years) who are co- residing with their parents 
contribute to household expenses has not received significant attention to date 
in the literature on youth transitions. In Chapter 12, Medgyesi and Nagy draw 
on EU- SILC 2010 data for 17 EU countries to examine how resources are pooled 
in these households. They find that income sharing in the household attenuates 
income differences between household members because it helps those with low 
resources. At the same time, income sharing in the household tends to increase 
inequalities for young adults living with their parents. Some young adults stay at 
home longer in order to enjoy better economic well- being, some stay longer as 
a strategy to overcome the difficulties faced in the labor market or the housing 
market or both, whereas others remain at home longer in order to support their 
family of origin.
The evidence presented by the chapters in Part II indicates the persistent im-
portance of family resources (or the lack of them) in affecting the capability to 
move out of joblessness (Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa, this volume; Mazzotta 
and Parisi, this volume). In some cases, family resources allow some young 
people to “wait” for the right opportunity (Filandri et al., this volume). For other 
young people, it is not a question of “waiting” as they have nowhere else to go; 
while some stay at home to support other family members (Medgyesi and Nagy, 
this volume). Flek et al. (this volume) show that waiting longer than six months 
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can have deleterious long- term effects that may culminate in becoming youth 
who are “left behind.” The extent to which young people are able to act is clearly 
shaped by the resources on which they can rely. Whether these are private family 
resources or collective public goods or agencies will vary by country, region, 
and class.
1.7.3. Part III: Transitions Across Europe
One of the distinctive characteristics of the recent period of youth unemploy-
ment has been the increased level of labor mobility across Europe (O’Reilly et al. 
2015). A range of European initiatives that includes directives, social security co-
ordination, and information services has sought to encourage EU cross- border 
labor mobility so as to contribute to better labor market matching by remedying 
intra- EU skill gaps and skill shortages. EU cross- border labor mobility of often 
young and high- qualified workers has become particularly important since the 
2004 and 2007 accessions of Central and Eastern European countries (Galgóczi, 
Leschke, and Watt 2009, 2012). The trend has been further enhanced and 
diversified with the Great Recession, which led to increased flows of Southern 
Europeans to the North as a result of the economic downturn in their own coun-
tries (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016).
Recent intra- EU labor migration might represent a key tool for remedying 
youth unemployment by providing work opportunities for young unemployed in 
the countries with more abundant work opportunities (Berg and Besharov 2016). 
Migration experience might provide important individual- level benefits and give 
signals to employers who value a set of skills and characteristics that living and 
working abroad help to develop. These can range from cognitive language skills 
to noncognitive skills such as independence, self- initiative, intercultural compe-
tence, and increased flexibility. However, migration can also lead to suboptimal 
labor allocation, with substantial numbers of migrant workers being employed 
below their skill levels and often facing poorer working conditions than their 
peers when they return home (Clark and Drinkwater 2008; Johnston, Khattab, 
and Manley 2015).
To examine young migrants’ (aged 15– 35 years) labor market integration, in 
Chapter 13 Akgüç and Beblavý use pooled data from the European Social Survey 
(2002– 2015). They analyze labor market outcomes (unemployment, hours 
worked, contract type, and overqualification) across an aggregate of European 
destination countries by migrant origin (Southern European, Eastern European, 
intra- EU, and non- EU) vis- à- vis natives. They show that young migrants of all 
origin clusters have poorer labor market outcomes than nationals. In particular, 
after controlling for education, gender, age, country, and year effects, migrants 
from Eastern and Southern Europe display important differences vis- à- vis 
nationals in terms of having a higher propensity to be unemployed, to be em-
ployed on a temporary employment contract, and to be overqualified. Moreover, 
the analysis reveals a gender gap in women’s disfavor.
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Building on this analysis and deepening it, Chapter  14 by Spreckelsen, 
Leschke, and Seeleib- Kaiser examines the quantitative and qualitative labor 
market integration of young recent migrants (aged 20– 34  years) in Germany 
and the United Kingdom. The assumption is that because of different reserva-
tion wages and variations in the applicable migration policy regimes, migrants 
from Central Eastern Europe (EU8), Bulgaria and Romania (EU2), Southern 
Europe, and the remaining EU will have qualitatively different outcomes in des-
tination labor markets. Using German microcensus data and the UK- LFS, the 
chapter focuses descriptively on levels of employment and income; on marginal, 
fixed- term, and (solo) self- employment; and on overqualification of migrants 
compared to nationals before and after the economic crisis. The authors find 
that despite institutional differences and policy regimes regarding EU migrant 
workers, young EU migrant citizens are well integrated into the labor markets of 
both the two destination countries (particularly the United Kingdom) in terms 
of employment rates. However, their qualitative labor market integration seems 
to mirror the existing stratification across regions of Europe: EU8 and EU2 cit-
izens often work in precarious and atypical employment, youth from Southern 
Europe take a middle position, and youth from the remaining EU countries do 
as well, or better, on several indicators than their national peers.
The entry route of young migrants from Eastern European countries (EU8) 
into a foreign labor market is a central focus of Chapter 15 by Ortlieb and Weiss. 
Focusing on the Austrian labor market, an important destination for EU8 
migrants, these authors examine the role of labor market intermediaries (LMIs), 
such as public employment services, online job portals, and temporary work 
agencies, in facilitating this transition. Based on semistructured interviews with 
representatives of employers, LMIs, and young migrants (aged 18– 34 years), they 
find that online job portals are the most common LMIs used and that the in-
formation services offered by LMIs are more relevant than matchmaking and 
administrative services. The relevance of LMI types and services varies across 
sectors. To varying degrees, LMIs fulfill specific functions in these sectors, such 
as reducing transaction costs, managing risks associated with the employment 
relationship, and building networks. The results can inform the design of policy 
measures aimed at improving the labor market opportunities of young migrants 
from Eastern Europe, such as the provision of cost- free information and match-
making services and monitoring of LMIs in order to prevent exploitation of 
young migrants, and they can also inform future theoretical models accounting 
for youth migration.
Finally, going beyond understanding what happens to young people when they 
move abroad to find work, we also examine what happens when, and if, they re-
turn home. In Chapter 16, Masso et al. examine the labor market trajectories of 
return migrants to Estonia and Slovakia. They analyze how the characteristics of 
young return migrants (aged 18– 34 years) differ from those of their peers who 
either stayed in Estonia and Slovakia or are still working in another European 
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country. They also investigate the short- term labor market outcomes of returnees 
relative to the two other groups. The analysis is based on national LFS data sets 
from 2009– 2013. The authors find that return migrants, in both countries, are 
more likely to be young, male, and overqualified before their return compared 
to stayers. Return migrants in Slovakia initially face a higher risk of short- term 
unemployment, but they exit unemployment registries faster than stayers. In con-
trast, Estonian returnees who register with the labor office exit the registry at a 
slower pace than the unemployed in general. Masso et al.’s findings can inform 
policymaking aimed at reintegrating young return migrants into home- country 
labor markets under changing economic conditions and varied welfare support 
structures.
Altogether, the four chapters in Part III provide fresh insights into the 
experiences of young migrants during the Great Recession. Although 
European youth (particularly from a number of Central and Eastern coun-
tries of origin and— more recently— Southern Europe) show relatively high 
mobility and have comparatively high employment rates, some of them are 
also more prone to skills– occupation mismatch, atypical working conditions, 
and vulnerability compared to nationals in the destination countries to which 
they migrate.
1.7.4. Part IV: Challenging Futures for Youth
Drawing this volume to a close, the chapters in Part IV identify a number of 
key issues that will remain significant in future years. These chapters focus on 
the concept of NEETs; the consequences of overeducation, gender, and ethnic 
differences; the promises and drawbacks of youth self- employment; young 
people’s attitudes; and what possibilities there are for trade unions to organize 
the next generation of young workers.
Starting with the concept of NEETs, Mascherini provides an overview in 
Chapter 17 of the origin of the concept and how it entered the European policy 
agenda. He reviews the characteristics, evolution, and composition of the NEET 
population in Europe using EU- LFS data. He then proposes disaggregating the 
NEET indicator so as to better address the heterogeneity of different subgroups 
of young people categorized as NEETs. These subgroups include re- entrants into 
the labor market or education, the short- and long- term unemployed, young 
people unavailable because of illness or disability, young people unavailable be-
cause of family responsibilities, discouraged workers, and other inactives. The 
chapter discusses the diversity of member states in terms of size and composition 
of the NEET population, as well as their STW transition patterns. This is linked 
with an analysis of the first year of the implementation of the European Youth 
Guarantee and the concrete measures adopted by member states in order to ad-
dress the needs of the different subgroups of NEETs.
In contrast to the NEET population, the problem of overeducation is 
perceived as a consequence of the expansion of higher education and the lack of 
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appropriately skilled jobs for graduates. Well- qualified young people may have to 
enter employment that is below their qualification level, which in turn can have 
long- term consequences for their future labor market success. Drawing on EU- 
LFS data to construct quarterly time series of both youth (aged 15– 24 years) and 
adult (aged 25– 64 years) overeducation between 1997 and 2011 for 29 European 
countries, Chapter 18 by McGuinness, Bergin, and Whelan assesses the rate of 
overeducation among various age cohorts across countries and over time. Using 
time- series techniques, the authors find that youth overeducation is substantially 
driven by the composition of education provision, aggregate labor demand, and 
labor market flexibility.
Gender and ethnicity differences after a period of nonemployment are the 
focus of Chapter 19 by Zuccotti and O’Reilly. Their analysis is based on the Office 
for National Statistics Longitudinal Study, a large- scale data set from England 
and Wales that follows employment and occupational outcomes for individuals 
from 2001 (aged 16– 29 years) to 2011 (aged 26– 39 years). Being NEET in 2001 
leads to approximately 17 pp less chance of being employed 10 years later (while 
controlling for comparable levels of education, social background, and neighbor-
hood deprivation). However, this penalty varies across ethnic groups. The NEET 
scar is less severe among Indian and Bangladeshi men than among White British 
men by more than half. In contrast, the scars appear to be deeper for Pakistani 
and Caribbean women than for White British women.
Self- employment for youth has been widely promoted at the national and 
European level as a response to changing labor market conditions (European 
Commission 2010). But how beneficial is self- employment for young people? 
Is it a new form of precarious and poor- quality employment? Despite consid-
erable interest among policymakers in measures to stimulate self- employment 
and entrepreneurship, there is limited comparative evidence about the nature 
and quality of self- employment, as well as the job- creation propensities of 
these enterprises. Ortlieb, Sheehan, and Masso address this gap in Chapter 20 
using a comparative mixed methods approach. In addition to a range of sec-
ondary data sources, they draw on in- depth interviews with founders of 
business start- ups (aged 18– 34  years) in six countries— Estonia, Germany, 
Ireland, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom— focusing on two industries 
(cultural and creative, and communication technologies). The analysis takes 
account of the differences between self- employed people who work as sole 
traders— sometimes under conditions that have been termed “bogus self- 
employment”— and those business founders who run an enterprise with 
employees. The findings suggest that for some young people, self- employment 
presents an option that offers high- quality jobs. A  group of young self- 
employed people report that they can use and further develop their skills, and 
they appreciate the high degrees of autonomy and flexibility. However, the ac-
tual volume of jobs created through self- employment is rather low. Moreover, 
job quality is impaired by poor social protection, with negative consequences 
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especially in the long term. Policies need to address the high risks associated 
with self- employment in relation to unemployment, health care, and pension 
benefits.
Another dimension of future challenges discussed in this volume relates 
to changing attitudes toward and values regarding work among young people 
compared to previous generations. In Chapter 21, Hajdu and Sik conceptu-
alize and operationalize different aspects of work values. They draw on inter-
national data sets (World Values Survey/ European Values Study, European 
Social Survey, and International Social Survey Programme) to test for more 
than 30 countries whether work values differ across birth cohorts, age groups, 
and periods. The most important result is that significant gaps do not exist 
among the birth cohorts regarding the centrality of work, employment com-
mitment, or extrinsic and intrinsic work values. Consequently, the authors 
argue that generations are not significantly divided in their work values in 
contemporary Europe.
The final challenge examined here looks at the problem of low youth unioni-
zation in Europe. Chapter 22 by Vandaele argues that the low and decreasing rate 
of youth unionization in the majority of European countries is not the outcome 
of a generational shift in attitudes and beliefs regarding the value of trade unions. 
Rather, this is a result of the decline of union membership as a social practice and 
the diminishing exposure of young people to unionism at the workplace. The 
chapter illustrates with a number of examples that unions have a large amount 
of agency in developing effective, tailor- made strategies for organizing young 
workers and thereby strengthening their collective voice.
1.8. CONCLUSIONS
The book draws to a close by providing an integrated analysis of the findings of 
all the research presented in the volume. We discuss the challenges of comparing 
youth transitions across countries and the importance of using a wider range 
of indicators and a more comprehensive policy focus. First, we argue that the 
concept of economic production encapsulates some of the key dimensions and 
foci for policy initiatives related to VET, labor market flexibility, insecurity, 
and mobility. Second, we contend that an exclusive focus on this domain risks 
undervaluing the continued importance of the sphere of social reproduction, 
the role of family legacies, and how these affect established and emerging forms 
of inequality. Third, we propose that given the complexity and variety of youth 
transitions, policy initiatives need to attend simultaneously to both dimensions 
so as to develop multifocused strategies for ensuring successful youth transitions. 
The final chapter concludes with an outlook on what directions are required for 
future policymaking and research targeted at identifying sustainable bridges that 
facilitate youth labor market transitions.
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NOTES
1 The research presented here draws evidence from an EU- funded interdisci-
plinary research project involving 25 partners from 19 European countries, 
including Turkey (http:// www.style- research.eu). This was funded from the 
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technolog-
ical development, and demonstration under grant agreement No. 613256.
2 The NEET share is higher if we consider the age group 20– 34 years, which 
stood at 18.9% in 2015— this is approximately 17.6 million young people in 
the EU28 (Eurostat 2017, EU- LFS, not shown).
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WHERE DO YOUNG PEOPLE WORK?
Raffaele Grotti, Helen Russell, and Jacqueline O’Reilly
2.1. INTRODUCTION
A considerable body of comparative research on youth labor markets has fo-
cused on differences in school- to- work (STW) transitions and their impact on 
youth employment. Much of this research has examined institutional factors, 
comparing the performance of different vocational education and training 
(VET) systems, the effectiveness of active labor market policies, wage- setting 
arrangements, or the need for young people to have greater employability skills. 
However, surprisingly little attention has been given to employers’ behavior or 
to identifying which sectors of the economy are more open to employing young 
people and how these have changed over time. This chapter seeks to address this 
gap by examining where young people (aged 16– 24 years) have been employed— 
prior to and since the Great Recession of 2008– 2009.
2.2. COMPARING YOUTH TRANSITIONS 
ACROSS COUNTRIES AND SECTORS
2.2.1. Country Comparisons
Comparative employment research has drawn on a range of different analytical 
frameworks that can be used to understand youth employment. These range 
from polarized “ideal types,” such as the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice 
2001), to more complex typologies encompassing a broader range of variables 
(O’Reilly 2006). These typologies focus not only on VET systems, wage setting, 
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trade unions, and employers’ organizations but also on labor market policies 
and labor market characteristics, as well as cognitive conceptions of what kind 
of problem youth unemployment represents for policymakers (Russell and 
O’Connell 2001; Wallace and Bendit 2009; Buchmann and Kriesi 2011).
Using a multidimensional approach, Pohl and Walther (2007) classify coun-
tries into five types of “youth transition regimes”:  universalistic (Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden); employment- centered, primarily based on dual training 
(Austria and Germany), but also including school- based (France) or mixed 
(Netherlands) training; liberal (Ireland and the United Kingdom); subprotective 
(Cyprus, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain); and post- socialist, which includes a 
mixed liberal and employment- centered approach (e.g., Baltic states, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia). This comparative framework provides a parsi-
monious heuristic device for making systematic comparisons of trends in youth 
employment between countries (for a fuller discussion of this typology, see 
Hadjivassiliou et al., this volume).
2.2.2. sectorial Comparisons
Here, we are interested in differences in youth employment not only between 
countries and regime types but also between sectors within countries— a topic 
that has received surprisingly little attention (Marsden and Ryan 1986). Cross- 
national research has tended to focus either on macroeconomic factors and the 
effects of labor market policies or on supply- side comparisons of youth “em-
ployability.” More qualitative sectorial studies of employer engagement have ei-
ther examined differences within one country (Simms, Gamwell, and Hopkins 
2017) or evaluated the impact of labor market policies in particular sectors, again 
often within one country (Lewis and Ryan 2008). Overall, there has been a re-
markably limited examination of the role of employers and of sectorial trends in 
understanding changes in youth employment from a cross- national perspective.
An early comparative study from Marsden and Ryan (1986) asked, “Where 
do young workers work?” These authors established that youth employment 
was not evenly distributed across sectors; in fact, services and some areas of 
manufacturing were more open to youth than other sectors (Marsden and Ryan 
1986, 85). Within countries, considerable variation between “youth- friendly” 
sectors emerged, but this distribution was very similar across all six countries 
the authors examined. At the time this research was carried out (1972), and fo-
cusing only on male youth, the most popular sectors were footwear, clothing, 
wood products, and textiles— all largely manufacturing jobs.
More recent studies by Blanchflower and Freeman (2000), using Organization 
for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) data from 1994, have 
revealed the persistent uneven distribution of youth employment across sectors. 
Blanchflower and Freeman distinguished between “youth- intensive” industries, 
in which there is a higher ratio of younger to older workers,1 and they found 
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that young people (aged 16– 24 years) were more likely to be employed in hotels 
and restaurants, retail, and repair than in utilities, education, or public adminis-
tration. Two sectors (hotel and restaurants, and retail) accounted for 39% of all 
young workers in Germany and France in 1994. Gender differences were also 
identifiable, with young men being disproportionately employed in construction 
and young women disproportionately in the health sector. Like Marsden and 
Ryan before them, these authors found that “the uniformity of these patterns 
across countries is striking and suggests that, differences in school to work transi-
tion patterns notwithstanding, what happens to the youth labor market depends 
critically on developments in a limited set of sectors in all countries” (p. 47).
2.2.3. gender segregation
Greater attention has been given to sectorial comparison of the changing compo-
sition of employment in studies on gender segregation and the Great Recession. 
Bettio and Verashchagina (2014) found that the concentration of women in the 
public sector and in services shielded them from the worst job losses. Rubery 
and Rafferty (2013) also emphasize the role of gender segregation in their anal-
ysis of the crisis in the United Kingdom; they argue that recession and restruc-
turing may induce changes in segregation through substitution that will result in 
higher unemployment rates for women. Kelly et al. (2014) show that gender seg-
regation in Ireland fully accounts for the observed gender differential in unem-
ployment rates during the recent recession: The hyper- concentration of young 
men in construction was a significant factor in the disproportionate rise in male 
youth unemployment.
This body of research indicates that not only is youth employment concen-
trated in particular sectors but also this varies significantly by gender. As a result, 
we might expect the consequences for youth employment opportunities to be 
sensitive to how these sectors were affected by the Great Recession.
2.2.4. Comparing the Quality of employment
In addition to the quantity of jobs created or destroyed, there has also been 
a long- running interest in the quality of youth employment. Marsden and 
Ryan (1986) were also interested in understanding the quality of employ-
ment that young people can access and how pay rates affect their employment 
opportunities. They argued that young people have greater difficulty entering 
jobs where adult wages are high and jobs are well protected. Employers are more 
likely to view young people as less productive and relatively expensive compared 
to older workers, if they are expected to treat them on similar terms of employ-
ment. Young workers are likely to find it easier to enter low- wage, low- skilled 
jobs, for which there is less competition from older workers. In sectors where 
employers can pay apprentices lower rates of pay, this has encouraged higher 
rates of youth employment. The quality of these jobs could be enhanced where 
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there was a good apprenticeship system in place, as evidenced by Germany, 
which overall has a much higher proportion of skilled young workers compared 
to other countries.
More recent analysis from Blanchflower and Freeman (2000, 49) expected the 
youth share of employment for 20- to 24- year- olds to increase between 1985 and 
1994. Demographic trends with falling numbers of youth, increased educational 
participation, and the growth of a youth- friendly service sector should have led 
to an increase in the youth share of employment. Instead, this share fell, and 
the quality of youth employment and earnings deteriorated in nearly all OECD 
countries. Blanchflower and Freeman attribute this to the worsening conditions 
of low- paid and less skilled jobs.
2.2.5. Declining Demand for Youth labor
In addition to the previously mentioned deterioration, Blanchflower and 
Freeman (2000) argue that there has been a “massively declining labor demand 
for young workers” (p. 54). A similar finding has been provided in a more re-
cent analysis from Boeri and Jimeno (2015, 4). The latter authors attribute the 
explosion of European youth joblessness since the Great Recession to a massive 
elimination of jobs held by young people and to a hiring freeze by employers. 
Indeed, employers’ first response to decreases in demand is to stop recruiting 
and to not renew temporary contracts when they expire. Boeri and Jimeno argue 
that the destruction of jobs for young people came about with the “dissolution 
of temporary contracts, while at the same time employment rates among older 
workers were increasing” (p. 4). As Boeri and Jimeno acknowledge, this is a dis-
tinct feature of the Great Recession. In previous economic downturns, older 
workers were incentivized to leave the labor market via early retirement plans. In 
the recent period, fiscal consolidation has led to increasing retirement ages to the 
detriment of employment among young people. Boeri and Jimeno cite this as one 
example of a more general thesis: Reforms that are effective in normal times may 
not be desirable during major recessions. However, older workers are not a direct 
substitute for younger workers because they have different skills and experience 
that employers value (Eichhorst et al. 2014).
Countries also show different capacities for integrating young people. Despite 
country similarities in the distribution of youth- friendly jobs across sectors, 
there was significant variation between countries in the proportions of employed 
youth. The Marsden and Ryan (1986) study found that some countries, such as 
Italy, had very low shares of youth employment, whereas these rates were much 
higher in the United Kingdom. Country differences clearly have had a long- term 
impact on how many young people are integrated into paid work, where that 
work is located, and the status it is accorded. This variation is likely to derive from 
both long- term processes (related to change in the economic structure and labor 
market institutional characteristics) and short- term cyclical effects, which elicit 
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different national policy responses (Blanchflower and Freeman 2000; O’Higgins 
2012; Boeri and Jimeno 2015).
Some accounts of the declines in youth employment attribute them to the 
impact of the economic crisis on particular sectors. Okun’s law predicts that 
the depth of the recession, measured as a decline in gross domestic product 
(GDP), has a direct correlation with the rise in unemployment. However, 
O’Higgins (2012) suggests that Okun’s law is not well supported in the 
European case. For example, Ireland experienced a 12% drop in GDP and a 
disproportionally large fall of 53% in youth employment; the explanation, he 
argues, while including an account of other countries, is largely related to a 
fall in aggregate labor demand (O’Higgins 2012, 21). Boeri and Jimeno (2015) 
draw a similar conclusion to that of O’Higgins (2012). Although they argue 
that Okun’s law can account for approximately 50% of the change in youth jobs 
in Europe, it does not explain the “unbearable divergence of unemployment 
in Europe.” This divergence, they believe, is the product of both shocks of 
varying intensity and different labor market responses. Policy options include 
increasing wage flexibility or employment flexibility, where this can mean ei-
ther cuts in the number of hours worked or cuts in the number of people em-
ployed. Whether youth unemployment is a long- term structural characteristic 
related to labor market institutions or the result of short- term cyclical effects 
is contested; Boeri and Jimeno (2015, 4) suggest that even long- term struc-
tural characteristics fluctuate too much over time.
2.2.6. research Questions
Evidence from this literature suggests three possible lines of investigation to 
understand how sectorial differences affected youth employment rates during 
the Great Recession. First, changes to the overall size of youth- friendly sectors 
can explain why the youth job market worsened, or in a few cases improved. 
We can hypothesize that part of the explanation for the growth in youth un-
employment is related to how the size of these sectors changed since 2007. Did 
young people lose their jobs because the sector shrunk as a result of economic 
shock and the recession? This would be a reasonable expectation in countries 
in which youth were disproportionately employed in the construction sector 
and in which there had been a housing bubble leading up to 2007 (Boeri and 
Jimeno 2015). Or, second, did the fall in youth employment come about be-
cause employers’ propensity to employ young workers declined? This would be 
evidenced by a decline in the youth:older worker ratio. Third, was the growth 
of youth unemployment only a consequence of the destruction of temporary 
jobs; that is, was it easier to get rid of young people, especially in dualist labor 
markets? Or, have youth job opportunities continued to deteriorate with the 
growth of lower quality employment, in the way identified by Blanchflower and 
Freeman (2000)?
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2.3. RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS
To answer the previous questions, we draw on European Union Labour Force 
Survey (EU- LFS) data, examining where young people (aged 16– 24 years) have 
been employed and how this changed between 2007 and 2014. First, we examine 
the descriptive statistics on youth unemployment and labor force participation 
trends for the five country groups over three decades (from 1983, where possible, 
to 2014). The 23 countries considered have been chosen in order to maximize the 
time span over which we can assess the trends. At the same time, so as to have 
consistent aggregate measures, the countries chosen have data for the entire pe-
riod.2 We present aggregate trends for two measures: the youth unemployment 
rate and the youth labor force participation rate.
The youth unemployment rate represents the share of unemployed youth 
among the active— that is, employed or unemployed— youth labor force pop-
ulation. Students and other inactive youth are not included in this estimate. In 
contrast, the labor force participation rate records the share of economically ac-
tive youth over the total youth population, including those who are inactive. We 
decided to complement the measure of unemployment rate with the measure 
of participation rate in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
nonemployment phenomenon among youth and of the heterogeneity among 
country groups in the forces that have driven unemployment trends. Indeed, 
focusing only on the unemployment rate risks missing important aspects of the 
phenomenon (O’Reilly et al. 2015). This is because variations in the unemploy-
ment rate may be the result both of flows between unemployment and employ-
ment and of flows from unemployment or employment to inactivity, and vice 
versa (O’Higgins 2012; Berloffa et al., this volume; Flek, Hála, and Mysíková, this 
volume); for a discussion of measures of youth not in employment, education, or 
training (NEETs), see Mascherini (this volume).
Second, we select 11 countries that represent the five country groups to provide 
a more in- depth analysis identifying where young people have been employed and 
how this has changed over three time points: before (2007), during (2010), and 
after (2014) the Great Recession. The countries selected are Denmark and Sweden 
for the universalistic group; France, Germany, and the Netherlands representing 
the employment- centered countries; Ireland and the United Kingdom for the lib-
eral countries; Italy and Spain for the subprotective countries; and Hungary and 
Poland representing the post- socialist countries. By including pairs of countries 
for each regime type, we can also identify differences within these categories.
Third, we use a shift- share analysis to address our research question as to 
whether young people lost their jobs because a sector reduced in size or because 
it became less youth friendly, suggesting a reduction in employers’ propensity 
to employ young people. This allows us to disaggregate changes in employment 
by economic activity. It also enables us to answer our third research question 
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regarding the deteriorating quality of jobs for youth by drawing on other rel-
evant characteristics relating to employment status (full- time/ part- time and 
permanent/ temporary employment) and demography (age and gender). This 
method is particularly suitable for our purposes. It allows us to decompose ag-
gregate changes in total employment resulting from different driving forces: the 
structural change in the overall size of sectors (growth effect), the change in the 
proportion of youth workers in each sector (share effect), and the interaction be-
tween these two forces (interaction effect).
More formally, where Yt is the share of youth over total employment in year 
t, we can write
Y T pt i t i t
i
= ∑ , ,
where Ti,t represents total employment in sector i in year t, and pi,t is the share of 
youth employment over total employment in sector i in year t. Then, based on 
these two quantities, we can decompose the changes in the share of youth em-
ployment as follows:
∆Y Y Yt t t= − =−1
= −( )
− −
∑ T T pi t i t i t
i
, , ,1 1 Growth effect
+ −( )
− −
∑ p p Ti t i t i t
i
, , ,1 1 Share effect
+ −( ) −( )
− −
∑ p p T Ti t i t i t i t
i
, , , ,1 1 Interaction effect
This equation can be further decomposed to disaggregate changes in youth em-
ployment by subgroups— for example, distinguishing between males and females 
or distinguishing youth according to their employment status (i.e., full- time, 
part- time, or temporary employment). In these cases, the aggregate changes, as 
well as the contribution of the different effects, do not change but are simply fur-
ther disaggregated by additional characteristics.
Throughout the chapter, we define employment in accordance with the 
International Labour Organization definition. Under this definition, anyone 
working at least 1 hour during the reference week is considered employed, which 
includes, for example, students working part- time. This has possible implications 
for the comparative dimension of the study because in some countries, such as 
the Nordic states, students are more likely to work than in others, leading to a 
higher estimation of youth employment.
The self- employed are included with the employed, except when we ex-
amine temporary/ permanent contracts, because this characteristic applies only 
to employees. Less than 5% of employed youth are self- employed, with the 
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exception of Poland, Spain, and especially Italy (see Ortlieb, Sheehan, and Masso, 
this volume). As we will show, the results that exclude the self- employed are in 
line with the results for total employment.
Finally, in the decomposition analyses, the categorization of the sectors is 
based on the NACE statistical classification of economic activities in the EU 
(Eurostat 2008).3 Shift- share analysis furnishes descriptive understandings of the 
shifting trends over time and allows us to investigate whether changes in youth 
employment are driven by structural shifts in the growth or shrinkage of partic-
ular economic sectors or whether they are attributable to changes in employers’ 
propensity to employ young people.4
2.4. TRENDS IN YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
ACTIVITY RATES
The recession of 2008– 2009 marked the end of a period of fairly continuous 
growth in youth employment during the early years of the millennium. Since 
2008, youth unemployment has soared dramatically in subprotective, liberal, and 
post- socialist countries (Figure 2.1). The subprotective countries have had some 
of the highest levels of youth unemployment, even since the mid- 1980s, while 
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Figure 2.1 Trends in youth (aged 16– 24 years) unemployment rate in 11 EU countries, grouped 
by youth transition regime: 1983– 2014 (%).
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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youth unemployment rates were also high in liberal countries during the 1980s. 
Toward the end of that decade, youth unemployment began to fall in both re-
gions, but then it increased again coming into the mid- 1990s. Until the Great 
Recession in 2008– 2009, youth unemployment had been falling across most re-
gions. The exception to this trend was the post- socialist countries, which ex-
perienced very high levels of youth unemployment in the 1990s. However, by 
the mid- 2000s, this was also beginning to change, mainly driven by Poland 
and Slovakia, so that by 2007 the overall levels for this group of countries were 
converging with the levels in other European countries. The fluctuating trend in 
unemployment characterizing the employment- centered regime did not result 
in substantial variation between the beginning of our observational window and 
the pre- recession period, although notable variations were present during that 
time. The universalistic countries, which we observe from the mid- 1990s, expe-
rienced a decline in youth unemployment up until the end of the century, which 
was mainly driven by reductions in youth unemployment in Sweden and, above 
all, in Finland. Overall, prior to the Great Recession, trends in the rate of youth 
unemployment appeared to be converging over time between country groups. 
Indeed, at the outset of the recession, youth unemployment ranged from 12% to 
15% for all groups of countries apart from the subprotective, which registered a 
value of 19%.
With the onset of the recession, more variation between country groups can be 
observed. At one extreme, there are the universalistic and employment- centered 
countries, where youth unemployment grew slightly at the very beginning of the 
recession and then stabilized. Germany had experienced rising levels of youth 
unemployment up until 2005 (Kohlrausch 2012), but, unlike any other country, 
youth unemployment fell there during the recession. At the other extreme, in the 
subprotective countries, where youth unemployment was already very high— 
driven especially by Spain and Greece— the rate more than doubled to stagger-
ingly high levels with the onset of the recession in 2008. In the middle are the 
liberal and post- socialist countries, which witnessed a notable increase in youth 
unemployment in the first years of the recession and a subsequent decrease. 
However, these declines have not counterbalanced the steep growth in the im-
mediate postcrisis period. In these two country groups, the countries driving the 
upward trends were Ireland, Latvia, and Lithuania. By 2014, we observed a con-
vergence between country groups, with the youth unemployment rate ranging 
from 16% to 21% everywhere, apart from the subprotective cluster, which has a 
youth unemployment rate of 46%.
Looking at unemployment rates only, however, may hide important dynamics 
of the phenomenon. For example, the unemployment rate does not capture the 
outflow of individuals from the pool of the active population, which is more 
widespread among youth than among prime- age workers (see Flek et  al., this 
volume). Greater difficulties in making the transition from school to work can 
lead young people to stay longer in education. Several countries in fact witnessed 
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increases in enrollments in higher education during the Great Recession (OECD 
2013). The recession may also have led to “discouragement” among young people, 
who gave up on the labor market when job search failed. The problem of NEETs 
highlights this latter issue (see Mascherini, this volume). For these reasons, the 
picture presented previously should be interpreted in light of the evolution of 
youth labor market participation (Figure 2.2). Unemployment dynamics can 
thus be seen as the result of both demand- and supply- side factors.
Here, we see that the universalistic countries have the highest levels of 
youth labor market participation and that this has been fairly constant over the 
observed period. Overall, for the other countries, there is a fall in youth labor 
market participation rates from the 1980s until the late 1990s, arguably because 
of the increasing number of young people staying on in education. From the 
late 1990s onward, youth participation stabilized up until the recession in the 
liberal and employment- centered countries. In the post- socialist countries, after 
a steep decline, youth participation stabilized around the mid- 2000s, while the 
subprotective countries experienced an uninterrupted decline.
With the onset of the Great Recession, young people started to exit again from 
the labor market in four country groups out of five. The post- socialist group is 
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the exception. A particularly marked decline is observed for the liberal and the 
subprotective groups.
The combined trends in youth unemployment and labor market participa-
tion provide a more complete picture of the consequences of recession for youth 
in terms of jobs lost. This is particularly true for the young people in the liberal 
group and especially in the subprotective group, who experienced the highest 
decline in labor market participation and the largest increase in unemployment. 
The phenomenon of youth exclusion from the labor market is far more sub-
stantial if we consider both indicators jointly, as discussed by Blanchflower and 
Freeman (2000).
The heaviest consequences of the Great Recession have been paid by 
Mediterranean youth, where almost one in two young people were unemployed 
in the last phase of the recession. If we do not limit our focus to the active youth 
population but expand our attention toward the labor market participation of 
youth, the scenario is even more stark. Indeed, the trends for labor force partic-
ipation show that a growing share of youth is giving up or postponing employ-
ment and moving into inactivity. The consequences of this latter trend depend 
on the extent to which young people are remaining longer in education or are 
stuck in other forms of “inactivity” (see Mascherini, this volume).
2.5. CROSS- NATIONAL VARIATION IN THE YOUTH  
SHARE OF EMPLOYMENT
As Marsden and Ryan (1986) noted, countries vary significantly in terms of the 
proportion of all employment occupied by young people; this characteristic 
persists, as evidenced in Table 2.1, which reports the share of youth (aged 16– 
24 years) employment among total (aged 16– 64 years) employment. Overall, the 
universalistic and liberal countries together with the Netherlands and Germany 
had the highest youth shares of employment. In 2014, this ranged from nearly 
15% in Denmark and the Netherlands to approximately 10% in Finland and 
Germany. Seven years previously, Ireland would have topped the list, along with 
a number of post- socialist countries, where young people accounted for a sizable 
percentage of all those at work. However, by 2014, many of these countries had 
seen a decimation of young people in employment: Ireland experienced a fall in 
the youth share from 16% to just under 8% during this period; the youth share of 
employment was also halved in Spain and Portugal, with a drop from just under 
10% of all employment in 2007 to less than 5% in 2014.
The youth share of employment fell by between 1 and 2  percentage points 
(pp) in most of the other countries considered between 2007 and 2014. The only 
exceptions are the universalistic countries, where youth employment decreased 
only slightly or even increased, as was the case in Sweden. The countries with the 
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lowest proportion of working youth in 2007 were Luxembourg, Italy, Hungary, 
and Greece, where youth younger than 25 years accounted for approximately 6% 
of all workers. By 2014, these shares had fallen to approximately 4% of all em-
ployment in Italy and Greece.
However, an employer “hiring freeze” (interpreted as employers’ lower pro-
pensity to employ young people aged 16– 24 years as a share of the 16- to 64- year- 
old population) is not the only factor that might influence the declining youth 
share of employment. Increased enrollment in school and a greater number of 
NEETs may also have contributed to this trend. Demographic trends might like-
wise have played a role. Declining fertility or rising emigration could lead to 
Table 2.1 Youth employment (ages 16– 24 years) as a share of total employment (ages 
16– 64 years) in 23 EU countries: 2007, 2010, and 2014 (%)
Transition regime Country 2007 2010 2014
Universalistic Denmark 14.4 14.7 14.5
Norway 13.2 13.1 12.8
Sweden 9.9 11.0 11.2
Finland 11.5 10.2 10.8
Liberal United Kingdom 13.9 13.0 12.8
Ireland 16.1 10.4 7.9
Employment- centered Netherlands 15.5 15.1 14.8
Germany 11.7 11.2 10.2
France 9.3 8.9 8.0
Belgium 8.2 7.5 6.9
Luxembourg 6.4 6.3 5.4
Post- socialist Lithuania 8.3 6.9 8.3
Latvia 12.7 9.1 8.0
Estonia 10.6 8.2 8.0
Poland 9.7 8.7 7.1
Hungary 6.7 5.9 6.4
Slovakia 9.9 7.1 6.3
Czech Republic 7.9 6.8 6.2
Romania 8.8 7.3 6.1
Subprotective Portugal 9.1 7.2 5.9
Spain 9.9 6.5 4.5
Italy 6.5 5.5 4.3
Greece 6.9 5.6 4.2
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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a shrinking youth population and a consequent reduction in the youth labor 
supply.5
2.6. IN WHICH SECTORS ARE YOUNG PEOPLE EMPLOYED?
Looking in more detail at sectorial patterns, we focus separately by gender on 
developments in 11 countries (with 2 or 3 countries representing each country 
group).6 Table 2.2 reports the three main sectors in which female and male youth 
were employed in the periods pre (2007) and post (2014) the Great Recession 
(Tables A2.2a and A2.2b in the Appendix report the complete figures for females 
and males, respectively).
A common feature of employment for young women across all 11 coun-
tries examined is the importance of the wholesale and retail sector (labeled D 
in Table 2.2). This sector accounts for more than one in three jobs for young 
women in Denmark and the Netherlands and for one in four jobs in Ireland, 
the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Poland (2014 figures). The lowest this 
figure falls is 19% in Germany. There are, however, differences in the impor-
tance of other sectors as employers of young women across countries and 
country groups. The health sector (K) accounts for a significantly higher pro-
portion of female youth employment in the universalistic countries (Denmark 
and Sweden) and the employment- centered countries (Germany, France, and 
the Netherlands), whereas in the liberal and subprotective countries, the ac-
commodation and food sector (F)  is the second highest employer of young 
women, accounting for between 14% and 22% of their total employment. The 
two post- socialist countries, and to a lesser extent Germany and Italy, have 
a distinctly high level of manufacturing sector (B) employment. However, in 
all four of these countries, manufacturing employment declined between 2007 
and 2014.
The wholesale and retail sector also accounts for a significant proportion of 
employment for young men in all 11 countries, suggesting that there are lower 
barriers to entry in this sector. In 2014, the proportion of young men employed in 
wholesale/ retail varied from 33% in the Netherlands to 14% in Hungary. Country 
variation appears to be somewhat greater for young men than for young women; 
in particular, there is wide divergence in the importance of manufacturing. Pre- 
recession, in 2007, manufacturing accounted for approximately one- third of 
male youth employment in Germany, Hungary, and Poland but only for 13%– 
15% in Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Over time, 
the proportion of young men employed in the manufacturing sector decreased 
in all countries except Ireland, Hungary, and Poland, but the fall was particularly 
sharp in Denmark, Sweden, and Spain.
Because of the housing bubble, a distinctively high percentage of young men 
were employed in construction (C) in Spain and Ireland in 2007— 34% and 27%, 
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respectively. This left young men particularly exposed to the subsequent crash, 
and by 2014 the percentages employed in construction had fallen to under 7% 
in both cases. In the other countries, excluding the Netherlands, construction 
remains an important source of employment for young men, accounting for at 
least 1 in 10 jobs.
Table 2.2 The three main sectors in which youth (aged 16– 24 years) are employed 
in 11 EU countries by gender: 2007 and 2014 (employment shares)
Female Male
Country Period 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
Denmark 2007 D (34.0) K (17.7) F (11.4) D (29.5) B (15.2) C (14.4)
2014 D (34.4) K (18.1) F (14.4) D (30.3) F (10.5) C (10.3)
Sweden 2007 D (22.8) K (20.8) F (14.0) D (18.8) H (14.2) C (13.9)
2014 D (21.1) K (20.2) F (14.1) D (17.8) H (13.9) B (11.7)
Ireland 2007 D (30.6) F (16.2) K (10.7) C (33.5) D (19.9) B (13.5)
2014 D (29.1) F (22.2) K (14.2) D (25.1) F (19.2) B (13.8)
United Kingdom 2007 D (28.0) F (13.8) K (13.1) D (25.5) C (16.3) B (14.3)
2014 D (24.6) F (16.9) K (16.4) D (22.2) F (13.3) B (13.3)
Germany 2007 D (19.4) K (19.3) B (15.0) B (34.2) D (14.2) C (13.1)
2014 K (22.5) D (18.6) B (12.7) B (28.9) D (17.6) C (12.8)
France 2007 D (22.1) K (17.4) H (11.0) C (20.8) B (19.9) D (18.3)
2014 D (23.7) K (19.9) H (10.2) D (18.8) B (16.5) C (16.3)
Netherlands 2007 D (31.3) K (18.6) F (13.8) D (27.8) B (12.9) H (11.8)
2014 D (37.1) K (19.4) F (12.6) D (33.4) F (15.2) H (11.8)
Spain 2007 D (30.9) F (13.8) B (10.6) C (27.0) B (20.9) D (15.9)
2014 D (27.4) F (20.8) K (11.8) D (20.9) F (15.8) B (14.6)
Italy 2007 D (23.5) B (17.1) F (14.5) B (29.0) C (19.3) D (17.5)
2014 D (24.7) F (21.6) L (14.6) B (27.3) D (18.6) F (15.6)
Hungary 2007 D (25.2) B (23.0) F (10.7) B (34.2) C (14.9) D (14.2)
2014 B (20.1) D (19.5) F (14.2) B (34.1) D (13.5) C (11.2)
Poland 2007 D (31.1) B (16.2) A (9.0) B(32.1) D (18.5) A (14.7)
2014 D (31.1) B (14.8) F (10.4) B (35.0) D (16.6) C (13.8)
Symbols
A Agriculture E Transport and communication I Public administration
B Manufacturing F Accommodation and food J Education
C Construction G Financial activities K Health and social work
D Wholesale and retail H Real estate, business
Note: For each country, the table shows the shares of youth employment in the first three main sectors.
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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The changes in the distribution of youth across sectors could simply reflect 
overall shifts in the employment structure. In the following section, we consider 
whether sectors have also changed in their propensity to employ young people.
2.7. DID EMPLOYERS HAVE A WEAKER PROPENSITY 
TO EMPLOY YOUNG PEOPLE DURING THE GREAT 
RECESSION?
In Section 2.5, we showed that the youth share of total employment declined 
during the period 2007– 2014 in all observed countries except Denmark and 
Sweden. Here, we deepen this analysis and investigate whether and to what ex-
tent employers’ preferences for youth labor vary across sectors. Table 2.3 shows 
the share of youth within each sector. This allows us to see the concentration of 
youth within particular sectors— and their under- representation in others— and 
how these vary over time.
The highest youth share is found in the accommodation and food sector, 
which is particularly high at 46% in Denmark and the Netherlands. The youth 
share in this sector is much lower in the subprotective countries, although young 
people are still over- represented. Over time, however, the reliance on youth in 
this sector decreased in the majority of countries.
Wholesale and retail is also a youth- intensive sector: In 2007, young people 
accounted for more than one- fourth of those employed in this sector in Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, but they accounted for less 
than 10% in Italy and Hungary. Over time, the youth share of employment in 
wholesale and retail decreased in almost all countries, and particularly in Ireland 
and Spain, again suggesting that youth are particularly exposed to a hiring freeze 
or labor shedding in this sector in some countries. Ireland and Spain also expe-
rienced the largest decline in the youth share in construction (17 pp and 10 pp, 
respectively). Notable decreases of between 3.5 pp and 5 pp are also present in 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
Beyond these marked changes, and with the exception of Denmark and 
Sweden, the decline in the youth share was observed in all sectors, reflecting 
young people’s declining employment share across the economy as a whole. This 
evidence substantiates the argument made by Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) 
that there is a long- term tendency of employers to lower their propensity to em-
ploy young people. The negative impact on young people has been exacerbated 
during the crisis by a lower propensity of employers to hire young people and 
the dissolution of temporary contracts, by and large held by young people (Boeri 
and Jimeno 2015). We examine these trends more formally using a shift- share 
analysis.
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Table 2.3 Youth employment (ages 16– 24 years) as a share of total employment (ages 16– 64 years) by sector in 11 EU countries: 2007, 2010, and 2014 (%)
Denmark Sweden Germany France Netherlands
Sector 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014
Agriculture 20.0 17.2 14.8 13.4 13.2 12.7 12.1 10.6 10.2 9.0 6.3 6.2 20.2 17.2 16.5
Manufacturing 11.1 8.4 8.0 9.0 7.3 7.3 12.4 11.7 10.1 8.7 8.3 7.3 10.8 8.5 7.5
Construction 16.2 15.5 13.5 12.7 13.6 12.7 13.2 12.3 11.3 15.6 13.5 10.9 12.0 11.4 8.6
Wholesale and retail 30.5 32.3 33.7 16.4 18.5 18.3 14.5 14.5 13.0 13.4 13.2 12.8 30.8 31.6 30.0
Transport and 
communication
11.3 10.6 10.0 10.0 8.8 8.7 7.6 8.1 7.7 6.8 7.0 7.0 14.6 12.5 9.5
Accommodation and food 43.9 46.5 45.8 31.3 34.6 35.4 21.1 20.7 18.2 19.9 20.4 17.0 45.6 46.7 44.6
Financial services 6.7 6.3 6.4 5.8 6.9 7.8 8.6 9.8 8.6 6.0 6.7 6.5 7.8 5.7 4.0
Real estate, professional 9.9 10.6 10.5 8.8 10.8 9.7 9.3 9.8 8.1 8.5 7.6 6.4 12.9 12.6 11.7
Public administration 5.1 6.5 4.2 2.8 3.7 4.4 9.2 7.0 7.3 4.9 5.1 4.7 6.0 5.6 3.4
Education 4.9 5.7 6.8 4.0 5.2 7.0 9.3 8.4 8.0 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.7 7.2 7.1
Health and social work 8.9 9.8 9.3 7.1 8.4 9.4 11.7 11.0 10.8 6.9 6.4 5.8 10.0 11.0 8.8
Arts and other services 16.0 22.0 22.0 13.5 16.1 18.6 10.4 11.3 9.8 11.4 12.2 10.4 17.3 19.7 12.8
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Ireland United Kingdom Spain Italy Hungary Poland
Sector 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014
Agriculture 6.9 6.7 5.9 13.6 10.8 12.5 7.7 7.6 6.0 5.1 4.4 4.2 5.4 5.3 6.2 8.5 6.8 5.5
Manufacturing 11.9 7.2 6.0 10.2 9.9 9.5 9.7 4.7 3.3 7.1 5.2 4.3 8.2 6.4 7.4 10.2 8.6 8.2
Construction 21.8 10.2 4.8 14.9 11.5 11.1 12.5 6.5 2.8 9.5 7.9 4.8 7.4 6.6 7.1 9.1 10.5 8.4
Wholesale and retail 27.4 21.0 14.9 26.0 25.3 22.1 13.7 9.7 6.2 8.4 7.7 6.1 8.3 7.4 7.6 15.4 13.5 10.9
Transport and 
communication
8.2 4.9 4.7 9.7 7.8 7.7 7.5 5.2 2.9 4.3 3.9 2.9 5.8 4.8 4.3 7.6 7.4 6.6
Accommodation and food 30.9 25.1 22.4 37.0 33.1 35.9 13.6 10.8 9.9 14.7 14.1 13.2 13.5 14.2 14.6 26.1 21.9 19.2
Financial services 16.7 7.1 4.4 14.3 9.3 10.8 5.1 2.3 1.6 3.7 3.1 1.3 7.2 4.1 3.6 9.1 9.4 5.0
Real estate, professional 13.1 6.6 5.9 9.7 9.9 9.3 7.7 4.5 3.1 5.7 4.7 3.1 5.4 3.5 5.1 9.5 7.4 6.4
Public administration 5.8 3.7 1.1 7.5 6.2 5.5 4.5 4.1 1.2 2.6 1.8 1.2 5.5 6.6 6.4 6.5 6.7 3.2
Education 6.9 6.5 3.6 5.5 6.3 7.9 6.1 4.5 3.8 1.1 1.1 0.5 2.0 2.1 2.8 3.4 3.6 2.5
Health and social work 8.5 5.6 5.0 8.5 8.8 9.6 6.3 5.4 3.6 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.8 4.1 3.8 3.7 2.6
Arts and other services 21.6 17.7 12.7 20.1 21.5 19.6 14.5 12.4 8.3 9.5 9.6 8.4 7.0 7.4 7.4 12.7 13.2 9.1
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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The heterogeneity in the experience of youth employment among coun-
tries could be a result of several different factors. It could be the result of an 
overall shrinkage in the sector in question (shift) or of a declining share of youth 
employed in the same sector. Using a shift- share analysis, we can decompose 
changes in the total share of youth employment in 2007– 2010 and 2010– 2014 
by sector. This method enables us to measure how much of the changes in youth 
employment are due to changes in the size of sectors (growth or sector effect), to 
changes in the utilization of youth labor within sectors (share effect), and to the 
interaction between these two forces (interaction term) (Figure 2.3).7
The first thing to note is that in all countries and in both periods, changes in 
youth employment are driven by the share effect, namely by the fact that during 
the recession young people are more likely to be dismissed (or less likely to be 
hired) compared to older people. For example, the great decrease in youth em-
ployment that we observe for Spain in the first phase of the recession (– 3.35) is 
almost entirely due to the share effect (– 3.31). This supports the argument that 
employers have lowered their propensity to employ young people, both by im-
posing a hiring freeze and through the dissolution of temporary contracts.
In some cases, we observe growth and share effects operating in opposite 
directions at the same time. For example, in the Netherlands in the second pe-
riod, the growth effect increases youth employment (+0.35), but the share effect 
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Figure 2.3 Decomposition of changes in youth employment as a share of total employment in 
11 EU countries, 2007– 2010 and 2010– 2014 (percentage points).
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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decreases it (– 1.91). We could interpret this as being the result, on the one hand, 
of the expansion of some sectors that traditionally give employment to youth and, 
on the other hand, to a decline over time in the use of youth within these sectors. 
This is what has happened for the wholesale and retail sector in the Netherlands.
Although differences between countries exist in the contribution of each 
sector to the total share effect, the overall changes have been mainly driven by 
construction, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail (results not shown but 
available upon request). Shifts in manufacturing played a particularly important 
role in reducing youth employment in the first phase of the recession; this was 
attributable to sector shrinkage, but also to a reduction in the use of youth labor. 
Countries especially affected by shifts in manufacturing were Ireland and the 
subprotective and post- socialist countries. Construction has also been a major 
driver of youth unemployment especially in Spain and Ireland (where both 
growth and share effects contributed to falling employment rates). The whole-
sale and retail sector played a major role in growing youth unemployment in the 
liberal countries, Spain, and Poland, where the reduced use of youth within this 
sector contributed to the overall decline in youth employment.
Beyond this general picture, it is worth investigating which young workers 
have been most affected by the recession. As a first step in this direction, 
we look at whether changes in youth employment have been driven mainly 
by shifts in male or in female employment. We do so by carrying out a 
shift- share analysis and decomposing the changes in youth employment by 
gender (Figure 2.4).8 Here, we only report the share component because it 
has emerged as the factor that drives overall youth employment and because 
it addresses the issue of whether employers have lowered their propensity to 
employ youth. Because these results are derived from a further decompo-
sition of the effects presented in Figure 2.3 (and in Table A2.4), the overall 
changes as well as the total share effect are identical.
When youth employment changes are disaggregated by gender, a clear and 
unique pattern does not emerge. On the one hand, changes in overall employment 
were driven in the universalistic and employment- centered countries by changes 
in female employment. This holds in the case of both employment increases 
(Denmark and Sweden) and decreases. On the other hand, in the subprotective 
and post- socialist countries, the overall changes were driven by changes in male 
employment. These different patterns are not surprising. Indeed, compared with 
employment- centered and especially with universalistic countries, countries 
belonging to the subprotective and post- socialist groups are characterized by 
considerably lower female labor market participation, implying a lower capacity 
of women’s employment to drive changes in overall employment. It is also worth 
noting that whenever we observe increases in the share of youth employment, 
these are driven by an increased share of female employment.
A further step in studying how the recession has hit youth employment is to 
focus on which types of job creation and destruction have benefited or disadvan-
taged the youth population. We do this in Section 2.8, employing a shift- share 
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analysis to decompose changes in youth employment by whether employment is 
full- or part- time and on a permanent or temporary contract.
2.8. HAS THE QUALITY OF YOUTH EMPLOYMENT 
DETERIORATED?
In addition to the fall in employment, the situation of young people may also 
have worsened because of a reduction in the quality of their jobs. Were youth 
displaced because they were employed in jobs characterized by less secure em-
ployment contracts? Or did the youth share of temporary and part- time jobs 
increase because young people were increasingly hired via less desirable forms of 
employment contract (Blanchflower and Freeman 2000)?
First, we decompose share effects by working arrangement, distinguishing be-
tween full- time and part- time employment (Figure 2.5). Focusing on the share 
effects, which we have shown to drive a reduction of youth employment, we see 
that it is the component related to full- time employment that drives the youth 
employment decline; that is, the driving force is the fall in the proportion of 
full- time jobs that are available to young people. In some cases, the use of part- 
time employment among youth increased across sectors. This is the case of the 
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Figure 2.4 Decomposition of changes in youth employment as a share of total employment in 
11 EU countries, 2007– 2010 and 2010– 2014; share effect by gender (percentage points).
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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universalistic countries in both phases of the recession. Overall, the larger losses 
in full- time employment have resulted in the decline in youth employment. An 
emblematic example is the Netherlands during the first phase of the recession, 
where the decrease in youth employment resulted from two opposite forces: the 
increase in part- timers (+0.98) and the decrease in full- timers (– 1.13)— that is, 
the growth in part- time jobs did not compensate for the fall in full- time work.
Whenever we observe an overall increase in youth employment, this is often 
attributable to an increase in young people working part- time rather than any 
increase in full- time jobs, which overall have decreased. The universalistic coun-
tries in the first period are an example of this dynamic, which has been driven by 
the wholesale and retail sector.
Overall, we have shown that job destruction for young people mainly 
occurred in full- time employment; there was some decrease in part- time jobs, 
and in some cases, it led to an increase in youth unemployment. Young people 
were more at risk of remaining jobless because of an employer hiring freeze; 
where they were able to find work, this was more likely to be in economically less 
desirable jobs. The use of full- time employment declined in all sectors virtually 
everywhere in both phases of the recession. In the few cases in which full- time 
work has increased, the growth has been negligible. The generalized decline in 
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Figure 2.5 Decomposition of changes in youth employment as a share of total employment in 
11 EU countries, 2007– 2010 and 2010– 2014; share effect by working arrangement (percentage 
points).
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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youth employment is mainly attributable to the declining full- time component; 
changes in the wholesale and retail, construction, and manufacturing sectors 
have been driving the trend, with the collapse of full- time job opportunities for 
young people.
The next step is to investigate another characteristic of the employment re-
lationship, namely the type of contract. The analysis presented in Figure 2.6 
reports slightly different results than those shown so far; this is because we ex-
clude the self- employed, as discussed in Section 2.3. Focusing on employees only 
produces some negligible differences in the size of the changes, but the results 
follow the same patterns observed previously: decreases in the share of youth 
employment in all countries and periods, with the exception of Sweden in both 
periods, Denmark in the first period, and Hungary in the second period.
The share effects of the type of contract used to employ young people largely 
mirror those presented for full- time and part- time employment. Again, the out-
flow of youth from the labor market mainly derives from the loss of better jobs. 
Changes in the share of youth in employment are driven by declines in the share 
of youth in permanent employment. However, in the few cases in which we ob-
serve the youth share increasing, this comes from increases in both permanent 
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Figure 2.6 Decomposition of changes in youth employment as a share of total employment in 
11 EU countries, 2007– 2010 and 2010– 2014; share effect by employment relationship (percentage 
points).
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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and temporary youth employment, with the creation of permanent jobs driving 
the changes.
Great heterogeneity is also visible between countries. Of course, this is due 
both to the impact of the recession on total employment and to the overall use of 
temporary employment. For example, we observe the highest decrease (– 2.56) in 
temporary employment in Spain in the first phase of the recession, as predicted 
by Boeri and Jimeno (2015). This is not very surprising because Spain, among the 
11 countries selected, is probably the country where the impact of the recession 
was greatest, and it is also the country where temporary forms of employment 
are more widespread.
As regards variations in growth and share effects for permanent and tem-
porary employment across sectors, the results reflect the patterns presented 
in Section 2.7. Manufacturing, construction, and wholesale and retail are the 
sectors that have driven the decline in permanent employment for youth during 
the recession. This has occurred both via the shrinkage of sectors and via the de-
clining utilization of youth within sectors.
There are a couple of caveats that should be underlined. First, in interpreting 
the sizes of the decomposed changes, we have to keep in mind that these changes 
also reflect the sizes of the groups. For example, if we observe the largest contri-
bution of part- time employment in the Netherlands, it is probably because the 
Netherlands is the country where part- time employment is more widespread. 
The same holds for temporary employment in Spain.
Second, we have to consider that changes in the share of youth are also a 
product of the inflow/ outflow of those aged 25 years or older into and out of 
employment. For example, Boeri and Jimeno (2015, 3) observed that a charac-
teristic of this specific recession is that the employment rates of older people 
increased in most countries as pension reforms progressively increased retire-
ment age. This, also, is a factor that contributes to accounting for the heteroge-
neous experience of youth unemployment across countries. Therefore, at least in 
principle, we might observe changes in the share of youth employment even in 
cases in which youth employment does not change but older people’s employ-
ment does. In this sense, these analyses furnish a picture of youth employment 
from a different perspective— looking at the composition of employment— and 
complement the pictures provided by the study of the unemployment and labor 
force participation rates.
2.9. CONCLUSIONS
We set out to understand which sectors of the economy are more likely to em-
ploy young people and how this changed between 2007 and 2014. Drawing on 
research from the 1980s, the study illustrated the persistently uneven distribu-
tion of youth employment across sectors, regardless of cross- national differences 
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in youth transition regimes. Even as the relative importance of different sectors 
has changed within these economies with the growth of service employment, job 
opportunities for youth are dominated by particular sectors. These differences 
have persisted and become more entrenched since the Great Recession. Young 
people (aged 16– 24  years) have historically been more likely to find work in 
low- wage, low- skilled jobs where there is less competition from older workers. 
Despite growth in youth- friendly sectors, demographic trends showing a con-
traction in younger cohorts of workers, and increasing levels of youth partici-
pation in education, youth employment continues to fall, and it was falling even 
prior to the Great Recession. Boeri and Jimeno (2015) argue that the collapse of 
the youth labor market is attributable not only to a hiring freeze by employers 
but also to the heavy destruction of jobs held by young people through the dis-
solution of temporary contracts in response to the sharp deterioration in the 
economy and despite incentive structures shaped by policy. Blanchflower and 
Freeman (2000) suggested that the quality of employment and earnings for 
young people in these sectors has deteriorated in nearly all OECD countries be-
cause of the worsening conditions of low- paid and less skilled jobs. To test these 
arguments, we conducted a shift- share analysis for the period from 2007 to 2014 
to examine whether these predicted trends explained overall European patterns 
in youth employment, and how they were affected by gender and employment 
status.
The share of youth employment (ages 16– 24 years) relative to the total pop-
ulation (ages 16– 64 years) has fallen over the period considered (2007– 2014). 
This is demonstrated in our findings from a shift- share analysis. Part of this fall 
is attributable to the impact of the recession on reducing the overall levels of em-
ployment in some sectors— for example, construction and manufacturing. But 
this is only part of the explanation. It was not only that the size of the sector 
shrank but also that the share of employed youth fell even in sectors that were 
more resilient. Second, the quality of jobs for youth has deteriorated, as predicted 
by Blanchflower and Freeman (2000). We have seen that better quality employ-
ment declined in favor of part- time and temporary jobs during this relatively 
short period from 2007 to 2014.
These findings clearly contribute to improving a relatively neglected under-
standing of cross- national sectorial differences as to where young people find 
work. By drawing on earlier studies, we illustrated the persistence of this sec-
torial variability, despite cross- country differences. One of the clearest findings 
from this research is the need first to understand that youth job opportunities 
are very specific to sectors and that this applies regardless of country. Second, 
the engagement of employers is key to improving youth opportunities for work 
(Lewis and Ryan 2008; Simms et al., 2017). Our research evidence indicates that 
employers have lowered their propensity to employ youth (combining a hiring 
freeze with the dissolution of temporary contracts), possibly for some of the 
reasons outlined by Marsden and Ryan (1986) with regard to wages, productivity, 
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and training costs. But closer attention needs to be given to understanding how 
wage rates, labor market policies, and the costs of training make employers less 
disposed to recruiting young people. Hadjivassiliou et al. (this volume) illustrate 
how countries perform better where employers are closely engaged in STW tran-
sition regimes and VET systems. Here, employers see an incentive to participate. 
In more fragmented regimes where there is greater inertia in the ability to involve 
employers through different policy channels, the outcomes for youth have been 
devastating, especially in subprotective countries (see Petmesidou and González 
Menéndez, this volume). One of the key challenges in terms of policy learning 
and transfer requires mobilizing employers and professional bodies within multi-
agency forms of governance to deliver effective programs to overcome some of the 
deleterious consequences for youth that have become evident in the past decade.
NOTES
1 This is similar to the youth- share statistic we report later.
2 The aggregate measures do not take into account the size of the countries (or 
sample size); rather, each country has a weight of one.
3 Since 2008, the applied version of NACE is “Rev. 2” (Revision 2). In the 
change from Rev. 1.1 to Rev. 2, some activities were disaggregated, whereas 
others were collapsed. In order to maximize the comparability of our data 
over time, we built a new classification based on the two versions (see Table 
A2.1 in the Appendix). The main changes involved in the shift to NACE Rev. 
2 are related to the creation of a new Section J, “Information and communi-
cation,” which includes activities that in Rev. 1.1 were spread across different 
categories. Although it was not possible to entirely eliminate potential bias, 
we reduced its effects by collapsing the new category with the old category 
I, “Transport, storage and communications.” Finally, because of their small 
sizes, we excluded the categories “Activities of households as employers” and 
“Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies.”
4 See Smith, Fagan, and Rubery (1998) for a comparable approach used to ex-
amine the use of part- time employment in Europe.
5 Significant variations between countries are also present in this respect. On 
the one hand, we observe in our sample for the post- socialist countries and 
Ireland a marked decline in the share of youth among the total population 
aged 16– 64 years— of between 4 pp and 6 pp between 2007 and 2014. On the 
other hand, the share of youth increased in the universalistic countries. At the 
same time, Ireland is also the country in which the share of youth in employ-
ment declined the most, whereas Denmark and Sweden are the only countries 
in which youth in work increased.
6 The complementary figures for the whole working population are shown in 
Table A2.3 in the Appendix.
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7 Results of the shift- share analysis presented in Figure 2.3 are also reported in 
Table A2.4 in the Appendix.
8 Results are also reported in Table A2.5 in the Appendix. The same table also 
reports the shift- share results decomposed by working arrangement and em-
ployment relationship that will be discussed later.
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APPENDIX
Table A2.1 Classification of sectors based on NACE Rev. 1.1 and NACE Rev. 2
NACE Rev. 1.1  
(up to 2007)
NACE Rev. 2  
(from 2008 onward) Sector
A Agriculture, hunting and 
forestry
A Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing
Agriculture
B Fishing
C Mining and quarrying B Mining and quarrying Manufacturing
D Manufacturing C Manufacturing
E Electricity, gas and water 
supply
D Electricity, gas, steam and 
air conditioning supply
E Water supply, sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities
F Construction F Construction Construction
G Wholesale and retail 
trade: repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles 
and personal and 
household goods
G Wholesale and retail 
trade: repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles
Wholesale and retail
H Hotels and restaurants I Accommodation and food 
service activities
Accommodation and 
food
I Transport, storage and 
communications
H Transportation and storage Transport and 
communication
J Information and 
communication
J Financial intermediation K Financial and insurance 
activities
Financial activities
K Real estate, renting and 
business activities
L Real estate activities Real estate, business; 
Professional and 
technical activitiesM Professional, scientific and 
technical activities
N Administrative and support 
service activities
L Public administration 
and defence; 
compulsory social 
security
O Public administration and 
defence; compulsory 
social security
Public administration
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NACE Rev. 1.1  
(up to 2007)
NACE Rev. 2  
(from 2008 onward) Sector
M Education P Education Education
N Health and social work Q Human health and social 
work activities
Health and social 
work
O Other community, social 
and personal services 
activities
R Arts, entertainment and 
recreation
Arts and other 
services
S Other service activities
P Activities of private 
households as 
employers and 
undifferentiated 
production activities 
of private households
T Activities of households 
as employers; 
undifferentiated goods- 
and services- producing 
activities of households 
for own use
Excluded (small size 
sectors)
Q Extraterritorial 
organizations and 
bodies
U Activities of extraterritorial 
organizations and bodies
Table A2.1 Continued
62
Table A2.2a Distribution of employed youth (aged 16– 24 years) across sectors in 11 EU countries, 2007 and 2014 (%), females
Denmark Sweden Germany France Netherlands
Sector 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014
Agriculture 2.1 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.4 0.7 1.3 0.8 1.9 1.4
Manufacturing 10.1 5.2 6.1 4.1 15.0 12.7 10.8 8.7 5.7 3.2
Construction 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.6 1.0 1.4 0.4 0.3
Wholesale and retail 34.0 34.4 22.8 21.1 19.4 18.6 22.1 23.7 31.3 37.1
Transport and communication 3.8 3.7 3.9 4.2 2.3 4.4 3.2 4.6 3.1 2.6
Accommodation and food 11.4 14.4 14.0 14.1 9.8 8.8 8.5 8.3 13.8 12.6
Financial activities 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 3.2 3.1 3.4 3.3 1.9 0.9
Real estate, business 6.9 6.4 11.5 11.1 9.7 10.0 11.0 10.2 11.0 11.3
Public administration 1.4 1.3 1.9 2.1 6.0 5.0 5.8 5.5 1.9 1.4
Education 3.0 4.6 6.9 9.3 5.9 7.6 6.6 6.0 3.6 4.7
Health and social work 17.7 18.1 20.8 20.2 19.3 22.5 17.4 19.9 18.6 19.4
Arts and other services 7.4 8.9 8.6 10.1 7.0 5.2 8.9 7.6 6.8 5.2
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Ireland United Kingdom Spain Italy Hungary Poland
Sector 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014
Agriculture 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.3 2.0 2.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 2.2 9.0 4.9
Manufacturing 7.1 5.1 6.3 3.8 10.6 5.7 17.1 10.5 23.0 20.1 16.2 14.8
Construction 1.3 0.3 1.3 1.3 1.9 0.2 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.3 0.7 1.6
Wholesale and retail 30.6 29.1 28.0 24.6 30.9 27.4 23.5 24.7 25.2 19.5 31.1 31.1
Transport and communication 2.8 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.9 3.0 2.9 3.7 5.6 4.2 2.8 4.9
Accommodation and food 16.2 22.2 13.8 16.9 13.8 20.8 14.5 21.6 10.7 14.2 7.9 10.4
Financial activities 6.4 2.4 5.4 3.0 1.8 1.5 2.6 1.6 4.4 1.8 4.2 3.1
Real estate, business 8.4 7.3 9.3 8.3 9.7 8.4 13.5 10.0 6.9 6.9 5.9 8.7
Public administration 1.9 0.7 4.0 2.5 1.8 0.7 1.4 0.7 5.3 8.8 6.4 4.3
Education 4.9 5.4 5.0 9.5 5.9 8.5 2.3 1.3 4.6 5.9 4.8 6.1
Health and social work 10.7 14.2 13.1 16.4 8.7 11.8 5.8 9.1 4.6 8.3 4.2 4.3
Arts and other services 9.5 7.9 9.6 10.0 9.1 9.4 13.3 14.6 7.1 6.9 7.0 5.8
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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Table A2.2b Distribution of employed youth (aged 16– 24 years) across sectors in 11 EU countries, 2007 and 2014 (%), males
Denmark Sweden Germany France Netherlands
Sector 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014
Agriculture 5.5 3.9 3.7 2.9 3.1 1.9 5.1 3.3 5.6 3.8
Manufacturing 15.2 9.4 20.0 11.7 34.2 28.9 19.9 16.5 12.9 8.7
Construction 14.4 10.3 13.9 14.0 13.1 12.8 20.8 16.3 9.2 6.3
Wholesale and retail 29.5 30.3 18.8 17.8 14.2 17.6 18.3 18.8 27.8 33.4
Transport and communication 6.0 8.6 8.4 10.4 5.0 7.3 5.9 9.9 8.6 8.3
Accommodation and food 7.0 10.5 6.2 7.8 4.0 5.1 7.2 7.2 11.0 15.2
Financial activities 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.6 2.3 2.4 1.1 2.4 1.4 1.2
Real estate, business 6.3 7.6 14.2 13.9 7.0 7.2 9.1 8.2 11.8 11.8
Public administration 2.6 1.9 1.3 2.9 5.9 5.2 5.0 5.8 3.4 2.0
Education 2.3 4.4 2.6 4.8 3.9 3.2 1.5 4.3 1.6 2.8
Health and social work 5.1 6.0 5.1 5.9 4.7 5.5 3.0 3.7 2.7 3.2
Arts and other services 4.5 5.9 4.9 6.5 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.6 4.2 3.2
   65
Ireland United Kingdom Spain Italy Hungary Poland
Sector 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014
Agriculture 3.7 6.0 1.9 2.0 4.5 8.7 4.0 4.8 5.3 6.2 14.7 11.4
Manufacturing 13.5 13.8 14.3 13.3 20.9 14.6 29.0 27.3 34.2 34.1 32.1 35.0
Construction 33.5 6.6 16.3 11.5 27.0 6.8 19.3 12.0 14.9 11.2 11.0 13.8
Wholesale and retail 19.9 25.1 25.5 22.2 15.9 20.9 17.5 18.6 14.2 13.5 18.5 16.6
Transport and communication 3.2 6.6 5.7 7.3 5.3 7.5 4.2 5.9 7.5 7.2 6.7 9.3
Accommodation and food 8.9 19.2 10.1 13.3 7.3 15.8 9.5 15.6 6.8 6.1 3.3 2.7
Financial activities 3.1 2.9 3.8 3.7 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7
Real estate, business 7.0 7.6 7.4 10.0 7.0 7.3 7.1 6.9 5.0 5.7 6.4 5.0
Public administration 1.7 0.7 3.8 2.7 3.7 3.3 3.3 2.2 6.0 9.8 2.5 2.3
Education 1.0 2.3 2.4 3.7 2.2 4.0 0.5 0.4 0.9 1.6 0.9 0.6
Health and social work 1.0 2.8 1.9 3.9 1.3 2.7 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.6
Arts and other services 3.8 6.5 7.1 6.6 3.8 7.7 3.7 4.6 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.1
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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Table A2.3 Distribution of total employment (ages 16– 64 years) across sectors in 11 EU countries, 2007 and 2014 (%)
Denmark Sweden Germany France Netherlands
Sector 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014
Agriculture 2.79 2.32 2.32 2.00 1.85 1.69 2.19 1.48 1.34 3.53 2.94 2.79 2.84 2.59 2.08
Manufacturing 16.57 13.86 13.38 15.45 13.34 12.17 23.79 22.20 21.58 16.97 15.40 14.00 13.45 11.63 10.91
Construction 7.09 5.88 6.05 6.39 6.73 6.69 6.61 6.78 6.85 7.10 7.52 6.88 6.33 6.11 5.32
Wholesale and retail 14.93 14.70 13.94 12.28 12.33 11.89 13.50 12.90 14.08 13.80 13.45 13.09 14.88 14.49 16.24
Transport and 
communication
6.29 8.82 8.96 6.25 9.30 9.39 5.65 8.15 7.83 6.40 8.42 8.48 6.31 9.18 7.84
Accommodation and food 2.97 3.30 3.95 3.20 3.47 3.44 3.70 3.90 3.84 3.63 3.89 3.61 4.20 4.45 4.32
Financial services 2.99 3.23 2.93 1.99 2.16 2.12 3.68 3.38 3.25 3.25 3.49 3.41 3.29 3.05 3.66
Real estate, professional 9.61 9.34 9.64 14.57 13.36 14.36 10.40 10.75 10.65 10.92 9.97 11.31 13.61 10.96 13.52
Public administration 5.73 5.89 5.57 5.74 5.95 6.43 7.54 7.49 7.17 10.03 10.23 9.54 6.88 7.34 6.70
Education 7.81 8.55 9.54 10.87 10.93 11.28 6.03 6.63 6.64 6.97 6.99 7.66 6.94 7.57 7.25
Health and social work 17.90 19.37 18.84 16.10 15.61 15.56 11.62 12.26 12.67 12.77 13.41 15.12 16.39 18.21 17.62
Arts and other services 5.31 4.74 4.87 5.17 4.98 5.00 5.31 4.08 4.10 4.63 4.29 4.12 4.88 4.41 4.53
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Ireland United Kingdom Spain Italy Hungary Poland
Sector 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014 2007 2010 2014
Agriculture 4.82 3.93 4.74 1.26 1.08 1.17 4.46 4.21 4.39 3.86 3.69 3.58 4.59 4.52 4.62 14.06 12.62 11.26
Manufacturing 14.16 13.31 12.83 14.18 11.85 11.65 16.99 15.13 14.12 22.26 20.85 21.14 24.22 23.49 24.34 24.13 22.45 23.30
Construction 13.61 6.54 5.85 8.26 7.85 7.39 13.28 9.01 5.94 8.54 8.62 6.94 8.47 7.35 6.33 7.00 8.21 7.55
Wholesale and retail 14.58 14.88 14.37 14.37 14.05 13.55 15.77 16.07 17.17 15.37 14.91 14.91 15.15 14.44 13.52 15.02 14.93 14.60
Transport and 
communication
5.85 9.08 9.09 6.84 8.60 8.90 6.22 8.05 8.51 5.54 7.25 7.48 7.73 9.35 8.93 6.48 7.63 8.18
Accommodation and food 6.44 6.86 7.32 4.50 5.13 5.40 7.19 7.44 8.17 5.05 5.30 5.92 4.19 4.11 4.21 1.94 2.22 2.13
Financial services 4.42 5.05 4.85 4.45 4.10 3.97 2.53 2.67 2.91 2.93 3.00 2.87 2.19 2.44 2.32 2.42 2.32 2.40
Real estate, professional 9.42 9.18 10.00 12.01 11.89 12.53 10.33 10.38 11.14 10.97 10.76 11.21 7.21 7.13 7.79 6.26 6.64 7.25
Public administration 5.02 5.71 5.20 7.17 6.46 6.06 6.43 8.07 7.48 6.30 6.47 6.05 7.01 8.28 9.47 6.22 6.61 6.77
Education 6.52 8.05 8.02 9.21 10.52 10.56 5.99 6.79 7.13 7.12 7.03 7.09 7.97 8.41 7.96 7.40 7.81 7.90
Health and social work 10.36 12.80 13.20 12.04 13.51 13.43 6.73 7.83 8.49 6.96 7.51 8.42 6.67 6.74 6.71 5.74 5.82 5.85
Arts and other services 4.81 4.59 4.54 5.70 4.95 5.39 4.08 4.34 4.55 5.10 4.60 4.39 4.60 3.74 3.81 3.34 2.76 2.80
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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Table A2.4 Decomposition of changes in youth employment (ages 16– 24 years) as a 
share of total employment (ages 16– 64 years) in 11 EU countries: 2007– 2010 and 
2010– 2014 (percentage points)
Country Period
Observed 
change Growth effect Share effect
Interaction 
term
Denmark 2007– 10 0.28 – 0.16 0.37 0.06
2010– 14 – 0.15 0.09 – 0.23 0.00
Sweden 2007– 10 1.06 0.15 0.91 – 0.01
2010– 14 0.26 – 0.06 0.32 0.00
Ireland 2007– 10 – 5.68 – 0.85 – 5.41 0.58
2010– 14 – 2.47 – 0.01 – 2.53 0.07
United Kingdom 2007– 10 – 0.92 – 0.07 – 0.86 0.00
2010– 14 – 0.19 0.03 – 0.24 0.02
Germany 2007– 10 – 0.51 – 0.11 – 0.41 0.01
2010– 14 – 1.01 0.06 – 1.06 0.00
France 2007– 10 – 0.39 – 0.03 – 0.38 0.02
2010– 14 – 0.95 – 0.13 – 0.85 0.02
Netherlands 2007– 10 – 0.20 – 0.07 – 0.15 0.02
2010– 14 – 1.53 0.35 – 1.91 0.03
Spain 2007– 10 – 3.35 – 0.28 – 3.31 0.24
2010– 14 – 2.06 0.07 – 2.18 0.05
Italy 2007– 10 – 1.01 – 0.07 – 0.96 0.02
2010– 14 – 1.16 – 0.02 – 1.18 0.04
Hungary 2007– 10 – 0.86 – 0.09 – 0.79 0.01
2010– 14 0.55 0.01 0.53 0.01
Poland 2007– 10 – 0.98 – 0.04 – 0.98 0.05
2010– 14 – 1.61 – 0.04 – 1.59 0.02
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
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Table A2.5 Decomposition of changes in youth employment (ages 16– 24 years) as a share of total employment (ages 16– 64 years): 2007– 2010 
and 2010– 2014; share effect by gender, working arrangement, and employment relationship
Observed 
change in
Gender Working arrangement Observed  
change in
Employment relationship
Country Period
overall 
employment
Male Female Full- time Part- time
employees 
only
Permanent Temporary
Denmark 2007– 2010 0.28 – 0.01 0.38 – 0.81 1.19 0.35 0.48 0.05
2010– 2014 – 0.15 – 0.10 – 0.14 – 0.72 0.48 – 0.26 - 0.40 – 0.05
Sweden 2007– 2010 1.06 0.24 0.66 – 0.45 1.36 1.13 – 0.28 1.21
2010– 2014 0.26 0.10 0.22 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.19 0.05
Germany 2007– 2010 – 0.51 – 0.18 – 0.23 – 0.35 – 0.06 – 0.66 – 0.34 – 0.19
2010– 2014 – 1.01 – 0.49 – 0.57 – 0.95 – 0.11 – 1.15 – 0.09 – 1.14
France 2007– 2010 – 0.39 – 0.16 – 0.22 – 0.36 – 0.03 – 0.52 – 0.47 0.01
2010– 2014 – 0.95 – 0.53 – 0.31 – 0.77 – 0.07 – 0.99 – 0.49 – 0.37
Netherlands 2007– 2010 – 0.20 – 0.28 0.14 – 1.13 0.98 – 0.09 – 0.48 0.48
2010– 2014 – 1.53 – 0.73 – 1.18 – 0.77 – 1.14 – 1.43 – 2.67 0.70
Ireland 2007– 2010 – 5.68 – 3.07 – 2.35 – 5.86 0.45 – 6.66 – 5.61 – 0.31
2010– 2014 – 2.47 – 0.86 – 1.67 – 1.66 – 0.87 – 2.80 – 2.39 – 0.54
United Kingdom 2007– 2010 – 0.92 – 0.43 – 0.42 – 0.70 – 0.15 – 0.85 – 0.55 – 0.27
2010– 2014 – 0.19 – 0.09 – 0.15 – 0.19 – 0.05 – 0.25 – 0.69 0.33
Spain 2007– 2010 – 3.35 – 2.17 – 1.14 – 3.10 – 0.22 – 3.80 – 1.13 – 2.56
2010– 2014 – 2.06 – 1.11 – 1.06 – 1.95 – 0.23 – 2.32 – 1.72 – 0.74
(continued)
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Observed 
change in
Gender Working arrangement Observed  
change in
Employment relationship
Country Period
overall 
employment
Male Female Full- time Part- time
employees 
only
Permanent Temporary
Italy 2007– 2010 – 1.01 – 0.60 – 0.36 – 1.06 0.10 – 1.17 – 0.94 – 0.17
2010– 2014 – 1.16 – 0.72 – 0.46 – 1.13 – 0.05 – 1.48 – 1.23 – 0.28
Hungary 2007– 2010 – 0.86 – 0.63 – 0.15 – 0.97 0.18 – 1.01 – 1.12 0.20
2010– 2014 0.55 0.43 0.09 0.62 – 0.10 0.59 0.44 0.11
Poland 2007– 2010 – 0.98 – 0.40 – 0.58 – 0.70 – 0.28 – 0.99 – 0.22 – 0.73
2010– 2014 – 1.61 – 0.89 – 0.70 – 1.35 – 0.25 – 1.81 – 1.16 – 0.61
Source: EU- LFS; authors’ analysis.
Table A2.5 Continued
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HOW DOES THE PERFORMANCE OF  
SCHOOL- TO- WORK TRANSITION REGIMES  
VARY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?
Kari P. Hadjivassiliou, Arianna Tassinari, Werner Eichhorst,  
and Florian Wozny
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession has had a profound impact on the process of young people’s 
school- to- work (STW) transitions, exacerbating the challenges already arising 
from the long- term structural transformations affecting youth labor markets 
across the European Union (EU). These challenges have been a catalyst for policy 
change. Following European Commission recommendations, many countries 
have embarked upon ambitious reform programs, including the introduction 
of the Youth Guarantee (YG), structural reforms of vocational education and 
training (VET), and activation policies.
This chapter tackles two central questions pertaining to the performance and 
evolution of STW transition regimes in Europe during the Great Recession. First, 
what role have institutional characteristics played in mediating and structuring 
the impact of the crisis on young people’s labor market situation? Second, in 
what ways have policy changes introduced during the recession changed the 
structure and logic of European STW transition regimes?
Following an institutionalist approach, this chapter tackles these two analyt-
ical puzzles by means of a comparative case study design. We draw on the ty-
pology of “youth transition regimes” advanced by Pohl and Walther (2007) as a 
heuristic framework for comparison. First, we investigate how country- specific 
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institutional configurations mediated the impact of the crisis on young people’s 
labor market situation between 2007 and 2015 in a sample of eight member states 
belonging to different clusters. Our findings show that institutional legacies 
mattered considerably in determining the type and severity of the challenges 
that the different countries faced. However, institutional factors also interacted 
in complex ways with the broader macroeconomic conditions and the availa-
bility of fiscal resources.
Second, we analyze the main changes in STW transition regimes across five 
country clusters between 2007 and 2015. We review three policy domains: active 
labor market policies (ALMPs) and not in employment, education, or training 
(NEET) policies;1 VET; and employment protection legislation (EPL). We as-
sess the extent to which reforms have brought about substantial change in the 
underlying logic and design of STW transition regimes and whether these will 
lead to future improvements in performance. We focus on youth- specific em-
ployment policy areas in order to identify conflicting trends of convergence 
and persisting divergence in institutional design. We find that institutional 
configurations appear to be in a state of flux, blurring the distinctive character-
istics and internal coherence of the STW transition regimes captured by Pohl 
and Walther’s (2007) original typology and calling into question its continued 
heuristic validity. Considerable challenges persist despite intense reform activity, 
and the postcrisis quality of STW transitions appears to have deteriorated across 
all country clusters.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the theoretical and case 
study selection framework. Section 3.3 presents the institutional features and 
performance of each of the five STW transition regimes represented by the eight 
case study countries. Section 3.4 discusses the main trends and implications of 
institutional and policy change across clusters during the crisis, and section 3.5 
concludes.
3.2. THEORETICAL AND CASE STUDY SELECTION 
FRAMEWORK
The notion of “transition regimes” developed by Pohl and Walther (2007) 
encompasses institutional and policy domains, including the structure of edu-
cation and training systems, employment regulation and social security systems, 
and the focus of youth transition policies (whether their model of activation is 
“supportive” or “workfare”). The original conceptualization also includes cul-
tural norms relating to interpretative frames of youth and the causes of labor 
market “disadvantage” dominating different clusters; we do not include these in 
our analysis here. Pohl and Walther distinguish between five main types of youth 
transition regimes: universalistic, liberal, employment- centered, subprotective, 
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and post- socialist. The distinctive features of each ideal- typical regime are 
summarized in Table 3.1.
Although these clusters display considerable internal variation with regard 
to the institutional configurations of different countries, the typology can be a 
useful heuristic device for analyzing and conceptualizing broad patterns of con-
vergence and variation in terms of policy design and institutional change across 
countries. Each regime type is characterized by specific challenges regarding the 
STW transition process, as well as by a distinctive logic in the design of STW 
transition policies.
On the basis of this typology, we conducted eight case studies in coun-
tries belonging to distinct regime types so as to compare the performance of 
differing institutional arrangements and the trajectory of institutional change 
between and within clusters between 2007 and 2015. The country case studies 
were chosen not only to exemplify the characteristics and challenges of each 
cluster but also to illustrate internal variation within clusters. The universalistic 
model is represented here by Sweden. Within the employment- centered regime, 
we analyzed the cases of Germany, the Netherlands, and France, which— despite 
broad similarities— differ in the focus of their STW transition models, espe-
cially in their VET systems. The United Kingdom typifies the liberal regime. The 
subprotective regime, typical of the Mediterranean countries, is exemplified by 
Spain. Finally, the Estonian and Polish case studies illustrate the post- socialist re-
gime, which has adopted a mix of liberal and employment- centered approaches.
The case study methodology involved primary data collection through 
interviews with policymakers, employer organizations, trade unions, and aca-
demic experts in each country.2 This work was complemented by an extensive re-
view of policy documents and academic literature at the EU and national levels, 
as well as secondary data analysis of key statistical and evaluation data relating to 
youth labor market performance in the selected countries.
Section 3.3 considers how regimes’ institutional features affect their per-
formance regarding the effectiveness of young people’s STW transitions, 
conceptualized in terms of the speed, ease, and quality of youth transitions (see 
Flek, Hála, and Mysíková, this volume; Berloffa et  al., this volume; Filandri, 
Nazio, and O’Reilly, this volume). Although the quality of youth transitions 
encompasses a range of dimensions (incidence of informal, temporary, and/ or 
precarious employment, and transition rates to permanent employment), here 
we focus on the type of employment contract (permanent vs. temporary) as an 
indicator of quality.
We measure country performance using a range of empirical indicators: total 
and long- term youth unemployment rate, youth unemployment ratio, employ-
ment rate within 3 years of completing education, NEET rate, educational at-
tainment, and incidence of fixed- term employment.3 A comparison of indicators 
between 2007 and 2015 captures how different regimes have mediated the impact 
of the Great Recession on young people’s labor market situation. Our discussion 
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Table 3.1 Comparative framework
STW transition regime 
typology
Education system  
and VET
Focus of STW transition 
policies and ALMP
EPL and labor market 
regulation
Speed and quality of STW 
transitions
Universalistic (SE) Inclusive education system
High investment and high 
transitions in tertiary 
education
Secondary role of VET
Supportive activation (Youth 
Guarantee)
Human capital investment
“Flexicurity 
model”: moderate/ low 
EPL, inclusive social 
protection system;
Corporatist tradition with 
collectively agreed 
minimum wages 
(including youth- related) 
that vary by sector
Fast and stable
Employment- centered  
(DE, FR, NL)
Selective and standardized 
education and training
Prominence of VET 
(company- or school- 
based), including 
prevocational training and 
apprenticeships
High levels of employer 
involvement
“Train- first” approach: focus on 
VET and apprenticeships as 
main labor market integration 
route
Targeted ALMPs for 
vulnerable youth
Occasional use of wage incentives 
and demand- side measures
EPL dualism between 
permanent and temporary 
employment
Segmented social protection
Corporatist tradition, but 
minimum wages set by 
legislation
Variable, but fast and stable 
for countries with large 
apprenticeship systems or 
VET take- up
High levels of temporary 
employment
Cyclical problems of low labor 
demand
Liberal (UK) Comprehensive education 
system, predominance of 
general education
Fragmented post- compulsory 
training
Low status and 
standardization of VET
Limited employer 
involvement
Supply- side, workfare activation 
model
Focus on acquisition of 
employability skills and rapid 
labor market entry (“work- first” 
approach)
Targeted remedial interventions 
for NEETs and vulnerable young 
people
Low levels of EPL
Universalistic but minimal 
social protection
Minimum wages set by 
legislation (differentiated 
for young people)
Fast but unstable; high 
incidence of low- quality 
employment
Skills mismatch
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Subprotective (ES) Comprehensive education 
system
Low status and 
take- up of VET
High levels of early school 
leaving
Weak linkages between 
education system and 
labor market
Underdeveloped ALMP and low 
PES capacity
Focus on acquisition of first work 
experience
Wage subsidies
High EPL dualism between 
temporary and permanent 
employment
Segmented social protection 
with high protection gaps; 
high familialism
No age- related minimum 
wage
Lengthy and uncertain
High levels of temporary 
employment
Skills mismatch
Low labor demand
Post- socialist/ 
transitional (EE, PL)
Comprehensive education 
systems, predominance of 
general education
Low prominence of 
VET (school- or 
company- based)
Weak linkages between 
education system and 
labor market
High levels of educational 
attainment
Combination of liberal and 
employment- centered policies
ALMP relatively underdeveloped
Focus on acquisition of 
employability skills (supply 
side) and stimulus of labor 
demand through wage 
subsidies
High EPL dualism, but 
considerable differences 
within cluster
Minimum wages set 
with social partners’ 
involvement, not 
differentiated by age
Variable length and stability
High incidence of temporary/ 
low- quality employment
Skills mismatch
Source: Adapted from Pohl and Walther (2007).
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of performance determinants mainly focuses on the interaction between three 
institutional dimensions:  the structure of the education and training system 
(particularly VET); employment regulation; and labor market policy models, 
with a focus on the characteristics of ALMP. Although our emphasis here is 
more on supply- side policies, the issue of sufficient labor demand (and demand- 
side policies) is also of crucial importance for STW transitions. The Great 
Recession has affected member states differently in terms of both job destruc-
tion during the recession and job creation in the recovery years (Grotti, Russell, 
and O’Reilly, this volume). For instance, among the countries studied here, job 
separation rates increased sharply in Estonia and Spain, but to a lesser extent in 
the Netherlands, whereas Germany proved much more resilient throughout the 
crisis (European Central Bank 2014). This variation must be kept in mind when 
assessing differences in performance.
Section 3.4 analyzes how the regimes’ institutional features have changed 
due to intense policy innovation activity during the crisis, focusing on policy 
changes introduced since 2015. In particular, we assess the effects that recent 
policy changes may have on both the quality of future STW transitions and 
the heuristic and conceptual validity of Pohl and Walther’s (2007) typology 
in the current historical phase. Our analysis also draws upon Rubery’s (2011) 
concept of “hybridization” of social models to capture the nature of ongoing 
institutional changes affecting youth transition policy regimes in Europe. This 
refers to the process whereby developments in new policy areas cross tradi-
tional boundaries and paths of development usually associated with distinct 
welfare regime typologies. This is useful for conceptualizing ongoing changes 
in youth employment policy, where processes of gradual institutional change 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005) and multifaceted policy innovations appear to be 
slowly transforming the logic and objectives of existing policy regimes toward 
increased liberalization (Streeck 2009), while attempting to address existing 
protection gaps. The hybridization concept captures the contradictory na-
ture of existing policy innovations, emphasizing the need to reconsider the 
validity of existing typologies of youth transition regimes in light of recent 
developments.
3.3. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND PERFORMANCE 
IN DIFFERENT YOUTH TRANSITION REGIMES
The ideal- typical institutional characteristics of each regime prior to the crisis, 
as captured in Pohl and Walther’s (2007) heuristic typology, are summarized in 
Table 3.1, whereas our discussion focuses on our country case studies, whose 
features may deviate from those generalized in Pohl and Walther’s typology.
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3.3.1. universalistic Cluster
The universalistic youth transition model— represented here by Sweden— is 
characterized by an inclusive education system, with diversified post- compulsory 
routes into general and vocational education and high levels of investment in 
tertiary education. The linkage between education and the labor market is col-
linear, with employers increasingly playing a role in specifying and delivering 
training. Nonetheless, VET plays a secondary role in post- compulsory educa-
tion compared to higher education (Wadensjö 2015). The education and training 
system’s comprehensive and inclusive nature is considered an important factor in 
facilitating human capital acquisition and smooth STW transitions. The fact that 
a high share of students— well above the EU average— combines work and study 
also helps such transitions (Eurofound 2014).
Sweden’s strong corporatist tradition of close cooperation between the so-
cial partners and the state contributes to the effectiveness of STW transition 
mechanisms such as traineeships/ internships (Eurofound 2014). The institution-
alized nature of corporatist arrangements in universalistic countries means that 
collective agreements constitute important driving forces for labor market regu-
lation and wage setting (see Table 3.1).
The unemployment rate for 15- to 24- year- olds in Sweden was equal to the 
EU average in 2015 but was far below the EU average for 25- to 29- year- olds 
(Table 3.2). In general, STW transitions are comparatively fast and stable. In 
2015, approximately 83% of 15- to 34- year- olds were employed 3  years after 
completing education (Table 3.3). This explains why the long- term unemploy-
ment rate (see Table 3.2) and the NEET rate are among the lowest across the 
eight countries considered here and also far below the EU average (see Table 3.3). 
Indeed, unemployment spells for young people tend to be rather short and refer 
to transitions between education paths. However, subgroups such as the less ed-
ucated, the disabled, or migrants face considerable barriers to entering the labor 
market (Wadensjö 2015).
ALMPs are particularly well developed and funded, and the overall STW 
transition model is based on young people’s early activation, implemented 
through a highly personalized approach. In Sweden, this is realized through a 
strong job guarantee and social assistance program (Wadensjö 2015). One ele-
ment of such programs is intensive (and early) job search assistance, combined 
with personalized action plans that have proved to be effective short- term tran-
sition mechanisms. Supported forms of employment also play an important role.
Since the early 2000s, and more markedly since the onset of the Great 
Recession, the quality and effectiveness of Sweden’s education and training system 
have deteriorated, despite strong public investment (European Commission 
2015a). Sweden is one of the few European countries where VET participa-
tion has decreased since 2005 (Gonzalez Carreras, Kirchner, and Speckesser 
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Table 3.2 Unemployment rate, long- term unemployment rate, and unemployment ratio: 2007 and 2015 (%)
Country
Unemployment rate Long- term unemployment rate Unemployment ratio
15– 24 years 25– 29 years 15– 24 years 25– 29 years 15– 24 years 25– 29 years
2015 2007 2015 2007 2015 2007 2015 2007 2015 2007 2015 2007
Total Women Total Women Total Women Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total
Spain 48.3 48.0 18.1 21.7 28.5 28.1 9.0 35.0 10.1 44.1 14.7 16.8 8.7 24.3 7.7
France 24.7 23.4 18.8 19.5 14.0 13.7 10.1 28.8 24.3 35.3 32.3 9.1 7.2 11.9 8.8
Poland 20.8 20.9 21.7 23.8 10.1 9.8 10.6 29.2 34.6 35.9 45.5 6.8 7.1 8.5 8.7
Sweden 20.4 19.6 19.3 19.8 8.7 8.4 7.0 6.3 4.0 15.5 11.0 11.2 10.1 7.5 6.1
United 
Kingdom
14.6 12.9 14.3 12.5 6.0 5.6 4.9 21.9 15.7 28.7 23.7 8.6 8.8 5.1 4.2
Estonia 13.1 12.2 10.1 7.2 6.0 7.1 4.4 15.5 30.5 34.7 46.8 5.5 3.8 5.1 3.7
Netherlands 11.3 11.2 5.9 6.2 6.5 6.3 2.4 18.7 12.6 31.5 26.2 7.7 4.3 5.7 2.2
Germany 7.2 6.5 11.9 11.1 5.8 4.9 9.9 22.5 32.2 32.2 42.7 3.5 6.1 4.8 8.1
EU 20.4 19.5 15.5 15.9 12.4 12.3 8.7 32.4 26.4 43.0 36.8 8.4 6.8 10.2 7.1
Source: Eurostat (2015).
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Table 3.3 Employment rate within 3 years of highest educational attainment (ISCED), NEET rate, and fixed- term employment rate  
for 15- to 29- year- olds: 2007 and 2015 (%)
Employment rate within 3 years NEET rate Fixed- term 
(15– 29 years)
Country
Total 0– 2  
(ISCED)
3– 4  
(ISCED)
5– 8  
(ISCED)
15– 24 years 25– 29 years Total
2015 2007 2015 2015 2007 2015 2007 2015 2007
Germany 86.9 77.8 44.1 87.3 92.4 6.2 12.0 12.3 16.9 38.1 41.5
Netherlands 84.8 84.3 67.6 83.9 89.1 4.7 3.5 10.6 7.6 44.2 37.0
Sweden 83.2 82.4 61.6 79.2 90.8 6.7 7.5 8.6 8.8 41.0 43.6
United Kingdom 76.9 79.3 41.2 72.8 85.5 11.1 11.9 15.4 14.9 11.3 10.3
Estonia 74.8 76.0 32.7 71.8 84.8 10.8 8.9 14.8 17.2 8.0 4.2
Poland 73.3 70.5 23.7 64.7 83.7 11.0 10.6 20.5 21.6 54.3 49.5
France 62.8 70.6 21.4 57.0 77.9 11.9 10.7 20.0 17.2 41.0 35.5
Spain 54.2 74.4 29.2 47.5 66.7 15.6 12.0 26.0 13.8 54.3 51.5
EU 69.8 73.5 33.1 66.5 79.7 12.0 11.0 19.7 17.2 32.5 30.9
Source: Eurostat (2015).
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2015). Despite repeated attempts to increase the take- up of apprenticeships 
(Wadensjö 2015), their incidence remains low and primarily concentrated in 
craft occupations, suggesting a persistent prevalence of the “academic” higher 
education route as the privileged form of post- compulsory training.
This cluster’s institutional setup is usually characterized as an example of 
“flexicurity” with extended welfare provision (Eurofound 2014; Leschke and 
Finn, this volume). However, over time, activation has become tougher and 
benefits less generous and more conditional. Unemployment benefits are income 
based and subject to membership in an unemployment insurance fund. Young 
school- leavers generally do not qualify for these benefits because they do not 
meet the income requirements, which discourages them from registering as un-
employed (Albæk et al. 2015). However, they can access means- tested social as-
sistance or less generous unemployment benefit through ALMPs.
The universalistic cluster is not internally homogeneous, and different reg-
ulatory regimes may apply to distinct groups in the labor market. For example, 
in contrast to Denmark, Sweden’s EPL is relatively high for permanent employ-
ment, but relatively low for temporary employment, leading to labor market 
segmentation reflected in levels of temporary employment that surpass the EU 
average (see Table 3.3). However, unlike in France or Spain, fixed- term contracts 
act as a stepping stone to more stable and regular work.
The limited changes in unemployment rates and ratios, as well as contract 
types and transition speed, between 2007 and 2015 suggest that youth labor de-
mand was not strongly affected by the recent crisis (Grotti et al., this volume).
3.3.2. employment- Centered Cluster
Countries in the employment- centered transition cluster (DE, FR, and NL in 
this study) are characterized by selective and highly standardized education and 
training systems, with well- developed apprenticeship and national certification 
systems. The German education system’s selectivity is clearly shown in the ed-
ucational attainment data. Among the eight countries reviewed, Germany has 
the highest proportion of young people aged 20– 24 years (70.7%) with medium 
ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) levels and the lowest 
proportion (6.4%) with high ISCED levels, whereas France has high shares 
of youth with high ISCED levels, especially those aged 20– 24  years (28.8%; 
Table 3.4).
Dual VET constitutes a core feature of the German education system, with 
apprenticeships providing the main form of VET at the upper secondary level. 
In the Netherlands, apprenticeships are slightly less prominent, whereas in 
France, school- based VET still dominates (Eurofound 2014). Employers are ac-
tively involved in defining the design and content of VET in Germany and the 
Netherlands, closely cooperating with VET providers, but this is not the case in 
France. STW transitions in Germany and the Netherlands are generally efficient, 
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especially for those with medium ISCED levels, indicating well- established VET 
systems, which also contribute to both countries having the lowest NEET rates 
(see Table 3.3). High degrees of occupational specificity (Gangl 2001; Brzinsky- 
Fay 2007) and strong involvement of relevant stakeholders (Gonzalez Carreras 
et al. 2015)  in the German and Dutch training systems are important driving 
forces for smooth STW transitions.
Youth unemployment rates in Germany and the Netherlands are the lowest 
among all the countries reviewed. However, Dutch youth unemployment 
ratios for 15- to 24- year- olds are relatively high. This discrepancy between the 
two countries in the share of active young people in the labor market is espe-
cially strong for those aged 15– 24 years and much less important for those aged 
25– 29 years, who are less affected by differences in the education systems (see 
Table 3.2). Long- term unemployment rates are rather average in both countries 
(see Table 3.3). The difference between short- and long- term unemployment 
rates is due to the fact that short- term unemployed people tend to participate 
overproportionally during periods of recovery. The situation in France is more 
difficult because both short- and long- term unemployment rates are high.
Germany and the Netherlands have strict EPL for permanent employ-
ment, whereas their EPL for temporary employment is much lower than the 
Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) average. 
In France, EPL is high for both permanent and temporary employment. Despite 
these differences, temporary employment for 15- to 29- year- olds was above the 
EU average in all three countries in 2015. It must be noted that half of all fixed- 
term contracts relate to apprenticeships in Germany, which has a much better 
transition probability compared with France (see Table 3.3). Segmentation is also 
predominant in France, not only for disadvantaged but also for qualified youth 
(Eurofound 2014).
Table 3.4 Educational attainment by age and ISCED level (2015)
Country
20– 24 years 25– 34 years
0– 2 3– 4 5– 8 0– 2 3– 4 5– 8
Spain 31.5 46.9 21.5 34.4 24.6 41.0
Germany 22.9 70.7 6.4 12.7 57.7 29.6
Netherlands 20 61.7 18.3 14.4 40.5 45.1
Estonia 16.7 69.5 13.8 10.8 48.6 40.6
United Kingdom 14.3 56.2 29.5 14.7 38.4 47.0
France 12.8 58.3 28.8 13.5 41.9 44.7
Sweden 12.7 69.8 17.5 12.1 41.4 46.5
Poland 9.2 76.3 14.5 6.1 50.7 43.2
EU 17.3 65.5 17.2 16.6 45.6 37.9
Source: Eurostat (2015).
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Differences in ALMPs in the three countries are related to their different ed-
ucation systems and general economic performance. The Netherlands has tradi-
tionally high ALMP spending (EU’s highest spending in 2014), with a focus on 
mediation and re- employment or reintegration, especially for the most vulner-
able groups (Bekker et al. 2015). Wage subsidies also play a role in France and 
the Netherlands for helping young people acquire work experience. In Germany, 
basic training and assistance for less educated youth are also gaining importance 
given the favorable labor market situation. Thus, the specific focus of ALMPs 
depends not only on the general orientation of a particular cluster but also on a 
country’s current economic situation.
In this cluster, the welfare system is based on a social insurance model with 
benefits financed by taxes (as in Sweden) and individual contributions. Similar to 
Sweden, benefits are income based, but young people do not have universal ac-
cess to benefits. Indeed, depending on their status, young people can be excluded 
from or receive reduced benefits. In Germany, for example, young people receive 
a reduced amount of social assistance if they still live in their parents’ home, and 
they need the approval of their local authority if they wish to move out while still 
receiving benefits (Eichhorst, Wozny, and Cox 2015).
Likewise in the Netherlands, there is no automatic right of young people to 
either income or reintegration support (Bekker et al. 2015). According to the 
2012 Work and Social Assistance Act (Wet Werk en Bijstand, WWB), young 
people (aged younger than 27 years) have to wait 1 month before claiming so-
cial assistance for the first time, and they must search for a job (or education/ 
training placement). The aim is to encourage them to either (re)engage with 
education or attach themselves to the labor market, thus avoiding becoming 
NEETs. A  comparison of unemployment rates and ratios as well as contract 
types and transition speed between 2007 and 2015 suggests that youth labor 
demand has been negatively affected by the recent crisis in the Netherlands 
and even more so in France, leading to lower and more unstable employment. 
Conversely, Germany has experienced higher youth labor demand as a result 
of its exceptionally favorable economic situation, with improved labor market 
conditions in 2015 compared to 2007.
3.3.3. liberal Cluster
Liberal youth transition regimes— the United Kingdom in this study— are 
characterized by a comprehensive education system, high flexibility, and 
fragmentation in post- compulsory education. VET delivery models are not 
standardized and are accessible through school- based programs combining aca-
demic study with vocational elements, broad vocational programs, or specialist 
occupational programs delivered at both school and the workplace.
VET focuses rather narrowly on delivering particular occupational 
skills, albeit with less specialization and lower quality standards than in the 
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employment- centered model. Indeed, the United Kingdom’s VET provision 
has been criticized as being too focused on basic skills and relatively low- level 
qualifications.
The liberal regime is also characterized by limited employer engagement in 
VET provision, with employers viewing themselves as “customers” of the edu-
cation system as opposed to partners (Tassinari, Hadjivassiliou, and Swift 2016). 
In fact, the decoupling of the education system and labor market— as well as the 
lack of joint delivery or codesign of VET— has made skill mismatch a recurring 
concern. A significant minority still leaves secondary education without the nec-
essary skills and qualifications to compete in the labor market.
Recent reforms in the United Kingdom— especially the Apprenticeship 
Trailblazer reforms— have attempted to increase employer involvement in de-
signing and delivering apprenticeship standards (Hadjivassiliou et  al. 2015). 
Although the policy intention is to foster a major change in the STW transi-
tion pattern (expanding apprenticeships and revamping technical education and 
VET), it is too early to assess whether this initiative will lead to a permanent 
path shift. Indeed, due its deeply entrenched structural characteristics— that 
is, a fragmented market- based skills system with high flexibility but variable 
quality, employer resistance to assuming a more active role as providers instead 
of consumers of VET, and lack of parity of esteem between vocational and ac-
ademic qualifications— the United Kingdom’s VET- related policy has been 
suffering from a perennial implementation gap between policy objectives and 
reality, which is likely to continue (Tassinari et al. 2016).
Despite efforts to expand apprenticeships among young people in recent years, 
there has been a step- change in growth for those aged 25 years or older, with only 
a moderate increase in apprenticeship take- up among those aged 19– 24 years 
and a fall in the number of apprenticeships available to 16- to 18- year- olds 
(Hadjivassiliou et al. 2015). As already argued, this expansion of apprenticeships 
has so far been more about formalizing adult workers’ skills than meeting the 
youth- related policy objective.
To date, the evidence is unclear as to whether increased employer ownership 
in the United Kingdom is enough to guarantee quality in the new apprenticeship 
standards (House of Commons Education Committee 2015). Even so, it is also 
acknowledged that the ongoing apprenticeship/ VET reforms with the new em-
phasis on, inter alia, increased employer involvement in VET provision, greater 
standardization and coordination, and improved quality of apprenticeships/ VET 
linked to a more general upskilling push— which is likely to become more per-
tinent post- Brexit— show signs of potential paradigmatic change in the United 
Kingdom’s STW system (Tassinari et al. 2016).
The United Kingdom’s educational attainment data reflect this cluster’s dis-
tinctive feature, namely the relatively minor role of VET. Indeed, “academization” 
is highest for both 20- to 24- year- olds and 25- to 34- year- olds across all countries 
reviewed (see Table 3.4). For this reason, employability is an important concern 
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for the United Kingdom’s youth- related policy, as reflected in the work- first focus 
of youth- related ALMPs.
The liberal cluster is characterized by low EPL: The United Kingdom’s EPL 
is one of the lowest in the OECD, resulting in a less segmented labor market— 
reflected, for example, in the (lower) proportion of young people in temporary 
employment, which, in 2014, stood at 14.7% for those aged 15– 24 years (as op-
posed to an EU average of 43.4%; Eurostat 2015). However, weak EPL also helps 
give rise to hyper- precarious forms of employment such as zero- hours contracts, 
in which working hours are set by employer demand, leading to unpredictable/ 
unstable income. This transfer of business risk from employer to employee is 
especially prevalent among young people; indeed, 36% of people employed on 
zero- hours contracts are aged 16– 24 years (Office for National Statistics 2016).
ALMPs are not specifically targeted at young people, apart from some flag-
ship initiatives (e.g., the Youth Contract program) targeting unemployed youth. 
Unlike the other clusters, subsidies play a minor role, with interventions mainly 
focused on supply- side measures (Hadjivassiliou et  al. 2015). Although the 
United Kingdom’s benefits system is universal, benefit levels are low and sub-
ject to increasingly stringent conditionality. Welfare reforms implemented after 
2010 are generally aimed at encouraging young people to exit the benefits system 
quickly and achieve early labor market (re)integration by making rules gov-
erning access to benefits stricter and more punitive.
Youth unemployment and long- term unemployment rates (see Table 3.2) are 
comparatively low, achieved— as explained previously— by low EPL and strong 
conditionality for benefits. Whereas this reduces rigidities that are harmful for 
STW transitions, it also creates unstable working conditions: The employment 
rate 3 years after completing education tends toward the average for all edu-
cation levels through high job turnover (see Table 3.3). In general, the United 
Kingdom is characterized by rapid but unstable STW transitions. Due to low 
EPL for permanent contracts, temporary contracts are rarely used (see Table 
3.3). The United Kingdom’s labor market seems to have performed relatively 
well in the recent crisis, although long- term unemployment remains consid-
erably above the precrisis level and is recovering more slowly than short- term 
unemployment.
3.3.4. subprotective Cluster
The subprotective model— Spain in this study— is characterized by nonselective 
and comprehensively structured compulsory education systems, albeit with rel-
atively low- quality, underdeveloped VET and comparatively high early school- 
leaving (ESL) rates (Eurofound 2014). The structure of educational attainment 
reflects this cluster’s nonselective education system and weak VET role. Indeed, 
the Spanish education system is rather polarized in that it has the lowest level of 
ISCED 3– 4 attainment for those aged 20– 24 years, and especially for those aged 
25– 34 years (see Table 3.4).
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Education and training are centrally standardized, and the incidence of 
apprenticeships is comparatively low, although there have been efforts to make 
VET more flexible and more closely aligned to employers’ skill needs (González 
Menéndez et al. 2015b).
The distinctive characteristics of the subprotective model include the relatively 
high EPL levels for permanent employees, as well as the relatively ungenerous 
benefits system, which in turn reflects this cluster’s traditionally weak welfare 
state and limited benefit provision, especially to young people (Eurofound 2014). 
The Spanish labor market is highly segmented, with a high incidence of tempo-
rary employment, especially among youth, as a result of the gap in EPL between 
highly regulated permanent contracts and deregulated fixed- term contracts. 
However, whereas past reforms only reduced protection at the margins and thus 
increased segmentation, recent reforms also deregulated EPL for permanent 
contracts (González Menéndez et al. 2015b).
The employment rate 3  years after completing education in Spain is the 
lowest among all countries reviewed. In particular, individuals with medium or 
high educational attainment have to contend with comparatively low employ-
ment rates (see Table 3.3). This cluster’s institutional features tend to generate 
the greatest difficulties for labor market entry, given large shares of low- skilled 
entrants, comparatively high EPL for permanent jobs, and the absence of a com-
prehensive social safety net (Gangl 2001; Brzinsky- Fay 2007). This makes STW 
transitions complex, lengthier, and unstable.
ALMPs are relatively underdeveloped, with challenges arising from the weak 
institutional capacities of the Public Employment Services (PES), although 
improving ALMP delivery and strengthening activation constitute some of the 
main areas of recent policy intervention. Spanish ALMPs seek to improve young 
people’s skills or provide them with work experience (González Menéndez et al. 
2015b). An increase in the supply of work experience and/ or job placements for 
young people is pursued through hiring subsidies that reduce nonwage labor costs.
Institutional factors are overshadowed by a lack of labor demand in Spain as 
the main factor explaining poor performance in youth transitions. Indeed, the 
Spanish labor market was one of the most adversely affected by the recession and 
the ensuing severe fiscal consolidation efforts, which is why every indicator must 
be seen in the light of extremely low levels of youth labor demand.
Spain had the highest youth unemployment rate and ratio in 2015. The dis-
crepancy between these indicators is high for those aged 20– 24 years, and it is 
much higher than in 2007. Young people seem to be staying longer in education 
in view of the economic downturn (see Table 3.2). In addition, long- term youth 
unemployment, the NEET rate, and temporary employment are the highest in 
2015 among the eight countries (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Aside from temporary 
employment, these indicators were close to or below the EU average in 2007, 
indicating how labor demand fluctuations can change our assessment of STW 
transition regimes.
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3.3.5. post- socialist/ transitional Cluster
In both Estonia and Poland, compulsory education systems are comprehensive, 
with post- compulsory general education remaining a more popular choice than 
vocational education, partly because of VET’s poor reputation and excessive ri-
gidity (Ślęzak and Szopa 2015). In 2015, Poland had the lowest levels of low- 
qualified youth and the highest rate of medium ISCED attainment among those 
aged 20– 24 years, partly because compulsory education lasts until age 18 years. 
Educational attainment in Estonia is closest to the EU average (see Table 3.4). In 
both countries, NEET rates are also slightly below the EU average for those aged 
15– 24 years. However, NEET rates for 25- to 29- year- olds are close to the EU av-
erage in Poland and five percentage points below average in Estonia.
VET in Poland is mostly school based, whereas in Estonia it involves a 
greater share of company- based training, albeit still within a school- based de-
livery model. In Estonia, apprenticeships account for only approximately 2% 
of students, whereas they are marginally more common in Poland (European 
Commission 2015a). Employer involvement in VET is relatively low, although 
there have recently been efforts to increase employer engagement in VET. The 
linkages between the education system and the labor market are also weak, 
resulting in considerable skills mismatch (McGuinness, Bergin, and Whelan, 
this volume).
Similar to the United Kingdom, low incidence of work- based training 
increases the need for ALMPs to enhance youth employability, especially by 
providing financial incentives for employers to hire young people. Both coun-
tries also focus on specializing and standardizing education paths in line with 
labor market needs (Eamets and Humal 2015; Ślęzak and Szopa 2015). In both 
countries, the policy instruments used to support STW transitions include 
training and/ or employment subsidies to increase the supply of work- experience 
placements. Whereas ALMPs in Estonia mainly concentrate on less educated 
youth, in Poland they also target highly qualified young people, given that grad-
uate unemployment is quite high.
In both countries, welfare benefits are a mix of universal and contribution- 
based systems without any specific focus on young people. But they differ in 
relation to EPL: Estonia has relatively low EPL for permanent employment and 
relatively high EPL for temporary employment; in Poland, EPL is much stricter 
for permanent as opposed to temporary employment, making the latter more 
attractive for employers. The incidence of temporary employment in 2015 
among 15- to 29- year- olds was extremely high in Poland (54%), whereas it 
was the lowest (8%) in Estonia among the countries reviewed (see Table 3.3). 
Institutional rigidity— which hampers adjustments to labor market changes— 
is one major impediment to smooth STW transition in Poland. The youth em-
ployment rate within 3 years after completing education corresponds to the EU 
average in both countries, when all education levels are considered together. 
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However, educational attainment in Poland is very important: Those with the 
lowest levels of educational attainment face similar labor market entry barriers 
as in France (see Table 3.3). This is related to the Polish education system, which 
produces the lowest proportion of young people with low educational attain-
ment, who may face a crowding- out effect by more highly educated youth, 
leading to overqualification (see Table 3.4). In 2015, the Polish unemployment 
and long- term unemployment rates were close to the EU average. Estonian un-
employment rates were among the lowest in the EU in 2015, although they had 
dramatically increased during the first period of the crisis. Both countries have 
recovered rather well from the crisis: Unemployment rates in 2015 are similar to 
those in 2007, and long- term unemployment rates have considerably declined 
(Table 3.2).
3.4. INSTITUTIONS IN FLUX: HOW ARE YOUTH TRANSITION 
REGIMES CHANGING?
Although the recession has been a global phenomenon, there are significant 
differences between countries regarding its depth, duration, and impact on young 
people (European Central Bank 2014). Whereas Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Austria consistently recorded youth unemployment rates of less than or ap-
proximately 10%, other countries fared much worse (with France and Poland 
recording rates of greater than 20% and Spain and Greece rates of greater than 
50%; Hadjivassiliou et al. 2015).
After the recessionary years (2008– 2009), the most important policy pre-
scription recommended (or imposed— in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) by the 
EU and the European Central Bank was “fiscal consolidation.” All the countries 
most severely hit by the economic downturn, notably Southern countries but 
also some in Central and Eastern Europe, were recommended to combine aus-
terity policies to cut public deficit and debt with structural reforms (including 
labor market reforms— to introduce more “flexibility” combined with an expan-
sion of ALMPs). This produced contradictory outcomes for young people. The 
resulting macroeconomic environment generated weak or insufficient labor de-
mand in many member states— or, in the case of the subprotective cluster, dra-
matically reduced demand for labor— and further exacerbated young people’s 
labor market situation, given that they face more elastic labor demand relative 
to adult workers (Eurofound 2014; Eichhorst, Marx, and Wehner 2016; Grotti 
et al., this volume).
These developments have resulted in (1) a dramatic rise in youth unemploy-
ment in most countries; (2) lengthier, unstable, and nonlinear STW transitions; 
(3)  a deterioration of youth employment quality combined with greater pre-
cariousness; (4)  increased discouragement and labor market detachment; and 
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(5) greater labor market vulnerability of disadvantaged youth, such as the low 
skilled, migrants, and the disabled. Although recession- related economic deteri-
oration and subsequent job- poor recovery account for such developments, these 
are also rooted in persistent structural deficiencies such as poorly performing 
education and training systems, segmented labor markets, and low PES capacity. 
The degree to which these deficiencies adversely affect young people varies con-
siderably between and even within clusters, although a general deterioration in 
the length and quality of STW transitions is observed in all five clusters.
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that considerable policy action at the 
EU and national levels has focused on reforming the institutional arrangements 
that structure the STW transition process (Smith et al., this volume). In Section 
3.4.1, we discuss some of the most notable institutional changes observed in 
2007– 2015 across the eight countries in the five clusters reviewed, including the 
implementation of the YG (2013 onward).4
In view of this changing policy landscape, some of the characteristics of each 
regime are in a state of flux, although more in some clusters (subprotective) 
than in others (universalistic). Moreover, competing trends of convergence 
and persisting divergence in different policy areas across clusters appear to 
be emerging. The implications of these ongoing processes of institutional 
change for the coherence and applicability of the existing typologies of youth 
transition regimes, as well as the quality of STW transitions, are assessed in 
Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1. trends in institutional Change and Convergence
Between 2007 and 2015, there was a change in governance structures, insti-
tutional frameworks, and actual policies and mechanisms associated with 
each STW transition regime across all countries in the five clusters. In many 
countries, the introduction of the YG in 2013 acted as a catalyst for structural 
reforms.5 We identify five areas in which institutional change was especially 
prominent in 2007– 2015: the strengthening of ALMP and PES capacity, the de-
centralization and localization of governance and delivery of youth employment 
policy, targeting of NEET policies, reforms of VET and apprenticeships, and EPL 
reforms. Next, we discuss the parallel trends of convergence and persisting diver-
gence in these policy areas across clusters.
3.4.1.1. Strengthening of ALMP and PES Capacity
The institutional field of ALMP was a focus of substantial policy innovation 
between 2007 and 2015, and it was subject to some contradictory trends re-
garding the trajectory of change. Countries in all five clusters have intervened to 
strengthen their ALMPs and related infrastructure, most notably PES, although 
this has not been matched overall by an increase in available resources.
The YG— the EU’s flagship youth employment program— has arguably been a 
potentially important driver of change in this area. Its implementation combines 
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measures to help young people into employment in the short term with com-
prehensive structural reforms aimed at introducing systemic change in the 
structuring of STW transitions. These include introducing properly designed ac-
tivation policies, well- functioning PES, cross- sectoral partnerships, multiagency 
working and outreach measures aimed at NEETs and disengaged youth, and ef-
fective VET and apprenticeship policies (European Commission 2015b).
In Estonia, France, Poland, and Spain, the implementation of the YG has in-
volved PES restructuring to provide young people with individualized support, 
foster better links with both employers and education and training providers, 
and adopt a more targeted and proactive approach toward supporting NEETs 
(European Commission 2015b). It seems that the YG has improved the capacity 
of the Spanish PES to play a more active role in addressing youth unemployment 
(González Menéndez et al. 2015b).
The countries reviewed have also introduced new or have strengthened ex-
isting ALMPs and brought about changes in their activation models. In some 
cases, this emanated from the YG’s focus on properly designed activation policies, 
whereas in others such reforms were enacted independently. For example, the 
YG’s specific focus on young people’s integrated STW transitions represents a de-
parture from Estonia’s traditional lack of labor market policies targeted at youth. 
As such, it arguably represents a “new way of doing things,” especially by fo-
cusing on increasing the combined effect of different measures for vulnerable 
youth (Eamets and Humal 2015). Focusing even more on early intervention and 
activation, Sweden’s government has reinforced its YG with a gradual introduc-
tion of a 90- day guarantee (Wadensjö 2015; Forslund 2016). Moreover, there is 
a much stronger focus on closer cooperation between Swedish central and local 
government (and PES) to ensure that youth- related ALMPs have greater impact 
at the local level.
Independent of the YG, the United Kingdom also implemented a raft of 
youth- related ALMPs such as the Youth Contract, introduced in 2012 with a 
strong focus on early activation and/ or education and training. Similarly, in the 
Netherlands, there has been a distinct reinforcement of activation combined 
with severe restrictions to benefit access for youth aged 18– 27 years following 
the 2009 Investment in Youth Act (Eichhorst and Rinne 2014).
Although the YG concept— including its focus on early, personalized, and 
integrated interventions— has been welcomed, its implementation across the 
EU has unsurprisingly been patchy and uneven (Bussi 2014; Eurofound 2015; 
Eichhorst and Rinne 2017). Reflecting the different institutional setups, labor 
markets, and economic structures and performance, the scope for YG- related 
change at the national and/ or regional level has varied considerably. In Germany 
and the Netherlands (employment- centered cluster) and Sweden (universalistic 
cluster), the focus of the YG has been on the continuation, upscaling, and im-
provement of existing measures, as well as on improved cooperation and cross- 
agency working, rather than on any major change (Weishaupt 2014; Düll 2016). 
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In Spain (subprotective cluster), the YG led to some policy innovation and pro-
vided the framework whereby local initiatives already in place were formalized 
as part of its implementation (Petmesidou and González Menéndez 2016; see 
also Petmesidou and González Menéndez, this volume).
However, the EU funds earmarked for the YG are viewed as being inade-
quate for its effective implementation (Dhéret and Morosi 2015; Eurofound 
2015; International Labour Organization 2015; Eichhorst and Rinne 2017). The 
uneven absorption capacity of these funds across the EU— especially at the re-
gional level— combined with a lack of mobilization of some countries has cast 
further doubt on their ability to successfully implement the YG (Bussi 2014; 
ETUC 2016).
These examples point to the emergence of a partly contradictory trend, in 
which changes in policy design to strengthen ALMPs’ effectiveness have not 
been matched by adequate increases in capacity. With the exception of Germany 
and— to some extent— Sweden, in most other countries reviewed (EE, ES, NL, 
PL, and UK), such efforts have not been accompanied by an increase in funding 
commensurate to the magnitude of youth unemployment. In Spain— where 
youth unemployment rose dramatically during the Great Recession— substantial 
fiscal consolidation linked to its austerity program has led to PES recruitment 
freezes and thus affected PES capacity to help increasing numbers of young 
jobseekers (European Commission 2016). Likewise, the Polish PES did not re-
ceive additional funds (Ślęzak and Szopa 2015). Estonia, one of the countries 
with the most severe austerity, experienced adverse implications for PES capacity 
(Eamets and Humal 2015).
This focus on PES capacity indicates potential convergence regarding policy 
objectives across clusters. However, the ability of a PES to actually strengthen 
links and cooperation with both employers and education and training 
institutions is highly variable, often limited, or even missing (Dhéret and Morosi 
2015). In both Spain and France, there has been concern about PES’s capacity 
to adequately service the large number of unemployed young people (European 
Commission 2016). However, concerns about capacity in the delivery of ALMPs 
extend beyond PES. In Sweden, there are concerns that reinforced municipal re-
sponsibility for youth- related activation measures has not been accompanied by 
a commensurate realignment between municipalities and centrally financed PES 
for financial incentives for ALMPs, thus limiting the municipalities’ outreach ca-
pacity (European Commission 2016).
3.4.1.2. Decentralization and Devolution of Responsibility
The extent to which major changes regarding governance structures and/ or in-
stitutional frameworks underpinning STW transitions were implemented as a 
result of the YG varied across contexts, largely depending on the pre- existing 
institutional setup. However, across the clusters we can observe convergence in 
terms of greater decentralization and devolution of responsibility for supporting 
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effective STW transitions at the local level, combined with greater autonomy and 
flexibility in addressing the specific needs of young people, especially NEETs.
In Germany and the Netherlands, where the YG can be considered an 
upscaling of existing measures, change has mainly occurred in the form of on-
going decentralization and localization of the responsibility for supporting STW 
transitions from the national to the local level. The objective is to enhance the 
cooperation and cross- agency working of local partnerships and to provide more 
integrated services to disadvantaged youth (Düll 2016). In the Netherlands, the 
responsibility for delivering employment and youth care services has shifted since 
2015 to local authorities (Bekker, van de Meer, and Muffels 2015; Bekker et al. 
2015). In Germany, municipal- level initiatives such as the Jugendberufsagenturen 
in Hamburg have developed effective local models of one- stop shops offering in-
tegrated, multiagency services to young people (Gehrke 2015).
Although municipalities (and the state) have always been the main actors for 
youth- related policies in Sweden (Wadensjö 2015), their activation responsibility 
has been strengthened since January 2015, as they are now directly responsible 
for activating early school- leavers and following up NEETs for targeted support 
(Forslund 2016). Devolution is also occurring in the United Kingdom, where 
local authorities now have formal responsibility for tracking young people’s par-
ticipation in education or training and for supporting NEETs in finding suitable 
training (Hadjivassiliou et al. 2015).
There seems to be convergence— sometimes instigated by YG implementa-
tion rules— in setting up broader stakeholder partnerships to offer integrated 
services, especially to youth at risk. Most countries are improving or setting up 
new governance structures, such as stronger partnership working arrangements 
and broader stakeholder engagement to address fragmentation in youth- related 
policies (Eurofound 2015; International Labour Organization 2015). For ex-
ample, the introduction of the YG in Spain has led to better PES coordination 
between different levels of government and improved interregional coopera-
tion (European Commission 2016) while providing a new framework for policy 
transfer across several government levels (González Menéndez et  al. 2015a; 
Petmesidou and González Menéndez, this volume). Nonetheless, such broader 
stakeholder involvement and partnership working is not always easy to achieve 
in contexts with no tradition, structures, or mechanisms for cross- agency collab-
oration (e.g., France and Poland).
Both Estonia and France have strengthened partnership working across 
government agencies (European Commission 2016). For example, Pôle emploi 
(French PES) and missions locales (local PES for youth) are negotiating an agree-
ment to improve their partnership working and provide adequate services to 
young people (European Commission 2016). How successful this attempt will be 
is debatable. The coordination of actors has historically been problematic within 
the fragmented French STW transition system, which lacks an overarching co-
ordinating structure and integrative logic (Smith, Toraldo, and Pasquier 2015; 
92 Comparing problematiC Youth transitions to Work
92
European Commission 2016). Similarly, in Poland, the YG has stimulated 
enhanced cooperation between local- level employment offices (Poviat) and a 
wide range of organizations, such as academic career centers, local Voluntary 
Labor Corps (Ochotnicze Hufce Pracy (OHP)) units, social welfare centers, and 
schools (Weishaupt 2014). However, effective cooperation between PES and OHP 
regarding youth- related ALMPs remains a challenge (European Commission 
2016). Early indications regarding YG implementation show that social partner 
and youth organizations’ involvement has been very limited in most countries 
(Dhéret and Morosi 2015; Eurofound 2015).
3.4.1.3. Targeting of NEET Policies: Addressing Low  
Skilling and Early School Leaving
Another common pattern across clusters has been a stronger focus on NEETs, 
early school- leavers, and other at- risk youth groups (low qualified, from an 
ethnic minority/ migrant background, or from a lower socioeconomic/ disadvan-
taged background).
Education- related reforms have addressed low educational attainment. Policy 
interventions across all clusters have focused on reducing ESL age so that young 
people obtain the minimum labor market entry requirement of at least an upper 
secondary education qualification (European Commission 2015a; Hadjivassiliou 
2016). In Spain, the 2013 education reform (Ley Orgánica para la Mejora de la 
Calidad Educativa) sought to reduce ESL by allowing those aged 15– 17 years to 
enroll in basic professional training to obtain the upper secondary school qual-
ification and eventually access higher level training (González Menéndez et al. 
2015a, 2015b). In Sweden, given the large share (approximately 25%) of youth 
who have not successfully completed upper secondary education, so- called “ed-
ucation contracts” were introduced in 2015 to encourage unemployed young 
people aged 20– 24 years to complete their upper secondary education (Wadensjö 
2015; Forslund 2016).
There has also been an increased focus on targeting NEETs across all clusters 
(Mascherini, this volume). Training and education or activation measures, re-
habilitation programs, more integrated services, and outreach activities to iden-
tify, register, and (re- )engage NEETs have all been used. This is crucial given the 
large numbers of NEETs who are not registered with PES and cannot access YG- 
related and other supportive interventions. Although many countries— including 
Spain and Germany— have set up online outreach tools, the engagement of un-
registered, “hardest- to- reach” youth through grassroots actions (e.g., street out-
reach work) and multiagency working remains less common (Eurofound 2015; 
Hadjivassiliou 2016). This constitutes a serious limitation because online out-
reach tools (e.g., using Facebook and other social media and/ or designated online 
platforms/ portals to reach out to NEETs) cannot replace face- to- face interaction, 
especially when it comes to youth with more complex problems (International 
Classification of Functioning 2015).
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Overall, it is fair to say that in many cases, the YG has provided an additional 
impetus in focusing on NEETs, although the actual implementation in countries 
with high youth unemployment falls short of initial expectations.
3.4.1.4. VET and Apprenticeships
VET and apprenticeships suggest elements of convergence across clusters, al-
though changes may be confined to policy objectives rather than actual 
outcomes. There has been a universal effort to reform or strengthen the role of 
VET/ apprenticeships in STW transitions, although the extent of change seems to 
be more far- reaching— at least in terms of policy intention— in the subprotective 
cluster (European Commission 2015a; González Menéndez et al. 2015b). Spain 
has recently embarked upon a major education reform to improve the links be-
tween its education system and the labor market. Royal Decree 1529/ 2012 laid the 
foundations for the gradual introduction of the dual- training principle in Spain’s 
VET and sought to foster greater participation by companies (González Gago 
2015; González Menéndez et  al. 2015b). Recent education reform introduced 
more vocational pathways in lower secondary education and a new 2- year VET 
module to address ESL (González Gago 2015).
Since 2013, the United Kingdom (liberal cluster) has been implementing a 
major VET and apprenticeship reform. Apprenticeship Trailblazers seek to put 
employers at the heart of the apprenticeship system, representing a potential par-
adigm shift within the UK context (Tassinari et al. 2016). The reforms aim to 
promote VET and associated career pathways as a high- quality option and to 
expand apprenticeship take- up (Hadjivassiliou et al. 2015). Similar VET/ appren-
ticeship reforms have been introduced in Estonia (2013), Sweden (2014), and 
France (2013 and 2014).
VET and apprenticeships may potentially become more important STW tran-
sition mechanisms, even in the liberal (UK) and the subprotective (ES) clusters, 
where they have traditionally been underdeveloped. However, introducing ap-
prenticeship/ VET reforms at the policy design level is not sufficient to bring 
about deep- seated institutional change. This requires a change in the attitude 
of training providers and employers, as well as increased partnership working 
between the two, which is not easily achieved in countries lacking such a tra-
dition of cooperation, such as France, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
(Eurofound 2015; Hadjivassiliou, Tassinari, and Swift 2015; Ślęzak and Szopa 
2015; Smith et al. 2015).
VET reforms also require strong and unequivocal employer support in terms 
of offering an adequate supply of quality placements and associated training 
(Eichhorst 2015). Change is also required in the attitude of young people and 
their families, whereby apprenticeship/ VET is not viewed as a second- best op-
tion. Nonetheless, VET still suffers from a rather poor image in the subprotective 
(ES), post- socialist (EE and PL), and liberal (UK) clusters (Eamets and Humal 
2015; González Menéndez et al. 2015b).
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There is also concern about the education and training systems’ ability 
to quickly adapt in line with the new VET/ apprenticeship reforms to deal ef-
fectively with the current cohort of unemployed youth, as well as the gap be-
tween employer demand and the VET system’s ability to respond satisfactorily 
(Eurofound 2015). These factors may act as barriers to deep institutional change 
in this policy area.
3.4.1.5. Flexibilization of Youth Labor Markets and EPL Reforms
Persistent labor market segmentation is evident across all five clusters, al-
though the trajectory of change seems to be one of convergence toward greater 
“flexibilization,” along with the loosening of EPL for prime- age workers rather 
than greater security. Reforms of EPL have focused on achieving a better balance 
in protection between those on permanent and those on temporary contracts, 
thus reducing existing dualisms. In the Netherlands, EPL changes since July 2015 
seek to strengthen the position of workers on temporary contracts (Bekker et al. 
2015). Similarly, in Spain, following the 2010 and 2012 labor market reforms, 
the deregulation of EPL for permanent contracts has reduced the dualism be-
tween temporary and permanent employment protection (González Menéndez 
et al. 2015a). The Estonian Employment Contracts Act (2009) introduced major 
reforms aimed at increasing labor market flexibility. In France, highly controver-
sial and politically difficult EPL changes have proved to be more limited but in 
any case have sought to reduce labor market dualism.
However, it is too soon to gauge the impact of these changes on youth labor 
markets, especially against a backdrop of limited labor demand in some of the 
countries examined. More worryingly, existing evidence suggests that the share 
of temporary contracts among youth has even increased in countries (FR and ES) 
that deregulated EPL during the crisis (Eichhorst et al. 2016; Grotti, Russell, and 
O’Reilly, this volume). The available evidence suggests that attempts to loosen 
EPL for permanent contracts in highly dualized labor markets (FR and ES) are 
likely to result in worsening working conditions and more unstable employment 
for all workers rather than in easier STW transitions (Eichhorst and Rinne 2014; 
González Menéndez et al. 2015a, 2015b). Even the traditionally better perfor-
mance of some STW regimes seems to come under question, with temporary, 
precarious employment rates increasing among young people in countries such 
as the Netherlands, thus pointing to a potential convergence toward lower quality 
of transitions across the board.
3.4.2. assessing the impact of institutional Change 
on Youth transition regimes
The ongoing processes of institutional change in the targeting, design, and gov-
ernance of ALMPs, the status of VET systems, and the design of EPL institutions 
are leading to a reconfiguration of European youth transition regimes. The 
five convergence trends in the trajectory of policy change during the crisis are 
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accompanied by persisting divergence in institutional and fiscal capacity across 
countries that— together with dynamics of institutional path dependency— 
affect the depth and effectiveness of reform implementation and thus raise 
doubts about the possibility of substantial institutional change occurring in the 
short term.
Nonetheless, our analysis suggests that the STW transition regimes defined by 
Pohl and Walther’s (2007) typology may be in a state of flux as a result of policy 
developments during the recent crisis. Rubery’s (2011) “regime hybridization” 
concept is relevant here for capturing the nature of the ongoing institutional 
changes affecting the structure of youth transition policy regimes in Europe. 
Indeed, recent policy developments are blurring the distinctions between regimes 
and potentially altering the underlying logic structuring youth transitions in each 
cluster. Countries across all regimes have recently adopted reforms in regula-
tion and policy instruments that do not belong to their “traditional” institutional 
legacy as captured by Pohl and Walther’s typology. Furthermore, a tendency to-
ward greater liberalization of employment regulation has been accompanied by 
increased policy activity in “new” areas, such as ALMPs, to address existing gaps 
in support and protection, in line with the trajectory identified by Rubery for 
European welfare regimes as a whole.
For example, reforms of VET and apprenticeship systems have achieved 
prominence in countries in the liberal and subprotective clusters, where these 
instruments have traditionally been secondary in importance, while at the 
same time the sustainability and effectiveness of VET have faced challenges in 
the employment- centered and universalistic cluster countries, where VET has 
traditionally been more established. The increased focus on “supportive” and 
targeted ALMPs— traditionally characteristics of the universalistic cluster— is 
now spreading to countries where such instruments were considerably less de-
veloped, such as those belonging to the subprotective and post- socialist clusters, 
largely as a result of the policy convergence process driven by the YG. At the 
same time, processes of labor market flexibilization are changing the institutional 
architecture of employment regulation toward greater liberalization across the 
board, including in countries traditionally characterized by entrenched dualisms 
in protection (i.e., subprotective or employment- centered clusters).
Although developing revised typologies was not an objective of our analysis, 
our findings show that it is necessary to consider institutional configurations and 
“clusters” as being dynamic, while continuing to devote attention to processes of 
institutional and structural change that may be altering the underlying logic of 
distinct youth transition regimes over time.
Although the limited number of countries in our sample did not allow us 
to systematically explore the internal “coherence” of the different youth transi-
tion regimes outlined by Pohl and Walther (2007), our analysis has shown that 
considerable variation exists across countries, even within clusters that share 
common underlying logics of institutional configuration. This suggests that 
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although the “youth transition regime” concept can act as a useful heuristic, an-
alytical device, generalizations at the cluster level in terms of performance need 
to be examined judiciously.
In terms of impact on performance, most reforms introduced in the aftermath 
of the Great Recession are very recent, making it difficult to estimate their poten-
tial to contribute to positive changes in the future quality and speed of STW tran-
sition to tackle performance challenges. However, some preliminary remarks can 
be made. In the universalistic cluster, where the main challenge arises from the 
difficult labor market integration of specific groups of disadvantaged youth, cur-
rent efforts to improve the speed and targeting of activation measures may prove 
helpful. In the employment- centered and subprotective clusters, where a key 
youth- related challenge arises from high levels of labor market segmentation, 
the current policy trend of greater labor market flexibilization may actually be 
counterproductive in ensuring fast and secure transitions. Indeed, it has already 
resulted in higher levels of temporary and precarious employment— at least in 
the short term (Eichhorst et al. 2016).
Increasing PES capacity and strengthening ALMP comprise another funda-
mental area of intervention to help disadvantaged youth across clusters, espe-
cially in the subprotective and post- socialist regimes. Likewise, reforming VET 
to increase linkages between education and the labor market could help address 
the skills mismatch pervasive in the subprotective and liberal clusters. However, 
the depth of policy change in these areas remains limited by dynamics of insti-
tutional path dependency and the low availability of resources for effective im-
plementation. The overall emerging picture is thus one in which policy changes 
aimed at strengthening supportive policy instruments— such as expanding 
ALMP and PES capacity and strengthening VET systems— are currently limited 
in their reach and potential effectiveness. At the same time, the trends of liber-
alization and deregulation of protective institutions, such as EPL, contribute to 
making young people’s STW transitions potentially more unstable, at least in the 
short term.
3.5. CONCLUSIONS
Our comparative analysis has shown that countries’ institutional configurations 
matter considerably in shaping the structure of young people’s STW transitions 
and in mediating the impact of the Great Recession on youth unemployment. 
Drawing upon Pohl and Walther’s (2007) concept of “youth transition regime” 
as a heuristic framework for comparison, we have assessed the performance of 
countries belonging to different clusters regarding the speed, ease, and quality of 
STW transitions. The divergence in performance between countries belonging 
to different regimes— which had already started in 2007 and has accelerated 
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since 2009— shows the important role of institutional arrangements in shaping 
STW transitions in the fields of employment regulation, education and training, 
and ALMP.
In line with existing evidence, well- integrated VET systems with strong em-
ployer involvement and clear labor market connections alongside supportive 
ALMPs have emerged as important institutional characteristics that have histor-
ically facilitated the comparatively better performance in STW transitions of the 
universalistic (SE) and employment- centered (DE and NL) clusters. Therefore, it 
is unsurprising that recent policy interventions introduced by European coun-
tries during austerity, including the YG initiative, have focused on strengthening 
these two institutional areas. In VET, the focus has primarily been on expanding 
apprenticeships as a transition route and increasing linkages between training 
systems and the labor market by enhancing employer involvement. In ALMP, 
policy intervention has focused on improving PES capacity and diversifying ex-
isting activation measures to provide more personalized support to unemployed 
youth, including NEETs. Given the well- documented “scarring” effects of NEET 
status, this renewed NEET focus is welcome, as is the tailoring of responses across 
clusters in recognition of the NEET population’s heterogeneity (Mascherini, this 
volume; Zuccotti and O’Reilly, this volume).
These areas of policy change could be viewed as a potential sign of conver-
gence across regimes in terms of their underlying logic of STW transitions. 
However, the extent to which such policy changes can become embedded in 
other contexts crucially depends on existing institutional and coordination ca-
pacity, as well as the availability of resources. Indeed, VET systems are complexly 
interwoven within the broader institutional fabric, with the evidence suggesting 
that the potential for far- reaching change may be limited by dynamics of insti-
tutional path dependency (e.g., the lack of established mechanisms for social 
partner engagement and coordination). Likewise, the absence of pre- existing in-
stitutional infrastructures of coordination in numerous countries jeopardizes the 
success of attempts to improve PES capacity and establish effective partnership 
working between different agencies to engage difficult- to- reach youth.
Resource limitations— both fiscal and in terms of actors’ capacity— also act as a 
barrier to more deep- seated institutional change, potentially making the transfer 
of “good practice” across regimes inherently difficult. Despite EU funding, in 
most cases reforms are being introduced against a backdrop of tight public 
finances and spending cuts, which undermines the effective implementation of 
policies such as the expansion of ALMP and PES capacity. Moreover, in the con-
text of a fragile economic recovery in many countries— or second- dip recession 
in a few— employer capacity to provide training places (e.g., apprenticeships) 
and jobs to young people may be limited (Eurofound 2015).
Employment regulation has also emerged from our analysis as a key factor 
affecting the quality and nature of STW transitions. Differential levels of EPL 
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between temporary and permanent employment have led many countries— 
especially in the subprotective and employment- centered clusters— to en-
trenched labor market segmentation, with young people being increasingly 
confined to the labor market’s temporary segment. Since 2010, many coun-
tries have tried to tackle segmentation by deregulating permanent contracts 
(Eichhorst et al. 2016). Despite being more pronounced in the most segmented 
countries, such as France and Spain, this has also occurred in better- performing 
countries such as the Netherlands. While reducing segmentation, excessive flex-
ibility can lead to low employment quality and high precariousness, as the expe-
rience of the liberal and post- socialist clusters shows. The trend emerging from 
reforms implemented during the Great Recession thus seems to point toward 
greater labor market flexibilization, which is not promising in terms of ensuring 
that transitions are stable and secure in the long term. Balancing flexibility and 
security in youth labor markets represents a key outstanding challenge that is yet 
to be fully confronted in all clusters.
Although institutional configurations are very important in shaping the 
structure, nature, and effectiveness of STW transitions, the performance of 
countries is also significantly shaped by macroeconomic trends, especially by 
levels of demand for youth labor. Divergence between countries in economic 
performance accounts for many of the observed differences with regard to the 
performance of youth labor markets. The comparatively positive performance 
of the Polish youth labor market is largely explained by the fact that Poland 
did not fall into a recession. Likewise, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
started recovering from the recession relatively sooner compared to the other 
countries, accounting for their comparatively better performance in youth 
employment.
In a context in which youth labor demand remains low, policy interventions 
focused solely on the supply side or that encourage flexibility will remain 
limited in their effectiveness. Our analysis illustrates how the institutional 
configurations of STW regimes in Europe are “in flux.” The validity and ap-
plicability of established typologies, such as that of Pohl and Walther (2007), 
are limited in the present historical phase because of ongoing dynamics of re-
gime hybridization (Rubery 2011). Current trends of emerging “convergence” 
across clusters in the design of youth- transition policy instruments may alter 
the logic of transition systems across regimes in the long term, making a new 
conceptualization of youth transition regimes necessary. However, currently, 
this institutional change remains limited in terms of impact and superficial in 
terms of actual implementation. Differences in performance across regimes 
persist, with some faring better than others, although at the same time a 
common, worrying trend can be identified across clusters: a progressive de-
terioration of the quality of youth transitions across the board, despite the 
positive policy intentions to strengthen and improve the efficacy of transition 
regimes.
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NOTES
1 Although we are aware of the importance of other policy instruments such 
as in- work benefits, which may act as pull factors for what concerns the labor 
market transitions of young people, we are unable to address them in this 
chapter due to space constraints (see Smith et al., this volume).
2 This chapter is based on seven in- depth case studies completed in 2015. See 
STYLE Working Papers, WP3, Country reports, CROME. http:// www.style- 
research.eu/ publications/ working- papers.
3 The different indicators capture different aspects of youth labor market per-
formance. High youth unemployment rates reflect young people’s difficulties 
in securing employment. However, this does not mean that the number of un-
employed young people (aged 15– 24 years) is large, because many in this age 
group are in full- time education (i.e., inactive). This may make meaningful 
comparisons between different countries difficult (Wadensjö 2015). A more 
reliable indicator is the youth unemployment ratio (O’Reilly et al. 2015).
4 Although the introduction of the YG by the European Commission in 2013 
has been welcome, it has been subject to a number of criticisms, not least 
that it was introduced quite late and was accompanied by inadequate finan-
cial resources (Dhéret and Morosi 2015). According to International Labour 
Organization (2015) estimates, the proper implementation of the YG in EU28 
requires spending of approximately €45 billion, whereas the available EU fi-
nancial support— under the Youth Employment Initiative, which is funding 
the implementation of the YG across the EU— amounts to €6.4 billion.
5 All the country reports on the YG mentioned here were published by the 
European Commission in 2016 on the website http:// ec.europa.eu/ social/ 
main.jsp?catId=1161.
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STRESSED ECONOMIES, DISTRESSED POLICIES, 
AND DISTRAUGHT YOUNG PEOPLE
european poliCies anD outComes From a Youth 
perspeCtiVe
Mark Smith, Janine Leschke, Helen Russell, and Paola Villa
4.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter assesses recent labor market policies and outcomes in Europe, with 
a focus on the impact upon young people.1 Our point of departure is the inad-
equacy of moribund “flexicurity” policies that lost both their political sponsors 
and their credibility during the Great Recession.2 These weaknesses were 
compounded by an overemphasis on flexibility measures, a gender- blind ap-
proach to policy, and limited consideration for the impact on young people.
The crisis facing young people on the labor market has become a growing 
concern for both policymakers and academic researchers. Whereas some of 
these concerns reflect long- standing challenges faced by young people entering 
the labor market, other issues are linked more specifically to outcomes and 
policy changes resulting from the severe economic downturn. These challenges 
have short- term (rising unemployment), medium- term (long- term unemploy-
ment and precariousness), and long- term consequences (scarring and delayed 
family formation) for the generation of youth that entered working life in the 
years of the Great Recession (see Part II of this volume).
Our critique of policies and outcomes is based on extensive analysis— as part 
of the STYLE project— of recent European and national policies for youth at the 
flexibility– security interface. This includes studies tracing and scrutinizing policy 
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reforms— in particular, developments in active labor market policies (ALMPs) 
and unemployment insurance— using, among other sources, European compar-
ative policy databases such as the Labour Market Reforms Database (LABREF) 
and the Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) (Eamets 
et  al. 2015; Smith and Villa 2016; also see Leschke and Finn, this volume). 
Another study under the project used quantitative analysis on European Social 
Survey (ESS) data to analyze the impact of flexicurity on young people’s inse-
curity and subjective well- being (Russell, Leschke, and Smith 2015). Based on 
these studies and previous research by the authors (e.g., Smith and Villa 2013; 
Leschke, Theodoropoulou, and Watt 2014), we demonstrate in this chapter four 
key weaknesses in employment policy related to young people in Europe. First, 
there has been an over- reliance on supply- side policies and on quantitative 
targets. Second, labor market reforms have been driven by external pressures of 
macroeconomic stability rather than by a coherent strategy toward sustainable 
labor market outcomes. Third, reforms have been based on a downward pressure 
on job security and a strengthening of employability security through ALMPs, 
despite slack labor demand. Fourth, due to the over- reliance on quantitative 
targets, there is a lack of consideration by policymakers of the wider (subjective) 
impact of precariousness and early career insecurity on young people and their 
life courses. In identifying these four elements, we argue that employment policy, 
both European and national, has not been well adapted to the needs of young 
people. The consequences of all these four weaknesses in policymaking are par-
ticularly acute for young people and are frequently not taken into consideration.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4.2 
explores the context of European employment policymaking, with a partic-
ular focus on the evolution of the European Employment Strategy (EES) and 
the position of young people within this pan- national framework for policy 
learning and development. Section 4.3 explores, in turn, the four key critiques 
of European employment policy and their impact on young people. Section 4.4 
concludes with a consideration of the policy implications and a call for a renewed 
perspective on durable and resilient labor markets for young women and men 
transitioning from school to work.
4.2. YOUTH AND EUROPEAN UNION EMPLOYMENT POLICY
Within the European Union (EU), the most direct way to influence member 
states’ employment policy is via labor law directives, which are often negotiated 
autonomously by the social partners in the area of working conditions. These 
initiatives, however, have been rather ineffective in setting EU- wide minimum 
standards during the past 15  years— at least at a cross- sectoral level (Falkner 
2016). The EES has provided a framework whereby the EU exerts a soft influ-
ence on member states’ employment policy.3 The aim has been to achieve broadly 
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defined European- level goals in terms of labor market performance— in partic-
ular, a high level of employment— by way of benchmarking and best- practice 
learning. These ideals were proposed in order to help member states improve 
their labor market policies (including structural reforms) and achieve shared 
goals— articulated through the “employment guidelines” and the “country- 
specific recommendations” (CSRs). The extent to which the EES— based on the 
voluntary open method of coordination (OMC)— influences national employ-
ment policies has been a question for researchers over the life of the strategy 
as this innovative form of policymaking has evolved (Heidenreich and Zeitlin 
2009; de la Porte and Pochet 2012; Copeland and ter Haar 2013; Smith and Villa 
2013). Although direct links between European- level analysis and prescription 
on employment policy, on the one hand, and national- level implementation, on 
the other hand, have been difficult to draw, there is evidence of a number of 
mechanisms whereby EU policy formulations have some influence on national 
policymaking (Heidenreich 2009; de la Porte and Heins 2015).
The EES operates on the basis of employment guidelines and quantitative 
headline targets to be achieved by the EU as a whole. These guidelines provide 
concise and general guidance in terms of what is “expected” of member states 
regarding the achievement of the different targets set within the general goal of 
“high employment,” as established in the Amsterdam Treaty. Over this period, EU 
influence has been exercised via the OMC framed by the employment guidelines, 
which form the basis for the country- specific reporting in the so- called National 
Reform Programmes; specific guidance on national employment policy is pro-
vided via CSRs (issued by the European Commission (EC) and endorsed by the 
Council of Ministers). These processes have been complemented by best- practice 
events between national policymakers and the EC. Moreover, this has also been 
a period in which European countries have been encouraged (by the EC and 
the Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD)) to 
make their labor markets more flexible (i.e., more responsive to changes), with 
an emphasis on moving from job security (i.e., employment protection legisla-
tion (EPL)) to employment or employability security (i.e., smooth transitions 
from unemployment to employment or directly between different jobs through 
ALMPs), under the assumption that an increase in flexibility should lead to more 
employment opportunities for all.4 At the heart of the EES, there has been an 
idealized view of the employment relationship and of good labor market perfor-
mance, based on freeing up supply- side constraints. Indeed, flexibility has been 
a theme of the EES since its early formulation, albeit with limited recognition 
of the impact on youth in its diverse effects for insiders and outsiders. However, 
as the economic context and the political leadership of member states have 
changed, the policy buzzwords and foci on particular labor market problems, key 
labor supply groups, and core solutions have also shifted. Over time, the policy 
tools proposed for reaching the goals of the EES have evolved, shifting from flex-
ibility toward flexicurity (for a critique, see Hansen and Triantafillou 2011).
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The promotion of flexicurity was the policy approach that marked the pe-
riod directly prior to the crisis (Wilthagen and Tros 2004), although without an 
explicit target group and with blindness toward differences in age and gender 
(Jepsen 2005; Plantenga, Remery, and Rubery 2008). The shift from “security of 
the job” to “security on the labor market” suggested by Wim Kok’s (2003) report 
was often interpreted by policymakers at the national level as a prescription for 
reducing EPL and flexibilizing labor markets. This resulted in an underdevelop-
ment of the security dimension5— at least before the crisis kicked in— which was 
also implied by an overemphasis on flexibility vis- à- vis security in the EU version 
of flexicurity (Heyes 2011).
Young people have not always been visible in the various formulations of the 
EES framework and have mainly been included where there have been chronic 
problems in certain member states. One of the most significant lines of action of 
the EES highlights the need to improve the quality of human capital through ed-
ucation and continuous training, in particular that of the most “disadvantaged” 
groups (women, older workers, low- skilled, migrants, and the disabled). Thus, 
education, particularly important for young people, has been a central plank of 
the EES since its inception and was further strengthened in 2010 when the new 
strategy, Europe 2020, was launched, providing guidelines for the new decade. In 
particular, Europe 2020 included some revisions of the EES by way of introducing 
two explicit headline targets on education. Indeed, an underlying principle of the 
“ideal labor market” proposed by the EES (throughout its many reformulations) 
has been the provision of high- quality education and skills. This should equip 
young people with the appropriate characteristics to enter employment; hence, 
failures in this area may result in high drop- out rates; youth unemployment; and 
not in employment, education, or training (NEET) status (see Mascherini, this 
volume).
Despite the position of education in the EES, analysis of the 477 CSRs issued 
by the EC over time (2000– 2013) shows that young people were not identified 
as a group in need of specific employment policies.6 Indeed, mention of younger 
workers was rather rare, likewise in the documentation and other mechanisms 
of the EES (Smith and Villa 2016). For example, in the early years of the EES 
(2000– 2002) there were, on average, just 5 CSRs per year linked to youth out 
of the 50– 60 issued each year. By contrast, older workers and women received 
more CSRs: 8– 9 and 12– 13, respectively. Only when the situation on the youth 
labor market deteriorated did we witness a greater focus on young people in the 
CSRs. In 2011 and 2012, there were 15 and 17 CSRs, respectively, that explicitly 
considered young people (Smith and Villa 2016, 19– 20).
The impact of labor market reforms on young people received little attention 
before the economic recession of 2008– 2009. So- called “reforms at the margin” 
in the name of flexicurity had been recommended and implemented in a number 
of member states— with dramatic consequences for young people, not taken into 
account by policymakers. Prior to the economic recession, several member states 
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started deregulating their labor markets: Although this move enabled the entry of 
many young people into employment when the economy was growing, it turned 
into something of a boomerang effect when these young workers became among 
the first to lose their jobs during the severe recession (European Commission 
2010; Leschke 2012; O’Reilly et  al. 2015). As a result, the subsequent call to 
member states was to strengthen ALMP and to intervene with individualized 
and well- targeted policies of activation to prevent long- term youth unemploy-
ment (e.g., the Youth Guarantee (YG) in 2013). The evolving economic crisis 
meant that the emergence of high youth unemployment became a key theme. 
Against the backdrop of the EES, member states also responded to their own 
priorities (and political constraints) as well as to the various recommendations 
for reform from the EC.
The 2010 Youth on the Move flagship policy of Europe 2020 did place young 
people in a more prominent position within the employment strategy as one of 
the seven flagship policy areas. This followed the publication of the Youth Strategy 
Communication a year earlier, which again placed a heavy emphasis on education 
and training opportunities but also highlighted the principles of flexicurity as a 
means to ease youth transitions (European Commission 2009). The Youth on the 
Move policy documentation did recognize the risks associated with segmentation 
of young people on temporary contracts (European Commission 2010), but there 
were few targeted initiatives in this regard. Furthermore, the gender dimension to 
these policy proposals was almost completely absent, reflecting a long- term de-
cline in the position of gender equality and gender- mainstreaming mechanisms 
within the EES (Villa 2013). The Youth Opportunities Initiative (2012– 2013) led 
to more action as the effects of the crisis on young people became clear (European 
Commission 2011). The main area of action for this initiative was supporting the 
transition from school to work, particularly for those young people falling out 
of the system having failed to achieve an upper secondary education. But it also 
included intra- EU mobility and the use of the European Social Fund to support 
youth labor markets. Although these initiatives represented an increased focus 
on young people, an integrated approach to youth transitions and the challenges 
young people face on the labor market was still absent (Knijn and Plantenga 
2012). These initiatives coalesced around the YG— an EU- wide scheme aimed at 
providing employment or training opportunities for all young people before they 
experience 4 months without work or training, in order to avoid the risk of long- 
term unemployment. The scheme was bold in its ambitions, reflecting acknowl-
edgment of the scale of the problem facing European youth, but it was weak in its 
implementation (Bussi and Geyer 2013).
The somewhat ambivalent position of the EES toward youth has been mirrored 
in national policy priorities, leading to a situation in which concerns about the 
position of young people on the labor market have not been widely considered. 
Responses were reactive rather than proactive, and they often materialized only 
in the face of the deterioration of youth labor market prospects created by the 
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Great Recession. In Section 4.3, we explore in more detail the consequences of 
the relatively scant attention given to young people in European employment 
policymaking.
4.3. FAILED POLICIES AND OUTCOMES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE
4.3.1. over- reliance on supply- side solutions  
and Quantitative targets
Employment policy guidance from the EC and national- level policy implemen-
tation have been characterized by an over- reliance on supply- side solutions to 
high unemployment and low employment rates, with emphasis being placed 
on the activation of unemployed and inactive people and on the need for new 
forms of “flexible” contracts to encourage employers to recruit. The 2015 re-
vised guidelines do call for “boosting demand for labor,” but they focus on re-
ducing “barriers” to job creation rather than on aggregate demand (see Section 
4.3.3). Yet the subsequent guidelines call for “enhancing labor supply, skills and 
competences,” underlying the ongoing reliance on supply- side approaches. In a 
sovereign debt crisis (that followed the 2008– 2009 recession), there may well 
be constraints on policymakers’ options (which are focused on labor market 
policies rather than on expansionary macroeconomic policies), but it is then also 
necessary to acknowledge the limitations of those options that, by definition, rely 
only on supply- side policy measures. For young people, the activation approach 
has been evident in the emphasis on educational investment, highlighting the 
idea that failings have been linked to inadequate qualifications rather than to the 
functioning of the labor market or to a lack of demand. Indeed, the reformula-
tion of the EES under the Europe 2020 strategy reinforced this position, with the 
inclusion of education headline targets (reducing early school leaving and, in 
particular, raising the share of young people with tertiary education to 40%),7 as 
well as the new skills and jobs agenda.
The emphasis on labor market flexibility could be considered to have been 
optimistic before the crisis and to have been unrealistic during the crisis and 
austerity period (Lehndorff 2014). The weaknesses of the supply- side philosophy 
were exposed during the crisis, with the consequences falling on young people. 
The EES has also been heavily focused on increasing the quantity of people in 
employment, with a limited (and then invisible) focus on job quality. This is most 
evident in the strong priority given to quantitative targets over quality outcomes 
and the creation of new atypical contracts. Also, the focus has been on soft law 
under the OMC in employment; indeed, the past decade and a half has seen very 
few labor law directives with binding and sanctionable content.8 An exception 
is the 2008 Temporary Agency Work Directive— an issue that had long been in 
stalemate due to disagreement between the European- level social partners.
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The employment rate headline target (75% of 20- to 64- year- olds to be em-
ployed in 2020, with specific national targets reflecting their current situation)9 
illustrates the dominance of quantitative over qualitative ambitions. In order to 
assess the development of employment in the EU and the member states, the 
employment rate indicator from the EU Labour Force Survey (EU- LFS) is used, 
which records any employment in the interview reference week of 1 hour or 
more. This implies that the employment rate headline indicator does not dif-
ferentiate between regular full- time employment and employment with few 
hours, including marginal employment or involuntary part- time work. The het-
erogeneity of employment forms means that a single measure is inadequate for 
capturing and measuring experiences on the labor market. For example, Eurostat 
does not publish the full- time equivalent (FTE) employment rates on its web 
page, although using FTEs provides a very different picture— in particular, the 
(qualitative) employment integration of women and young people. The contrast 
is clearest in the Dutch case, in which female employment rates in the Eurostat 
definition are close to 70% and thus among the highest in Europe, whereas FTEs 
are only approximately 48% for 2015 and thus at the bottom of the European 
ranking.10
European initiatives establishing a complementary set of quality- of- work 
indicators include the 2001 Laeken indicators (with 10 quality- of- work 
dimensions) and the more recent deliberations of the Employment Committee 
of the Council, aimed at rendering these indicators more concise. Yet these 
initiatives have not been very fruitful in terms of visibility (for an extensive 
discussion, see Peña- Casas 2009; Bothfeld and Leschke 2012). A  stronger 
focus on work- quality issues was first “overshadowed” by the flexicurity drive 
in European policies and then by the urgency of the economic crisis and 
rising unemployment (Bothfeld and Leschke 2012). On a more general level, 
even though there exist several European- level social indicator systems and 
scoreboards that include more qualitative indicators, when it comes to using 
them in a more concrete manner, they usually disappear into annexes or com-
plementary assessment documents; also, the fact that there are several parallel 
social indicator systems and scoreboards does not make coherent reporting 
easy (Leschke 2016).
4.3.2. external pressures on employment policy
The external pressures on national employment policymakers have been rising 
for all member states and have been very intense for those under financial assis-
tance and experiencing the worst of the sovereign debt crisis (Scharpf 2011; de la 
Porte and Heins 2015). There has been a resulting high intensity of policymaking 
across the EU, as well as widespread reforms that have not necessarily been 
coherent with the founding vision of the EES or the aims of improving labor 
market performance— not least among those countries suffering most as a result 
of the Great Recession. Indeed, there are some member states that demonstrate 
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a particularly high intensity of policymaking and appear to be struggling in the 
more turbulent waters created by the changing economic conditions. Both policy 
and youth labor market outcomes suggest that these countries are finding it dif-
ficult to “swim” in these shifting waters of the European economic and policy 
environment (Smith and Villa 2016). Equally, Hasting and Heyes (2016) suggest 
that these conditions have made it more difficult to develop security policies as-
sociated with the flexicurity approach. Contrariwise, there are some countries 
that seem to have developed policy more incrementally and to have refined their 
“swimming technique” in these choppy waters; these countries have more stable 
institutional environments and have had some success on youth labor markets 
(Smith and Villa 2016). The uneven distribution of these external pressures may 
lead to a further variety of outcomes across youth labor markets and poorer 
chances of convergence toward stronger labor market performance.
The contradictory outcomes of pressure for change due to high youth un-
employment during the crisis, on the one hand, and austerity pressure for 
fiscal consolidation, on the other hand, can be illustrated by the developments 
in unemployment benefits over the course of the Great Recession (for other 
examples of incoherent developments in welfare policies, see Heise and Lierse 
2011; Lehndorff 2014). Young workers are subject both to explicit disadvantage 
in terms of differential rules of access to unemployment benefit and to implicit 
disadvantage in access through their over- representation in temporary contracts 
and shorter tenure. Reliable unemployment benefits of sufficient generosity and 
duration render it possible to search for an adequate job, facilitating a better 
match between education and jobs (Gangl 2004), instead of forcing unemployed 
youth to take the first- best option. Indeed, the limited access of youth to un-
employment benefit schemes in many countries has appeared on the national, 
international, and supranational agendas in light of high and rising (youth) un-
employment in the early years of the economic recession (OECD 2011; European 
Commission 2011; Dullien 2013; Del Monte and Zandstra 2014). The previous 
focus on supply- side measures was no longer deemed effective because of the 
lack of realistic possibilities to bring large numbers of youth back into employ-
ment quickly. A number of European countries accordingly improved the situa-
tion of youth and other weakly covered groups— such as temporary workers— by 
permanently or temporarily increasing access, benefit levels, or benefit duration; 
lump- sum and one- off payments were also common instruments (Leschke and 
Finn, this volume). However, the initial positive developments in terms of ben-
efit coverage were no longer visible in 2014 when the effects of austerity had 
kicked in. During the stimulus period (2008– 2009), the focus in several coun-
tries was on relaxing eligibility and increasing benefit levels. Reforms relating to 
eligibility, in particular, even when not explicitly geared toward youth, usually 
have a disproportionate effect on the young unemployed given their shorter av-
erage tenure. The austerity period (2010– 2014), in contrast, was characterized by 
tightening of eligibility and decreasing of benefit levels. However, there was still a 
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limited number of countries that relaxed the qualifying criteria for youth during 
the austerity period; these reforms usually stipulated a strong link between pas-
sive benefit entitlements and participation in education and training programs 
(for details on institutional changes and outcomes, see European Commission 
2014; MISSOC 2014; Leschke and Finn, this volume). Obviously, cutting income 
security in times of crisis is problematic because alternative income sources both 
in terms of job opportunities and wider household income are scarce (Mazzotta 
and Parisi, this volume).
Another example of external pressure on more inclusive employment policies 
is inherent in the way the EES has operated since the mid- 2000s. The coordina-
tion of employment policy under the EES takes place together with the macroec-
onomic coordination. Since 2010, this is done in the framework of the so- called 
“European Semester,” in which the countries submit both the National Reform 
Programme— as part of the EES— and a Stability and Convergence Programme. 
This implies that there is a general danger that qualitative employment and so-
cial targets may be subordinated to budgetary discipline, particularly in times 
of austerity. The fact that at the height of the crisis the Council of Ministers put 
fiscal discipline first on the list of country-specific recommendations confirms 
this view. We can observe a similar “hierarchy” in the 2010 guidelines, in which 
guidelines 1– 3 deal with macroeconomic stability and guidelines 7– 10 with em-
ployment and social policy (European Commission 2010). Leschke et al. (2014) 
demonstrate the contradictions between the recent EU economic governance 
reforms and the austerity measures, on the one hand, and the Europe 2020 in-
clusive growth target, on the other hand. Their analysis shows that the fiscal aus-
terity bias, as evident in the national social spending projections, makes it very 
difficult to reduce poverty and social exclusion. Indeed, further doubts are raised 
by the fact that the national- specific targets on poverty reduction do not add 
up to achieve the EU- wide 2020 headline target and that countries use different 
poverty indicators in their reporting, ranging from at- risk- of- poverty after social 
transfers to low work- intensity households and long- term unemployment.
4.3.3. mixed implementation of Flexicurity measures
The direction and tone of both EU and national policymaking have often been 
characterized by a downward pressure on EPL. In recent years, the focus has been, 
in particular, on decreasing EPL for permanent contracts, thereby narrowing 
the gap between EPL for permanent and temporary workers. Between 2008 and 
2013 (most recent data), 12 out of 22 EU countries included in the OECD EPL 
database lowered EPL on permanent contracts (OECD 2016). Three countries 
(Greece, Portugal, and Spain) lowered EPL also for temporary contracts be-
tween 2008 and 2013; in all three of these countries, there were also reductions 
in EPL for permanent contracts (i.e., further increasing labor market flexibility). 
Although at times there have been measures to promote security, such meas-
ures were often triggered by situations of urgency (i.e., the youth unemployment 
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crisis) and usually did not follow a steady upward logic. This reflects the mixed 
implementation of flexicurity measures and an ethos of deregulation. During the 
period of EU- led structural reform, much policy (and much research) has been 
driven by a focus on downward pressure on EPL. The declining position of job 
quality as a goal and the increasing emphasis on quantitative employment targets 
testifies to the increasingly explicit focus on liberalization of the labor market in 
order to raise the number of people in employment. Some authors claim that 
this has long been the goal of European employment policy (Hermann 2007; 
Amable, Demmou, and Ledezma 2009; Van Apeldoorn 2009), whereas others 
suggest that the changing political, economic, and social climate have reduced 
the scope for policies associated with a more secure and inclusive labor market 
(Villa and Smith 2014; Hastings and Heyes 2016).
The debate between the merits of more flexible hire- and- fire labor markets 
and more regulated protection of labor markets is not new and has driven policy 
and research debates for many years (OECD 1994). Comparisons of EPL over 
time and across countries are central to this debate. The evidence for the effects 
of EPL reduction is at best contradictory (Solow 1998, 2000; Simonazzi and 
Villa 1999; Freeman 2005; Aleksynska 2014). However, although the research 
suggests that there are limited effects of EPL reduction on “performance” and 
that the impact varies by specific target group (even proponents of the dereg-
ulation agenda admit that it is not easy to predict the impact of EPL reforms 
on young people (OECD 2004)), the propagation of the reform agenda in EC 
and European Central Bank (ECB) documents has continued. For example, 
recent ECB analysis of the limited impact of labor market reforms calls for more 
time, more reforms, and greater inter- and intracountry mobility (European 
Central Bank 2014, 67). This commitment on the part of European institutions 
reflects the hegemony of macroeconomic policy linked to monetary union, 
defining labor market policy in relation to its response to macro/ finance shocks 
(European Commission 2012) rather than gearing labor market policy toward 
quality outcomes for participants. Indeed, closer reading of these documents 
shows that rather than being based on empirical evidence, the case continues to 
be made on the basis of economic theory and on prior expectations regarding the 
outcomes of EPL reduction.11 Furthermore, some evidence shows the increasing 
inefficiency of labor markets, as measured by an outward- shifting Beveridge 
curve— a sign of declining “efficiency” in matching jobs to workers (Simonazzi 
and Villa 2016), with increasing risks for young people scarred by the crisis and 
the reform agenda. In addition, there is evidence of a strong divergence in the 
performance of EU labor markets despite a common reform agenda (Hastings 
and Heyes 2016).
Much of the reform agenda around reducing EPL has been conducted in the 
name of flexicurity as policymakers focus on the flexibility rather than the se-
curity dimension to the portmanteau (Eamets et al. 2015). Others have noted 
that flexicurity policies can have a disproportionate impact on young people, 
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especially measures to reduce job security (Madsen et al. 2013). The youth labor 
market may have much to gain from effective balancing of flexibility and secu-
rity (O’Reilly et al. 2015), but “reforms at the margin” (i.e., increasing flexibility 
for outsiders) risk increasing segmentation of youth labor markets and rising 
precariousness.
In order to illustrate the uneven implementation of flexicurity measures, we 
present here results from an analysis of the LABREF database to chart policy 
activity categorized as affecting different elements of the flexicurity model (see 
Smith and Villa 2016). In particular, we identify a subset of LABREF policy 
domains that fall under the three conventional flexicurity categories (see, e.g., 
Wilthagen and Tros 2004):12 job security (i.e., EPL),13 employment security (i.e., 
ALMP),14 and income security (i.e., unemployment benefits and other wel-
fare support measures).15 In short, these policies were categorized according to 
whether they are ex ante likely to promote or diminish job security, employ-
ment security, and income security.16 The focus is on the explicit intention of 
policymakers (as recorded in LABREF), not the actual impact of the measures 
enacted.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the intensity in policymaking categorized under the three 
elements of the flexicurity model by direction of policy (increasing or decreasing 
protection or coverage). The data demonstrate significant policy activity in the 
areas of both job security and employment security and less activity regarding 
income security. It is worth noting that whereas employment security measures 
are almost exclusively categorized as “increasing” (i.e., promoting employment 
security through changes in ALMP), job security measures and income security 
measures go in both directions (increasing and decreasing security)— not only 
over time but often also within the same year. This result holds across country 
groups and years.
When we focus on measures linked to job security (EPL), we observe 
that the Mediterranean group stands out with significant policy activity 
reducing job security; this is particularly stark during the austerity years. 
After the Mediterranean group, this pattern is most notable in the Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Elsewhere, there is evidence of 
policy activity reducing the level of job security across most country groups 
during the austerity years (least among the Nordic countries). However, the 
English- speaking countries have marked policy activity reducing income 
security in the austerity period. This is in contrast with the income security 
measures showing an increase in intensity in the crisis and austerity 
subperiods in all the other country groups— that is, Continental, Nordic, 
CEE, and Mediterranean.
The policies in Figure 4.1 relate to the whole labor market because young 
people are affected by wider changes in employment policy. However, it is also 
possible to analyze these flexicurity measures concentrating only on policies 
identified in LABREF as relating to young people. This focused policy activity 
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shows an increasing share of flexicurity policies targeted at young people as the 
economic conditions deteriorated, rising from just 6% in the precrisis subperiod 
to 12% in the crisis subperiod and to 15% in the austerity subperiod.
This subset of policymaking for young people is almost exclusively focused on 
increasing employment security, but in the austerity subperiod we not only see a 
greater intensity of measures but also a greater diversity. In the final period, the 
promotion of employment security for young people accounts for approximately 
four- fifths of new policies (Table 4.1). The Nordic and Mediterranean countries 
stand out, with certain measures aimed at reducing job security for young people.
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Figure 4.1 Flexicurity policy intensity by direction of policy (increasing/ decreasing) and country 
group, 2000– 2013 (average number of policies enacted per country).
Note: Figures below the Y axis (<0) indicate the average number of policies decreasing security, 
while those above the Y axis (>0) show the number of policies increasing security.
Source: LABREF database; authors’ analyses.
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Table 4.1 Distribution of youth- focused flexicurity policies by country group and subperiod, 2000– 2013 (% and number of policies)
Job security (%) Employment security (%) Income security (%)
Total (%) No.Increasing Decreasing Increasing Decreasing Increasing Decreasing
2000– 2007
Continental – – 100.0 – – – 100 26
Central and Eastern – – 100.0 – – – 100 20
Nordic – – 100.0 – – – 100 13
Mediterranean – – 100.0 – – – 100 10
English- speaking – – 100.0 – – – 100 7
EU27 – – 100.0 – – – 100 76
2008– 2009
Continental – – 76.9 – 23.1 – 100 13
Central and Eastern – – 100.0 – – – 100 5
Nordic – – 100.0 – – – 100 7
Mediterranean – – 100.0 – – – 100 13
English- speaking – – 100.0 – – – 100 15
EU27 – – 94.3 – 5.7 – 100 53
2010– 2013
Continental – – 84.0 4.0 8.0 4.0 100 25
Central and Eastern 4.0 2.0 84.0 2.0 6.0 2.0 100 50
Nordic – 11.1 77.8 5.6 – 5.6 100 18
Mediterranean 1.8 12.7 80.0 1.8 3.6 – 100 55
English- speaking – – 80.0 10.0 – 10.0 100 20
EU27 1.8 6.0 81.5 3.6 4.2 3.0 100 168
Note: See Chapter 3, Section 3.3 for details.
Source: LABREF database; authors’ analysis.
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Overall, we see the main element of youth- focused policymaking in the area 
of ALMP, which we have broadly categorized as promoting employment security 
(i.e., security in the labor market through ALMP) in line with the conventional 
flexicurity model. However, during the austerity subperiod, we observe other 
measures too, and at the margins these policies appeared to be weakening rather 
than strengthening the “principles” of flexicurity. The concentration of reforms 
in countries subject to “Euro Pact” pressure increases the risks for already vul-
nerable workers in weak labor markets, particularly the young. In this context, it 
is important to expand the metrics for judging labor market performance and to 
go beyond shifts in much- criticized EPL measures.
4.3.4. Consequences of early Career insecurity  
and precariousness
Although quality of employment and the wider consequences of insecurity have 
been neglected in policy developments, these are nevertheless crucial issues for 
understanding the impact of the crisis on young people in Europe.
Poor labor market integration and precariousness have negative consequences 
for all labor market participants, but for young people, early career insecurity 
can create longer- term consequences with regard to both labor market outcomes 
and family formation. The scarring effects of early unemployment for later ca-
reer prospects and earnings have been found in many countries (Ackum 1991; 
Arulampalam, Gregg, and Gregory 2001; Burda and Mertens 2001). Precarious 
employment may have similar consequences. Chung, Bekker, and Houwing 
(2012) argue that the low and decreasing rate of transition from temporary jobs 
means that the current youth cohort may be facing long- term labor market risks 
and scarring processes. As our results show, there is also growing evidence that 
early career employment precariousness may have persistent effects on psy-
chological well- being and health (Clark, Georgellis, and Sanfey 2001; Bell and 
Blanchflower 2011). In addition, McGuinness and Wooden (2009) show that 
skill mismatches in the early career can lead to a pathway of mismatched jobs, 
lower returns to qualifications, and unfulfilled potential (McGuinness, Bergin, 
and Whelan, this volume). Moreover, poor labor market integration of youth 
can also lead to delayed family formation or unfulfilled plans for having children 
(Scherer 2009).
There is evidence of a deterioration in the quality of work across a range 
of dimensions for young people who entered the workforce during the Great 
Recession. The proportion of young people working part- time involuntarily 
increased very substantially. Between 2007 and 2014, involuntary part- time 
work increased across the EU from 27% to 35% among those aged younger than 
30 years, and this figure rose to 69% in Spain, 82% in Italy, 75% in Greece, and 
72% in Romania.17 Temporary contracts also became increasingly widespread 
and in some countries became the norm for young people (OECD 2014). Across 
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the EU27, temporary employment among young people grew from 29% in the 
first quarter of 2005 to a peak of 34% in the third quarter of 2015.18
These objective trends in precarious work have other consequences, too. 
Feelings of subjective insecurity also increased among employed young people 
as a result not only of rising temporary work but also of perceived vulnerability 
to job loss and underemployment, as well as concerns about future prospects 
(Peiró, Sora, and Caballer 2012; Green et al. 2014). Data from the ESS show that 
across Europe between 2006 and 2008– 2009, the proportion of the employed 
who believed it was “likely” or “very likely” that they would become unemployed 
in the next 12 months rose from 17% to 27% among those aged younger than 
30 years, whereas the figure for those aged 30 years or older rose by 7 percentage 
points (Figure 4.2).19 The rise in insecurity was particularly sharp in Estonia, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, and young women experienced a greater increase in 
perceived insecurity than young men. As a consequence of these trends, the age 
gap in subjective insecurity widened, reflecting the disproportionate effect of the 
crisis on young people. Perceptions of wider employment security, or the extent 
to which employees perceive there to be opportunities outside their current job, 
were also adversely affected by the economic crisis (Russell et al. 2015).
In addition to increased insecurity and underemployment, labor market 
entrants are also particularly vulnerable to pay adjustments. In Ireland, for ex-
ample, the austerity measures included significant cuts in entry- level salaries for 
public- sector workers such as nurses and teachers. Results from the Structure of 
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
Male Female All Male Female All
Under 30 30–64 years
2006 2008/9
Figure 4.2 Subjective job insecurity, 2006 and 2008– 2009: percentage of the employed who 
think it is “likely” or “very likely” that they will become unemployed in the next 12 months.
Source: ESS Round 3 and ESS Round 4. Average across 20 countries; weighted by post- 
stratification weights.
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Earnings Survey (SES) show that the ratio of youth earnings (aged younger than 
30 years) to average earnings declined across 20 of 23 European countries be-
tween 2006 and 2014, illustrating that pay for young people fell further below the 
average.20 These figures provide some examples of the range of quality- of- work 
impacts that are hidden in figures or targets that only measure employment rates 
and the quantity of jobs.
The effects of unemployment and insecurity on well- being are also invisible in 
the policy discussions described previously. The impact of both unemployment 
and job insecurity on psychological well- being is very well established, with lon-
gitudinal studies demonstrating a causal link (for reviews, see De Witte 2005; 
McKee- Ryan et al. 2005; Paul and Moser 2009). However, it is sometimes argued 
that labor market instability will have a weaker effect on well- being among young 
people because employment is less central to their self- identity or because they 
have fewer financial responsibilities and may have access to parental support 
(Jackson et al. 1983). Furthermore, the argument may be particularly relevant 
for young people that when unemployment becomes a social norm, the psycho-
logical impact is reduced (Clark 2003). The normalization of unemployment, 
inactivity, and temporary employment for younger workers could mean that the 
stigma attached to these statuses is reduced. A number of studies have found that 
the effect of unemployment on psychological well- being is greatest for prime- 
age workers and is weaker for young people and workers closer to retirement 
(Theodossiou 1998; Nordenmark and Strandh 1999), although this finding is not 
universal (McKee- Ryan et al. 2005). Our analyses of the ESS data showed that 
although overall the satisfaction gap between the employed and the unemployed 
was narrower for younger people, the effect was nonetheless significant and sub-
stantial (Russell et al. 2015). Unemployed young people had significantly lower 
life satisfaction compared to their employed peers in all but 1 of the 20 countries 
analyzed, and they had significantly lower well- being— measured by items in the 
WHO- 5 Well- Being Index— in all but 4 countries.
Reduced life satisfaction is also observed among those who believe their job 
is insecure compared to those who feel secure. Figure 4.3 illustrates the gradient 
in life satisfaction scores by employment status. A significant difference in the 
life satisfaction of securely employed and insecurely employed young people is 
observed across all but six of the countries in the study,21 and statistical models 
reveal that the relationship is just as strong for those aged younger than 30 years 
as for those aged 30 years or older (data not shown; available from authors upon 
request). In a number of countries— namely Belgium, Finland, Greece, and 
Norway— insecurely employed young people are just as dissatisfied as the unem-
ployed (Figure 4.3).
The impact of unemployment and insecurity on the psychological well- being 
of individuals is often neglected by policymakers. Yet the costs for individuals 
and their families (Scherer 2009) are high. At the extreme, a number of studies 
have established a relationship between unemployment and increased suicide 
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rates among young men (Walsh 2011). The existing evidence suggests that young 
people struggling to gain a foothold in the increasingly precarious labor market 
may also pay a longer- term price for entering the labor market at the “wrong 
time.” The longer- term consequences of precariousness for young people will 
partly depend on policy responses to assist transitions out of unemployment and 
out of temporary/ insecure work into sustainable work.
4.4. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter develops a critique of EU and national employment policies in re-
lation to young people, highlighting the results and outcomes for their labor 
market experiences and drawing on research conducted for the STYLE project. 
We identify four main areas of critique:
 1. Employment policy has been strongly focused on supply- side meas-
ures that highlight the responsibility of individuals to equip them-
selves for jobs, with little consideration for the quality of employment.
 2. Labor market policymaking has been driven largely by the external 
pressures of austerity, fiscal consolidation, and monetary stability 
rather than by coherence and a strategy aimed at a sustainable healthy 
labor market for participants.
 3. There has been a partial implementation of flexicurity principles with 
a heavy focus on reductions in EPL for outsiders— a precrisis trend— 
without wider consideration of the consequences for young people, 
who were disproportionately affected by labor market flexibility during 
the crisis (via the heavy destruction of jobs held by young people and 
with the dissolution of temporary contracts). In the face of the youth 
unemployment crisis, the focus then turned to strengthening employ-
ment security by way of increasing ALMPs and also (temporarily) in-
come security.
 4. The focus on quantitative measures of labor market performance has 
meant that the subjective outcomes and quality measures have become 
something of a blind spot for policymakers, yet these outcomes are 
crucial for young people.
The EC’s response to the declining position of flexicurity has been to call 
for a “healthy and dynamic” labor market model as the new framework for 
labor market policy in the Europe 2020 period (European Commission 2014, 
75). However, the commitment of the EC and the ECB to the structural reform 
agenda suggests that the prospects for a healthy labor market— from the per-
spective of good matches with quality jobs and, more broadly, the well- being of 
young people— are likely to be limited, not least because an apparent underlying 
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neoliberal agenda has increasingly dominated the EC employment project, 
pushing social goals down the agenda (Villa and Smith 2014): Young people have 
been a casualty of this policy direction.
Before the crisis, flexicurity was seen as the ideal institutional setting that could 
be viewed as a beacon for policymakers and the problems faced by European 
labor markets (O’Reilly et al. 2015). The so- called flexicurity model was a key 
element of the EES, though with an overemphasis on flexibility components 
compared to security dimensions. Also, there was something of a blind spot with 
regard to the consideration of young people within flexicurity models (Eamets 
et al. 2015), just as was the case for gender (Jepsen 2005). Moreover, flexicurity- 
driven policies faced a major challenge with the onset of the crisis (Hastings 
and Heyes 2016). Overall, young people tend to have worse flexibility– security 
outcomes in that their labor market situation is more precarious and they ben-
efit less from income security, especially in the fiscal consolidation period. This 
is in line with previous literature indicating that vulnerable groups on the labor 
market, such as youth, the elderly, women, the long- term unemployed, and 
temporary employees, do not experience the same wins that regular employees 
might gain from flexibility– security policies (Leschke 2012).
The YG was a major policy initiative at the EU level, but it was based on a 
delayed recognition of the scale and consequences of the problems facing the 
youth labor markets (Bussi and Geyer 2013). The YG made a number of bold 
commitments designed to address the challenges facing a subsection— the so- 
called NEETs— of young people entering the labor market. Yet the implemen-
tation of the YG did not meet expectations (Dhéret and Morosi 2015). The 
question remains whether this was the embryo of a future policy for young 
people that lacked support or an inappropriate idea for the time, especially given 
financial constraints, poorly equipped public employment services to take on the 
task, and, importantly, poor labor demand in several member states. Part of the 
explanation rests with an employment policy that remains reactive and subser-
vient to macroeconomic stability measures, but it is also important to consider 
the limits of European coordination. Policymaking in relation to employment at 
the European and national levels struggles to find a voice in turbulent economic 
times, and some countries are finding it difficult to implement coherent and du-
rable reforms and instead are “splashing around,” to use the words of Smith and 
Villa (2016). At the same time, young people are learning to swim at the start of 
their active economic life, and in some contexts the waters are very turbulent. 
The long- term consequences for national labor markets and individual young 
women and men are potentially severe.
Thus, the challenges in relation to employment policy for young people, in 
particular, remain. Flexicurity was a much- criticized concept, but for a while 
it provided a common theme around which guidance and justification for 
labor market reform could be grouped (Bekker 2012). The weaknesses were 
an overemphasis on the implementation of flexibility measures, coupled with 
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economic circumstances creating slack demand when security, through employ-
ability on labor markets, was being promoted. These factors were compounded 
by an absence of a gender and life course perspective, including the perspec-
tive on youth in the original formulation. The economic circumstances will re-
main challenges for employment policy, but intelligent policy development that 
reflects the realities of generational and gender differences on modern European 
labor markets and addresses security measures more comprehensively and per-
manently can help address the policy weaknesses outlined here. Postcrisis, post- 
austerity, and post- flexicurity Europe requires the development of the “next big 
idea” around how to develop employment policy that is coherent, impactful, and 
relevant for young women and men as new entrants to the labor market, while 
capturing the imagination and commitment of policymakers at the European 
and national levels. This may require a return to hard- law measures, as evident 
in the labor law directives of the late 1990s and early 2000s, but it would be a 
considerable challenge to obtain sufficient support given the underlying policy 
approach of recent years. However, perhaps more important, the limitations of 
a primarily supply- side approach need to be addressed so that policymakers can 
place the promotion of quality employment opportunities at the heart of macro 
policymaking.
Based on this picture of incoherent policymaking and uncertain youth 
labor market outcomes, there is a need to (re)integrate the concept of quality 
into policies addressing the trajectories of young people (Berloffa et al., this 
volume), including school- to- work transitions. In this sense, with a view to 
longer- term outcomes, the notion of efficiency on the labor market needs 
be expanded to consider not only quantity or speed in finding jobs but also 
quality outcomes (e.g., good matching, job stability and/ or continuity in em-
ployment, and decent earnings). As with gender inequalities, an impact as-
sessment for generational differences is required to insure against unintended 
consequences of labor market policies that are not focused on youth but still 
have an effect on weaker participants because of subsequent changes in the 
overall institutional settings. At stake are lifelong consequences for today’s 
young people.
NOTES
1 We thank Brendan Burchell, Jochen Clasen, Ruud Muffels, Magnus Paulsen 
Hansen, the participants at the STYLE meetings in Turin and Krakow, as well 
as Martin Seeleib- Kaiser and Jackie O’Reilly from the editorial team for crit-
ical comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
2 See Section 4.2 for an overview of flexicurity. For a critical discussion of the 
European Union approach to flexicurity, see Smith and Villa (2016) and 
Leschke and Finn (this volume).
 
124 Comparing problematiC Youth transitions to Work
124
3 The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in employment policy, for sim-
plicity termed European Employment Strategy (EES) in this chapter, was 
launched in 1997 and was formally included in the Amsterdam Treaty. From 
2000, it was conducted as part of the Lisbon strategy, which was replaced in 
2010 by the Europe 2020 strategy.
4 See the communication on the common principles of flexicurity (European 
Commission 2007). Also see the approach proposed in the European 
Commission’s report, Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2014, 
for “a healthy labor market:  Balancing employment protection legislation, 
activation and support” in the analysis of the impact of the recession on labor 
market institutions (European Commission 2015, 75).
5 The four EC flexicurity principles are flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements, effective active labor market policies, comprehensive lifelong 
learning strategies, and modern social security systems.
6 Smith and Villa (2016) chart the evolution in the EES through a detailed anal-
ysis of the content of the 477 CSRs on employment policy issued over the pe-
riod 2000– 2013, identifying the CSRs directly and indirectly focused on young 
people. In the early years, only a limited number of countries received a rec-
ommendation that explicitly considered young people. It was subsequently ac-
knowledged that young people were at a disadvantage in some countries, but 
the recommendations issued were rather generic. In 2007– 2009, only three 
countries received a simple generic mention of the young without any precise 
suggestion as to what policy action to follow. It was only in 2011– 2013 that the 
deterioration of youth employment opportunities was reflected in an increasing 
number of CSRs directly focused on policy recommendations for youth.
7 This despite the problem of “brain overflow” (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 
2008), particularly in the new member states, implying that high- skilled 
young workers from new member states are migrating to EU15 countries, 
where they often work under precarious conditions and below their skill 
levels (see Spreckelsen, Leschke, and Seeleib- Kaiser, this volume).
8 Although, even with regard to binding labor law directives, derogations are 
possible with regard to specific roles or activities or by means of collective 
agreements (e.g., on the working- time directive, see Eurofound 2015).
9 In contrast to the Lisbon strategy, there are no longer subtargets for women 
and older workers.
10 FTEs are only presented in the statistical annex of the specialized annual 
publication Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015 (European 
Commission 2016) and are thus not made widely available.
11 So- called “priors” are used as part of the justification for a further deregula-
tory agenda (see European Commission 2012).
12 Also see the chart reproduced in the Employment and Social Developments in 
Europe 2014 report, illustrating the balance between EPL, ALMP, and unem-
ployment benefits (European Commission 2015, 75).
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13 This captures changes in EPL impacting on permanent and temporary, as 
well as individual and collective, contracts (Smith and Villa 2016).
14 ALMP measures were the only policies in LABREF that mapped clearly onto 
the employment security dimension of flexicurity.
15 This subset accounts for 2,216 policies (approximately two- thirds of all 
policies recorded in the database between 2000 and 2013). Using the ad-
ditional information in the LABREF database on the direction of policy 
(i.e., increasing or decreasing), we can further categorize policies ac-
cording to whether they strengthen or weaken different elements of the 
flexicurity model.
16 Information on the direction of reforms (whether they are ex ante likely to 
have an impact by increasing or decreasing security) is codified in LABREF 
by means of binary indicators. The taxonomy developed to construct the in-
dicator of the direction of reforms (built on existing economic literature) 
needs to be interpreted with caution because some simplifications are in-
evitable. However, an indicator of direction is necessary when analyzing 
reforms in order to avoid mixing reforms bringing opposing changes in the 
policy settings (European Commission 2012, 66).
17 Eurostat database: “Involuntary part- time employment as percentage of the 
total part- time employment for young people by sex and age” (yth_ empl_ 
080) (Eurostat 2016).
18 Eurostat database:  “Temporary employees as a percentage of the total 
number of employees, by sex and age (%)” (lfsq_ etpga) (Eurostat 2016).
19 The analysis is based on 20 countries: BE, BG, CH, CY, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, 
FR, HU, IE, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK, and UK. Each country was weighted 
to receive equal representation in the results (i.e., N is constrained to be equal 
for each country so that more highly populated countries do not dominate). 
Just under half of the ESS Round 4 interviews were carried out in 2009. The 
question in ESS Round 4 adds the qualification “unemployed and looking 
for work.”
20 Authors’ analysis of SES published results for 2006 and 2014. Table avail-
able from the authors on request. The SES excludes those employed in small 
establishments and those in the public administration/ defense.
21 The difference between subjectively securely and insecurely employed young 
people is not statistically significant in BG, FR, HU, NL, PL, and CH. In the 
UK and CZ, the difference is only significant at the 10% level.
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LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY  
AND INCOME SECURITY
Changes For european Youth During the great reCession
Janine Leschke and Mairéad Finn
5.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines how young people have been affected by the Great 
Recession. In particular, it analyzes the relationship between labor market flexi-
bility and the income security of youth in Europe. Given the exponential increase 
in youth unemployment during the Great Recession, a specific focus is placed on 
institutional developments regarding unemployment benefits— a topic that has 
remained under- researched to date.1
To provide some context, young people in most European countries are more 
likely than adults to be working on temporary contracts with limited job security, 
and they are also likely to move in and out of unemployment more frequently 
(external numerical flexibility) (Organization for Economic Co- operation and 
Development (OECD) 2014; Flek, Hála, and Mysíková, this volume). At the same 
time, young people tend to have less access to unemployment benefits compared 
to adults, given that eligibility for such benefits (income security) usually depends 
on a certain minimum amount of time spent in employment within a specific 
reference period, often with additional requirements regarding thresholds for 
earnings or working hours. Unemployment benefits and social assistance are fre-
quently means tested at the household level. Adequate unemployment benefit 
coverage not only renders young people more financially independent of their 
parents but also been shown to lead to better post- unemployment outcomes, 
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including earnings and job stability (Gangl 2004). Moreover, there is evidence 
that due to (on average) lower tenure and work experience (important assets 
when employers are deciding who to retain and who to fire), young people do 
not benefit as much as adults from subsidized short- time working (Arpaia et al. 
2010)— a measure that grants internal numerical flexibility to employers and 
at the same time (at least to a certain degree) sustains the income security of 
employees. Youth are thus faced with a situation in which they bear the brunt of 
a disproportionate share of external numerical labor market flexibility and at the 
same time lack income security.
Income security during unemployment has received considerable policy at-
tention at the international, European, and national levels throughout the Great 
Recession, but particularly during the first years, as certain groups— such as 
youth and nonstandard workers— have suffered a disproportionate share of 
job losses. Prior to the Great Recession, little attention was paid to this issue 
(Eurofound 2003; Leschke 2008; Schulze Buschoff and Protsch 2008), particu-
larly at the practical policy level.2 More comprehensive unemployment benefit 
coverage for youth and nonstandard workers can be achieved by ensuring the 
availability and adequacy of lower tier schemes, such as social assistance, and via 
permanent or temporary changes to the eligibility criteria under unemployment 
insurance schemes.3
Particularly during the early years of the crisis, serious efforts were made 
in several countries to improve the income security of those groups that had 
been disproportionally hit by unemployment, including youth and temporary 
workers. These efforts focused both on sustaining employment (introduction of 
state- subsidized short- term working schemes or expansion of existing schemes 
to new groups) and on cushioning unemployment (more inclusive unemploy-
ment benefits). There was also increased concern about the income security of 
nonstandard workers and youth at the European and international levels, as 
evidenced by a number of publications (OECD 2010a; European Commission 
2011a) and the explicit mentioning of the need for adequate social protection for 
fixed- term and self- employed workers under guideline 7 of the 2010 European 
Employment Strategy (Council of the European Union 2010). Moreover, a basic 
unemployment insurance for the Euro area, which could serve as an automatic 
stabilizer in downturns, has been discussed (Dullien 2013; Del Monte and 
Zandstra 2014). By contrast, austerity measures often targeted employment and 
social policies (Heise and Lierse 2011; Lehndorff 2014), which impacted on the 
initial expansionary adjustments to unemployment benefits in some countries.
Against this background, this chapter adopts a comparative European ap-
proach. It traces developments at the interface between numerical flexibility 
(both internal and external) and income security for youth during different 
phases of the Great Recession. We examine young (aged 15– 24  years) and 
older (aged 25– 29 years) youth separately so as to explore differences between 
these age groups. Older youth were also affected by the crisis, but given that 
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they typically have more work experience, and thus longer tenure, we can ex-
pect them to do better than younger youth at the flexibility– security interface. 
Section 5.2 frames the chapter by discussing the European Union’s approach to 
flexicurity and by describing possible interactions between labor market flexi-
bility and income security. Section 5.3 briefly discusses developments in external 
and internal numerical flexibility for youth during different phases of the Great 
Recession. Section 5.4, the core of the chapter, examines income security during 
unemployment— a dimension that has thus far remained underexplored. First, 
we map the institutional changes occurring in the design of unemployment 
benefits in a number of European countries during the Great Recession, with 
the intention of making benefits more inclusive for youth and other particularly 
affected labor market groups. Second, we analyze benefit coverage for young and 
older youth compared to adults— based on special extracts of aggregate European 
Union Labour Force Survey (EU- LFS) data. The chapter concludes that youth are 
doing worse than adults on all examined dimensions of the flexibility– security 
interface. Despite initial expansionary measures regarding income security in a 
number of countries, it emerges that income security has been undermined for 
youth overall when the austerity period is taken into consideration.
5.2. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LABOR MARKET 
FLEXIBILITY AND INCOME SECURITY
In examining the type of relationship that exists between labor market flexibility 
and income security, previous research has shown that nonstandard employ-
ment does not always act as a stepping stone to regular employment. On the 
contrary, nonstandard employment is often permanent or recurring, and— due 
to more limited job security— is frequently associated with transitions out of 
employment into either unemployment or inactivity (Anxo and O’Reilly 2000; 
Gash 2008; Muffels 2008; European Commission 2009; Leschke 2009; Berloffa 
et al., this volume). What little research is available on the income security of 
flexible workers shows that nonstandard workers are more likely to be excluded 
from access to unemployment benefits (to varying degrees, depending on the 
country and the group of workers in question). Once they qualify for access, they 
may actually be in a position to receive proportionately higher benefit levels be-
cause of the progressive nature of some of the systems (low benefit ceilings, flat- 
rate schemes, etc.; see Grimshaw and Rubery 1997; Talós 1999; Klammer and 
Tillmann 2001; Eurofound 2003; Leschke 2008; Schulze Buschoff and Protsch 
2008), although in absolute terms the levels might not suffice to make ends meet.
Turning to the literature on flexicurity, there has been enduring criticism of 
the flexicurity concept as proposed by the European Commission during the 
second half of the Lisbon Strategy (European Commission 2007).4 The European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has repeatedly questioned the shift in focus 
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from job security granted by strict employment protection legislation (EPL) 
to more labor market flexibility combined with employment or employability 
security— to be achieved, for example, through active labor market policies 
(ALMPs) and lifelong learning measures. ETUC has also questioned the framing 
of flexibility and security as trade- offs, as well as the one- sided attribution of flex-
ibility needs to employers and of security needs to employees (ETUC 2007). The 
Great Recession has put the flexicurity concept under further pressure (Heyes 
2011; Ibsen 2011) and— in view of the youth unemployment crisis and the fact 
that workers with temporary contracts have been disproportionally affected— 
has also called into question the strong focus on labor market flexibility as op-
posed to cushioning security measures (Tangian 2007; Burroni and Keune 
2011). In view of this criticism and in particular of the experience of the crisis, 
the Europe 2020 strategy has somewhat modified the EU’s take on flexicurity. 
Under Europe 2020, the EU places more emphasis on the role of job security for 
those countries that have very segmented labor markets and thereby removes 
the focus from labor market adaptation via increasing external numerical flex-
ibility.5 Europe 2020 also calls attention to the importance of income security 
during transitions. More adequate social security benefits for some groups of 
nonstandard workers, namely fixed- term workers and the self- employed, were 
specifically mentioned in the 2010 integrated guidelines on economic and em-
ployment policies (Council of the European Union 2010, guideline 7). The most 
recent guidelines have returned to a rather vague formulation stipulating a de-
sign of social protection systems that “facilitates take- up for all those entitled 
to do so . . . and helps to prevent, reduce and protect against poverty and social 
exclusion through the life cycle” (Council of the European Union 2015, guideline 
8). In addition, the positive role of internal flexibility devices— such as short- 
time working measures and working- time accounts— in buffering employment 
shocks is emphasized by the Commission in its agenda for new skills and jobs 
(European Commission 2010a).
A critical use of the flexicurity concept is particularly important with regard 
to youth, who— even more so since the onset of the crisis— tend to accumulate 
negative flexicurity outcomes (Madsen et al. 2013). Young people are more prone 
than adults to moving between fixed- term jobs (with limited job security) and 
unemployment (see Section 5.3); at the same time, because of contracts of shorter 
duration and thus greater difficulties in fulfilling the eligibility requirements for 
unemployment benefits, their access to benefits is considerable weaker than 
that of adults (see Section 5.4). Thus, the flexibility– security interface could be 
described as vicious (young people lose out on both dimensions because higher 
contractual flexibility means more frequent unemployment, which is less often 
covered by benefits).
As we show in this chapter, the crisis has not only triggered a change in dis-
course at the EU and international levels but also facilitated institutional change 
(although often only of a temporary nature), making unemployment benefits 
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for youth and temporary workers more inclusive in a number of countries. In 
the second part of the crisis, some of these developments have been reversed 
again, or benefit eligibility for young unemployed has been made more condi-
tional on participation in education or training measures. Wilthagen and Tros 
(2004), building on the concept of transitional labor markets developed by 
Schmid and Gazier (2002), have proposed a matrix combining different forms 
of flexibility, on the one hand, with different dimensions of security, on the other 
hand. Leschke, Schmid, and Griga (2007) and Schmid (2008)— working within 
the framework of transitional labor market theory— propose exploring the links 
between these dimensions more comprehensively by going beyond trade- offs 
and also examining cases in which both flexibility and security can be improved 
(termed virtuous relationships) and in which both can be undermined (termed 
vicious relationships). In this chapter, we focus in particular on the interface be-
tween numerical flexibility (both internal and external) and income security for 
youth, given that these dimensions have seen dynamic changes during the Great 
Recession.
5.3. TRACING CHANGES IN LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY 
FOR YOUTH DURING THE CRISIS
In this section, we examine developments regarding different components of 
labor market flexibility for youth during the crisis. Labor market transitions are 
a common phenomenon among young people. School- to- work transitions are 
often characterized by moves in and out of the labor market before a stable job is 
found (OECD 2010a). These transitions are a result of rather unstable first- time 
jobs (e.g., temporary contracts for probationary periods) or jobs that by defini-
tion are of shorter duration (e.g., training contracts). Some youth withdraw from 
the labor market for prolonged periods of time— for example, to return to educa-
tion. Spells of unemployment (and inactivity) are therefore a frequent phenom-
enon among young people.
Figure 5.1 illustrates for the EU as a whole the disproportionate levels of un-
employment and the different forms of nonstandard employment (temporary 
employment and part- time work) experienced by youth (aged 15– 24 and 25– 
29 years). It shows data for the precrisis period (2007), stimulus period (2009), 
and austerity period (2013). Young people both started from higher levels (with 
the exception of part- time employment for the older youth group) than adults 
and were more affected by increases in unemployment and nonstandard employ-
ment over the course of the crisis. During the austerity period, unemployment 
lies at 23.3% for the younger and at 14.6% for the older youth group, compared 
with 8.8% for adults. The spread across Europe is large, with an unemployment 
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Source: Eurostat EU- LFS, special extracts.
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rate of 58.3% for youth (aged 15– 24 years) in Greece and of 7.8% for youth in 
Germany. Temporary employment is the prime example for external numerical 
flexibility— here the share in 2013 lies at 42% for young youth and at 21.7% for 
older youth, while the adult share stands at 9%. Both youth groups have slightly 
higher temporary employment shares during the austerity period than before 
the crisis (2007), whereas the adult temporary employment rate in 2013 is still 
slightly below its 2007 level.
Temporary employment is often involuntary (inability to find a permanent 
job), and this is on average more pronounced among older youth and adults 
(approximately 55% and 65%, respectively) than among younger youth (ap-
proximately 33%) across the EU27. In most EU countries, more than half of 
the respondents in the age group of 15- to 24- year- olds are involuntarily in 
temporary employment. Only in Austria, Germany, and Denmark are the ma-
jority of temporary contracts of young youth composed of training contracts 
(Eurofound 2013).
There is a direct trade- off between external flexibility (in the form of tempo-
rary contracts) and job security because temporary employment by its nature 
enjoys less protection than regular employment. As a result of notice periods 
and severance pay, among other components, permanent employment is more 
protected than temporary employment. Temporary employment usually runs 
out after a predefined period based on a legal maximum number of succes-
sive fixed- term contracts and a maximum cumulated duration, as regulated 
by the European fixed- term work directive and other regulations. Countries 
vary substantially in the strictness of EPL for both permanent and temporary 
contracts (for details, see OECD 2013). Countries with lax rules regarding 
the dismissal of workers on permanent contracts usually have comparatively 
lower shares of people in temporary employment because labor market flexi-
bility can already be achieved through hire- and- fire policies around permanent 
jobs— the United Kingdom is a case in point. Schömann and Clauwaert (2012), 
drawing on country studies, identify a clear trend during the Great Recession 
of many member states making their labor markets more flexible by changing 
the rules governing atypical contracts. They highlight, in particular, the trend 
toward increasing the maximum length of fixed- term contracts or the max-
imum possible number of renewals of such contracts. They also point to the 
creation in several member states of new types of contracts that are often less 
protected and are frequently targeted explicitly at young people (Schömann and 
Clauwaert 2012, Section 2.2 and Table 1). Reforms of rules on redundancy that 
undermine the protective role of individual and collective dismissal are also 
highlighted by Schömann and Clauwaert for a substantive number of European 
countries (Section 2.3 and Table 1). The latter trend is confirmed by a compar-
ison of the 2008 and 2013 OECD indicators on strictness of EPL for individual 
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and collective dismissals pertaining to regular contracts (OECD 2016; see also 
Berloffa et al., this volume).
Working- time accounts or short- time working measures also create flexi-
bility for employers in times of slack demand. Both have been used during the 
Great Recession and particularly the economic recession of 2008– 2009, with 
a slightly stronger focus on short- time working:  Almost all countries that al-
ready had these publicly funded schemes in place before the crisis expanded the 
schemes to increase their reach,6 while some other countries (BG, CZ, HU, NL, 
PL, SK, SI, LV, and LT) newly introduced such schemes temporarily during the 
crisis. Newly introduced schemes are usually less generous in terms of duration 
and benefits than those that are already established; however, they also usually 
cover a broader range of employees (Arpaia et al. 2010). Since the crisis, some 
countries have introduced temporary schemes covering specific types of firm or 
sector.7 No such schemes exist in Cyprus, Estonia, or Malta, which suggests that 
in these countries, working- time reductions usually go hand in hand with wage 
cuts of the same proportion. In contrast to temporary employment, which is 
often involuntary (as noted at the beginning of this section), short- time working 
measures carry advantages for employees in that they have enabled job preser-
vation and the avoidance of unemployment during the crisis (Hijzen and Martin 
2012). Short- time working schemes partially compensate for lost wages through 
the unemployment benefit fund— topped up in some countries (e.g., Belgium) 
by sector- level funds either directly or via the employer.
In the past, short- time working measures were restricted in many countries to 
core workers— either explicitly by requiring that temporary workers be released 
first or implicitly by offering participation in these schemes only to workers 
who were eligible for unemployment benefits. During the crisis, however, sev-
eral of these countries (e.g., AT, BE, FR, DE, and LU) deliberately opened up 
their schemes— either temporarily or permanently— to new groups of workers 
(for country details, see Arpaia et al. 2010; European Commission 2010b). The 
available empirical evidence indicates, however, that the positive impacts were 
limited to permanent workers (Hijzen and Venn 2011; Hijzen and Martin 2012).
Figure 5.2 illustrates the evolution of short- time working for both youth and 
adults before and during the Great Recession. It shows, on EU27 average, the 
share of people working fewer hours than usual during the interview reference 
week because of slack demand for technical or (usually) economic reasons as a 
share of total employment. In all years, adults emerge as being more likely than 
young people to participate in short- time working measures. In line with the 
expansion of these schemes to new groups of workers, among them the tempo-
rarily employed, participation peaked in 2009 for all groups (somewhat more pro-
nouncedly for adults and older youth). The share subsequently declined, although 
it still stands at a higher level in 2013 than before the crisis for all three groups.
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Figure 5.3 provides information on short- time working by country and age 
group for the year 2009 when stimulus measures peaked. The EU- LFS data have 
the advantage that they are comparable across countries; they do not, however, 
tell us anything about whether short- time working is compensated by partial 
unemployment benefits.8 Using the information provided in Arpaia et al. (2010), 
we therefore group countries into those without compensation (/ ), those with 
long- standing and usually more generous schemes ($), and those with new, tem-
porary, and usually less generous schemes (¤). Figure 5.3 illustrates that young 
youth (aged 15– 24 years) were considerably more likely to participate in short- 
time working measures in 2009 in Denmark, the Netherlands, Latvia, Malta, 
and Lithuania— albeit with considerable variation in overall participation across 
these countries. In Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, and Hungary, the participation of 
young youth was slightly higher than that of adults.
In conclusion, overall, in contrast to external numerical flexibility, in which 
youth (and particularly younger youth) are considerably over- represented, in-
ternal numerical flexibility, as captured here by short- time working, is less seg-
mented than initially expected— at least when the EU- LFS indicator is used. It 
is younger rather than older youth who seem to have been over- represented in 
short- time working. Note that a positive assessment of short- time working only 
holds as long as it has prevented even sharper increases in unemployment. Also, 
in countries or sectors where no partial compensation of working- hour reduc-
tion is available, short- time working will have more adverse effects on the eco-
nomic situation of affected workers.
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Figure 5.2 Evolution of short- time working (with or without partial benefits) in EU27 by age 
group, 2007– 2013 (% of total employment).
Source: Eurostat EU- LFS, special extracts.
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5.4. EVOLUTION OF INCOME SECURITY FOR UNEMPLOYED 
YOUTH DURING THE GREAT RECESSION
Turning to income security, substantial shares of unemployed people do not have 
access to unemployment (insurance) benefits. In part, this is deliberate policy 
(i.e., a link between contributions and benefits is intended), whereas in other 
cases there is “implicit disentitlement” (Standing 2002) whereby, as a result of 
the trend away from dependent, permanent, and full- time “standard employ-
ment relationships,” growing numbers of unemployed workers cannot fulfill the 
qualifying criteria for unemployment insurance benefits.
Unemployment insurance benefits are the first tier of provision and are usu-
ally based on contributions from employers and employees. All EU countries 
have unemployment insurance schemes, although their eligibility conditions 
and benefit rates (generosity) differ substantially (Kvist, Straubinger, and Freundt 
2013; OECD Benefits and Wages). In order to contextualize the following anal-
ysis of reforms of unemployment benefits during the stimulus and austerity 
periods of the crisis, Table 5.1 provides an overview of benefit generosity during 
an individual’s initial phase of unemployment (1 or 2 months of unemployment). 
We depict benefit generosity using net replacement rates for single persons at 
67% of average wages because this likely comes closest to the situation for an av-
erage young person. Table 5.1 does not take access to benefits into account in any 
way: Generous benefit levels can easily go hand in hand with exclusive benefits 
and vice versa (see Table 5.3).
An unemployed person who is not eligible for unemployment insurance or 
whose entitlement has been exhausted may be entitled to unemployment as-
sistance, which is typically less generous, noncontributory, means tested at the 
household level, and financed by general taxation.9 The fact that unemployment 
assistance is assessed at the household rather than the individual level implies 
Table 5.1 Unemployment insurance benefit generosity of EU27 countries (in order 
of generosity) in 2013
Generosity (NRR)
Benefit insurance NRR for single person at 67% of 
average wage in initial phase of unemployment
Most generous  
(NRR > 71%)
Belgium, Slovenia, Denmark, Latvia, Luxembourg, Spain, 
Bulgaria, Portugal, Netherlands, Italy, Finland
Mid- level generous 
(NRR = 55%– 70%)
France, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Sweden, 
Germany, Austria, Estonia
Low- level generous 
(NRR = 41%– 54%)
Lithuania, Ireland, Poland, Romania, Malta
Least generous  
(NRR < 40%)
Greece, United Kingdom
NRR, net replacement rates.
Source: OECD Benefits and Wages, 2013; authors’ compilation.
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that young people living at home have broader household means taken into con-
sideration as part of their assessment (Eurofound 2013). Typically, unemploy-
ment assistance does not require qualifying periods; in cases in which it operates 
with qualifying periods, these are laxer than those for unemployment insur-
ance benefits.10 In some cases, unemployment assistance is restricted to certain 
categories, such as unemployed people with dependent family members; in some 
cases, youth or specific types of youth are explicitly excluded (see OECD Benefits 
and Wages).11 In almost all EU countries, as a last tier, tax- funded social assis-
tance subject to means testing exists.
This section seeks to highlight the exclusion of youth from access to un-
employment benefits, which is an underexamined topic in comparative 
welfare- state research (Van Oorschot 2013). Our analysis makes special ref-
erence to changes during the first period of the crisis (2008– 2009) and to 
developments throughout the austerity period (2010– 2014). Given that unem-
ployment benefit systems are designed to meet complex (and fast- changing) 
conditions, there is no room here to specify the different qualifying conditions 
and other design features, although some details are provided as they relate 
to youth (also as temporary workers).12 Regularly updated comparative infor-
mation on the design of unemployment benefit systems can be found in the 
European Commission’s Labour Market Reforms (LABREF) database (2015), 
the European Commission’s Mutual Information System on Social Protection 
(MISSOC) Comparative Tables database (2014), and the OECD Benefits and 
Wages series. Detailed comparative information on unemployment benefit 
schemes, particularly with regard to part- time workers, is also available from a 
special OECD (2010b) survey.
5.4.1. review of Youth integration in unemployment 
benefit schemes
Young workers are subject to both explicit exclusion in terms of differential rules 
of access to unemployment benefits and implicit exclusion (Standing’s (2002) 
“implicit disentitlement”) from such benefits through their over- representation 
in temporary contracts and an average shorter tenure. Earnings or hours 
thresholds directly exclude those who work on low- hours, part- time contracts, 
while the qualifying period (usually a minimum contribution period within a 
given reference period) can further restrict the access of young people whose 
contracts are of short duration (for details and specific country examples, see 
Eurofound 2013; Leschke 2013). There are also rules affecting youth directly with 
both positive and negative consequences for benefit coverage. We provide some 
concrete examples in the following discussion.
Three countries explicitly exclude certain types of temporary workers 
from eligibility for unemployment benefits:  the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Slovakia (for details, see Eurofound 2013). In Slovakia, for example, all tempo-
rary workers were excluded from unemployment benefits until January 2013; 
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now temporary workers above a certain earnings threshold qualify more easily 
than permanent workers (2  years of employment within a reference period 
of 4 years, compared to a reference period of 3 years for permanent workers; 
Eurofound 2013).
In general, it is easier for young people (and temporary workers) to ac-
cess unemployment benefits in countries that have short contribution periods 
within a long reference period (however, this says nothing about the generosity 
of the benefits received). According to Eurofound (2013), in practice it seems 
to be easiest for workers with short contract duration, in particular temporary 
workers, to qualify for unemployment benefits in France, Spain, Greece, Malta, 
and Finland. Qualifying conditions are likely to be most difficult to meet in the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, and Bulgaria (for details, see Eurofound 
2013, 20– 21).
Age also plays a role in access to benefits and is an explicit factor that can 
negatively impact on the access of young people. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, those younger than age 18 years are not entitled to any form of ben-
efit, irrespective of what type of contract they have had (European Commission 
2011a). On the other hand, the qualifying criteria for unemployment benefits in 
some countries can be more relaxed for youth or can include criteria other than 
a certain contributory period. In Finland, for instance, youth (aged 17– 25 years) 
wishing to access unemployment insurance benefits can have a vocational quali-
fication, 5 months’ work history, or 5 months’ participation in ALMPs. Romania 
grants graduates who are looking for work an exemption from qualifying periods 
for unemployment benefits (MISSOC 2014).
Young people can also be entitled to lower amounts and shorter benefit dura-
tion. In Italy and Ireland, for example, younger workers’ benefit rates are lower 
than those of older workers (European Commission 2011a). Several countries 
make benefit duration dependent on the length of the contribution period (e.g., 
AT, BG, DE, and NL), which disproportionally affects younger workers with 
shorter employment tenure (MISSOC 2014).
5.4.2. recent reforms of unemployment benefit 
schemes affecting european Youth
This section examines reforms in unemployment benefit schemes throughout the 
crisis, dealing separately with the first (“stimulus”) period (2008– 2009) and the 
second (“austerity”) period (2010– 2014). The focus during the stimulus period 
was predominantly— although not exclusively— on opening up access to unem-
ployment benefits, whereas during the austerity period, unemployment benefits 
were among the targets of austerity measures in several countries. A number of 
benefit reforms were explicitly geared toward youth, usually comprising direct 
links to education and training programs (see examples discussed later). The ma-
jority of reforms, however, were of a more general nature and were related to 
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relaxing or tightening up qualifying conditions or to increasing or decreasing 
benefit levels that indirectly impact on youth. Here, we review the changes to un-
employment benefit systems in the EU27 with regard to qualifying criteria, ben-
efit levels (including one- off payments), and duration.13 For country examples of 
these reforms, see the remainder of Section 5.4 and Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Initial typology of EU27 countries with modifications in unemployment 
benefit systems directly or indirectly targeted at youth during the first period of crisis 
(2008– 2009) and during the austerity period (2010– 2014)
(Temporary) 
Modifications of
Direction of 
change 2008– 2009 2010– 2014
Eligibility 
(qualifying 
conditions)
Relaxed Finland, Italy*, Latvia, 
Portugal, Sweden(*)
Portugal, Slovenia(*), 
Spain*
Tightened Ireland Belgium*, Czech 
Republic, 
Denmark*,1, 
Greece, Hungary, 
Romania
Explicitly opened up 
to new groups of 
workers
France*, Italy(*), Spain Czech Republic*, 
Italy*, Slovenia
Benefit levels Increasing Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, 
Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovenia
Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia
Lump sum/ one- off 
payment
France*, Greece, Italy, 
Spain
Spain
Decreasing Ireland(*) Greece, Ireland*, 
Latvia, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, 
Spain
Benefit duration Increasing Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain
Denmark
Decreasing Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Poland
Greece
Notes: Because of the complexity and the variation of benefit systems, some of the changes are difficult 
to classify. In 2013, for example, the number of days for which unemployment benefit could be paid was 
capped in Greece. The maximum of 450 days within a 4- year period now cannot be extended if one becomes 
unemployed again, and this affects both benefit duration and general eligibility. We have therefore listed 
Greece in both rows. In addition, in some cases there are uncertainties as to the exact year in which the 
reforms became active.
* = Reform explicitly relating to youth.
(*) = Parts of the reform explicitly relating to youth.
1 = Refers to social assistance.
Source: Authors’ depiction based on European Commission (2011a, 2011c), Eurofound (2013), Leschke (2013), 
MISSOC (2014), and LABREF (2015).
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5.4.2.1. Stimulus Period (Economic Recession of 2008– 2009)
In the first part of the recession (2008– 2009), which was characterized in most 
countries by a number of measures to stimulate the economy, qualifying criteria 
were relaxed in Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden (Latvia 
and Portugal previously had rather strict qualifying criteria), with positive impacts 
on employees with short tenure (for details, see European Commission 2010c, 
137; European Commission 2011a, 18– 24). The relaxation was achieved by re-
ducing contribution periods, increasing reference periods (or both), or opening 
up schemes explicitly to new groups of workers. Sweden, for example, temporarily 
lowered the condition of membership (in an unemployment insurance fund) 
for income- related unemployment benefits from 1  year to 6  months and— by 
abolishing the work requirement— made it possible for students to join an unem-
ployment insurance fund (European Commission 2011a). In Italy, from 2009 to 
2011, ordinary unemployment allowance was extended to apprentices with at least 
3 months’ tenure, while a broad group of employees— including fixed- term, tem-
porary agency workers, and apprentices— was allowed to apply for exceptional un-
employment benefits (European Commission 2011a). France made means- tested 
welfare benefits available to jobseekers aged between 18 and 25 years, who had 
previously been excluded. To prevent students from gaining access to this ben-
efit, a relatively strict qualifying condition of 2 years’ employment within 3 years 
was added, taking into account all types of employment contract (LABREF 2015). 
Several of the measures introduced in this time period were temporary.
A number of countries, including France, Greece, Italy, and Spain, granted 
temporary lump- sum or one- off payments to unemployed workers not eligible 
for regular unemployment benefits. In France, these were directly targeted at 
youth who did not fulfill the eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits 
(LABREF 2015).
Unemployment benefit levels were increased in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Poland, as well as in Latvia and Finland 
(European Commission 2011b, 76– 78). As an exception to this trend of improving 
the situation of groups with less coverage, Ireland substantially reduced the 
benefit level for young claimants (aged 18– 24  years) in 2009. However, these 
reduced benefit rates did not apply to those participating in training or education 
programs (European Commission 2011c).
Benefit duration of unemployment insurance or assistance was increased 
in Finland, Romania, Latvia, and Lithuania, although in the latter case only 
in municipalities that had been hit particularly hard by the crisis (European 
Commission 2011b, 76– 78). Targeting the benefit duration of persons already 
eligible for unemployment benefits, the Spanish government approved a tempo-
rary flat- rate unemployment assistance benefit payable for 6 months to all per-
sons whose unemployment insurance benefits had expired.14 A similar reform 
was carried out in Portugal. Conversely, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
France, and Denmark decreased the maximum duration of unemployment 
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benefits.15 The Irish reform explicitly targeted young youth (aged <18 years) by 
reducing the duration of Job Benefit from 12 to 6  months for this age group 
(European Commission 2011a).
Second- tier systems such as social assistance were improved in a number 
of countries, as evidenced by increases to housing support, for example. Some 
countries (e.g., Estonia) had planned improvements to their unemployment ben-
efit systems, which then were not implemented or were postponed because of 
the crisis. Only a few countries had reduced benefits during this initial crisis pe-
riod as a part of fiscal consolidation measures (e.g., Ireland); in most cases, these 
reductions concerned benefit duration.
5.4.2.2. Austerity Period
During the economic recession (2008– 2009), the focus was often on relaxing el-
igibility criteria and increasing benefit levels. The austerity period (2010– 2014), 
by contrast, was characterized by tightening eligibility and decreasing benefit 
levels (see Table 5.2). Reforms relating to eligibility, even when not explicitly 
geared toward youth, have a particularly disproportionate effect on young un-
employed given their shorter average tenure. However, there were also a few 
countries that relaxed qualifying criteria during this period, often with a view to 
supporting young people. These reforms usually stipulated a link between pas-
sive benefit entitlements and participation in education and training programs 
(European Commission 2014; MISSOC 2014).16 Here, we provide details re-
garding a number of reforms explicitly targeting youth (marked with an asterisk 
in Table 5.2).
In Ireland, benefit levels for those aged 22– 26  years were reduced fur-
ther (a first reduction had already taken place in 2009). Higher rates apply if 
the jobseeker participates in education or training or has dependent children. 
Belgium and Denmark tightened qualifying criteria for youth: In 2012, Belgium 
increased the waiting period before benefit allowance is granted to 12 months for 
all recipients (previously it had stood at 6, 9, and 12 months). The Belgian ben-
efit is now called “vocational development benefit” and requires proactive steps 
with regard to finding employment. In Denmark, since 2013, people younger 
than age 30 years and without education no longer receive social assistance.17 
There is an equivalent student benefit if youth embark on education, whereas 
those not ready for education will still receive social assistance if they participate 
in activation measures geared at inclusion in education. In Spain, Slovenia, and 
Italy, on the other hand, qualifying criteria for youth were relaxed during this 
period— the benefits to be accrued are usually short term and/ or means tested. In 
Spain, for example, a temporary program was introduced in 2011 geared toward 
youth, long- term unemployed, and other vulnerable groups, making a means- 
tested flat- rate unemployment subsidy of 6 months dependent on participation 
in individualized training actions (European Commission 2011a). In Slovenia, 
qualifying conditions were relaxed for all unemployed in 2011 and were further 
 
148 Comparing problematiC Youth transitions to Work
148
relaxed for those younger than age 30 years in 2013. In Italy, since 2013, young 
people on apprenticeships are eligible for regular unemployment benefits. The 
Czech reform shortened the reference period for eligibility (making benefits 
more difficult to access) but at the same time opened up unemployment benefits 
to students fulfilling the eligibility criteria (Eurofound 2013). Table 5.2 provides 
a summary overview of countries that modified their unemployment benefit 
schemes during the stimulus and austerity periods.18
Clearly, Southern European and Central- Eastern European welfare systems 
show more activity in relation to changing policies for youth, particularly— 
but not exclusively— in the austerity period. Thus, it seems that the trend is 
for greater change in countries that were affected more severely by the Great 
Recession. At the same time, these countries had a tradition of benefit provision 
that was not as long- standing or as robust as in corporatist or Nordic countries— 
traditions that were more neoliberal or relied on familial ties. Moreover, Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal— which received bailouts in exchange for implementing 
programs of economic adjustment described in the so- called Memoranda of 
Understanding— all feature in Table 5.2, with Ireland and Greece showing a pro-
file of tightening conditions, whereas Portugal has a more mixed profile. Spain 
and Italy experienced more informal pressure to implement structural reforms. 
According to our analysis, Spain shows a mixed profile, whereas Italy has an 
expanding profile, albeit from a very low starting point in terms of benefit cov-
erage, in particular.
5.4.3. income security: access to unemployment 
benefits for Youth During the Crisis
The remainder of Section 5.4 examines the access of youth versus adults to un-
employment benefits during different stages of the Great Recession. The aim is to 
explore the question as to whether youth were disproportionately affected during 
the crisis. Special extracts from aggregate EU- LFS data are used, and we pre-
sent figures regarding persons who are registered with the Public Employment 
Service (PES) and are in receipt of unemployment benefit or assistance. We ex-
amine here exclusively the short- term unemployed (1 or 2  months).19 Given 
that the EU- LFS information on people in receipt of unemployment benefits 
has been identified as unreliable as a result, among other things, of under- and 
misreporting (Immervoll, Marianna, and Mira D’Ercole 2004, 58– 67),20 when 
we report country results, we show relative distributions and changes over time 
in benefit coverage rather than absolute levels (for a similar strategy, see OECD 
2011). It is unlikely that reporting errors will vary substantially between different 
age groups in the same country or over time. Table 5.3 uses ranges on benefit 
coverage in 2013 with regard to the adult population (aged 30– 64 years) in order 
to put the following analysis into perspective.
As a first indication, Figure 5.4 highlights differences in unemployment ben-
efit coverage for the EU27 by previous contract type, age, and for three time 
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points, using the main reason for having left the previous job as a proxy for 
permanent or temporary job prior to being unemployed. We calculate the cov-
erage rate as those registered with the PES and receiving benefits or assistance 
as a percentage of all unemployed. Older youth (although only limited data are 
available) are doing better than younger youth in this respect, and if they have 
been on a permanent contract prior to unemployment, their coverage rate is 
Table 5.3 Coverage with unemployment insurance or assistance benefits as share 
of all unemployed adults (aged 30– 64 years) in EU countries, 2013 (EU27 = 44.7%)
Coverage (%) Countries
<20 Italy, Malta, Romania
≤ 20 < 35 Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
≥35 to <50 Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom
≥50 to ≤65 Austria, Czech Republic, France, Spain
≥65 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany
Notes: Duration of unemployment 1 or 2 months. Registered with PES and receiving benefits or assistance as 
percentage of all unemployed.
Source: Eurostat EU- LFS, special extracts.
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in fact close to that for adults. Distinguishing now by previous contract type, 
temporary workers in all age groups are less likely than permanent employed 
to have access to unemployment benefits if they become unemployed. Previous 
temporary workers in the young youth group are least likely to have access. The 
differences across age may be due either to the explicit difference in youth ac-
cess to benefits or to variations across age groups in the distribution of different 
types of temporary contracts or both. In line with the improvements in benefit 
design during the stimulus period, the situation of temporary workers seems to 
have improved somewhat in the first years of the crisis. However, the positive 
development stalled and indeed turned negative during austerity. This confirms 
our previously mentioned findings that national and supranational responses 
to the exclusion of certain labor market groups from benefit access were not 
sustained.
Figure 5.5 shows the benefit coverage of youth as a share of adults for all 
EU27 countries with complete data for 2013. With a few exceptions (RO, LT, 
and EE), in the majority of countries youth are considerably less likely to re-
ceive unemployment benefits than adults. On average, younger youth have a 
coverage rate corresponding to 30% of that of adults. Coverage for older youth 
corresponds to 70% of the adult rate. Regarding young youth in Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, and Austria, the coverage is approximately one- half 
that of adults. The examples of the United Kingdom and Germany show that for 
youth coverage, universal basic benefit schemes (as second- tier benefits) work 
relatively well. However, the benefits payable under these schemes are means 
tested and relatively low. In all other countries with available information, the 
younger youth share compared to adults lies under 40%, while it is below 20% 
in eight countries. Among the countries with very low youth coverage, the ma-
jority also have high temporary employment shares among youth, which points 
to a vicious relationship between flexibility and security. It is important to 
square these findings with youth unemployment rates, generosity of benefits, 
and other transition options such as apprenticeships or training or education 
with compensation.
Figure 5.6 shows relative changes in benefit coverage during the crisis period 
for young youth using 2007 as the basis. For ease of readability, we only display 
data for 2009 (the year of the recession when most money was spent on stimulus 
measures) and the most recent available year, 2013. The majority of countries 
with available information saw an increase in unemployment benefit coverage 
of youth during the first part of the crisis, with the most pronounced increases 
occurring in Slovenia, Portugal, Denmark, and Spain. Both improvements in ac-
cess to unemployment benefit systems and also, importantly, changing charac-
teristics of newly unemployed during the crisis will have played a role here.21 
When we compare 2007 precrisis data with 2013 austerity- period data, we see 
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that only for a limited number of countries is this positive coverage trend still 
visible. It is most pronounced in Italy (not included in the figure), Greece, and 
Denmark— countries that have medium to low relative coverage rates of youth as 
compared to adults (see Figure 5.5). Benefit coverage was lower in 2013 than in 
2007 in Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus, among others.
Table 5.4 summarizes the findings of the previous analysis, also including in-
formation for older youth and adults.
The analysis in this chapter has highlighted two important issues. First, it 
has emerged that it is important not to limit such a study to youth between 
ages 15 and 24  years or to merge the younger and older (aged 25– 29  years) 
youth groups. Older youth have been shown to be better off than younger youth 
in terms of external (but not internal) numerical flexibility, although we still 
lack detailed and age- specific information on compensation during short- 
time working. Older youth are also better off with regard to income security. 
At the same time, both youth groups differ from adults in that they are more 
affected by external numerical flexibility and are less likely to enjoy internal 
numerical flexibility or income security. Second, this analysis has highlighted 
the complexity of unemployment benefit schemes; how greatly they vary across 
Europe in terms of both access and generosity, as well as availability of sec-
ondary schemes; and their frequent adjustment (not always in a strategic way, 
as seems to have been the case during the economic recession of 2008– 2009). 
In this regard, comparative analysis on the dimension of benefit access is diffi-
cult. Attempts to create “simple” indices for benefit coverage— as they exist for 
benefit generosity— have so far not been successful (Alphametrics Ltd. 2009). 
The data testify to this complexity. Indeed, because the EU- LFS (in addition to 
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other potential comparability weaknesses) does not allow a distinction between 
insurance and assistance benefits, we questioned the reliability of the informa-
tion on benefit coverage rates in a cross- national perspective and therefore only 
used relative change within countries in our analysis.
5.5. CONCLUSIONS
The previous analysis has illustrated that youth are not only more likely to hold tem-
porary contracts with limited job security and to experience unemployment with 
potential long- term scarring effects but also less likely to have access to unemploy-
ment benefits than adults. Limited unemployment benefit coverage comes about 
due to their lacking, or shorter- term, labor market experience, which translates 
into difficulties in fulfilling the eligibility conditions for access to unemployment 
benefits, given that these schemes are still predominantly modeled on so- called 
standard employment. This combination of external numerical flexibility and 
lower income security during unemployment can be termed a vicious relationship 
between flexibility and security and seems to be the predominant long- term trend 
despite temporary improvements during the economic recession (2008– 2009).
Table 5.4 Relative change in access to unemployment insurance and assistance 
benefits for EU27 countries before crisis (2007) and in stimulus (2009) and austerity 
(2013) periods
Age 
group 
(years)
Substantial 
decrease in 
access
Substantial 
increase in 
access
Missing 
data
EU27 
(relative)
EU27 
(absolute)
15– 24 2009 CY EL, SE, FR, SK, 
ES, DK, PT, 
SI, IT
IE, NL, BG, 
EE, LT, 
LU, LV, 
MT
99 – 0.1
2013 CY, PT, CZ, 
PL, ES, 
AT (2012), 
HU
RO, DK, EL, IT 81 – 3.3
25– 29 2009 EL PL, UK, PT, CY, 
ES, SI, IT, RO
IE, NL, BG, 
EE, LT, 
LU, MT
100 0.1
2013 EL, SE, AT 
(2012)
UK, PL, RO, 
SI, IT
85 – 5.4
30– 64 2009 LU IT, PT, BG, LV, 
ES, EE, LT, MT
IE, NL 102 0.9
2013 MT, RO UK, ES, IT 104 1.7
Notes: Cut- off point for substantial decrease is <75% on 2007 value and for substantial increase is >125% 
on 2007 value. Duration of unemployment 1 or 2 months. Registered with PES and receiving benefits or 
assistance as percentage of all unemployed.
Source: Eurostat EU- LFS, special extracts.
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In light of surging youth unemployment— and indeed a youth unemploy-
ment crisis— in a number of European countries, concern about the previously 
overlooked explicit or implicit limited access of youth to unemployment ben-
efit schemes emerged on the international and supranational agenda (e.g., of the 
OECD and the European Commission). The previous focus on supply- side meas-
ures was no longer deemed very fruitful, given the lack of realistic possibilities to 
include large numbers of youth in employment again within a reasonable period 
of time. Several European countries— particularly, but not exclusively, during 
the economic recession (2008– 2009)— accordingly improved income security 
for youth. More generally, temporary workers also experienced improvements 
with regard to access to and the generosity of unemployment benefit schemes. 
This was achieved by relaxing qualifying criteria, offering lump- sum or one- off 
payments, and increasing benefit levels or benefit duration. However, already 
during the economic recession (2008– 2009), the reforms in terms of unem-
ployment benefits not only took the direction of greater generosity. Although 
no countries restricted access to benefits during the stimulus period, and only 
Ireland cut benefit levels, a sizable number of countries shortened the duration 
of benefits. In the second crisis period (2010– 2014), characterized by austerity 
policies, eligibility was tightened and benefit levels were reduced in many coun-
tries. There was still a focus in a few countries on improving the income security 
of youth, though usually conditional on participation in education or training. 
Increased coupling of benefit receipt with enforcement of education or training 
components for youth seems to be a more general recent trend according to our 
analysis. These developments have been summarized in Table 5.2.
More activity in relation to changing unemployment benefit policies is re-
corded for Southern European and Central- Eastern European welfare systems, 
the bulk of which were affected more severely by (youth) unemployment and 
at the same time had more limited unemployment benefit provisions than cor-
poratist and Northern European countries. Several of the countries that were 
recommended to implement fiscal consolidation and structural reforms feature 
in Table 5.2 and for the most part show a profile of expanding eligibility during the 
severe recession of 2008– 2009 and tightening conditions again at least on some 
dimensions thereafter, illustrating the short- term nature of upward adjustments.
Using the EU- LFS data on access to unemployment benefits and notwith-
standing the limitations of these data (especially compositional effects, besides 
changes in access due to changing eligibility), our analysis reveals— in line with 
the institutional changes outlined previously— an improved situation in coverage 
for both the youth and adult groups during the economic recession of 2008– 
2009 (for details, see Table 5.4). When we take into account the austerity pe-
riod, we see that on European average, both younger and older youth are worse 
off than before the Great Recession. This is not the case for adults. Accordingly, 
we can see that the benefit coverage of youth, which is considerably lower than 
that of adults to start with, has decreased further in a number of countries. This 
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outcome highlights the weaknesses in the system for protecting against shocks 
and illustrates that the current design of unemployment benefit systems— despite 
short- term adjustments— tends to protect older workers with more secure em-
ployment contracts as opposed to younger workers, who carry the bulk of labor 
market flexibilization and at the same time lack an income- security cushion. 
This finding corroborates longer term dualization trends in labor market and so-
cial security systems between those who are well protected (more often people in 
standard employment) and those who are poorly protected (more often people 
in nonstandard employment), including along the lines of age, as highlighted, for 
example, by Seeleib- Kaiser, Saunders, and Naczyk (2012) for Germany and the 
United Kingdom.
Reliable unemployment benefits of a certain generosity and duration make it 
possible to search for an adequate job. Income security during transitions thus 
can facilitate a better match between skills and occupation instead of forcing un-
employed youth to take the first best option— including informal or casual labor 
that will not contribute to increasing the tax and contribution base for funding 
social security schemes in the future. More comprehensive and reliable unem-
ployment benefit coverage can also have other positive effects— both from the 
viewpoint of the individual and from that of wider society— in that it might place 
youth in a situation of independence from their families, in which they can con-
sider forming families of their own. The trends we are witnessing and that were 
already evident before the Great Recession imply, however, that these functions 
of social protection are being weakened.
When examining the interface of flexibility and security in a comparative 
perspective, it is important to consider the context and potential functional 
equivalents. A case in point here are countries such as Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, 
and Slovakia, which combine very high youth unemployment and high tempo-
rary employment shares (external numerical flexibility) with very low relative 
benefit coverage rates (income security). On the other hand, the low benefit 
coverage rate for young youth in Denmark might be less problematic in light 
of Denmark’s relatively small youth unemployment population and its gen-
erous education allowance and comparatively generous social assistance— both 
of which can act as functional equivalents. Similarly, short- time working meas-
ures also acted as functional equivalents to unemployment benefits during the 
period under observation, and young people were relatively well represented. 
Short- time working measures were newly introduced in a number of coun-
tries (often temporarily) and were also expanded to include new groups of 
workers. Such measures are an instrument of internal numerical flexibility that 
enables job preservation while at the same time often cushioning working- time 
reductions to a certain degree and thereby granting some income security.
In summary, although virtuous relationships between flexibility and se-
curity were strengthened for youth and other disadvantaged labor market 
groups in the first part of the crisis— when these groups had been severely 
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affected by unemployment— this remained a short- term trend in most cases. In 
overemphasizing labor market flexibility to the detriment of income security, 
the more recent developments point again to trade- offs and vicious relationships 
and thereby continue the precrisis trend toward dualization and segmentation 
in accordance with age, gender, and other sociodemographic characteristics.
NOTES
1 We thank Ute Klammer, Igor Guardiancich, Martin Seeleib- Kaiser, Paola 
Villa, and Traute Meyer, as well as the participants at the Turin and Krakow 
STYLE meetings, for very comprehensive and useful comments on earlier 
versions of this chapter.
2 Notable exceptions are two studies commissioned by the European 
Parliament on indicators for monitoring the coverage of social security sys-
tems for people in flexible employment (Alphametrics Ltd. 2005, 2009).
3 Clasen and Clegg (2011) and Lefresne (2008), for example, provide country 
case studies addressing the extent to which benefit schemes have adapted— 
or have failed to adapt— in recent decades to the major changes affecting 
labor markets.
4 The Lisbon Strategy was launched by the European Commission in 2000, 
listing among its aims the generation of growth and of more and better jobs; 
in 2010, it was replaced by the Europe 2020 strategy for “smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth.”
5 See, for example, the discussion on the single open- ended contract, which, 
however, has been ardently criticized by ETUC.
6 For instance, opening them up to more firms than previously; less bureau-
cratic access conditions; and temporary increases in the level, duration, and/ 
or coverage of public financial support.
7 Greece has introduced such schemes for small and medium- sized enterprises, 
while Sweden has for manufacturing, for example (LABREF 2015).
8 Note, however, that because of differences in the definition and delimitation 
of short- time working, the EU- LFS figures diverge somewhat from other 
available figures, including OECD and national- level data.
9 Based on country- specific information from OECD Benefits and Wages, 12 
EU countries have unemployment assistance schemes (AT, DE, EE, EL, ES, 
FI, FR, IE, MT, PT, SE, and UK). However, in countries that do not have an 
unemployment assistance scheme, social assistance can act as a functional 
equivalent, although it is potentially more stigmatizing.
10 Examples are Estonia, Greece, and Portugal (OECD Benefits and Wages).
11 For example, in Ireland, Job Allowance is not available to those who are 
younger than age 18  years or who have been out of school for less than 
3 months. It can, however, be paid to those in ALMPs or with dependents 
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(European Commission 2011a). In both Austria and Ireland, unemployment 
assistance cannot be accessed directly but, rather. only after unemployment 
insurance benefits have been exhausted.
12 EPL is another area of reform that is important for understanding this topic. 
However, we confine ourselves here to an analysis of policies and practices 
related to income security because this in itself is quite voluminous and com-
plex. Furthermore, focusing on income security measures prioritizes the se-
curity offered to people outside of the working relationship and not just to 
those in work (as in the case of EPL).
13 Changes with regard to contributions that took place in a number of coun-
tries are not reviewed here because they do not usually have a direct impact 
on the coverage of nonstandard workers. They can, however, have an indirect 
impact if they create incentives to hire individuals on standard rather than 
nonstandard contracts (see, e.g., Spain, where in the past the government 
has tried to encourage employers to hire individuals on regular contracts by 
reducing related contributions).
14 Unemployment assistance in Spain is usually restricted to specific labor 
market groups, such as unemployed persons with family responsibilities or 
older workers. The special benefit introduced in January 2009 was abolished 
in February 2011; it had covered approximately 700,000 unemployed people 
(Sanz de Miguel 2011).
15 Denmark formerly had a comparatively long universal duration of unem-
ployment insurance benefits of 4 years; in 2010, this was reduced to 2 years.
16 Labor market integration, for example, is promoted through one- off benefits, 
special benefits for the young, and benefits for partial and temporary em-
ployment (for details, see MISSOC 2014).
17 Given its level, Danish social assistance can be viewed as a functional equiv-
alent to unemployment benefits.
18 It is important to note here that it is challenging to compile extremely com-
prehensive data on these developments. The difficulty lies in the frequent 
changes to policy, in the time limits imposed on some policies, and in the time 
that is needed to establish the impact of general policies on youth. Here, we 
draw on MISSOC and LABREF as sources, in addition to all publications that 
to our knowledge are available on the topic at the time of writing. However, 
our study represents a first effort at mapping this policy landscape, and we 
believe that more work is needed to fully complete the analysis. We do not 
distinguish between different causes for unemployment benefit reforms; al-
though most will have been directly linked to the (unemployment) crisis, in 
some countries changes might also be part of a longer term reform agenda.
19 This allows us to get around issues such as varying average duration of unem-
ployment (different long- term unemployment rates), differences in duration 
of unemployment insurance benefits, and timing of granting of unemploy-
ment assistance benefits across countries.
158 Comparing problematiC Youth transitions to Work
158
20 Differences in the wording of survey questions across countries play a crucial 
role here. Immervoll, Marianna, and Mira D’Ercole (2004) show for selected 
countries that the figures on unemployment benefit receipt rates from ad-
ministrative data sources differ substantially from those from labor force 
surveys, with no clear direction in difference.
21 For instance, men were more affected by unemployment than women in 
the first part of the crisis, whereas— due to being more often in standard 
employment— they are usually more likely to fulfill eligibility criteria for un-
employment benefits.
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6
POLICY TRANSFER AND INNOVATION 
FOR BUILDING RESILIENT BRIDGES TO  
THE YOUTH LABOR MARKET
Maria Petmesidou and María González Menéndez
6.1. INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession has significantly aggravated problems with the labor market 
integration of youth that have been evident for several decades in some areas of 
Europe. The need to develop effective measures for sustained school- to- work 
(STW) transitions has become a paramount political concern on the European 
Union (EU) policy agenda. It has generated EU initiatives for a common focus 
among member states on comprehensive and integrated policies for youth at 
risk. This has accelerated mutual learning, policy transfer, and experimentation 
with new practices in order to build resilient bridges to the youth labor market. 
Drawing on the policy learning and transfer literature, we test the hypothesis that 
a distinction can be made between countries with policy machineries that facil-
itate both learning and experimentation with new, proactive youth employment 
measures and those exhibiting considerable inertia.
Our analysis covers eight EU member states (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and one 
accession state (Turkey).1 They represent a range of STW transition regimes 
(Walther and Pohl 2005; Hadjivassiliou et al., this volume) and welfare regimes 
exhibiting different levels of national performance relating to youth unemploy-
ment and its gender dimension (Gökşen et  al. 2016a). The primary research 
consists of interviews conducted in each of the nine countries with policy 
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experts, officials, academics, and researchers. It is complemented by an analysis 
of available secondary data.
We find that local/ regional administrations and agencies are more likely to 
exchange knowledge on policy processes and tools among themselves and also to 
get involved in cross- country mutual policy learning. Most important, a mode of 
policy governance based on regional/ local partnerships and networks of public 
services, professional bodies and education/ training providers, employers, youth 
associations, and other stakeholders tends to stimulate policy experimenta-
tion. The role of policy entrepreneurs in promoting policy learning and transfer 
has also been ascertained in a few cases. However, for these manifestations of 
learning and innovation to yield results of sustained labor market integration 
of youth, a national policy environment is required that is conducive to coor-
dinated sharing and diffusion of information and experience between different 
levels of administration and joint stakeholders’ bodies.
Our hypothesis is proven true in this respect in that it brings to the fore a 
distinction between countries with more or less systematic interaction and feed-
back between all levels of administration— from the bottom up and vice versa— 
and those with poor channels of sharing and diffusion of policy knowledge. The 
factors accounting for the latter are, among others, overcentralized administra-
tive structures, fragmentation/ overlapping of competences, and bureaucratic 
inertia.
The remainder of this chapter consists of four sections. The first frames the re-
search question and presents our conceptual and analytical framework, and the 
second lays out the research methodology. The third section assesses, at a macro 
level, the relevance of policy learning in the political/ policy agenda of the coun-
tries studied and also examines the most significant channels of policy influence, 
transfer, and diffusion within and across various levels of governance (including 
the supranational level). It additionally provides a microanalysis of specific cases 
of more or less successful policy innovation with regard to the Youth Guarantee 
(YG; or a similar program) and apprenticeship schemes. We also reflect on the 
extent to which the gender dimension in STW transitions is taken into account 
in policy learning and innovation. The final section discusses the conclusions 
deriving from our findings.
6.2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Labor market and welfare policy arrangements in European countries are in-
creasingly open to “recalibration” and transformation through complex policy 
learning and policy transfer routes that, as Dwyer and Ellison (2009, 390) state, 
“undermine traditional welfare regime characteristics, and both pluralise and 
deinstitutionalise sources of policy making.” Available literature on policy 
transfer regarding work transitions has so far focused on globalization influences 
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and transatlantic policy transfer with respect to welfare- to- work schemes and 
on the “iterative process” across Europe involving the adoption of “workfare” 
elements in social welfare policies and their subsequent adaptation within na-
tional traditions (Peck and Theodore 2001; Fergusson 2002; Dwyer and Ellison 
2009). A  systematic examination of policy learning and transfer across STW 
transition regimes at different levels of governance and with respect to the role 
and influence of key actors (state and nonstate, as well as supranational actors) is 
lacking. There has also been little research on the degree to which EU- level youth 
strategies since the late 2000s (particularly the Youth Opportunities Initiative) 
have been a “leverage” for policy learning and change— assessed in terms of the 
extent, direction, and effectiveness of policy innovation.
The presence of policy learning and transfer cannot be assumed to lead au-
tomatically to successful outcomes (Dwyer and Ellison 2009). Similarly, not 
all policy innovations are necessarily effective, and there is no clear evidence 
of an association between policy innovations’ effectiveness and the type of 
policy transfer and learning, be it voluntary or coercive (Dolowitz and Marsh 
2000)  or soft or hard (Stone 2004). Nonetheless, some literature supports the 
hypothesis of a positive association between the degree of innovation/ experi-
mentation in employment policy and the strength of established processes of 
policy learning and transfer (Evans 2009; Legrand 2012). Accordingly, countries 
frequently experimenting with new, proactive youth employment measures and 
those exhibiting path dependence and inertia (European Commission 2011; 
Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) 2015) ap-
pear to respectively exhibit stronger and weaker established processes of policy 
learning and transfer. In this chapter, we test this hypothesis with the aim of 
highlighting, for a number of European countries, institutional and governance 
aspects of STW transition policies that facilitate or hinder learning and innova-
tion. We also examine EU influence in this respect.
We are interested in effective innovations, which we define as policy changes 
in objectives, programs, and delivery processes that are conducive to positive 
results with regard to the labor market and the social inclusion of youth (par-
ticularly of the most disadvantaged/ disaffected young people). Our definition of 
(effective) innovation is in agreement with the European Commission’s social in-
novation concept, defined as the development of “new ideas, services and models 
to better address social issues.”2
Crucial, as a point of departure, is Hall’s (1993, 278)  definition of policy 
learning “as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in 
response to past experience and new information.” Hall further distinguishes 
between radical changes in the basic instruments of policy and in policy goals 
(second- and third- order changes, respectively), on the one hand, and piece-
meal changes in the levels or settings of these instruments (first- order changes), 
on the other hand.3 Also key are Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) concepts for un-
derstanding institutional change, namely “layering” and “conversion.” Here, we 
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pay greater attention to the former, defined as “grafting of new elements onto 
an otherwise stable institutional framework,” which— if it takes place for pro-
longed periods— can “significantly alter the overall trajectory of an institution’s 
development” (Thelen 2004, 35; see also Hacker 2004). Streeck and Thelen’s 
approach seeks to show that significant innovative, path- departing reforms 
can occur beyond “critical junctures” and/ or strong “outside pressures.” 
In this sense, it provides an insight into how Hall’s first- and second- order 
changes may, in the long term, extensively alter the core objectives and role of 
an institution— resulting in radical change. These approaches identify major 
mechanisms of change and develop partly overlapping, partly complementary 
typologies.
In addition, we refer to a range of pathways along which policy change takes 
place: (1) through a more or less intentional policy learning and transfer pro-
cess that— according to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000)— could consist in “copying,” 
“emulation,” and/ or “inspiration” drawn from abroad; (2) in a context in which 
outside triggers may open up “windows of opportunity” for domestic policy 
entrepreneurs to push forward reform agendas (see Kingdon 1984; Roberts and 
King 1996); and (3) as a more or less coerced policy change and transfer (e.g., 
where EU funding or bailout deals are provided subject to certain conditions). 
The combination of mechanisms and pathways of policy change and innovation 
provide our analytical framework.
6.3. SELECTION/ GROUPING OF COUNTRIES  
AND METHODOLOGY
We used a combination of three criteria for selecting the nine countries under 
study. First, we included countries that joined the EU at different stages of en-
largement, and we also added an accession country. Second, drawing on Walther 
and Pohl’s (2005) study of STW transition regimes and Gangl’s (2001) anal-
ysis of labor market entry patterns, we selected countries spanning the entire 
range of categories differentiated by these authors. Walther and Pohl identified 
five STW transition regimes: the universalistic regime of Nordic countries, the 
employment- centered regime of Continental countries, the liberal regime of 
Anglo- Saxon countries, the subprotective regime of Mediterranean countries, 
and the post- socialist or transitional regime (with subprotective traits) in Central 
and Eastern European countries. In our study, these categories are represented, 
respectively, by Denmark; the United Kingdom; Belgium, France, and the 
Netherlands; Greece, Spain, and Turkey; and Slovakia. Labor market entry 
patterns provide a cross- cutting dimension: In Belgium, France, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom, labor market entry is driven by internal labor markets (ILM); 
in Denmark and the Netherlands, it is driven by occupational labor markets 
(OLM); and in Greece, it is driven by a mix of very high employment risks at 
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the outset of careers with little volatility once in employment. The stronger role 
of job experience and worker mobility in ILM- compared to OLM- driven labor 
markets makes youth labor market outcomes much less favorable in the former 
case (Gangl 2001).
The third criterion concerns the scale of the youth problem in Europe, 
assessed in terms of the total and long- term youth unemployment rates and the 
poverty and social exclusion risks faced by youth not in employment, educa-
tion, or training (NEETs). According to the STW transition regime literature, 
the severity of the youth problem varies significantly across regimes, as does the 
propensity to engage in policy experimentation at the national and local levels 
of government. This is the case even though innovative practices do not always 
imply successful youth employment outcomes— either in terms of efficiency 
(achieving the highest possible youth employment rate) or in terms of equity 
(significantly lowering the incidence of NEETs and the risk of poverty). Our aim 
is to highlight the factors driving or hindering effective innovation in terms of 
youth labor market outcomes.
As shown in Figure 6.1, Greece and Spain exhibit youth unemployment rates 
of greater than 50% and also experience comparatively high long- term youth 
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Figure 6.1 Comparison of countries on the severity of the “youth problem,” as indicated by youth 
total and long- term unemployment rates (aged 15– 24 years), 2014/ 2015. The youth unemployment 
rate refers to the 2015 annual rate, whereas the youth long- term unemployment rate refers to the 
2014 rate. Unemployment is considered long term if its duration exceeds 12 months.
Note: We focus on the youth age range 15–24 years because this is the most commonly used 
age bracket in the youth unemployment official statistics of most EU countries.
Source: Figure drawn by the authors on the basis of Eurostat’s EU- LFS and YOUTH data.
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unemployment. Slovakia shares some similarities with Greece and Spain in that 
it scores highly on both these indicators. Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, 
and Austria exhibit the lowest youth unemployment and long- term unem-
ployment rates. Belgium and France have higher rates than the latter countries 
because they have been affected by rising total and long- term youth unemploy-
ment, although not as acutely as is the case in Southern Europe. The United 
Kingdom performs better than the previously mentioned two Continental coun-
tries but less well than the best performers (Germany, Austria, Denmark, and 
Netherlands).4 In Turkey, the youth problem appears to be less severe than in 
most Continental, Eastern, and Southern European countries.5
Regarding NEETs and the at- risk- of- poverty and/ or social exclusion rates 
(particularly among young females), the United Kingdom performs worse than 
the Continental and Scandinavian countries (Figures 6.2 and 6.3), with young 
women facing a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion and of being NEET. 
Belgium, Denmark, and France exhibit no substantial gender differences. In 
fact, in Denmark, young women fare slightly better than men in terms of these 
dimensions. In Greece and Spain, the “youth problem” in terms of disengage-
ment from education, training, and employment is most acute. Greece is an out-
lier because it exhibits one of the highest NEET rates and risk of poverty and/ 
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Figure 6.2 Comparison of countries on the severity of the “youth problem,” as indicated by the 
NEET rate and the at- risk- of- poverty and/ or social exclusion rate (males aged 15– 24 years). The 
NEETs rates refers to 2014 and the at- risk- of- poverty and/ or social exclusion rates to 2013; there 
are no data for Turkey on youth at- risk- of- poverty or social exclusion.
Note: The poverty and/or social exclusion indicator refers to the share of youth in at least 
one of the following conditions: (1) living below the poverty line (defined as 60% of median 
equivalized income); (2) experiencing severe material deprivation; and (3) living in a household 
with very low work intensity. This is a household indicator that is sensitive to cases where young 
people leave the parental home early (e.g., in Denmark).
Source: Figure drawn by the authors on the basis of the Eurostat YOUTH data.
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or social exclusion among the young (particularly among young women) (see 
Mascherini, this volume).
Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands exhibit the shortest 
(first) job search periods for the young, with no significant gender differences 
(approximately 5– 11 months for 75% of the examined youth cohorts who had 
entered the labor market). Belgium and France follow with 16– 27 months, with 
no significant gender differences either. The longest search periods are found 
in Greece and Spain (36– 38 months, with a significant gender gap— in favor of 
men— in Spain). The transition to a first job is shorter in Slovakia, albeit with 
very pronounced gender differences (17  months for men and 29  months for 
women) (see Flek, Hála, and Mysíková, this volume).6
The nine countries we selected on the basis of the three criteria mentioned 
previously were divided into two groups. Group A is composed of Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, whereas Group B is made up of Belgium, 
France, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, and Turkey. Group A countries have lower youth 
unemployment rates and shorter job search periods for first entry into the labor 
market compared to Group B.
In the light of the analytical framework discussed previously, we examine 
differences and similarities between (and within) the two groups of countries. 
The analysis draws on data and information obtained through semistructured, 
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Figure 6.3 Comparison of countries on the severity of the “youth problem,” as indicated by the 
NEET rate and the at- risk- of- poverty and/ or social exclusion rate (females aged 15– 24 years), 
The NEETs rates refers to 2014 and the at- risk- of- poverty and/ or social exclusion rates refer to 
2013; there are no data for Turkey on youth at- risk- of- poverty or social exclusion.
Note: The poverty and/or social exclusion indicator refers to the share of youth in at least 
one of the following conditions: (1) living below the poverty line (defined as 60% of median 
equivalized income); (2) experiencing severe material deprivation; and (3) living in a household 
with very low work intensity. This is a household indicator that is sensitive to cases where young 
people leave the parental home early (e.g., in Denmark).
Source: Figure drawn by the authors on the basis of the Eurostat YOUTH data.
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in- depth interviews carried out in each of the nine countries with key stakeholders 
involved in the design and implementation of youth- related policies (high- 
ranking officials in ministries and relevant public services; in trade unions and 
employers’ associations; in vocational education and apprenticeship services; 
and in youth organizations, firms, and other major relevant bodies), as well as 
with academics and researchers with a good grasp of policy issues and challenges 
regarding youth labor markets; policy learning and transfer within and across 
countries; and policy negotiation, planning, and implementation.
In countries with highly centralized policymaking processes, the majority 
of interviewees were selected from among officials and other stakeholders at 
the national level, whereas in countries with devolved power in policymaking, 
the interviews were conducted with informants at the regional/ local level. 
A common template laid out the issues to be covered, but the interviews were 
adapted to each specific national case.
Table 6.1 depicts the number of interviews conducted in each country.7 These 
took place in two rounds (June– September 2015 and December 2015 to January 
2016). In the second round, case studies of schemes with an innovative potential 
were carried out. Because a comprehensive and integrated approach to STW tran-
sition (including apprenticeships) is at the forefront of EU initiatives providing a 
(more or less) convergent trend among member countries (Hadjivassiliou et  al., 
this volume), the case studies selected in each country consisted of interventions 
under the YG (or similar scheme easing transition to the labor market) and ap-
prenticeship schemes introducing innovation in the structure, management, and 
knowledge base of vocational education and training (VET). In some cases, per-
sons interviewed during the first phase of the study were also included among the 
interviewees of the second phase. In the light of our thematic focus, the national 
teams also scrutinized the available literature for each country with the aim of un-
derstanding the major planks of academic and public debate on facilitators of or 
constraints on policy innovation.
6.4. THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY CHANGE AND INNOVATION
In this section, we lay out and compare the major channels of policy influence, 
transfer, and diffusion within and across various levels of governance (including 
the supranational level) in the countries studied. Specific instances of innovative 
schemes in each country are also analyzed. The aim is to highlight major aspects of 
institutional structures, governance patterns, and interactions among main players 
in policy design and delivery that facilitate or hinder policy learning and innovation.
6.4.1. “enablers” of and “barriers” to policy learning 
and innovation
Institutional (and process) “enablers” and “barriers” in the sphere of policy 
learning and innovation are examined in the nine countries with regard to 
whether the political/ policy environment is conducive or not to learning and 
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Table 6.1 Countries examined by STW regime, interviews conducted, and in- depth studies of specific schemes with innovative potential
Countries and STW transition regimes
No. of (semistructured) 
interviewsa
Schemes studied in Phase 2
Phase 1 Phase 2 Schemes with holistic approach Innovative apprenticeship schemes
Group A
DK
Universalistic
6 4 YG (in place before launching of EU 
initiative)
Operation Apprenticeship
UK
Liberal
11 7 Youth Contract (similar to YG) Apprenticeship Trailblazers
NL
Employment- centered (OLM)
25 Pact for Youth- Unemployment- Free Zone 
in Mid- Brabant (South Netherlands)
Collaborative initiative in Amsterdam 
region
Group B
FR
Employment- centered (ILM)
8 8 Schemes integrated into YG Second Chance Schools
BE
Employment- centered (ILM)
3 4 Regional schemes for YG JEEP (Jeunes, École, Emploi) program
Subprotective
ESb 11 14 YG in three localities (Avilés, Gijón, 
Lugones)
Pilots of dual training in Asturias region
EL 14 7 Voucher for Labor Market Entry (main 
strand of YG so far)
Experimental Vocational Training Schools 
(tourism sector)
SKc 7 6 National Project Community Centers 
(Roma communities)
Dual VET initiated by Automotive Industry 
Association
TR 11 3 On- the- Job Training Program Apprenticeship Program (dual system)
aThe number of interviews varies depending on the scope of the literature available on the issues studied (for each country) and from which valuable information could be obtained.
bAccording to Gangl (2001), Spain clusters with the Northern European ILM countries (with high labor mobility), but it also shares the characteristic of family support to the young with the 
other Southern European countries under the subprotective regime.
cPost- socialist, but similarities with Southern European countries.
ILM, internal labor markets; OLM, occupational labor markets; STW, school- to- work.
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innovation; the main mechanisms of policy change and innovation; and the 
pathways of learning and transfer. The information is presented schematically in 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3.
Denmark and the United Kingdom stand out as the countries whose policy 
environments are most oriented toward evidence- based policymaking. In 
Denmark, corporatist learning supports a highly coordinated sharing and 
diffusion of knowledge between different levels of administration and joint 
stakeholders’ bodies. Recent reform in the apprenticeship- based VET system 
responds to the pressure for employment- relevant education and training in 
line with the requirements of the flexicurity model,8 which— in a context of 
high reservation wages and collectively agreed minimum wages— creates strong 
pressures for young workers to perform productive work immediately after being 
hired. The strengthening of the link between benefit provisions to the young and 
the obligation to participate in education— in parallel with the introduction of a 
grade requirement for entering vocational education— placed VET at the center 
of the growth agenda of Danish politics.
Denmark is more of an exporter of policy ideas to other EU countries, par-
ticularly with regard to active labor market policies (ALMPs) and the concept 
of flexicurity. However, soft forms of learning across countries and through su-
pranational channels are also important; for example, inspiration from the Swiss 
VET model has influenced reform in Denmark. As to the mechanism of change, 
the 2014 reform of the Danish VET system constitutes a case of institutional 
“layering,” in which an element of “merit” (namely the “grade requirement”) is 
attached to the existing institutional setup. The aim is to improve the quality 
and the perceived value of VET at the expense of its social integration role re-
garding youngsters who fail to achieve mainstream education standards. The 
latter function is undertaken by other programs targeted at disadvantaged youth 
(immigrants and youth with working- class backgrounds). In this way, however, 
disadvantaged young people run the risk of leaving education with inadequate 
qualifications. Gender considerations with regard to policy innovation play a 
minor role in Denmark, given the limited differences in unemployment rates 
for young men and young women. Recently, information campaigns and the 
use of student counselors have sought to address gender differences in educa-
tional choice. Additional mentoring services for young mothers have also been 
introduced (Gökşen et al. 2016a, 48– 50).
In the United Kingdom, a strong liberal tradition impedes coordinated 
policy diffusion and feedback. Instead, we find high reliance on voluntarist 
learning (peer- to- peer learning, codes of conduct, etc.). EU initiatives and 
program- funding eligibility criteria are not a major stimulus of policy innova-
tion. Cross- country learning and emulation concern mostly Anglo- Saxon and 
OECD countries. However, devolution of powers to the home nations has ar-
guably created favorable conditions for the diffusion of good practices and has 
promoted a closer dialogue with EU policy initiatives by the devolved entities 
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Table 6.2 Aspects of policy learning and innovation (Group A countries)
Country
Political/ policy environment 
conducive to policy learning, 
transfer, innovation (A) Pathways of learning and transfer (B) Mechanisms of policy learning and transfer (C)
“Enablers” “Barriers” Within- country policy 
learning
Cross- country 
mutual learning 
(inspiration, 
copying, 
experimental 
emulation, etc.)
EU influence 
(OMC, 
European 
Semester, 
funding 
conditionality, 
“bailout” 
deals)
Incremental 
adjustment, 
fine- tuning, 
“layering,” 
and/ or 
redeployment of 
old institutions/ 
measures for 
new purposes
Changes 
in policy 
instruments; 
new 
innovative 
schemes
Changes in 
specific or 
broad policy 
goalsCoordinated 
learning
Voluntarist 
learning 
(peer- to- 
peer, codes 
of conduct, 
etc.)
Denmark Robust evidence- 
based 
policymaking 
under 
corporatist 
governance
Weakening 
corporatist 
governance
Systematic 
bottom- up/ 
top- down 
policy 
learning
Some evidence Some inspiration 
(e.g., Swiss 
model for 
VET reform in 
Denmark)
“Exporters” of 
policy ideas in 
the EU (ALMPs, 
flexicurity 
model)
EU program 
funding 
conditionality 
not a major 
stimulus
“Exporters” of 
ALMPs
Strong evidence 
(e.g., of 
“layering”)
— Strengthening 
effectiveness of 
VET in meeting 
skills needs (at 
the expense 
of social 
integration 
role)
Netherlands No strong 
tradition of 
ex- ante or ex- 
post evaluation 
research
Centralized 
youth policy 
governance 
cannot 
address 
regional/ 
local 
challenges
Influence 
goes both 
ways, 
but more 
bottom- up 
initiatives 
through 
networking
As above As above As above Evidence of 
incremental 
adjustment
Experimentation 
with network 
governance
“Triple helix” form 
of governance
(continued)
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Country
Political/ policy environment 
conducive to policy learning, 
transfer, innovation (A) Pathways of learning and transfer (B) Mechanisms of policy learning and transfer (C)
“Enablers” “Barriers” Within- country policy 
learning
Cross- country 
mutual learning 
(inspiration, 
copying, 
experimental 
emulation, etc.)
EU influence 
(OMC, 
European 
Semester, 
funding 
conditionality, 
“bailout” 
deals)
Incremental 
adjustment, 
fine- tuning, 
“layering,” 
and/ or 
redeployment of 
old institutions/ 
measures for 
new purposes
Changes 
in policy 
instruments; 
new 
innovative 
schemes
Changes in 
specific or 
broad policy 
goalsCoordinated 
learning
Voluntarist 
learning 
(peer- to- 
peer, codes 
of conduct, 
etc.)
United 
Kingdom
Robust evidence- 
based 
policymaking— 
Use of piloting, 
controlled 
experiments, 
etc.
Liberal 
tradition 
and market 
competition 
do not favor 
diffusion 
or feedback 
for strategic 
decision- 
making
Evidence used 
for fine- 
tuning— 
Devolution 
facilitates 
policy 
learning 
cross- 
regionally
High reliance 
on 
voluntarist 
learning— 
Dense 
network of 
think tanks 
and policy 
communities
Influence of OECD 
and other 
Anglo- Saxon 
countries— 
Apprenticeship 
Trailblazer 
initiative may 
imply emulation 
of other EU 
countries
As above Strong evidence 
of incremental 
adjustment and 
fine- tuning
— Apprenticeship 
Trailblazers: 
Shift of focus 
from education 
providers to 
employers
OMC, open method of coordination (a soft form of EU intergovernmental policy learning and regulation; see Smith et al., this volume).
Source: Compiled on the basis of the information provided by the country reports.
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Table 6.3 Aspects of policy learning and innovation (Group B countries)
Country
Political/ policy environment 
conducive to policy learning, 
transfer, innovation (A) Pathways of learning and transfer (B) Mechanisms of policy learning and transfer (C)
“Enablers” “Barriers” Within- country policy learning Cross- country 
mutual learning 
(inspiration, 
copying, 
experimental 
emulation, etc.)
EU influence 
(OMC, European 
Semester, funding 
conditionality, 
“bailout” deals)
Incremental 
adjustment, fine- 
tuning, “layering,” 
and/ or redeployment 
of old institutions/ 
measures for new 
purposes
Changes 
in policy 
instruments; 
new 
innovative 
schemes
Changes 
in 
specific 
or broad 
policy 
goals
Coordinated 
learning
Voluntarist 
learning (peer- 
to- peer, codes 
of conduct, 
etc.)
France Strong 
monitoring 
and 
evaluation 
tradition
Institutional stasis 
due to “dirigiste” 
governance— 
“Policy fatigue”
Limited: 
Relatively poor 
coordination 
between different 
institutional 
actors
Limited: Low 
involvement 
of employers, 
union activism 
important in 
policy learning
Inspiration from 
EU (e.g., Second 
Chance Schools) 
and other EU 
countries (e.g., 
Germany)
OMC on ALMPs— EC 
recommendations 
and EU programs 
have accelerated 
measures for youth
Incremental changes Second Chance Schools 
(innovation in 
pedagogical principles 
that set in train 
institutional diffusion 
process)
Belgium Piloting and 
evaluation 
widespread 
but no 
systematic 
feedback 
into policy 
design
Fragmentation of 
competencies 
causes 
inconsistent 
cooperation across 
regions and with 
other actors
Limited cross- regional learning 
(Synerjob program facilitates peer- 
to- peer learning)
Strong influence 
through soft forms 
of learning from 
other EU countries
As above Increasing cross- regional cooperation in 
new programs
— 
Spain Limited 
evaluation, 
mostly 
linked to 
EU- funded 
programs
Fragmentation of 
competencies 
and political 
competition— 
Some policy 
inertia
Formal channels 
limited to 
state and 
autonomous 
communities
Limited but 
evidence 
of informal 
networks
EU influence strong 
in terms of policy 
goals and resources; 
weaker in terms 
of outcomes— EU 
channels (mutual 
learning, expert 
networks) are 
important
OMC on ALMPs— 
EC/ Troika 
recommendations 
and EU program 
requirements
— YG national 
registry 
(links and 
recentralizes 
data)— 
Increased 
weight of 
evaluation
Path shift 
toward 
dual 
VET
(continued)
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Country
Political/ policy environment 
conducive to policy learning, 
transfer, innovation (A) Pathways of learning and transfer (B) Mechanisms of policy learning and transfer (C)
“Enablers” “Barriers” Within- country policy learning Cross- country 
mutual learning 
(inspiration, 
copying, 
experimental 
emulation, etc.)
EU influence 
(OMC, European 
Semester, funding 
conditionality, 
“bailout” deals)
Incremental 
adjustment, fine- 
tuning, “layering,” 
and/ or redeployment 
of old institutions/ 
measures for new 
purposes
Changes 
in policy 
instruments; 
new 
innovative 
schemes
Changes 
in 
specific 
or broad 
policy 
goals
Coordinated 
learning
Voluntarist 
learning (peer- 
to- peer, codes 
of conduct, 
etc.)
Greece Excessive 
bureaucratization 
and high degree 
of policy  
inertia— Path 
dependence
Limited diffusion, 
mostly through 
EU influence 
and bailout 
requirements
Limited 
dialogue— 
Some diffusion 
by domestic 
policy 
entrepreneurs
As above Coerced transfer 
under bailout deal 
and EU program 
requirements
— — As above
Slovakia Party political 
expediency limits 
innovation
No systematic 
feedback 
between 
different 
institutional 
actors
As above As above EC recommendations 
and EU program 
requirements
— Experimentation 
with work- 
based 
interventions 
at local level
As above
Turkey Absence of 
evaluation 
and rare 
piloting
Overcentralized 
and monolithic 
administrative 
structure
Fragmented 
project- based 
solutions, no 
systematic 
feedback
Very limited Some copying and/ 
or emulation in 
context of World 
Bank- funded 
projects and 
accession process, 
but decreasing 
impact of latter
Eligibility criteria of 
EU and World Bank- 
funded programs 
and requirements of 
“acquis”
Redeployment of old 
instruments for 
introducing ALMPs 
by PES
Establishment 
of Vocational 
Qualifications 
Authority
— 
OMC, open method of coordination (a soft form of EU intergovernmental policy learning and regulation; see Smith et al., this volume).
Source: Compiled on the basis of the information provided by the country reports.
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(e.g., Wales). Although there is a well- established tradition of robust evidence- 
based policymaking, backed by a dense network of epistemic/ policy communities 
and think tanks facilitating extensive piloting, trailblazers, and so forth, there is 
no systematic and coordinated flow of information into high levels of (strategic) 
policy decision- making. Accumulated evidence is used for fine- tuning policies 
and for changes in policy instruments— that is, mostly for first- and second- 
order changes, according to Hall’s (1993) approach to policy change. A shift in 
policy goals is emerging in the VET field with the Apprenticeship Trailblazers 
initiative (discussed later). Regarding gender considerations, a number of 
programs (among others, Women’s Start- Up and Inspiring the Future) are aimed 
at tackling gender segregation; increasing women’s presence in science, tech-
nology, engineering, and mathematics; and keeping young parents in education 
(Gökşen et al. 2016a, 52– 53).
Compared to Denmark, corporatist learning in the Netherlands is less robust. 
Nevertheless, bottom- up innovations are usually introduced through concerted 
action between various local stakeholders, as is the case, for instance, with the 
Youth Starter’s Grant— the largest scheme for facilitating SWT transition, run 
by approximately 150 municipalities; the Pact for a Youth- Unemployment- Free 
Zone in the Mid- Brabant region; and innovative education reform practices in 
Amsterdam. Such initiatives embrace the “triple- ” or “multi- helix” model, which 
consists of collaboration, at the local level, between public administration and 
services, educational institutions, and the market (Bekker, van de Meer, and 
Muffels 2015). There is no strong tradition of controlled experiments or sys-
tematic ex- post evaluation research. However, like Denmark, the Netherlands is 
an exporter of good practices, such as the integrated personalized approach to 
youth unemployment adopted under the European Commission YG initiative. 
Soft forms of cross- country learning exert an influence on policy innovation in 
this country as well. Interregional policy transfer and emulation is highly impor-
tant: For instance, the “Brainport” model of network- based regional development 
(South Netherlands) that emerged in the late 1990s has provided inspiration and 
a blueprint for local actors’ innovative initiatives in the Mid- Brabant region and 
the Amsterdam area. The major barriers to policy change are the centralized gov-
ernance of youth policies and the lack of interaction/ integration between policy 
domains, of concrete target setting, and of impact assessment of single policies 
and their combined effect. Current innovative initiatives seek to tackle these 
barriers from the bottom up.
European- level influence is more decisive in initiating policy change in Group 
B countries. Piloting, program evaluation, and impact assessment are performed 
less systematically, and even if program evaluation is widespread, it is difficult 
to ascertain whether the acquired evidence effectively feeds into policy de-
sign. In Belgium, significant institutional barriers emerge from fragmentation/ 
overlapping of competences in the fields of education, training, and employment 
policy for youth between the two levels of government (federal and regional) 
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and the different language communities. This condition significantly slows the 
sharing of information on good practices. At the same time, EU influence is ex-
tensive, while some new schemes (e.g., the Synerjob scheme, in which public em-
ployment services (PES) from the different regions work together to fill vacancies 
through mixed job- counseling teams) open up opportunities for an incremental 
adjustment in the direction of peer- to- peer learning across regions and language 
communities with the aim of strengthening interregional labor mobility.
France stands out with respect to monitoring and evaluation. It fits the 
evidence- based tradition (of Group A countries), particularly as regards its VET 
system, paired with a long- standing concern about youth unemployment. At the 
same time, a high degree of institutional stasis due to the “dirigiste tradition” 
(a strong directive action by the state) is identified as a barrier to innovation. 
Notwithstanding policy compartmentalization and “policy fatigue,” the main 
enablers of and barriers to policy innovation in youth employment and educa-
tion policies are public opinion and social tensions, which have sometimes trig-
gered (or halted) reform, particularly in connection with labor contracts. The 
EU and other supranational bodies are identified as important sources of in-
novation. Regarding the intersection of vulnerable youth, gender, and employ-
ment, a significant innovative scheme launched in 2012— Emplois d’avenir (Jobs 
of the Future)— which comes under the French YG, consists of a holistic inter-
vention (of subsidized work contracts, training/ coaching, and counseling) and is 
addressed to youth from disadvantaged areas and disabled young people. Also 
since 2012, tackling the gender segregation of young people into male and female 
sectors has become a policy target (Gökşen et al. 2016a, 50– 51).
In the other four countries, the range of policy innovation and knowledge 
diffusion is limited by highly centralized administration structures (in Greece 
and Turkey), excessive bureaucratization (in Greece), policy inertia and path 
dependence (in Spain), and the fact that political interests overrule policy 
decisions (mostly in Turkey). However, Slovakia, as well as a number of regional 
governments in Spain (particularly those where policy coordination between 
regions/ localities is stronger), stand out as examples of innovative initiatives 
(e.g., the initiative by the automotive sector for VET reform in Slovakia and 
specific examples of policy learning and sharing of “good examples” in the re-
gions of Aragon, Asturias, and others in Spain). In Greece, Slovakia, and Spain, 
EU- program and European Social Fund funding conditionality are significant 
drivers of policy change. This is partly the case in Turkey, too, with regard to the 
accession process. However, sometimes project- based initiatives for policy ex-
perimentation wither away as funding expires.
Greece has experienced coerced transfer under the EU bailout, particularly 
in the field of labor protection legislation, with reforms that were embraced 
in the successive rescue deals dismantling collective bargaining, introducing 
subminimum wages for youth, and increasing flexibility in hiring and dismissals. 
In Greece, Slovakia, and Spain, a path shift is underway in VET structures in an 
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attempt to strengthen the dual system under the initiative provided in the con-
text of the European Alliance for Apprenticeships and bilateral agreements be-
tween Germany (an exporter of the dual system) and six EU countries. Domestic 
policy entrepreneurs (the Automotive Industry Association in Slovakia and the 
Hellenic Chamber of Hotels in collaboration with the Greek– German Chamber 
of Industry and Commerce in Greece) played a significant role in seizing the 
opportunity for experimenting with the dual VET system under the influence 
of external stimuli. This experimental emulation paved the way for a wholesale 
reform of VET in Slovakia.
Gender mainstreaming in youth employment policies is not prevalent in the 
two Southern European countries. In Spain, a gender concern can be found 
only in two youth employment policies: (1) the 2012 entrepreneurship contract 
for young women (aged 16– 30 years) in male- dominated industries and (2) the 
consideration of age 35 years (vs. 30 years for men) as the maximum age for 
capitalizing 100% of unemployment benefits in a lump sum for self- employment. 
In Greece, there are specific support schemes for women’s entrepreneurship, 
but these do not particularly target young women. Likewise, some programs 
addressed to youth (Gates for Youth Entrepreneurship, Youth in Action, and 
European Youth Card) only marginally embrace a gender perspective.
In summary, in the Group A countries, a strong debate on the mismatch be-
tween the skills provided by the educational and VET systems and those required 
in the workplace constitutes a significant driver of policy change and innova-
tion (see McGuinness, Bergin, and Whelan, this volume). In Denmark, under 
the universalistic STW transition regime and within a systematic framework of 
knowledge diffusion between all levels of governance and stakeholders’ bodies, 
VET reform for tackling this mismatch reflects a “layering” change process. 
Under the liberal STW regime of the United Kingdom, despite robust ex- ante 
and ex- post policy evaluation, competition and choice leave little room for co-
ordinated diffusion of evidence/ knowledge that could feed into policy decisions 
(except for policy fine- tuning). And yet there is evidence of an incipient radical 
change that brings employers to the center of VET policy design and delivery. 
The Netherlands represents an interesting example of copying/ emulation of in-
novative policies across regions.
In the Group B countries, EU stimuli and inspiration from other EU coun-
tries for policy change are found to be quite significant. Policy entrepreneurs 
can also play an important role in these initiatives. France, Greece, and Slovakia 
provide some examples of EU influence opening a “window of opportunity” for 
local policy entrepreneurs to act as pull factors for major reform in VET/ educa-
tion. In Greece, however, which exemplifies a case of coerced reform under the 
rescue deals, this has been of marginal impact so far. European stimuli fostering 
cooperation at the local/ regional level constitute an important channel of inno-
vative initiatives in Belgium and Spain. Turkey exhibits strong barriers to policy 
innovation mostly because of its overcentralized administrative structures, 
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monolithic policy implementation institutions, and overruling of policy choices 
by political expediency.
Finally, even though there is much concern among EU countries about gender 
equality in the professional sphere, there is limited focus on the intersection of 
youth, gender, and employment in all the countries examined (see Gökşen et al. 
2016a).
6.4.2. Case studies of policy innovation
Following the brief, comparative macro perspective presented previously, this 
section further elucidates the foci of innovation on the basis of case studies 
of YG and apprenticeship policies. The schemes studied range from ambi-
tious, novel initiatives at an early stage (in the case of the Netherlands) to well- 
established programs with a positive impact on youth labor markets (e.g., the 
YG in Denmark). Steps taken toward a holistic/ integrated approach to youth 
unemployment triggered by the European Commission YG program, with little 
progress so far in terms of nationwide implementation (in Greece, Slovakia, and 
Spain), have also been included.
We use three interrelated (and partly overlapping) dimensions for analyzing 
and comparing policy innovations. The first dimension concerns the extent to 
which the selected policy schemes produce significant changes in the institu-
tional setting and/ or in the group of actors involved in their design and im-
plementation. Of crucial importance is how the schemes impact on changes 
in policy governance by promoting more or less structured forms of cooper-
ation between actors at different levels of administration and between major 
stakeholders (employers, trade unions, youth organizations, and others) with the 
aim of improving service provision to disadvantaged youth. The second dimen-
sion refers to changes in the way policy is formulated and in the policy toolkit 
with a view to reaching out to disadvantaged youth, improving the skill profile 
of young jobseekers, and providing integrated services. Third, we trace the main 
pathway(s) in which innovation takes place: (1) through more or less intentional 
policy learning (among domestic actors at different territorial levels and/ or across 
countries); (2) via a push provided by policy entrepreneurs; and (3) through EU 
influence, mainly with regard to the flagship initiatives for youth (the YG and the 
European Alliance for Apprenticeships). Tables 6.4 and 6.5 briefly summarize 
the trends along these three dimensions in the two groups of countries.
Our case studies indicated three foci of innovation for addressing STW tran-
sition barriers and difficulties. First is a novel way of governance in policy design 
and delivery often referred to as a “triple” or “multiple” helix. This involves collab-
oration between the public administration, professional bodies and education/ 
training providers, employers, youth associations, and other stakeholders inter-
ested in employment growth and youth labor market integration. Second is a 
commitment to the YG through an integrated preventive and proactive approach. 
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Table 6.4 Summary of findings— YG or similar scheme
Changes in governance Changes in policy tool kit Pathways of policy innovation
“Triple- ” or “multi- helix” governance Holistic intervention Intentional learning, 
experimentation
Policy entrepreneurs EU influence
Group 
A countries
DK Active path in context of holistic interventions. New measures focus on 
speeding up intervention and improving individual screening
Lessons drawn from 
previous schemes
— “Exporter” of YG
NL Partnership- and network- based initiatives at regional level supporting 
comprehensive, integrated policies
Cross- regional learning 
very important
— Important— Also 
“exporter” of 
policies
UK More interagency and joined- up 
partnership working under YG, with 
mixed results— “Payment by results” 
drives performance
Local tailoring important, 
limited collaboration in 
delivery
Lessons drawn from 
previous schemes
— Important for 
regions with 
devolved 
government
Group B 
countries
FR Limited evidence (partnerships often ad hoc)— Innovation linked to 
coordination of existing measures
As above In some local missions 
and Pôles emploi
Important
BE Regional and local examples of establishing partnerships with nonstate 
actors and experimenting with holistic interventions
No systematic exchange 
of information between 
regions
— Important
ES Major challenge: 
coordination at 
national level
Multi- agent 
partnerships in local 
pilot interventions
Established practice before 
YG in some localities but 
still a major challenge
Informal channels of 
information from 
bottom up
State in centralizing 
youth unemployment 
data— Local PES 
targeting specific 
groups
Important
EL As above Very limited 
partnerships
Major challenge: 
experimenting with 
individually tailored 
services
— — Important
SK As above Local, collaborative, 
trust- based 
relationships
Communities of 
practice exposed 
to international 
experience
In some localities, 
incubators of learning 
and innovation
Important
Source: Compiled on the basis of the information provided by the country reports (Turkey is omitted because there is no scheme similar to the YG or dual VET).
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Table 6.5 Summary of findings— Apprenticeship Scheme
Changes in governance Changes in structure 
and knowledge/ 
pedagogic base of VET
Pathways of policy innovation
“Triple- ” or “multi- 
helix” governance
Flexible learning 
process— 
Integrated approach
Intentional learning, 
experimentation
Policy 
entrepreneurs
EU influence
Group A 
countries
DK Operation Apprenticeship 
launched by 
Confederation of Danish 
Industry
Emphasis on matching 
skills to needs of 
industry
Peer- to- peer learning 
and exchange of 
knowledge with training 
institutions and other 
key stakeholders
— Important but also 
exporters of 
policies
NL Coalition of key stakeholders in Amsterdam region— Set 
vocational training in context of an integrated system 
of service provision
Cross- regional learning 
very important
— As above
UK Apprenticeship Trailblazers imply significant shift in 
design and delivery of VET— New apprenticeship 
standards
Ongoing policy and peer 
learning
— Little exchange of 
knowledge with 
the EU
Group B 
countries
FR “Plural governance” of 
Second Chance Schools
Flexible learning process Marseille model diffused 
to other regions/ 
localities
Local policy 
entrepreneurs 
mobilized key 
stakeholders
Important
BE JEEP program (Jeunes, École, Emploi), a network- based 
bottom- up initiative in the Forest municipality of 
Brussels
Diffusion to other 
municipalities
— Important
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ES Different approaches by 
region
Employers can decide 
curricula
Individualized learning 
pathway (Basque 
region)— Learning 
across regions
Regional 
governments— 
Employers’ 
associations
Important: Through 
European Alliance 
for Apprenticeship 
and bilateral 
agreements for 
cooperation with 
Germany
EL Experimentation in 
tourism sector
Flexibility in course- 
based training and 
apprenticeship 
schedules following 
seasonality of tourism 
sector
Hellenic Chamber of Hotels and Greek– German 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce
As above
SK Experimentation in 
automotive industry
New apprenticeship 
standards
Automotive Industry— Key actors drew on 
experience from other countries
As above
Source: Compiled on the basis of the information provided by the country reports (Turkey is omitted because there is no scheme similar to the YG or dual VET).
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This combines services and provides comprehensive support, tailored to indi-
vidual needs. Third is the strengthening of traineeships and apprenticeships, 
combining school- and work- based learning (dual VET), which are advocated 
by the European Commission as significant tools for enhancing youth employ-
ability, in parallel with the mobilization of employers to play a more active role 
in this respect.
Experimentation around a raft of policies for a YG is currently particularly 
visible in the Netherlands. This is illustrated by the case of two regions (Mid- 
Brabant and Amsterdam), which are implementing a preventive approach to 
youth unemployment that links the YG and dual training. The initiatives rest 
on cooperation between multiple agents. In the Amsterdam region, the aim is to 
embed vocational training in an integrated system of service provision embracing 
health, housing, family conditions, and labor market integration. The Mid- 
Brabant Pact is a partnership- based endeavor— signed by major stakeholders— 
for comprehensive and integrated interventions that are expected to lead to a 
Youth- Unemployment- Free Zone within 3 years (2015– 2018). New policy tools 
include a youth monitor database linking schools, public employment offices, 
and local agencies, in addition to an umbrella network of partnerships that is 
hoped will foster rich, cross- industry learning— if network ties prove to be sus-
tainable. Both cases involve extensive cross- regional learning, as mentioned pre-
viously, and introduce a partnership- based mode of policy governance. In this 
respect, the innovation consists in the “push for cooperation” that yields policy 
experimentation (Verschraegen, Vanhercke, and Verpoorten 2011).
Danish YG policies linked to dual training and apprenticeships stand out 
as the blueprint for the EC initiative for a YG. The key feature of this model is 
an active path that mixes education/ training and work- first approaches in the 
context of holistic interventions that combine profiling the young by education 
and age— in order to activate them in a given period of time— with coaching, 
mentoring, and the development of basic skills. Recently, incremental changes 
have reinforced a path shift from rights to obligations for youth regarding educa-
tion and employment (Carstensen and Ibsen 2016).
The United Kingdom is another front runner for ALMPs. A  marketized 
logic dominates governance and delivery of policies in this country (e.g., the 
“payment- by- results” system). The negative aspects of this model, which slows 
down the coordinated use of knowledge for effective strategies targeting the most 
disadvantaged youth, were briefly highlighted in Section 6.4.1. These drawbacks 
are reflected in the persistently high NEET rate and the comparatively high risk 
of poverty and social exclusion among the young. The significant shift in the 
governance, design, and delivery of VET sought through the Apprenticeship 
Trailblazers initiative attempts to mobilize employers to play a central role in this 
respect (Hadjivassiliou, Swift, and Fohrbeck 2016).
Among Group B countries, initiatives for innovation in Belgium rest mostly 
with the relatively autonomous authorities (regions and language communities). 
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Flanders and the Brussels region take the lead for innovative partnership- based 
interventions and programs (e.g., the Jeunes, École, Emploi (JEEP) program, 
which provides guidance on training and job search to students before they 
leave compulsory education). The YG initiative has triggered some degree of 
central coordination through a national framework that fosters the use of local 
administrations’ access to school data to prevent early school leaving, and the 
development of common conditionality criteria for unemployment benefit pro-
vision and of incentives for acquiring information/ communication technologies 
and language skills (the latter are particularly important for labor mobility 
across language communities) (Martellucci and Lenaerts 2016).
In France, a most significant innovation in policy governance and in the 
structure and knowledge base of VET is linked with the introduction of Second 
Chance Schools (E2C) (European Commission 2013; Smith 2016). Their exper-
imental introduction (in Marseille in 1997), institutional recognition, and fur-
ther diffusion are closely linked with the role of local policy entrepreneurs in 
mobilizing regional/ local stakeholders from the political, economic/ corporate, 
and educational world to get involved in the design and operation of these new 
vocational education units in the context of a “plural governance.” E2Cs signpost 
a significant shift in learning methodology from the mainstream qualification- 
based approach to the acquisition of competences in a flexible learning process 
that follows the student’s progress. However, as for YG policies, a comprehen-
sive outreach strategy for all young NEETs is lacking, the ability of the local PES 
(local “missions”) to form partnerships with various local stakeholders is highly 
variable, and stakeholders’ commitment is often low or ad hoc.
In Greece, Slovakia, and Spain, EU influence on introducing a comprehen-
sive and integrated approach to youth unemployment and the NEETs problem, 
as well as upgrading and expanding VET, has been important. Nonetheless, 
interventions along these lines remain fragmented, with little positive effect on 
outcomes so far. In Spain, overly restrictive rules for participation in the YG pro-
gram and a technically difficult registration process have excluded many low- 
skilled unemployed youth. Local partnerships forged with non- governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and with employers’ associations to motivate the young to 
go to the PES to receive tailored services have been present in successful YG re-
gional/ local projects. Experimentation at the regional level aimed at mobilizing 
business- sector participation in the dual- training environment has been marked 
(e.g., in the Basque region; González Menéndez et al. 2016).
In Slovakia, experimental local community centers (some of them in the 
form of social enterprises) were formed by municipalities or by NGOs to sup-
port the social inclusion of marginalized social groups under the YG (with an 
emphasis on Roma youth). These have been inspired by similar organizations 
in Belgium and Germany through the diffusion of knowledge and expertise by 
research networks and international NGOs. Equally important are the knowl-
edge and experience accumulated by principal officers in these centers, through 
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their previous careers in similar policy settings and the relationships of trust they 
have helped develop with local agencies. Moreover, the Automotive Industry 
Association played the role of “policy entrepreneur” in creating the first pilot 
centers in dual vocational schools in 2002, which instigated a wholesale reform 
to strengthen dual training (Veselková 2016).
In Greece, a top- down experimental transfer is underway in the context of 
the German– Greek cooperation for developing dual VET and improving its 
image. Domestic actors, such as the Hellenic Chamber of Hotels and the Greek– 
German Chamber of Industry and Commerce, played the role of “pull factors” 
for external stimuli and created industry- based experimental vocational educa-
tion schools in order to provide the skills needed in the tourism industry. The 
initiative is still at an incipient stage. Moreover, there has been very little develop-
ment of comprehensive and integrated intervention under the YG (Petmesidou 
and Polyzoidis 2016).
In Turkey, the on- the- job training program operated by the PES shares 
some similarities with the active path under the YG, given that it seeks to help 
young people with low skills into available training places. However, there is 
no in- built integrated and individualized orientation. The system operates in 
a highly centralized way with little bottom- up or horizontal communication. 
Despite some recent EU- inspired institutional building (e.g., the Vocational 
Qualification Authority and the Directorate- General of Lifelong Learning), the 
absence of cooperation between existing institutions and firms maintains sub-
stantive inefficiencies in VET, which is further weakened by an extensive practice 
of apprenticeships in the informal economy (Gökşen et al. 2016b).
6.5. CONCLUSIONS
The hypothesis of a distinction between those countries frequently experimenting 
with new, proactive youth employment measures (Denmark, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and, to some extent, France) and those exhibiting consid-
erable inertia (mainly Greece and Turkey, but also Belgium, Slovakia, and Spain) 
is clearly supported by our analysis. This distinction cuts across the typology of 
STW transition regimes and indicates a more complex picture of differences and 
similarities within and between regimes, as well as across regions/ localities, with 
regard to policy learning and effective innovation in youth labor markets.
Our analysis shows that the urgency of the youth employment problem in 
many areas of Europe in the aftermath of the Great Recession led to a swathe of 
policy responses involving learning, transfer, and experimentation in order to 
address the complex needs of youth at risk. By drawing upon the main explan-
atory frameworks of policy learning and transfer, we recorded the following 
mechanisms of policy learning and innovation:  evidence- based incremental 
changes in policy delivery and policy instruments (e.g., in Denmark and the 
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United Kingdom); a “layering” process with new elements being drafted on ex-
isting policies and altering their focus (e.g., in the VET field in Denmark); 
a novel way of governance (multi- actor/ multi- agency partnerships) with the 
potential to trigger a paradigm shift in policy design and implementation in 
specific regions (e.g., in the Netherlands and less wide- ranging in Belgium and 
Spain) or in specific policy fields (VET in France, Slovakia, and the United 
Kingdom); and, finally, the mobilization of policy entrepreneurs (Greece 
and Slovakia)— mainly under the influence of EU- level initiatives (YG and 
European Alliance for Apprenticeships)— who introduce and develop new 
ideas and instruments.
Regarding the pathways of learning, these range from more or less 
systematic diffusion of policy knowledge among the different levels of admin-
istration to peer- to- peer learning (in Group A countries) and weak or absent 
diffusion channels (in Group B countries). In the latter group of countries, 
EU influence through conditions linked to program funding, mutual learning 
activities, country recommendations, or coerced transfer (under the bailout 
deal for Greece) has had varying degrees of importance.
Notably, devolution of policy functions tends to facilitate learning and exper-
imentation with innovative interventions because local/ regional administrations 
and agencies are more likely to exchange knowledge on policy processes and tools 
among themselves, as well as get involved in EU- wide mutual policy learning. 
However, for innovative initiatives to yield results with regard to sustained labor 
market integration of youth at the national level, a policy environment that is 
conducive to coordinated sharing and diffusion of knowledge between different 
levels of administration and joint stakeholders’ bodies is required. In some 
countries (e.g., Denmark), corporatist governance highly supports systematic 
bottom- up and top- down learning and policy innovation, leading to significant 
policy outcomes (namely comparatively low youth unemployment rates and 
gender disparities). In other countries, fragmented governance and administra-
tive inertia hinder coordinated learning exchange for effective innovation. Poor 
labor market outcomes in Group B countries partly reflect these conditions.
The following major barriers were identified:  Fragmentation and often 
overlapping competencies among different levels of administration lead to in-
consistent cooperation across regions and with other actors, thus slowing inno-
vation diffusion (in Belgium and Spain); overcentralized administrative structures, 
dominance of fragmented, project- based solutions, and inability to convert such 
projects into long- term sustainable policies (in Greece and Turkey); and political 
culture and values (e.g., a strong liberal tradition in the United Kingdom) and 
party- political expediency (e.g., in Slovakia), which do not favor systematic and 
coordinated flow of information into high levels of (strategic) policy decision- 
making. Hence, the improvement of coordination capacities vertically and hor-
izontally among key policy actors is crucial for facilitating the spread of good 
practices nationwide.
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Regarding the major foci of policy learning, innovation, and change, these 
include integrated, personalized interventions of a YG type; the structure, man-
agement, and knowledge base of VET as a significant tool for enhancing youth 
employability; and new forms of policy governance creating scope for regional/ 
local experimentation. In Group A countries with developed vocational educa-
tion “tracks” (e.g., Denmark and the Netherlands), the main policy challenges 
that involve learning and innovation concern VET upgrading, feedback 
mechanisms between VET and the labor market, and multi- actor/ multi- agency 
forms of governance. How to mobilize employers— in collaboration with profes-
sional bodies and training providers— in order to reconsider the knowledge base, 
learning methodology, and delivery of VET and to develop new apprenticeship 
standards— is a key challenge also in France and the United Kingdom. In Group 
B countries, learning lessons from other countries’ experience so as to improve 
the quality and capacity of PES operation is a crucial step toward developing 
integrated individualized services under the YG. Equally important is drawing 
experience from across Europe in order to develop robust VET systems and raise 
their public visibility and attractiveness for young people.
NOTES
1 The research inputs of the partner institutions that participated in Work Package 
4 of the STYLE project are greatly acknowledged. We truly appreciate the 
contributions by the following colleagues: Martin B. Carstensen and Christian 
Lyhne Ibsen (Copenhagen Business School); Kari Hadjivassiliou, Arianna 
Tassinari, Sam Swift, and Anna Fohrbeck (Institute of Employment Studies, 
United Kingdom); Sonja Bekker, Marc van der Meer, and Ruud Muffels (Tilburg 
University); Mark Smith, Maria Laura Toraldo, and Vincent Pasquier (Grenoble 
École de Management); Marcela Veselková (Slovak Governance Institute); Elisa 
Martellucci, Gabriele Marconi, and Karolien Lenaerts (Centre for European 
Policy Studies); and Fatoş Gökşen, Deniz Yükseker, Sinem Kuz, and Ibrahim 
Öker (Κοç University). Their analyses of policy learning and innovation in their 
countries have provided key insights for our comparative approach. Many thanks 
go also to our colleagues at Democritus University (Periklis Polyzoidis) and the 
University of Oviedo (Ana M. Guillén, Begoña Cueto, Rodolfo Gutiérrez, Javier 
Mato, and Aroa Tejero) for their valuable help. For critical comments and sub-
stantive suggestions on earlier drafts of the chapter, we thank Nigel Meager and 
the editors of the book. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 Accessible at http:// ec.europa.eu/ social/ main.jsp?catId=1022. There is also a 
vast literature on innovation patterns regarding the interface between labor 
market institutions, technological/ organizational regimes, and industrial 
competition. Such research examines innovation in the light of economic 
theory (e.g., the Schumpeterian view on innovation and entrepreneurship) 
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and focuses on the extent to which labor market deregulation and increasing 
flexibility promote or hamper innovation, productivity, and gross domestic 
product growth (Kleinknecht, van Schaik, and Zhou 2014). However, this lit-
erature is beyond our scope here.
3 Similarly, the Europeanization literature focusing on change induced by EU 
policy options (Radaelli 2003)  distinguishes between inertia, absorption/ 
accommodation of new elements into domestic policies without significant 
change in the overall institutional settings, and wholesale changes in policy 
structures and processes.
4 Also see European Commission (2014), where Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom are among the countries with comparatively high 
rates of transitions from short- term unemployment to employment and from 
temporary to permanent employment (among all working- age groups). The 
Netherlands is a borderline case with its low transition rates from temporary 
to permanent employment but comparatively easy returns from short- term 
unemployment to permanent employment. Greece and Spain are among the 
worst performers in these two respects. Slovakia also exhibits low rates of re-
turn from short- term unemployment to employment.
5 Turkey shares some similarities with Southern European countries in terms 
of welfare patterns (Grütjen 2008), but there are significant differences in em-
ployment structure. In 2014, approximately one- fifth of the labor force was 
employed in agriculture (the rates for Italy, Portugal, and Spain ranged be-
tween 4% and 5%; in Greece. the share stood at 13%).
6 Turkey exhibits a much lower level of educational attainment for women, with 
45% not having completed primary schooling (Gökşen et al. 2016a). Across 
EU countries, gender differences in terms of the educational field of study, vo-
cational educational orientation, and the impact of parenthood are crucial for 
examining labor market entry (Mills and Präg 2014). However, these issues lie 
outside our scope here.
7 For a detailed presentation of the country studies, see the Working Papers 
and Synthesis Reports available at http:// www.style- research.eu/ publications/ 
working- papers (under Work Package 4).
8 For a critical discussion of “flexicurity,” see Smith et al. in this volume.
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HOW DO YOUTH LABOR FLOWS DIFFER 
FROM THOSE OF OLDER WORKERS?
Vladislav Flek, Martin Hála, and Martina Mysíková
7.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes youth labor market dynamics, their structure, and their 
policy implications. We focus on selected European Union (EU) countries 
(Austria, France, Poland, and Spain) during the various stages of the Great 
Recession (2008– 2009, 2010– 2011, and 2012), comparing the results for young 
people (aged 16– 34  years) with those for prime- age individuals (aged 35– 
54 years). The choice of countries is based on two criteria: (1) sufficient differences 
in youth labor market performance and/ or in labor market regulations1 and 
(2) the availability/ quality of data.2 We concentrate on the possible presence of 
common trends across all the countries analyzed.
Our aim is to provide new evidence regarding differences between youth 
and prime- age labor market dynamics, thus calling attention to the overall pres-
ence of age- based labor market segmentation and even marginalization. To this 
end, we apply (1) the flow approach toward labor market dynamics (Blanchard 
and Diamond 1990; Elsby, Smith, and Wadsworth 2011) and (2) an analysis of 
the socioeconomic determinants of transitions in both directions between em-
ployment and unemployment (D’Addio 1998; Kelly et al. 2013; Flek, Hála, and 
Mysíková 2015).
Our analysis is based on an exploration of longitudinal data from the European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU- SILC) in an innovative 
way. In Sections 7.2 and 7.3, we argue in detail that existing flow analyses based 
on longitudinal data lack comparisons across EU countries because of data 
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limitations. For the same reason, they typically concern working- age populations 
as a whole rather than just youth. The cross- national analysis based on longitu-
dinal data developed in this chapter represents a research novelty, but we must 
admit that it still far from constitutes full representativeness.
In general, youth labor market dynamics should be more pronounced 
compared to those of prime- age groups for many reasons. First, young people 
move relatively more frequently between the labor market and inactivity. In ad-
dition, two other key factors are worth noting: (1) Matching difficulties in the 
early years of working life lead to frequent job changes, with repeated unem-
ployment spells in between; and (2) investment in firm- specific human capital is 
lower for young people; hence, when layoffs occur, the last- in, first- out (LIFO) 
rule is frequently applied (Bell and Blanchflower 2011). For the period of the 
Great Recession, there is still a lack of studies comparing the quantitative dimen-
sion of youth and prime- age labor market dynamics.
The flow approach views labor market transitions as a state- dependent pro-
cess that simultaneously involves all the movements (flows) of individuals be-
tween employment, unemployment, and inactivity. It enables us to quantify the 
overall degree and structure of labor market dynamics over time, across coun-
tries, and for various age groups. We address the degree of difference between 
the gross flows and flow transition rates (transitional probabilities of moving 
from one labor market status to another) of young and prime- age individuals. 
The results should be instructive for assessing the gap between the labor market 
prospects of the two age groups.
The flows between labor market statuses, particularly between employment 
and unemployment, determine variations in unemployment rates (Petrongolo 
and Pissarides 2008). We focus on the link between the different unemployment 
performances in various countries, age groups, and periods and the concrete 
flow, which contributes decisively to the observed differences in the evolution 
of unemployment rates. Thus, our research results based on the “flow” decom-
position of unemployment rate dynamics should be helpful for understanding 
differences in the evolution of youth and prime- age unemployment rates.
Research on youth labor market dynamics concentrates on school- to- work 
transitions (for an overview and/ or most recent findings, see Albert, Toharia, and 
Davia 2008; Berloffa et al., this volume; Hadjivassiliou et al., this volume). We 
prefer instead to combine the flow approach outlined previously with a detailed 
analysis of the socioeconomic determinants of transitions between employment 
and unemployment. Our previous research (Flek and Mysíková 2016)  shows 
that the flows in both directions between employment and unemployment are 
actually decisive for the overall youth labor market dynamics during the Great 
Recession.
When estimating the determinants of a likelihood of exiting employment and 
becoming unemployed, we intend to verify the significance of age, in particular. 
Furthermore, we estimate the determinants of moving from unemployment to 
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employment, with an emphasis on the length of previous unemployment. With 
increasing unemployment duration, the unemployed are likely to be stigmatized 
and/ or discouraged from further job search. Job- finding prospects may therefore 
be viewed as a diminishing function of unemployment duration, net of other 
socioeconomic characteristics of the unemployed (Machin and Manning 1999; 
Shimer 2012). Based on our results, we suggest country- specific adjustments in 
youth unemployment policy agendas.
To summarize, the chapter addresses the following key research questions:
 1. How do youth labor market dynamics (expressed by the movements 
of young people between employment, unemployment, and inactivity) 
differ from the dynamics of the prime- age individuals?
 2. Do the most marked differences between the evolutions of the youth 
and the prime- age unemployment rates lie in a relatively different ex-
posure to job loss, in the prospects for exiting unemployment, or in 
transitions between inactivity and the labor market?
 3. Does the age of a worker significantly affect the probability of job loss 
followed by unemployment? Or is the impact of the age variable actu-
ally offset by variables such as work experience or education?
 4. How do job search durations vary between young and prime- age un-
employed persons? At which unemployment duration does the job- 
finding probability of an unemployed person drop significantly and 
become already comparable to the gloomy employment prospects of a 
long- term unemployed individual?
Section 7.2 provides a literature overview with a deeper foundation of our 
research questions. We outline our methodological approach in Section 7.3 and 
also describe how we conduct cross- national comparative flow analyses using 
longitudinal EU- SILC data. In Section 7.4, we focus on the youth and prime- age 
flows and flow transition rates. This section continues with decompositions of 
unemployment dynamics and the identification of the driving forces (flows) that 
account for the different evolution of youth and prime- age unemployment rates. 
In Section 7.5, we analyze the determinants of youth and prime- age flows in both 
directions between employment and unemployment. Section 7.6 concludes the 
chapter.
7.2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW
The literature provides us with various partial arguments pointing to the spec-
ificity of youth labor market dynamics. Only a small fraction of young labor 
market entrants immediately manage to find stable and satisfactory employ-
ment. The rest are first faced with unemployment or with frequent job changes 
 
198 TransiTions around Work and The Family
198
combined with repeated unemployment spells (for recent evidence, see Berloffa 
et al., this volume). This situation is often attributed to educational mismatch, 
to a lack of work experience, or to the absence of firm- specific skills on the part 
of young workers (International Labour Organization (ILO) 2013; McGuinness, 
Bergin, and Whelan, this volume).
The position of young adults in the labor market is more dynamic than that 
of prime- age participants even when education, skills, and other characteris-
tics match the employer’s requirements. Young employees are still more likely 
to be subject to layoffs— through the practice of fixed- term labor contracts or 
because of the LIFO rules and seniority- weighted redundancy payments (Bell 
and Blanchflower 2011). Higher outflows from employment to unemployment 
compared to those for the prime- age segment of the workforce thus indicate that 
young workers actually constitute a marginalized group in the sense established 
by Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973).
As shown most recently by Elsby et  al. (2011), young people are also 
characterized by a relatively higher frequency of outflows from unemployment 
into employment and by shorter unemployment spells compared to the prime- 
age segment. Such a seemingly positive tendency is likely to be associated with 
the lower reservation wages of young unemployed, with their acceptance of less 
stable or less significant jobs, and with lower redundancy costs linked with their 
future layoffs (Blanchard 1999; Berloffa et al., this volume). Thus, the relatively 
high outflows of young people from unemployment into employment are again 
closely linked with a notion of youth as a marginalized group: Young people ap-
pear to be forced to accept jobs prevailingly on secondary labor markets, with 
frequent and relatively brief unemployment episodes in between.
Despite the reasonably good and varied amount of findings collected so far, 
we believe that an accurate, cross- national view on youth labor market dynamics 
during the Great Recession is still largely missing. This concerns the absence of a 
synthetic measure of such dynamics and their structure, as well as comparisons 
with the labor market dynamics of prime- age individuals. The flow approach 
seems a promising way to fill that gap. However, the existing longitudinal flow lit-
erature lacks comparisons across countries because of data limitations. Instead, 
it explores national data sources such as Labor Force Surveys (Gomes 2009; 
Elsby et al. 2011). Also, except for the latter authors, such flow analyses concern 
working- age populations as a whole rather than various age groups.
Elsby et  al. (2011) deal explicitly with youth flows in the United Kingdom 
and report a higher youth labor market dynamics compared to the prime- age 
group. Higher youth outflow rates from employment to unemployment and 
vice versa appear to be in line with the theoretical assumptions of Reich et al. 
(1973) and Blanchard (1999). These rates confirm the presence of an age- based 
labor market segmentation and the marginalized status of young workers in the 
United Kingdom. Flek and Mysíková (2015) and Flek et al. (2015) address youth 
flows in the Czech Republic and provide some comparisons with neighboring 
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countries and/ or Spain, with similar conclusions to those reported by Elsby et al. 
(2011). Given the relatively small number of such studies, European youth flows 
still need to be analyzed in a broader cross- country perspective.
The Great Recession exacerbated the difficulties for young people on the labor 
market, creating a situation in which youth unemployment rates increased faster 
than prime- age unemployment rates (ILO 2013). Because the flows of workers 
between labor market statuses determine variations in unemployment rates 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides 2008; Dixon, Freebairn, and Lim 2011; Elsby et al. 
2011; Shimer 2012), a link can be derived between the different unemployment 
performances in various countries, age categories, or periods, on the one hand, 
and the concrete flow (which contributes decisively to the observed differences), 
on the other hand. Labor market and activation policies should then focus on 
that particular flow. As noted by Elsby et al. (2011), “Policy that focused on en-
couraging outflows from unemployment may not be as relevant in an economy 
in which rises in unemployment were driven by changes in the rate of outflows 
from employment” (p. 4).3
When estimating the socioeconomic determinants of moving from employ-
ment to unemployment, we use a standard binary probit model. Kelly et  al. 
(2013) use an analogous approach for analyzing the outflows from youth unem-
ployment to employment in Ireland during the Great Recession. Our main aim 
is to verify the presence of age- based labor market segmentation, based on the 
higher exposure of young people to job loss followed by unemployment.
A negative relationship between job- finding probability and unemployment 
duration is referred to in the literature as the “duration dependence” (Machin 
and Manning 1999; Shimer 2012). We plan to verify its presence in both age 
categories of unemployed by performing estimates based on the discrete- time 
proportional hazard models developed by Cox (1972) and Jenkins (1997). 
Among others, Albert et al. (2008) use such models when analyzing school- to- 
work transitions in Spain. Other examples include retirement decisions in the 
United Kingdom (Disney, Emmerson, and Wakefield 2006)  and employment 
decisions after the birth of the first child in Spain (Davia and Legazpe 2014). 
To our knowledge, there have been only two attempts to explore this model for 
analyzing exits from youth unemployment into employment (D’Addio 1998; Flek 
et al. 2015), and both of these point to the significance of duration dependence. 
As with the flow analysis, however, cross- country comparisons and comparisons 
between age groups are still scarce.
7.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To our knowledge, this chapter represents one of the first attempts to use the 
matched longitudinal monthly data of the EU- SILC database for a comparative 
analysis of youth and prime- age labor market flows in Europe. Being relatively 
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new, this approach requires some initial description of the data, followed by 
methodological notes on estimation strategies.
7.3.1. labor market dynamics and Flow 
decomposition of unemployment rates
Some European labor markets that are potentially suitable for reference purposes, 
such as that of Germany, were not yet included in the versions of longitudinal 
EU- SILC data sets used in our analysis. Some countries, typically Scandinavian, 
collected some of the relevant variables only for one selected person per house-
hold. In other potentially interesting cases, such as the United Kingdom, there 
were other technical obstacles to the results being comparable (e.g., a high share 
of missing information on monthly economic activity).
We deal with young people aged 16– 34 years at the beginning of all analyzed 
periods (2008– 2009, 2010– 2011, and 2012). The prime- age population, aged 35– 
54 years, represents a reference group. The choice of the age interval 16– 34 years 
to represent young people is relatively straightforward in that any study aimed 
at youth labor market dynamics has to involve at least the early stages of work 
careers of young people, including university graduates. Where appropriate, we 
decompose the youth age band into various subgroups (16– 19, 20– 24, 25– 29, 
and 30– 34 years) so as to examine the possible heterogeneity of this age group.
The EU- SILC data explored in Section 7.4 consider an individual as the unit 
of analysis. Only the respondents with full survey participation over the chosen 
subperiods have been selected for analysis. Our national subsamples are there-
fore pure panels, where all the reported month- to- month individual labor market 
statuses are matched. We use the longitudinal weights provided by Eurostat spe-
cifically for these subsamples— the standard means of minimizing the attrition 
bias. Regarding the calendar bias, we hope to avoid it by averaging the observed 
status changes over the subperiods analyzed.4 Nonetheless, the retrospective na-
ture of reports on economic activity and their self- declared character may lead to 
deviations from the ILO definition of unemployment.
We extract a 2- year period from longitudinal EU- SILC 2010 (version 5 of 
August 2014), which covers monthly economic activity for January 2008 through 
to December 2009, and another 2- year period from longitudinal EU- SILC 2012 
(version 1 of August 2014), which includes data for January 2010 through to 
December 2011. Both of these subsamples provide chains of 23 monthly indi-
vidual labor market statuses (i.e., employment, unemployment, and inactivity) 
and contain far more respondents than a single, 4- year panel of EU- SILC. We 
also add data for January through December 2012, from EU- SILC 2013 (ver-
sion 2 of August 2015). The chains of monthly labor market statuses for a single 
year are obviously shorter (and thus less suitable for longitudinal analysis than 
the 2- year subsamples), but they enable us to incorporate the year 2012 into the 
analysis.
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In the past month, an individual could be employed ( )Et −1 , unem-
ployed Ut −( )1 , or inactive It −( )1 . In the current month, he or she can re-
main in an unchanged labor market status5 or change it as follows:
E U E I U E U I I E I Ut t t t t t t t t t t t− − − − − −→( ) →( ) →( ) →( ) →( ) →(1 1 1 1 1 1; ; ; ; ; ). Thus, 
the individual may move from previous to current status in six ways, and the 
corresponding numbers of individuals represent six gross labor market flows. 
Figure 7.1 in Section 7.4 compares the relative involvement of young and prime- 
age individuals in gross flows, where UE U E E U It t t t t= →( ) + +( )− − − −1 1 1 1/  and so 
forth for EU, EI,  .  .  .  . This approach represents a standard proxy for aggregate 
and/ or group- specific labor market fluidity (Blanchard and Diamond 1990).
In contrast, transitional probabilities λ presented later in Section 7.4 (see 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3) represent a first- order Markov process, where the prob-
ability of moving from the previous to the current status depends exclusively 
on the individual’s previous status (Blanchard and Diamond 1990). For in-
stance, an unemployed individual’s average monthly job- finding probability is
λUE t t tU E U= →( )− −1 1/ .
Next to this, we express a net change in unemployment in terms of the cor-
responding average monthly gross flows “in” E U I Ut t t t− −→ →( )1 1;  and “out” 
of unemployment U E U It t t t− −→ →( )1 1; , which are additionally rearranged as 
a product of the respective transition probability rate λ and the labor market 
stock (E, U, I) at time (t – 1). A monthly average change in unemployment rate 
in percentage points is then decomposed into the contributions of the “ins” and 
the “outs” of unemployment. The third term shows the contribution of changes 
in the labor force to unemployment rate dynamics. Such a decomposition of un-
employment rate dynamics was developed by Dixon et al. (2011) and applied in 
a slightly modified form also by Flek and Mysíková (2015). Table 7.1 in Section 
7.4 reports results separately for the evolutions of the youth and prime- age 
unemployment rates.
7.3.2. assessing the determinants of Transitions 
Between employment and unemployment
In Section 7.5, the estimates consider an (un)employment spell as the unit of 
analysis, including multiple episodes. This leads to a different data organization, 
which is based on nonweighted subsamples. It must be admitted that a data or-
ganization of this kind makes the results potentially more prone to the calendar 
and/ or attrition bias than in the case of the flow approach (presented in Section 
7.4), which considers the individual as the unit of analysis. We concentrate in-
itially on the determinants of transitions from employment to unemployment 
by using a probit model. In the 2- year subperiods, we extract from nonweighted 
samples all employment spells occurring at any time between the first month of 
the first year (January 2008 or January 2010) and the beginning of the second 
year (January 2009 or January 2011). For 2012, we concentrate on employment 
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recorded in the first month (January 2012). For all of the three subperiods, we 
ascertain whether or not the transitions into unemployment occur during the 
following 11 months.
The dependent binominal variable in a probit model equals 1 if an employ-
ment status transitioned to unemployment during the observed period, and 0 
otherwise. The individual and other characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, 
work experience, household size, and population density) stand for independent 
explanatory variables. We report results in the form of average marginal effects 
for pooled samples (with a dummy for prime age) and then separately for the two 
age groups. Among a range of potentially relevant determinants, we do not ana-
lyze the impact of previous employment duration. We are aware that the length 
of an employment spell can affect the probability of losing a job (e.g., because 
of LIFO) but, unfortunately, job tenure is not available in the data. Instead, we 
capture the intensity of employment by years of work experience as a regressor.
For the duration model estimates, we collect all unemployment spells in 
our three nonweighted subsamples. As with the probit estimates, we refer later 
for simplicity to individuals, although some of them experienced multiple un-
employment spells. The data used for estimations are naturally censored. We 
introduce a censoring indicator “1” if an unemployment spell terminates in em-
ployment and “0” in all other cases.6
The econometric analysis is developed in two steps. As the first step, we 
explore the Kaplan– Meier (KM) estimator (Kaplan and Meier 1958), which 
represents a nonparametric estimate of the survival function. For our purposes, 
“survival” means the duration of unemployment; time is measured in months. At 
this stage, we do not account for individual or other characteristics. Instead, we 
simply assume that the KM survival curves will decline over time in line with the 
emergence of closed spells that end in a move into employment. Log- rank tests 
would document how (in)significantly the KM curves for young and prime- age 
unemployed differ— in other words, whether the duration of job search differs 
significantly between the two age categories.
Second, we apply a discrete- time proportional hazard model (Cox 1972).7 Our 
idea is to detect the “true” duration dependence of unemployment. Note that un-
employed workers with “bad” characteristics (low education, etc.) tend to be less 
employable than those with “good” characteristics. This is likely to apply to un-
employment spells of any length and leads to a selection of individuals with “bad” 
characteristics into long- term unemployment. But such “duration dependence” is 
actually spurious because it is explained by other variables and not by unemployment 
duration per se. In contrast, unemployment duration in and of itself may negatively 
affect the job- finding probability of unemployed individuals— even after control-
ling for their available characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity— because of 
the stigmatization and discouragement effects of long- term unemployment.
We assume that the baseline hazard function is piecewise constant in 
the chosen unemployment duration intervals (1– 2  months, 3– 4  months, 5– 
6 months, 7– 10 months, 11– 15 months, and 16– 24 months), whereas the vector 
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of covariates in the model equation indicates the impact of explanatory variables 
on the probability of moving in a randomly chosen time from unemployment 
into employment. For the sake of better interpretation, the estimated coefficients 
are transformed into hazard ratios. For the periods 2008– 2009 and 2010– 2011, 
unemployment spells lasting between 16 and 24 months represent a reference 
duration interval. For 2012, a reference interval stands for unemployment spells 
lasting between 11 and 12 months. The set of chosen covariates is analogous to 
the previous probit analysis.8
7.4. LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS AND THEIR AGE- BASED 
SPECIFICITY
7.4.1. Comparing the youth and Prime- age 
Gross Flows
Figure 7.1 reports gross flows for young (aged 16– 34  years) and prime- age 
(aged 35– 54 years) individuals in the four countries considered and suggests the 
presence of country- specific and age- based patterns in labor market dynamics 
during the Great Recession. The results are presented as percentages, where, for 
instance, UE relates the average monthly number of individuals involved in a 
gross flow from unemployment to employment to total labor market stocks (and 
so forth for EU, EI, . . .).
In both age groups, Austria and Spain record persistently higher aggregate flu-
idity of their labor markets compared to France and Poland. Viewed from another 
perspective, all the countries involved in our analysis display an approximately two 
or three times lower degree of aggregate fluidity of their labor markets compared 
to the United States and the United Kingdom, where between 5% and 7% of the 
working- age population change their labor market status every month or quarter 
(Gomes 2009). In this respect, our results are in line with the general view, which 
considers the Anglo- American labor markets to be considerably more fluid than 
the labor markets in Continental, Southern, or Eastern Europe.9
Figure 7.1 shows that young people are relatively more involved in gross 
flows compared to prime- age individuals. This holds true uniformly across all 
the analyzed countries and periods (1: 2008– 2009; 2: 2010– 2011; and 3: 2012). 
Thus, on aggregate, the position of young people on the labor market is much 
less stable. This result confirms the observations of Elsby et  al. (2011) for the 
United Kingdom, who also established that young people “churn” through the 
labor market relatively more frequently.
The structure of the gross flows of young people is different from that of 
prime- age individuals. Whereas in the latter case, gross flows between employ-
ment and unemployment (UE; EU) are almost the only source of dynamics, the 
youth flows involve a relatively higher frequency of transitions between inac-
tivity and the labor market (IE; EI; UI; IU). This is fully in line with intuition, 
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Figure 7.1 Gross flows as percentages of total matched labor market stocks in four European 
countries (monthly averages; period 1: 2008– 2009; period 2: 2010– 2011; period 3: 2012; 
youth: 16– 34; prime age 35– 54).
Sources: EU- SILC longitudinal UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU- SILC longitudinal 
UDB 2012, version 1 of August 2014; EU- SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ 
computations.
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given that young people naturally tend to enter or exit the labor market relatively 
more frequently, particularly because of beginning/ finishing education or be-
cause of taking/ finishing parental leave.
The relatively higher frequency of transitions between inactivity and the labor 
market is not the sole specificity of youth labor market dynamics. The relative 
share of youth flows between employment and unemployment in both directions 
(EU; UE) is actually also higher compared to that of prime- age individuals. 
Figure 7.1 reveals that these two flows typically account for more than 50% of 
the entire youth labor market dynamics. Only Austria deviates persistently from 
this tendency because of its exceptionally high shares of youth transitions from 
employment to inactivity and vice versa (EI; IE).
7.4.2. The youth and Prime- age Transition rates
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 present transition rates from employment to unemployment 
(λUE) and from unemployment to employment (λUE) for young and prime- age 
individuals for the three periods and the four countries considered.
The values of λEU in Figure 7.2 confirm that a young worker (aged 16– 
34 years) is more likely to become unemployed than a prime- age worker (aged 
35– 54  years). This finding stems from comparisons of the last two columns 
(i.e., of the two age groups) for each country and applies uniformly to the four 
countries and the three periods analyzed, irrespective of the existing institu-
tional differences, different unemployment performances, or other national 
specificities. A disproportionally high exposure of young workers to unemploy-
ment appears to be a general phenomenon, suggesting the overall presence of an 
age- based segmentation and marginalization on European labor markets.
Figure 7.2 also documents heterogeneity in the risk of becoming unemployed 
within the youth age band (16– 34  years). The lowest age categories (16– 19 
and/ or 20– 24 years) face the highest risk of becoming unemployed. But this is 
not to say that as the age of young workers increases, their risk of becoming un-
employed becomes fully comparable with that of prime- age workers. Even the 
upper youth age category (30– 34 years) typically faces a relatively higher risk of 
becoming unemployed compared to prime- age workers.
The job- finding rates λUE( )in Figure 7.3 suggest that, with the sole exception 
of Austria in 2008– 2009, a young unemployed person is relatively more “attrac-
tive” than a prime- age individual when firms hire new workers. This applies also 
to the job- finding rates λ IE( ) of previously inactive young people (see Figures 
A7.1– A7.4 in the Appendix). As argued in more detail in the literature overview 
in Section 7.2, such tendencies will probably again label youth as a marginalized 
group, forced to accept less stable employment conditions compared to the 
prime- age segment of the workforce, with frequent subsequent transitions back 
into unemployment.
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Figure 7.2 Transition rates from employment to unemployment for various age groups in four 
European countries (monthly averages, in %)
Sources: EU- SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU- SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 
2014; EU- SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
   207
14.0
2008–2009
2010–2011
2012
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
AT ES FR PL
AT ES FR PL
AT ES FR PL
% λUE
λUE
λUE
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
%
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
%
16–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 16–34 35–54
Figure 7.3 Transition rates from unemployment to employment for various age groups in four 
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One would presume that the lowest age categories of young unemployed tran-
sition back into education (inactivity) more frequently than the upper categories. 
This alternative transition channel should help them avoid remaining in unem-
ployment and increase their job- finding chances in the future. However, our 
results presented in the Appendix suggest that even the lowest age categories of 
young unemployed remain mostly dependent on the labor market and that their 
transitions to education (inactivity) cannot be viewed as a relevant alternative.10
Our findings confirm the observations of Elsby et al. (2011) for the United 
Kingdom. The established (age- based) gaps in both job- loss and job- finding 
rates can be interpreted as typical features of marginalized groups in the sense 
of Reich et al. (1973) or Blanchard (1999). The results point to the need for addi-
tional policy measures aimed at higher employment stability and a better quality 
of jobs held by young people rather than at merely increasing their outflow rates 
from unemployment (inactivity) to employment.
7.4.3. Flow decomposition of unemployment rate 
dynamics
Table 7.1 decomposes changes in the unemployment rate for the four countries 
considered (AT, ES, FR, and PL) in terms of both movements into unemploy-
ment (from employment or inactivity) and movements out of unemployment 
(into employment or inactivity) over the periods 2008– 2009, 2010– 2011, and 
2012. The results in the second column demonstrate the trend of dispropor-
tionate increases in youth unemployment rates compared to prime- age unem-
ployment rates in the initial period of the Great Recession (2008– 2009). As seen 
in the fourth column, these disproportionate increases in youth unemployment 
in 2008– 2009 (in ES, FR, and PL) were generated decisively by inflows into un-
employment from employment, which accounted for far higher increases in 
youth unemployment rates than in prime- age unemployment rates.
This is in line with our finding that the job- loss rates of young workers are 
persistently higher than those of prime- age workers. But in the fourth column 
of Table 7.1, we can see exactly how the inflows of workers into unemployment 
from employment contribute to the different evolutions of the unemployment 
rates of the two age groups. The contribution of inflows into unemployment 
from inactivity in the fifth column is also higher for young people, but this con-
tribution to the different unemployment rate dynamics of the two age groups is 
much less relevant than the contribution of inflows of workers into unemploy-
ment from employment (likewise, the contribution of changes in the labor force 
in the last column is less relevant).
In contrast, had the outflows from unemployment to employment (in the sev-
enth column in Table 7.1) been the only driver of unemployment rate dynamics, 
youth unemployment rates would actually have developed more favorably than 
prime- age unemployment rates. This confirms that the job- finding difficulties of the 
young unemployed cannot be viewed as the cause of disproportionate increases in 
youth unemployment rates in the initial stage of the Great Recession (2008– 2009).
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Table 7.1 Unemployment rate dynamics of young people (aged 16– 34 years) and prime- age individuals (aged 35– 54 years) in four European countries 
in 2008– 2009, 2010– 2011, and 2012 (monthly averages, in percentage points)
Country/ period ∆ U
LF
  “Ins” (+) λEU t t
I
LF
−1 λ IU t
t
E
LF
−1 “Outs” (– )
−
−λUE t
t
U
LF
1
−
−λUI t
t
U
LF
1 Contribution of 
changes in LFa
AT 2008– 2009
Prime age 0.0311 0.7845 0.7297 0.0548 – 0.7599 – 0.6685 – 0.0914 0.0065
Youth – 0.1660 1.3498 1.1001 0.2498 – 1.5124 – 1.1797 – 0.3327 – 0.0034
AT 2010– 2011
Prime age – 0.0788 0.6160 0.5533 0.0628 – 0.6992 – 0.6127 – 0.0866 0.0044
Youth – 0.2594 1.2005 0.9697 0.2308 – 1.4543 – 1.1670 – 0.2873 – 0.0056
AT 2012
Prime age – 0.0012 0.5719 0.5354 0.0364 – 0.5743 – 0.5180 – 0.0563 0.0012
Youth 0.0408 1.0867 0.8436 0.2431 – 1.0120 – 0.9025 – 0.1095 – 0.0339
ES 2008– 2009
Prime age 0.3080 1.1727 1.0535 0.1193 – 0.8641 – 0.7768 – 0.0873 – 0.0006
Youth 0.4432 1.9669 1.6931 0.2737 – 1.4785 – 1.3286 – 0.1499 – 0.0452
ES 2010– 2011
Prime age 0.1791 1.1002 0.9189 0.1813 – 0.9041 – 0.8088 – 0.0953 – 0.0170
Youth 0.1446 1.8244 1.4199 0.4045 – 1.5977 – 1.3550 – 0.2426 – 0.0821
ES 2012
Prime age 0.0926 1.1173 1.1089 0.0084 – 1.0321 – 1.0091 – 0.0230 0.0074
Youth 0.0036 1.5550 1.4727 0.0823 – 1.5106 – 1.4612 – 0.0494 – 0.0408
(continued)
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Country/ period ∆ U
LF
  “Ins” (+) λEU t t
I
LF
−1 λ IU t
t
E
LF
−1 “Outs” (– )
−
−λUE t
t
U
LF
1
−
−λUI t
t
U
LF
1 Contribution of 
changes in LFa
FR 2008– 2009
Prime age 0.0916 0.4532 0.4292 0.0240 – 0.3623 – 0.3276 – 0.0347 0.0007
Youth 0.1252 1.1087 0.9230 0.1858 – 0.9255 – 0.8313 – 0.0942 – 0.0581
FR 2010– 2011
Prime age – 0.0407 0.3760 0.3504 0.0255 – 0.4153 – 0.3890 – 0.0263 – 0.0014
Youth – 0.0311 1.1350 0.8799 0.2551 – 1.0941 – 1.0059 – 0.0881 – 0.0721
FR 2012
Prime age 0.0242 0.4447 0.4247 0.0200 – 0.4196 – 0.3879 – 0.0317 – 0.0009
Youth 0.1678 1.3437 1.0912 0.2525 – 1.1115 – 1.0138 – 0.0977 – 0.0645
PL 2008– 2009
Prime age 0.0648 0.4748 0.3910 0.0838 – 0.4088 – 0.3597 – 0.0491 – 0.0012
Youth 0.1974 0.9511 0.6529 0.2982 – 0.6974 – 0.6299 – 0.0675 – 0.0563
PL 2010– 2011
Prime age 0.0238 0.5294 0.4684 0.0611 – 0.5063 – 0.4518 – 0.0545 0.0007
Youth – 0.0214 0.9993 0.6961 0.3032 – 0.9643 – 0.8663 – 0.0980 – 0.0564
PL 2012
Prime age 0.0151 0.3902 0.3626 0.0276 – 0.3796 – 0.3475 – 0.0321 0.0046
Youth 0.0855 0.8987 0.6498 0.2488 – 0.7501 – 0.7075 – 0.0426 – 0.0632
aComputed as Ut LFt LFt
−
−
−



1
1 1
1
. The results are affected by rounding.
Sources: EU- SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU- SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 2014; EU- SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
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After a short break in 2010– 2011, when the development of youth unem-
ployment rates started to resemble and sometimes even outperform prime- age 
unemployment rates, the most recent period covered by our data (2012) shows 
again the prevailing tendency of youth unemployment rates to increase more 
rapidly than prime- age rates. This could potentially be attributed to an only tem-
porary effect of stimulus measures that were targeting the young unemployed 
disproportionally. Indeed, except for Spain, the 2012 balance of “ins” and “outs” 
reflects a new round of disproportionate increases in youth unemployment rates 
compared to prime- age unemployment rates. Similarly to 2008– 2009, the main 
driver of these disproportions is seen in the fourth column in Table 7.1 and is 
embodied in a disproportionally high contribution of inflows of young workers 
from employment into unemployment.
Table 7.1 reveals the sources of different dynamics in youth unemployment 
rates. Surprisingly, the contributions of outflows from unemployment into em-
ployment in Spain and Austria were comparable in 2008– 2009 and 2010– 2011 
(see the seventh column). The decisive source of strikingly different youth un-
employment rate dynamics in these two countries was represented by a relatively 
much higher contribution of inflows of Spanish young workers into unemploy-
ment from employment (see the fourth column).
In 2012, France and Poland recorded the highest increases in youth unemploy-
ment rates. Both the stories behind these developments and the policy implications 
are somewhat different. In Poland, the only problem was embodied, at least in a 
given comparative perspective, in insufficient outflows from unemployment into 
employment (in the seventh column in Table 7.1). In contrast, France suffered 
simultaneously from relatively low “outs” and high “ins” of youth unemployment.
7.5. DETERMINING FACTORS OF TRANSITIONS 
BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
In this section, we provide an econometric analysis of the socioeconomic 
determinants of movements between employment and unemployment in both 
directions. In particular, we intend to verify within a multivariate framework 
the statistical significance of age for the risk of losing one’s job and becoming 
unemployed. Then we concentrate on unemployment durations within both age 
groups of interest with the aim of detecting the presence of duration depend-
ence of unemployment, net of other individual and additional characteristics 
influencing the job- finding probability of an unemployed person.
7.5.1. Transitions from employment to unemployment
Tables 7.2a– 7.2c evaluate the factors influencing the probability of losing one’s 
job and becoming unemployed. We present results for pooled samples of 
young and prime- age individuals in two specifications in the second and third 
columns. The first specification does not involve work experience and confirms 
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Table 7.2a Determinants of transitions of young people (aged 16– 34 years) and prime- age individuals (aged 35– 54 years) from employment 
to unemployment in four European countries: 2008– 2009 (average marginal effects from probit model)
AT ES
Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age
Prime age – 0.048*** 0.044** — — – 0.131*** – 0.022** — — 
Male 0.033*** 0.045*** 0.027 0.054*** – 0.032*** – 0.008 0.004 – 0.012
Tertiary education – 0.150*** – 0.156*** – 0.228*** – 0.138*** – 0.199*** – 0.109*** – 0.099*** – 0.112***
Secondary education – 0.100*** – 0.090*** – 0.087*** – 0.096*** – 0.138*** – 0.078*** – 0.064*** – 0.082***
Experience (in years) — – 0.006*** – 0.005** – 0.006*** — – 0.004*** – 0.009*** – 0.003***
HH size 1 0.082*** 0.101*** 0.137*** 0.089*** a a a a
HH size 2 0.072*** 0.090*** 0.121*** 0.081*** 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.014
HH size 3 0.027* 0.038*** 0.073*** 0.025 0.009 0.003 – 0.002 0.006
Densely populated area 0.004 – 0.008 0.025 – 0.025* – 0.038*** – 0.02** – 0.053*** – 0.004
Medium- populated area – 0.017 – 0.018 – 0.003 – 0.024 – 0.011 0.003 – 0.015 0.013
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.061 0.058 0.060 0.065 0.054 0.027 0.050
AUC 0.651 0.676 0.662 0.677 0.675 0.673 0.617 0.672
n 3,982 3,982 1,215 2,677 9,799 7,828 2,577 5,251
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FR PL
Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age
Prime age – 0.102*** – 0.000 — — – 0.065*** 0.024** — — 
Male 0.004 0.015** 0.013 0.015** 0.007 0.017*** 0.017 0.018**
Tertiary education – 0.101*** – 0.105*** – 0.178*** – 0.069*** – 0.121*** – 0.123*** – 0.144*** – 0.126***
Secondary education – 0.045*** – 0.037*** – 0.065*** – 0.026*** – 0.046*** – 0.041*** – 0.071*** – 0.025**
Experience (in years) — – 0.007*** – 0.019*** – 0.004*** — – 0.006*** – 0.011*** – 0.004***
HH size 1 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.038 0.077*** a a a a
HH size 2 0.028*** 0.042*** 0.050** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.040*** 0.035* – 0.041***
HH size 3 0.017* 0.026*** 0.030 0.020** – 0.011 0.000 – 0.019 0.011
Densely populated area – 0.003 – 0.01 – 0.026 – 0.004 – 0.006 – 0.000 – 0.022 0.012
Medium- populated area – 0.013 – 0.013 – 0.058*** 0.004 – 0.006 – 0.003 – 0.029 0.007
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.095 0.083 0.065 0.036 0.063 0.053 0.059
AUC 0.682 0.725 0.700 0.694 0.631 0.688 0.666 0.683
n 7,449 7,449 2,387 5,018 8,782 8,694 3,097 5,597
aOne- and two- person households are merged because of a low share of observations in the first category.
AUC, area under the curve; HH, household.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Sources: EU- SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; authors’ computations.
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Table 7.2b Determinants of transitions of young people (aged 16– 34 years) and prime- age individuals (aged 35– 54 years) from employment 
to unemployment in four European countries: 2010– 2011 (average marginal effects from probit model)
AT ES
Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age
Prime age – 0.040*** 0.034** — — – 0.115*** – 0.011 — — 
Male 0.005 0.019* 0.024 0.024** – 0.021** – 0.001 – 0.018 0.007
Tertiary education – 0.167*** – 0.181*** – 0.220*** – 0.163*** – 0.154*** – 0.110*** – 0.097*** – 0.119***
Secondary education – 0.086*** – 0.084*** – 0.101*** – 0.076*** – 0.093*** – 0.066*** – 0.123*** – 0.047***
Experience — – 0.005*** – 0.001 – 0.006*** — – 0.005*** – 0.006*** – 0.005***
HH size 1 0.024 0.044*** 0.029 0.049*** a a a a
HH size 2 0.026** 0.045*** – 0.001 0.064*** – 0.013 0.000 – 0.014 0.004
HH size 3 – 0.012 0.000 – 0.012 0.006 0.018* – 0.005 – 0.010 – 0.004
Densely populated area 0.014 0.005 0.033 – 0.006 – 0.050*** – 0.022** – 0.036* – 0.017*
Medium- populated area – 0.004 – 0.008 0.031 – 0.023* – 0.030** – 0.002 – 0.005 – 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.063 0.045 0.072 0.052 0.060 0.028 0.062
AUC 0.652 0.686 0.641 0.695 0.661 0.682 0.622 0.690
n 4,057 3,972 1,274 2,698 7,735 6,344 1,763 4,581
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FR PL
Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age
Prime age – 0.104*** – 0.006 — — – 0.069*** 0.034*** — — 
Male – 0.011* 0.002 – 0.013 0.006 – 0.030*** – 0.016** – 0.033** – 0.007
Tertiary education – 0.108*** – 0.113*** – 0.196*** – 0.076*** – 0.173*** – 0.170*** – 0.160*** – 0.185***
Secondary education – 0.043*** – 0.038*** – 0.078*** – 0.023*** – 0.074*** – 0.062*** – 0.056** – 0.061***
Experience — – 0.006*** – 0.019*** – 0.004*** — – 0.006*** – 0.014*** – 0.005***
HH size 1 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.041 0.049*** a a a a
HH size 2 0.025*** 0.039*** 0.034* 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.033***
HH size 3 0.015* 0.024*** 0.020 0.017* 0.013 0.022*** 0.025* 0.020**
Densely populated area – 0.021*** – 0.014* – 0.029* – 0.007 0.003 0.004 – 0.033** 0.026***
Medium- populated area – 0.003 0.002 – 0.014 0.008 0.018** 0.021** 0.023 0.020**
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.105 0.099 0.061 0.040 0.069 0.066 0.065
AUC 0.692 0.737 0.726 0.685 0.644 0.688 0.682 0.689
n 7,774 7,736 2,387 5,349 8,464 8,407 3,071 5,336
aOne- and two- person households are merged because of a low share of observations in the first category.
AUC, area under the curve; HH, household.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: EU- SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 2014; authors’ computations.
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Table 7.2c Determinants of transitions of young people (aged 16– 34 years) and prime- age individuals (aged 35– 54 years) from employment 
to unemployment in four European countries: 2012 (average marginal effects from probit model)
AT ES
Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age
Prime age — – 0.051*** 0.014 — — 
Male – 0.024** – 0.020*** – 0.004 – 0.030** 0.004
Tertiary education – 0.067*** – 0.067*** – 0.083*** – 0.107*** – 0.075***
Secondary education – 0.019 – 0.062*** – 0.07*** – 0.100*** – 0.059***
Experience – 0.003** — – 0.005*** – 0.010*** – 0.004***
HH size 1 0.010 a a a a
HH size 2 – 0.028* 0.019** 0.022*** – 0.007 0.034***
HH size 3 – 0.029* 0.007 0.010 – 0.016 0.020**
Densely populated area 0.026* – 0.021*** – 0.019*** – 0.013 – 0.021***
Medium- populated area 0.003 – 0.022** – 0.018** – 0.004 – 0.022**
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.031 0.051 0.045 0.047
AUC 0.668 0.634 0.667 0.648 0.666
n b b 1,596 b 9,003 8,927 2,424 6,503
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FR PL
Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age Pooled Pooled Youth Prime age
Prime age – 0.053*** — 
Male – 0.007 – 0.025***
Tertiary education – 0.062*** – 0.071***
Secondary education – 0.016** – 0.035**
Experience — – 0.007***
HH size 1 0.019** a
HH size 2 0.010 0.004
HH size 3 0.006 – 0.013
Densely populated area 0.011** 0.005
Medium- populated area 0.009 0.003
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.049
AUC 0.678 0.676
n 8,629 b b b b b 3,702 b
aOne- and two- person households are merged because of a low share of observations in the first category.
bFor 2012, the share of employment spells transitioning into unemployment frequently amounts to less than 5%. Such results are omitted because of their presumably low representativeness.
AUC, area under the curve; HH, household.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: EU- SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
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the significantly lower probability of prime- age workers losing their jobs and 
becoming unemployed. The second specification includes work experience— a 
variable that proves significant in all cases. With added controls for work experi-
ence, the previously established age- group effect weakens substantially; in some 
cases, it loses its significance or even reverses. Austria and Poland represent the 
most illustrative cases in that in these two countries, the controls for work expe-
rience change the sign of the age- group effect.
The pooled models show uniformly that higher education levels signifi-
cantly diminish the likelihood of losing one’s job and becoming unemployed. 
In contrast, the effects of the remaining variables— such as gender, house-
hold size, or population density— are rather country specific or vary over 
time. Considering national specificities, it is worth noting that Spain is the 
only country in which gender has a significant effect on the probability of 
losing one’s job and becoming unemployed in all subperiods analyzed. Female 
workers in Spain thus have a higher probability of becoming unemployed 
compared to men.
With added controls for work experience, this gender- based difference 
becomes insignificant. Women’s lower work experience in Spain is thus respon-
sible for their disadvantage in terms of sustaining employment and avoiding un-
employment. This effect is not clearly apparent in any other country. In Austria, 
we can observe the opposite: Here, controls for work experience strengthen the 
men’s disadvantage.
Among young people, the gender effect (both with and without controls for 
work experience) usually has no significant impact on the probability of losing 
one’s job and becoming unemployed. This is not surprising because the gender 
difference in work experience cannot fully evolve at the beginning of working 
careers. But the gender gap in work experience may intensify during the life 
cycle, and women, especially in Spain, might suffer from a lack of such experi-
ence in the longer term.
The results of separate estimations for the two age groups also show that work 
experience significantly lowers the likelihood of losing one’s job and becoming 
unemployed and that this effect is in most cases more evident among young 
workers. Higher education likewise significantly reduces the probability of losing 
one’s job and becoming unemployed, and this effect is again typically stronger for 
young workers. Only in Spain is this specificity missing, thus indicating another 
difficulty faced by young workers in this country.
What really matters is not the age of a worker but, rather, his or her work ex-
perience and education. Our results confirm that young workers need to very 
quickly accrue relevant work experience because it diminishes their risk of be-
coming unemployed. The acquisition of higher education also appears to be an 
important factor in reducing the unemployment risk for young people.
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7.5.2. duration dependence of unemployment
Finally, we consider the differences in the duration of unemployment between 
young people and prime- age workers. Figure A7.5 in the Appendix provides evi-
dence from KM functions. The graphs confirm our empirical findings presented 
in Section 7.4— as well as the conceptual considerations mentioned in the litera-
ture overview in Section 7.2— that young unemployed are unlikely to suffer from 
longer job search compared to prime- age unemployed.11 But this is not to say 
that the problem of a prolonged duration of job search within the group of young 
unemployed should be ignored. As the Great Recession progressed, the survival 
functions in Figure A7.5 show dramatic declines in the job- finding prospects of 
young unemployed even in the shortest unemployment spells. This tendency is 
most apparent when comparing the periods 2008– 2009 and 2012.
Austria shows its best performance within this general tendency. Figure A7.5 
illustrates the gap between Austria and the remaining countries in terms of time 
needed by young unemployed to find a job: For instance, in 2010– 2011, 44% of 
young Austrian unemployed managed to find a job after 4 months of unemploy-
ment duration; in France, Poland, and Spain, the shares were only 29%, 25%, and 
21%, respectively. When comparing the situation after unemployment lasting 
for a minimum of 1 year in the same period, Austria again boasts the best job- 
finding prospects for young unemployed— this share amounted to 68%, as op-
posed to a mere 47% for Spain (58% for France and 53% for Poland).
Table 7.3 assesses the role of unemployment duration within a multivariate 
framework that also controls for a range of factors such as age, education, house-
hold size, and population density. The results in the first five rows of Table 7.3 
show the impact of unemployment duration on individual job- finding proba-
bility in the form of hazard ratios. For each unemployment spell analyzed, the 
hazard ratio γ in Table 7.3 indicates the probability of leaving unemployment and 
becoming employed relative to a reference spell. For the periods 2008– 2009 and 
2010– 2011, unemployment spells lasting between 16 and 24 months represent a 
reference duration interval. For 2012, a reference interval stands for unemploy-
ment spells lasting between 11 and 12 months.
Statistically insignificant hazard ratios γ would mean that there is actually no 
difference in job- finding prospects between the particular unemployment spell 
and the reference spell. The remaining rows in Table 7.3 show the hazard ratios 
that report the impact of explanatory variables. Suppose, for instance, that the 
hazard ratio reported for males takes the value “2”; then the probability that a 
man moves in a randomly chosen time from unemployment into employment 
would be, ceteris paribus, twice as high as for a woman.
In the initial stage of the Great Recession (2008– 2009), the negative dura-
tion dependence of youth unemployment appeared to be absent in France and 
Austria.12 This means that the individual and other characteristics of the young 
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Table 7.3 Youth hazard ratios of transition from unemployment to employment in four European countries (age category 16– 34 years)
2008– 2009 2010– 2011 2012
AT ATa ES FR FRa PL AT ES ESa FR PL AT ES FR PL
γ1 (1– 2 months) 4.029*** 0.477 3.444*** 1.514** 0.582 2.589*** 3.637*** 2.318*** 1.137 1.977*** 2.280*** 6.127** 4.715*** 4.965*** 7.061***
γ2 (3– 4 months) 3.123*** 0.629 3.517*** 1.623** 0.743 3.357*** 3.207*** 2.578*** 1.408 1.640*** 3.128*** 6.542*** 5.186*** 5.218*** 9.670***
γ3 (5– 6 months) 2.451** 0.671 3.031*** 1.607** 0.862 3.006*** 2.600** 2.632*** 1.608 1.699*** 3.236*** 2.118 6.736*** 4.845*** 9.282***
γ4 (7– 10 months) 1.458 0.524 2.067*** 1.376* 0.894 2.924*** 1.365 1.619*** 1.110 1.457** 1.925*** 2.934 3.208*** 3.010*** 5.447***
γ5 (11– 15 months) 2.336** 1.225 2.212*** 0.958 0.759 1.323 1.595 2.132*** 1.719*** 1.361 1.551** — — — — 
Male 1.446*** 1.659** 1.092 0.911 0.884 1.421*** 1.051 1.122* 1.159 1.032 1.416*** 1.204 0.987 0.800** 1.355***
Tertiary 
education
1.248 1.409 1.380*** 2.158*** 3.061*** 1.155 1.450* 1.381*** 1.542*** 1.774*** 1.161 1.886* 1.646*** 1.735*** 1.921***
Secondary 
education
1.319** 1.907*** 1.100 1.522*** 1.759*** 1.156 1.410** 1.112 1.165 1.446*** 0.936 1.662** 1.434*** 1.549*** 1.257
Age 20– 24 years 1.624*** 2.206*** 1.283** 1.024 1.034 1.341* 2.044*** 1.722*** 1.968*** 1.283 1.817*** 0.822 2.312*** 2.499*** 1.846**
Age 25– 29 years 1.790*** 2.390*** 1.327*** 0.876 0.804 1.37* 2.644*** 2.036*** 2.417*** 1.378* 2.037*** 0.662 2.244*** 2.235*** 1.888**
Age 30– 34 years 1.616** 2.072** 1.289** 0.771 0.707 1.639*** 2.045*** 1.753*** 2.042*** 0.948 1.848*** 0.774 2.133*** 1.907** 1.625
HH size 1 1.618** 3.452*** b 1.732*** 2.315*** b 1.279 b b 1.690*** b 1.693** b 1.357 b
HH size 2 1.905*** 2.843*** 1.440*** 1.438*** 1.521*** 1.581*** 1.012 1.332*** 1.475*** 1.524*** 1.684*** 1.034 1.327*** 1.395** 1.354*
HH size 3 1.143 1.314 1.118 1.141 1.202 0.883 0.840 1.087 1.121 1.208* 1.233** 0.765 0.999 0.979 1.221*
Densely 
populated
0.738** 0.594** 0.766*** 0.643*** 0.534*** 0.932 0.676*** 0.636*** 0.574*** 1.429*** 0.987 0.450*** 0.693*** 0.817* 1.116
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Medium 
populated
1.027 0.939 0.847** 0.684*** 0.588*** 0.878 0.740* 0.775*** 0.731*** 0.944 0.946 0.553*** 0.872 0.771* 0.797*
Constant 0.012*** 0.058*** 0.018*** 0.046*** 0.118*** 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.027*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002***
Log- likelihood – 977.8 – 970.4 – 4,201.8 – 1,731.4 – 1,728.4 - 1,863.4 – 872.2 – 3,476.0 – 3,474.1 – 2,007.6 – 2,614.0 – 463.3 – 2,674.1 – 1,329.3 – 1,601.2
p value — 0.000 — — 0.007 — — — 0.024 — — — — — — 
n 
(unemployment 
spells)
541 541 2,237 896 896 1,077 466 1,952 1,952 1,014 1,376 315 2,133 981 1,378
aResults with gamma frailty reported only when the likelihood ratio test of gamma variance (p value) significantly proved the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on model results.
bOne- and two- person households are merged because of a low share of observations in the first category.
HH, household.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Sources: EU- SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU- SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 2014; EU- SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
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unemployed (and not the duration of unemployment per se) significantly af-
fected their prospects of finding a job.
In contrast, those young unemployed in Poland whose unemployment spells 
lasted more than 10 months represented the risk group of young unemployed 
requiring targeting by additional policy measures, given that their chances of 
finding a job were not significantly better in comparison with the reference dura-
tion interval representing long- term unemployment (16– 24 months). In Spain, 
the analogous risk group consisted of those young unemployed with unemploy-
ment spells exceeding 15 months (all shorter unemployment spells were associ-
ated with significantly higher job- finding probabilities).
As the Great Recession progressed, the duration dependence of youth unem-
ployment started affecting developments in all the countries analyzed. Young 
Austrians who remained unemployed for more than 6  months in 2010– 2011 
(and for more than 4 months in 2012) represented the risk group of young un-
employed. It follows that those young Austrian unemployed who did not find 
(or did not accept) a job relatively quickly faced sharply diminishing employ-
ment prospects. This suggests that stigmatization and/ or discouragement effects 
of prolonged youth unemployment emerged in Austria with much briefer un-
employment spells than in countries with considerably higher youth unem-
ployment. The probable reason is that in countries with high levels of youth 
unemployment, longer unemployment durations are considered more “natural.” 
The results for France and Poland confirm this assumption. In France, all young 
individuals who were unemployed for more than 10  months formed the risk 
group. This applied to both 2010– 2011 and 2012. The results for Poland are very 
similar to those for France.
In Spain, the situation changed most dramatically between the two periods. 
In 2010– 2011, all young unemployed with unemployment spells of between 
1 and 10  months actually constituted the risk group in that their job- finding 
probabilities did not differ significantly from the employment prospects of long- 
term young unemployed (16– 24 months). This further illustrates the depth of 
the youth unemployment problem in Spain. In contrast, the results for Spain in 
2012 became comparable with those for France and Poland— the risk group of 
Spanish young unemployed was associated with unemployment durations ex-
ceeding 10 months.
The analysis of explanatory variables does not confirm the uniform presence 
of statistically significant gender- or education- based differences. But in Austria 
and France, the chance of finding a job gradually evolved in favor of young 
women. This is in line with Kelly et al. (2013), who report a lower probability of 
moving from unemployment to employment for young Irish men. In contrast, 
young Polish men have a consistently relatively higher chance of finding a job 
compared to young women in Poland. Spain shows no gender effects. Poland is 
also specific in that it lacks an education effect (except for tertiary education in 
2012), whereas for the remaining countries we find convincing evidence that the 
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chance of a young unemployed person finding a job increases with secondary 
and/ or tertiary education. A young person aged 25– 29 years has the highest prob-
ability of moving from unemployment to employment in the majority of coun-
tries and periods analyzed. This indicates that employers tend to avoid hiring 
the relatively immature young unemployed. Regarding household size, it nega-
tively affects the probability of young unemployed finding a job, although with 
varying significance. A significantly higher job- finding probability (relative to a 
household consisting of four members or more) is associated almost exclusively 
with small households consisting, as a maximum, of two members. This might 
suggest that in the absence of other members in respondents’ households (pre-
sumably their parents), who could contribute decisively to the common budget, 
the pressure to find a job imposed on young unemployed is significantly higher. 
However, this effect is not fully uniform— it is absent for Austria in 2010– 2011.
The hazard ratios for densely populated areas are significant and lower than 
1 (except for Poland in all three periods). This seems to contradict the assump-
tion that larger cities provide more employment opportunities and thus better 
chances to exit from unemployment.13 Our result can be associated with longer 
job search in the hope of gaining a better match or more opportunities to partic-
ipate in the informal economy.
Table A7.1 in the Appendix suggests that prime- age hazard functions gen-
erally display a higher sensitivity of job- finding chances to the duration of un-
employment episodes. Among other findings, the impact of age on the prospect 
of finding a job among prime- age unemployed is worth noting, especially the 
significant negative impact of age categories 45+ years. This suggests that the 
presumed skill obsolescence and deterioration in human capital associated with 
these age categories function as negative signals to potential employers and di-
minish the chances of older unemployed finding work.
7.6. CONCLUSIONS
Youth are relatively more involved in gross flows than are prime- age groups. 
This holds true uniformly across the four countries analyzed during the period 
2008– 2012 and supports the existing evidence of a higher aggregate fluidity of 
youth labor markets compared to prime- age markets. The main result stemming 
from the analysis of flow transition rates is that a young worker is more likely 
to move between employment and unemployment in both directions compared 
to a prime- age worker. This finding is in line with contemporary evidence for 
the United Kingdom. It can be interpreted as a typical feature of marginalized 
groups, which have to “churn” relatively more frequently through the (sec-
ondary) labor market.
The analysis of transition rates provides the following main conclusion: The 
policy priority should be to reduce the gap between the unemployment risks 
 
224 TransiTions around Work and The Family
24
faced by a young and a prime- age worker. This gap is characteristic for all the 
labor markets analyzed and concerns countries with substantially different 
labor market performance, institutions, EU membership history, and other 
national specificities. Reducing the gap is important not only for generally 
improving the relative position of marginalized youth on the labor market but 
also for achieving more proportional evolutions in the youth and prime- age 
unemployment rates.
This chapter demonstrates that inflows of young workers into unemployment 
accounted for far higher increases in youth unemployment rates compared to 
prime- age unemployment rates. In contrast, had the outflows from unemploy-
ment to employment been the only driver of unemployment rate dynamics, 
youth unemployment rates would have developed more favorably than prime- 
age unemployment rates.
We analyzed in detail the determining factors of transitions from employment 
to unemployment. The results again stress the importance of a policy targeted at 
employment protection for young people, who need to gain work experience 
promptly after entering the labor market so as to minimize the probability of job 
loss. In addition, the effect of education on lowering the risk of job loss and be-
coming unemployed is apparent for individuals of any age; nonetheless, it seems 
that higher education decreases the probability of becoming unemployed more 
substantially for young workers.
Finally, we examined the extent to which the job- finding chances of young 
unemployed decline due to the duration of their unemployment, net of the im-
pact of standard socioeconomic characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity of 
unemployed persons. Although the results for young unemployed appear to be 
generally favorable compared to those for prime- age unemployed, they simulta-
neously show growing negative duration dependence of youth unemployment as 
the Great Recession progressed. From 2010 onward, the job- finding prospects 
of young unemployed could be viewed as a diminishing function of unemploy-
ment duration in all countries analyzed. In 2012, the results nearly equalized 
across countries (except for Austria): With unemployment durations exceeding 
10 months, the job- finding probability of a young unemployed person declines 
significantly, and those who remain unemployed for a longer time deserve addi-
tional policy attention.
Such a result may represent useful feedback for the European Youth Guarantee 
scheme, which promotes uniformly an offer to young people in the EU of a 
quality job, an apprenticeship, or training within 4 months after graduation or 
job loss. In contrast, our results demonstrate that the job- finding probability of 
a young unemployed person is already highest within the shortest unemploy-
ment spells. Although the information on unemployment durations and job- 
finding probabilities is never available ex ante to policymakers, it would appear 
that young people who are unemployed for a considerably longer time than 
4 months are those who should be targeted by concentrated policy efforts and 
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resources. This proposition is probably even more relevant for the ongoing post- 
recessionary period.
NOTES
1 Hadjivassiliou et al. (this volume) provide an overview of national specificities 
in youth labor market performance and in institutional arrangements of 
labor markets across the EU (including employment protection legislation, 
vocational education and training, active labor market policy, and collective 
bargaining). Our categorization of countries is analogous to that of Berloffa 
et al. (this volume), who analyze, among others, the clusters of Continental, 
Mediterranean, and Eastern European countries. Given the depth of our 
analysis, we concentrate on only a limited number of countries that reflect 
our categorization.
2 Section 7.3 discusses the data issues in more detail.
3 A  common practice in this respect is to follow Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2008) or Shimer (2012) in showing how much of the variance of the steady- 
state unemployment rate accounts for changes in the flow transition rates. 
Also see Elsby et al. (2011) for an application to youth unemployment rate 
dynamics in the United Kingdom. A  credible compliance with this direc-
tion would require data gathered over a longer period of time than in the 
EU- SILC. This is why we limit ourselves to a “flow” decomposition of the 
observed changes in unemployment rates. Dixon et al. (2011) apply a similar 
framework to US data. Except for Flek and Mysíková (2015), such an ap-
proach has probably never been applied before to a cross- country analysis in 
Europe.
4 EU- SILC is an annual survey in which the monthly economic status is re-
ported retrospectively. Respondents might not always recall correctly when 
they changed their labor market status. Although the precise month of such 
changes is potentially uncertain, it should not affect our results, which are 
based on monthly averages for the entire subperiods analyzed.
5 EU- SILC data do not account for direct job- to- job flows. This is why in our 
analysis an unchanged employment status can represent either maintaining 
the previous job or moving to another job.
6 A particular unemployment spell is left censored when it is already in prog-
ress at the beginning of the observed period, and it is right censored when 
it does not terminate by the end of the observed period. An additional, spe-
cific type of right censoring occurs when an unemployment spell ends in 
inactivity rather than in employment. The KM estimators applied take into 
account the right- censored data, whereas the left censoring remains unad-
dressed by techniques available to us. The seemingly easiest solution to this 
problem would be to remove the censored observations from the data set. 
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Unfortunately, this would probably make all the estimations of unemploy-
ment durations downward biased because longer unemployment spells are 
more likely to be censored compared to shorter ones. Note that in the case of 
probit model estimations, censoring is not an issue because we do not ana-
lyze the duration of employment there.
7 This model was implemented into a STATA routine (pmghaz) by Jenkins 
(1997). We utilize a refined version (pmghaz8) that has been applied, for 
example, by Disney et  al. (2006), Albert et  al. (2008), Davia and Legazpe 
(2014), and Flek et al. (2015).
8 Note that these variables may not capture all the existing differences among 
unemployed individuals, and their unobserved heterogeneity may lead to 
spurious duration dependence (Jenkins 1997; Machin and Manning 1999). 
To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we use the mixed proportional 
hazard model, in which the continuous hazard rate contains a gamma- 
distributed random variable with unit mean and unknown variance, which 
is to be estimated.
9 The results in Figure 7.1 do not involve the 55+ years age group. However, 
the share of elderly individuals in the working- age population and/ or the 
specificity of their transitions are not large enough to qualitatively change the 
overall nature of the results (Flek and Mysíková (2015) report more details 
on flows among the elderly).
10 We do not report results for unemployment- to- education transitions of 
young people. However, Figure A7.4 in the Appendix presents the outflow 
rates from unemployment to inactivity for four age bands of young unem-
ployed. In most countries and periods, these rates do not necessarily increase 
with lower age. Moreover, for the low age categories of young unemployed, 
the outflow rates from unemployment to inactivity are too low (usually lower 
than 1%) to represent any real alternative to unemployment. Austria can be 
viewed as the only exception.
11 Log- rank tests reveal that only in Austria (in the first subperiod analyzed) is 
the youth survival curve placed significantly above the prime- age survival 
curve; see Figure A7.5 in the Appendix.
12 For Poland and Spain, the controls for unobserved heterogeneity did not 
affect the significance of the results reported in Table 7.3 for the given pe-
riod. For Austria and France, the results with gamma frailty are reported 
in additional columns because the likelihood ratio test of gamma variance 
(p value) proved the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the signifi-
cance of results— with added controls for unobserved heterogeneity, all the 
coefficients turned out to be insignificant. To eliminate spurious duration 
dependence, we decided not to discuss the results where the controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity proved the insignificance of duration intervals for 
job- finding probability.
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13 D’Addio (1998) reports such an effect for young French women in the 
early 1990s.
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Figure A7.1 Transition rates from inactivity to employment for various age groups in four 
European countries (monthly averages, in %)
Sources: EU-SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU-SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 
2014; EU-SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
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Figure A7.2 Transition rates from employment to inactivity for various age groups in four 
European countries (monthly averages, in %)
Sources: EU-SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU-SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 
2014; EU-SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
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Figure A7.3 Transition rates from inactivity to unemployment for various age groups in four 
European countries (monthly averages, in %)
Sources: EU-SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU-SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 
2014; EU-SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
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Figure A7.4 Transition rates from unemployment to inactivity for various age groups in four 
European countries (monthly averages, in %)
Sources: EU-SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU-SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 
2014; EU-SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
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Figure A7.5 Survival functions for two age groups (16–34, 35–54) in four European countries 
(probabilities of remaining unemployed in %; 1: 2008–2009, 2: 2010–2011; 3: 2012)
Note: Analysis time: unemployment in months.
Sources: EU-SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU-SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 
2014; EU-SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
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Table A7.1 Prime- age hazard ratios of transition from unemployment to employment in four European countries (age category 35– 54 years)
2008– 2009 2010– 2011 2012
AT ES FR PL AT ES FR PL AT ATa ES FR PL
γ1 (1– 2 months) 9.106*** 5.432*** 2.062*** 2.346*** 4.956*** 3.986*** 1.691*** 3.181*** 6.297*** 2.479 5.467*** 4.480*** 4.358***
γ2 (3– 4 months) 10.808*** 5.193*** 2.030*** 4.833*** 3.845*** 3.710*** 1.903*** 5.116*** 6.291*** 3.870** 6.379*** 3.811*** 7.374***
γ3 (5– 6 months) 4.296*** 4.583*** 2.150*** 3.972*** 3.201*** 3.562*** 1.691*** 3.668*** 2.710 2.094 6.271*** 3.597*** 5.987***
γ4 (7– 10 months) 2.575** 3.203*** 2.042*** 3.195*** 1.732 2.096*** 1.358* 2.648*** 1.822 1.632 3.574*** 2.752** 3.303***
γ5 (11– 15 months) 2.139 2.262*** 0.874 1.511 2.340** 3.197*** 1.155 2.186*** – – – – – 
Male 1.612*** 1.026 0.982 1.421*** 1.450*** 1.271*** 1.109 1.770*** 1.179 1.372 1.146** 1.267* 1.951***
Tertiary education 1.530** 1.124 1.831*** 1.316 1.336 1.273*** 1.188 1.404 1.230 1.267 1.161 1.484* 1.516
Secondary education 1.602*** 1.100 1.242 1.112 1.263* 1.011 1.257* 1.056 1.098 1.073 1.129 1.619*** 1.271
Age 40– 44 years 0.817 1.145* 0.766* 1.176 0.957 1.019 1.192 0.891 0.866 0.696 0.979 0.644** 1.018
Age 45– 49 years 0.731** 1.038 0.824 0.737** 0.720** 0.997 0.967 0.918 0.739 0.582* 0.849* 0.777 0.818
Age 50– 54 years 0.824 0.928 0.705** 0.687*** 0.510*** 0.771*** 0.715** 0.748** 0.410*** 0.260*** 0.728*** 0.490*** 0.785
HH size 1 1.176 b 1.411** b 0.646** b 1.032 b 1.106 1.034 b 0.870 b
HH size 2 1.177 0.954 0.961 1.046 1.104 1.051 0.712** 0.823* 0.988 0.914 1.154 0.888 0.972
HH size 3 1.009 0.955 1.017 0.918 0.827 1.178** 0.825 0.784** 1.177 1.150 1.222** 0.863 0.926
Densely populated 0.641*** 0.675*** 0.796 0.951 0.428*** 0.559*** 1.326** 0.896 0.266*** 0.166*** 0.554*** 0.897 0.899
Medium populated 0.685*** 0.684*** 1.104 1.044 0.721** 0.711*** 1.146 0.802** 0.668** 0.559** 0.707*** 0.827 0.845
(continued)
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2008– 2009 2010– 2011 2012
AT ES FR PL AT ES FR PL AT ATa ES FR PL
Constant 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.046*** 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.017*** 0.037*** 0.154* 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.005***
Log- likelihood – 996.8 – 4,030.9 – 1,326.9 – 1,800.1 – 997.3 – 4,067.8 – 1,677.3 – 2,307.9 – 532.0 – 530.0 – 3,629.6 – 958.0 – 1,305.7
p value – – – – – – – – – 0.022 – – – 
n (unemployment 
spells)
548 2,260 722 1,028 519 2,353 822 1,237 394 394 3,048 734 1,176
aResults with gamma frailty reported only when the likelihood ratio test of gamma variance (p value) significantly proved the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on model results.
bOne- and two- person households are merged because of a low share of observations in the first category.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
HH, household.
Sources: EU- SILC UDB 2010, version 5 of August 2014; EU- SILC UDB 2012, version 1 of August 2014; EU- SILC UDB 2013, version 2 of August 2015; authors’ computations.
Table A7.1 Continued
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HOW CAN YOUNG PEOPLE’S EMPLOYMENT 
QUALITY BE ASSESSED DYNAMICALLY?
Gabriella Berloffa, Eleonora Matteazzi, Gabriele Mazzolini, 
Alina S¸andor, and Paola Villa
8.1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to present a dynamic approach that enables as-
sessment of various aspects of youth labor market performance over a relatively 
long period of time. Standard analyses of labor market performance are usu-
ally based on indicators aimed at capturing young people’s condition in the 
labor market at a single point in time (employment, unemployment, or inac-
tivity rates; see Hadjivassiliou et al., this volume) or on estimations of the con-
ditional probabilities of entering or leaving a certain status (see Flek, Hála, and 
Mysíková, this volume). More recently, some authors have turned their attention 
to the analysis of entire employment status trajectories. In this chapter, we argue 
that it is important— in order to be able to set priorities and design appropriate 
policies— to consider sequences of individual employment statuses over time 
that encompass information on the timing, length, and order in which changes 
of status occur.
Another aspect of labor market outcomes for which it is important to adopt 
a dynamic perspective is evaluation of the “quality” of employment. Researchers 
and policymakers are increasingly concerned with various employment 
dimensions, such as the security of jobs, a decent labor income, and a good 
match between educational qualifications and skills. Because it is increasingly 
common for individuals to move between different jobs, with possible unem-
ployment spells in between, we need to go beyond the concepts of job security 
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and job quality and evaluate the quality and security of the individual employ-
ment condition over an appropriate period of time. In this chapter, we present 
the definition of employment quality illustrated in Berloffa et al. (2015). This def-
inition is based on four dimensions (employment security, income security, in-
come success, and successful match between education and occupation), which 
are identified using information covering a 2- year period.
An empirical application of this approach to analyzing young people’s em-
ployment quality within a dynamic perspective is presented here. We distinguish 
between two different phases of young people’s working lives:  entry into the 
labor market (i.e., the transition from school to the first relevant employment 
experience) and the subsequent phase approximately 5 years after leaving full- 
time education. The analysis of these two phases is carried out using EU- SILC 
(European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) longitudinal data 
over the period 2006– 2012 for 17 countries. Our results suggest that adopting 
a dynamic approach to youth labor market performance allows a more accu-
rate analysis of young people’s employment paths and their quality. Empirical 
findings show that although males and females have similar chances of rap-
idly accessing paid employment after leaving education, women’s labor market 
conditions deteriorate over the following few years. Consequently, there is still 
a pressing need to enhance women’s chances of remaining continuously in em-
ployment and of moving up the labor income distribution. Relaxing the rules on 
the use of temporary contracts actually generates more difficulties for women 
and low- educated individuals, and it also appears to worsen youth employment 
prospects in general.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 reviews the 
relevant literature. Section 8.3 discusses the methodology and data used. Section 
8.4 presents some descriptive statistics to show the extent to which individual 
trajectories and employment quality vary across European countries, gender, 
and educational attainment. Section 8.5 presents the empirical methodology and 
illustrates our main empirical findings. Section 8.6 concludes the chapter.
8.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the analysis of individual labor market performance, two aspects are of par-
ticular interest to researchers and policymakers: employment status and some 
job- related characteristics (job security, earnings, and match with level of ed-
ucation). Analysis of individual employment status is usually based on aggre-
gate indicators referring to a single point in time (employment, unemployment, 
and inactivity) and on related trends (International Labour Organization 2015; 
European Commission 2016). More sophisticated studies also include the tem-
poral dimension (European Commission Employment Committee 2009). Such 
studies generally consider the probabilities of entering or exiting a certain status 
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(employment or unemployment), conditional on current or previous statuses, 
but they differ according to the type of conditionality considered. Some authors 
estimate simple status- dependent probabilities (Russell and O’Connell 2001; 
Uhlendorff 2006; Stewart 2007; Cappellari and Jenkins 2008; Berloffa, Modena, 
and Villa 2014); others use a duration analysis to capture different effects of pre-
vious statuses according to their length (Muller and Gangl 2003; Kalwij 2004; 
Dorsett and Lucchino 2013b). Some scholars consider only transitions between 
statuses of a specific length (Korpi et al. 2003), whereas others are interested in 
the long- term effect of youth unemployment on later labor market outcomes 
(employment status, earnings, etc.; Mroz and Savage 2006).
One drawback of these approaches is their focus on a single status change 
(education– employment, employment– unemployment). They often account 
for the length of previous spells yet discard other crucial information on labor 
market dynamics, such as the timing and the order in which events occur. The 
sequence analysis approach attempts to overcome these shortcomings by con-
sidering the complexity of a transition process involving several status changes 
over time (Shanahan 2000). Various authors have recently used this type of anal-
ysis to model longitudinal processes, such as school- to- work transitions and ca-
reer trajectories (Scherer 2005; Brzinsky- Fay 2007; Quintini and Manfredi 2009; 
Dorsett and Lucchino 2013a).1 All of these studies adopt the optimal matching 
(OM) technique to group individual sequences.2 However, the use of OM to 
study life course events is a controversial choice. The most recurrent criticisms 
concern the lack of a theoretical basis for converting sequences into a model 
(Levine 2000) and the failure to account for the direction of time and the order of 
statuses across sequences (Wu 2000). Given these criticisms, research on OM has 
moved toward a fine- tuning of the methodology.3 Notwithstanding the various 
extensions and improvements developed during the past decade, the classifica-
tion of trajectories or sequences based on OM is still data driven. In the following 
section, we present an alternative, outcome- driven methodology for grouping in-
dividual trajectories. This approach does not rely on sequence alignment (OM) 
or data- reduction techniques (i.e., cluster analysis or discrepancy analysis) to 
group trajectories. Instead, we identify— on the basis of our research questions— 
the main outcomes we are interested in, and we group the individuals in our 
sample accordingly.4 Further details regarding this methodology are discussed 
in Section 8.3.
Because labor markets are increasingly characterized by workers moving 
quite frequently between jobs, with possible unemployment spells in between, 
we need to adopt a dynamic perspective not only for individuals’ employ-
ment statuses but also for the evaluation of other dimensions of their em-
ployment condition. For example, the need to combine flexibility and security 
in European labor markets (Smith et al., this volume) requires going beyond 
the concept of job security associated with type of contract and instead using 
a definition of individual employment security based on employment status 
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trajectories (Berloffa et  al. 2016). In this chapter, we present a new ambi-
tious attempt to define a concept of “employment quality” within a dynamic 
perspective.
Numerous studies have explored the definition and implications of the 
complex and multidimensional concept of job quality (Green 2006; European 
Commission 2014, 172– 79). Even when attention is restricted to objective 
(rather than subjective) job quality, the definition and the aspects considered 
vary noticeably across academic fields and studies. Nevertheless, there is some 
convergence on the features considered to be crucial for workers’ well- being. 
These always include some indicators on the level of earnings (and earnings dis-
tribution) and on insecurity (i.e., unemployment risk).5 Thus, our definition of 
employment quality encompasses four dimensions that we consider essential for 
the successful inclusion of young people in the labor market: employment se-
curity, income security, income success, and a good match between educational 
qualification and occupation. The last dimension is not usually considered in the 
literature on job quality. However, skill mismatch is a widespread and increasing 
phenomenon in Europe, especially for young people (European Commission 
2012; European Central Bank 2014; International Labour Organization 2014a, 
2014b; McGuinness, Bergin, and Whelan, this volume)6 and for migrant workers 
(Spreckelsen, Leschke, and Seeleib- Kaiser, this volume). Generally, overquali-
fied workers are less satisfied with their jobs and are more likely to leave them 
compared to their equally qualified and well- matched counterparts (Quintini 
2011). Therefore, we include a good match between educational qualification 
and occupation as one of the key dimensions of employment quality (also see 
Berloffa et al. 2015).
8.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The approach presented in this chapter is based on two main tools of analysis: (1) 
a new “outcome- driven” methodology for grouping individual employment 
status trajectories (ESTs) and (2) a dynamic concept of employment quality. In 
the evaluation of youth labor market performance, these two tools can be used 
jointly or separately according to the specific aim of the analysis. As an example, 
we show how they can be employed to examine two different phases of youth 
working life: the first entry into the labor market and the subsequent phase ap-
proximately 5 years after exit from education.7
For young individuals exiting full- time education (first phase), a particu-
larly important policy concern is whether they are able to enter and remain in 
employment for a sufficiently long period of time. In this phase, other aspects 
of employment quality are less relevant. Hence, we use only the first tool of 
analysis— that is, the features of individual ESTs in the first 3 years after leaving 
education. As in Berloffa, Mazzolini, and Villa (2015), we classify ESTs according 
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to the outcome of interest— that is, the achievement of a “relevant” employment 
spell, defined as lasting for at least 6 consecutive months (see Section 8.3.1 for 
more details).
For the subsequent phase (approximately 5 years after education exit), it is 
important to examine whether individuals achieved a secure and successful em-
ployment condition and whether the shortcomings of lack of work experience 
are overcome. For the analysis of this phase, we combine the two tools of anal-
ysis, as in Berloffa et al. (2015). We identify those individuals who achieved a 
good- quality employment condition and disaggregate the group of those who 
did not achieve this outcome by the type of EST that characterizes their labor 
market experience during that same period. In this case, trajectory types are 
grouped according to the outcome of interest— that is, prevailing status and the 
frequency of status changes (for further details, see Section 8.3.2).
The empirical analysis makes use of EU- SILC longitudinal data covering the 
years from 2006 to 2012. The focus is on young people aged 16– 34 years. The 
data make it possible to track individuals for a maximum of four interviews (i.e., 
4 years), but our analysis is restricted to individuals with at least three consec-
utive interviews (i.e., 3 years) in order to increase the sample size. For the first 
phase, we consider only young individuals who left education during the 3 years 
covered by the three interviews. Because of data limitations, we are able to con-
sider 17 countries (AT, BE, CZ, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IT, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK, 
and UK).8 For the second phase, we consider young people who left education 
3– 5 years before the first interview.9 We consider the same group of countries as 
for the first phase, except for Denmark (because of the low number of cases in 
some EST types) and the United Kingdom (because its definition of the income 
reference period is not consistent with that of the other countries and with the 
data used to identify employment status sequences). However, we are able to 
also include the Netherlands in the second phase of the analysis. In both phases, 
monthly information about self- declared employment statuses (e.g., employed, 
unemployed, inactive, and in education) is used to identify individual employ-
ment status sequences.10
8.3.1. First Phase: esTs in the First 3 years after 
leaving education
In the analysis of the early labor market experiences of young people, we consider 
their ESTs during the first 3 years after education exit. As discussed in Berloffa, 
Mazzolini, and Villa (2015), we classify them according to the time needed to 
reach, and the pathway that led to, the first relevant employment spell— that 
is, an employment spell lasting at least 6 consecutive months.11 We distinguish 
between successful and unsuccessful trajectories according to the achievement 
or not of this outcome, and we identify various subtypes according to whether 
individuals experience a small number of long jobless spells (i.e., spells of 
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unemployment or inactivity) or a large number of short employment and jobless 
spells. We also consider the decision to return to education after a sufficiently 
long period in employment or unemployment/ inactivity. These criteria produce 
six different EST types:
Successful trajectories
 • Speedy pathway: The sequence presents a relevant employment spell 
within 6 months after leaving full- time education.
 • Long- search pathway: The sequence presents a relevant employment 
spell after more than 6 months in unemployment or inactivity.
 • In & out successful pathway: The sequence presents a relevant employ-
ment spell after various nonrelevant employment spells, interspersed 
by short periods in unemployment or inactivity.
Unsuccessful trajectories
 • In & out unsuccessful pathway: The sequence (similar to the in & out 
successful pathway) does not end in a relevant employment spell.
 • Continuous unemployment/ inactivity pathway:  The sequence is 
characterized only by spells of unemployment or inactivity.
Return to education pathway: The sequence is characterized by a long spell 
in education (at least 6 consecutive months) experienced 6  months 
after having left full- time education.
Figure 8.1 provides a graphical representation of individual employment 
trajectories pertaining to these six EST types. They are obtained by applying the 
previously specified criteria to the EU- SILC sample of young people for the first 
phase (i.e., during the first 3 years after education exit).
8.3.2. second Phase: employment Quality 
approximately 5 years after leaving education
As discussed in Berloffa et al. (2015), for the subsequent temporal phase of youth 
labor market experience, four dimensions are essential for assessing individuals’ 
“employment quality”:  employment security, income security, income success, 
and education– occupation success. The definition of each dimension is presented 
in Table 8.1. Each dimension is evaluated during the two calendar years corre-
sponding to the first two interviews.12
Identifying those young people who experience security and/ or success is 
not enough from a policy standpoint because the group of those who have not 
achieved this outcome is quite heterogeneous. Indeed, individuals with frequent 
status changes require different policy interventions compared to individuals 
who remain for long periods in unemployment or inactivity. Therefore, we con-
sider individual ESTs and group them according to their prevailing status and 
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the frequency of status changes.13 In this group, returning to education for a rel-
evant number of months may have important consequences for future prospects. 
Hence, it cannot be mixed with other types of trajectories. Given these criteria, 
we identify six EST types for the second phase:
 1. Almost always in employment:  All months in employment, with or 
without short spells in education (less than 6 consecutive months).
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Figure 8.1 ESTs for young people in the first 3 years after leaving education (first phase) in 17 
European countries.
Source: Berloffa, Mazzolini, and Villa (2015) based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2006– 2012).
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 2. Prevalently in employment: Long employment spells (at least 12 con-
secutive months); few spells of nonemployment (unemployment, in-
activity, or education); low number of status changes (three at most); 
and, overall, more months in employment than in unemployment and 
inactivity.
 3. Prevalently in unemployment: Long unemployment spells (at least 12 
consecutive months); few spells of employment or inactivity/ educa-
tion; low number of status changes (three at most); and, overall, more 
months in unemployment/ inactivity than in employment. This cate-
gory also includes individuals who were always out of employment, 
with more months in unemployment than in inactivity.
 4. Prevalently in inactivity: Long inactivity spells (at least 12 consecutive 
months); few short spells (less than 6 months) in employment and ed-
ucation;14 low number of status changes (three at most); and, overall, 
more months in inactivity than in unemployment.
 5. In & out employment: More than three status changes; individuals enter 
and exit paid employment at least four times during the 36 months 
considered.
 6. Return to education: Returned to full- time education for at least 6 con-
secutive months.
A representation of individual trajectories pertaining to the different EST types 
can be found in Berloffa et al. (2015).
Table 8.1 Employment quality and its dimensions: Security and success
Employment quality
Security Success
Employment security Income success: Individuals’ monthly earningsa
Spells of employment ≥ 6 months Above the country– year– education median 
earnings
Spells of nonemployment ≤ 3 months Not diminishing over time
Income security: Individuals’ annual 
earningsb
Education– occupation successc
Above the at- risk- of- poverty threshold Not overeducated
Not diminishing over time Not moving down the occupational ladder over 
time
aMonthly earnings are computed by dividing the declared annual labor income by the number of months 
worked during the income reference period.
bThis threshold corresponds to 60% of the national median equivalized disposable income after social 
transfers.
cOvereducation and undereducation mean that workers have more or less education than is required to carry 
out their job (International Labour Organization 2014b).
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8.4. YOUTH TRAJECTORIES IN EUROPE: A DESCRIPTIVE 
ANALYSIS
Differences in youth transitions, both from school to work and within the labor 
market, may be explained by cross- country differences in education systems, 
labor market institutions, youth unemployment rates, and other macroeconomic 
conditions (Müller and Gangl 2003; Scherer 2005; Schomburg and Teichler 2006; 
Wolbers 2007). But individual trajectories vary greatly also with respect to some 
individual characteristics, particularly gender and education level.
8.4.1. First Phase: From school to Work
Table 8.2 shows the unconditional distribution of the six EST types (in the first 
3  years after leaving full- time education) by gender, highest education level 
attained, across European countries,15 and before and during the economic 
crisis.16
Approximately 66% of young individuals in our sample reach a relevant em-
ployment spell within 3  years after leaving education, with no major gender 
differences. Within the unsuccessful group, women have a slightly higher share 
of continuous unemployment/ inactive pathways, whereas men slightly more 
frequently have in & out unsuccessful trajectories. Level of education plays a 
relevant role in leading to a successful EST: 73% of university graduates have a 
speedy pathway, compared to 59% of those with a high school diploma and 44% 
of those with primary education. Only 10% of individuals with tertiary educa-
tion have an unsuccessful trajectory, whereas this share is substantially higher 
among people with secondary and primary education (21% and 41%, respec-
tively). Within this unsuccessful group, the relative distribution between contin-
uous unemployment/ inactivity and in & out is similar across education levels.
Successful trajectories are more frequent in the Nordic countries, which ex-
hibit the highest shares of young people in both speedy (74%) and in & out suc-
cessful pathways (5%). The Nordic countries also have the lowest percentage of 
young people who are continuously unemployed/ inactive (6%). The Southern 
countries show the worst youth labor market outcomes. Only 43% of young 
people have a speedy trajectory, whereas more than 31% are continuously un-
employed or inactive.
The impact of the economic crisis on ESTs is significant: The share of young 
people with speedy trajectories decreases by 11 percentage points (pp) between 
2005– 2007 and 2009– 2011 (from 63% to 52%). Also apparent is an increase in 
individuals who experience continuous unemployment/ inactivity trajectories 
(from 16% to 24%) and in & out unsuccessful pathways (from 4% to 7%). 
Moreover, return to education pathways record an increase (from 6% to 9%), 
suggesting higher investment in human capital during economic downturns, as 
would be expected.
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Table 8.2 Descriptive statistics on ESTs in the first 3 years after leaving education (first phase) in 17 European countries
Successful trajectories Unsuccessful trajectories
Speedy Long search In & out 
successful
In & out 
unsuccessful
Continuously 
unemployed/ 
inactive
Return to 
education
No. of 
observations
All sample 0.57 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.21 0.08 6,924
Gender
Male 0.57 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.20 0.07 3,256
Female 0.56 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.09 3,668
Education
Low 0.44 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.33 0.09 3,016
Medium 0.59 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.10 1,856
High 0.73 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 2,052
Country group
Nordic 0.74 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 974
Continental 0.60 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.20 0.05 1,727
Southern 0.43 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.31 0.12 2,239
Eastern 0.60 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.06 1,984
ESTs observed in
2005– 2007 0.63 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.06 1,230
2009– 2011 0.52 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.24 0.09 1,156
Notes: ESTs, individual employment status trajectories. Sample: young individuals (aged 16– 34 years) observed for 36 months. Education: low, lower secondary education; medium, upper 
secondary education; high, tertiary education. Country groups: Nordic = DK, FI, and SE; Continental = AT, BE, and FR; the UK is also added to this group because the sample size is too small 
to be considered separately and because the distribution of UK individuals across EST types is more similar to Continental countries than to other country groups; Southern = EL, ES, IT, and 
PT; Eastern = CZ, EE, HU, PL, SI, and SK.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2006– 2012).
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8.4.2. second Phase: employment Quality and esTs 
approximately 5 years after leaving education
Table 8.3 shows the shares of young people who, approximately 5  years after 
leaving education, achieve each of the four dimensions used to define their em-
ployment quality. Inspection of Table 8.3 reveals that 67% of young individuals 
in our sample experience employment security, whereas 42% enjoy income se-
curity. Overall, 40% of young individuals have a “secure employment condition” 
(combining employment security with income security). Major differences by 
gender emerge: Young males are more likely than young females to have a secure 
employment condition, whatever the dimension of security taken into account. 
Moreover, education plays a crucial role in ensuring a “secure employment con-
dition”:  Almost half of all university graduates experience security, compared 
to only 16% of those with a lower secondary education. The Southern coun-
tries stand out as featuring the lowest share of young people enjoying security. 
Finally, the impact of the economic crisis results in an overall reduction in the 
share of young people enjoying security: 36% in 2009– 2010 compared to 45% in 
2006– 2007.
The share of young people in our sample enjoying a successful employment 
condition (i.e., income success and education– occupation success) is only 16%. 
More than half of young individuals enjoy a good match between their educa-
tional attainments and the type of their occupation, but only one out of five is 
income successful.17 Because economic success is defined with respect to the 
education- specific earnings distribution, differences between university and 
high school graduates disappear when we examine the “success” dimension.
The differences across country groups are relatively small, with the Southern 
countries recording the lowest shares of young people in terms of both 
dimensions of success. Although we define income success using year- specific 
monthly earnings, there is a modest reduction over time in the share of young 
people experiencing income success. Because our definition of the latter also 
requires that monthly earnings are nondecreasing during the 2- year observa-
tion period, this result suggests that since the onset of the crisis, it has become 
more likely for youth to experience a reduction in their monthly earnings over 
time. During the crisis, young people encounter increasing difficulties not only 
in finding a job but also in finding one that matches their education level.
What is really striking in this scenario is the strong disadvantage suffered 
by young women— in terms of both income success and education– occupation 
success. As a result, only 11% of women, versus 21% of men, enjoy a suc-
cessful employment condition. These results clearly reflect the issues of occu-
pational segregation and wage penalty for females (Dalla Chiara, Matteazzi, and 
Petrarca 2014).
As noted in Section 8.3.2, the group of people who do not achieve a secure 
or successful employment condition is quite heterogeneous. Table 8.4 shows 
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Table 8.3 Descriptive statistics of employment quality of young people approximately 5 years after leaving education (second phase) in 15 European 
countries
Secure employment condition Successful employment condition
Employment 
security
Income security Employment and 
income security
Income success Education– occupation 
success
Income and education– 
occupation success
All sample 0.67 0.42 0.40 0.21 0.53 0.16
Gender
Male 0.72 0.46 0.44 0.28 0.57 0.21
Female 0.61 0.38 0.35 0.15 0.49 0.11
Education
Low 0.40 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.36 0.10
Medium 0.65 0.41 0.39 0.21 0.55 0.17
High 0.78 0.51 0.48 0.24 0.58 0.18
Country group
Nordic 0.69 0.41 0.37 0.22 0.60 0.18
Continental 0.74 0.44 0.42 0.23 0.56 0.17
Southern 0.58 0.37 0.33 0.19 0.44 0.14
Eastern 0.69 0.45 0.43 0.22 0.57 0.18
Employment quality in
2006– 2007 0.68 0.48 0.45 0.24 0.55 0.18
2009– 2010 0.66 0.38 0.36 0.19 0.49 0.14
Notes: See Table 8.1 and notes to Table 8.2. DK and UK are not included in the analysis.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2006– 2012).
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Table 8.4 Descriptive statistics on ESTs approximately 5 years after leaving education (second phase) in 15 European countries
Almost always 
in employment
Prevalently in 
employment
Prevalently in 
unemployment
Prevalently in 
inactivity
In & out Return to 
education
No. of 
observations
All sample 0.55 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 8,070
Unsuccessful and/ or 
insecure people
0.49 0.21 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.06 6,824
The relative distribution of young people with unsuccessful and/ or insecure ESTs
Gender
Male 0.53 0.20 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.06 3,277
Female 0.45 0.22 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.06 3,547
Education
Low 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.15 816
Medium 0.45 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.06 3,510
High 0.62 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 2,498
Country group
Nordic 0.51 0.20 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.06 358
Continental 0.57 0.20 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.07 1,289
Southern 0.40 0.22 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.10 2,130
Eastern 0.51 0.21 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.03 3,047
ESTs observed in
2005– 2007 0.50 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.05 1,284
2009– 2011 0.48 0.21 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.07 1,280
Notes: See notes to Table 8.2. DK and UK are not included in the analysis.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2006– 2012).
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the unconditional distribution of the six second- phase EST types described in 
Section 8.3.2 for the whole sample and for the unsuccessful/ insecure group. As 
to be expected, unsuccessful and/ or insecure young people are less likely to be 
almost always in employment. Among the young individuals unable to achieve 
success and/ or security, young women are less likely than men to be almost al-
ways in employment and are more likely to be prevalently inactive. No relevant 
gender differences emerge for the other EST types in this set.
University and high school graduates are much more likely to be almost al-
ways in employment compared to individuals with low education, and they are 
much less likely to be prevalently in unemployment. Only 15% of young people 
with a low education level choose to return to education.
Again, the Southern countries stand out for the difficulties that young people 
face in the labor market: Only 62% are almost always or prevalently employed, 
compared to 72% or more in the other country groups. Southern Europe also 
exhibits the highest share of young individuals who are prevalently unemployed. 
No important differences are observed in the distribution of young people by 
EST types before and during the crisis.
8.5. THE DETERMINANTS OF YOUTH TRAJECTORIES  
AND EMPLOYMENT QUALITY
We estimate various multinomial logit models for the first and the second phase 
of young people’s labor market experience in order to check the extent to which 
socioeconomic factors impact on the probability of experiencing various types 
of outcomes. For the first phase, the outcome considered is the EST type. For 
the second phase, the explained variable is the interaction between the secure or 
successful employment condition and the EST types. We also estimate a multi-
nomial logit model for the interaction between the employment security condi-
tion and the EST types because we want to compare the results of this model with 
those for the first phase.
Among the explanatory variables,18 we include individual characteristics 
(sex, age, education level, and potential labor market experience), country and 
quarter of the interview dummies,19 gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate 
corresponding to the first and second year of the sequence, and variables ac-
counting for the role of labor market institutions. These include employment 
protection legislation (EPL) and active labor market policy (ALMP) expenditure. 
For EPL, we enter separately the two Organization for Economic Co- operation 
and Development (OECD) indicators of the strictness of regulation on regular 
contracts (EPL- P) and on temporary contracts (EPL- T),20 whereas for ALMP we 
consider annual expenditure on active policies per unemployed, as a share of per 
capita GDP.21 For the first phase, the analysis could suffer from right censoring, 
especially for individuals who left education in the last year of observation 
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(approximately 16% of our sample).22 Because approximately half of these are 
continuously unemployed or inactive, our analysis might slightly overestimate 
the percentage of young people continuously at the margin of the labor market 
and might underestimate those engaged in lengthy job search.
8.5.1. school- to- Work Trajectories: The role 
of individual Characteristics and institutions
Table 8.5 shows the predicted probabilities and some selected marginal effects 
for the first phase of labor market entry. No major gender differences emerge in 
the likelihood of following various trajectory types, with two exceptions: Males 
have a higher probability of moving in and out of employment without reaching 
a relevant employment spell, and they have a lower probability of returning to 
education. Education is crucial for rapid labor market entry and for avoiding the 
risk of being continuously unemployed/ inactive. Previous working experiences 
contribute to gaining stable and relevant employment after leaving education, 
and they reduce the probability of experiencing continuous unemployment/ in-
activity or of returning to education. However, they also have a small positive 
and significant effect on the probability of remaining in an unsuccessful in & out 
pathway.
More stringent regulation of the use of temporary contracts (i.e., a higher level 
of the EPL- T index) is associated with a lower probability of following both an in 
& out unsuccessful and a long- search successful pathway. It also increases female 
probability of being in & out successful. This result suggests that encouraging 
the use of temporary contracts by reducing the strictness of the rules regulating 
their use (as has been done mainly by Southern countries)23 is not an effective 
policy tool with which to improve employment outcomes; indeed, it may even 
have undesirable effects.24
The effects associated with EPL for regular contracts are more diverse across 
the subgroups. In general, a more stringent regulation of firings and dismissals 
(i.e., a higher level of the EPL- P index) appears to have positive effects on the 
school- to- work transition because it reduces the probability of following an 
in & out unsuccessful pathway. However, for medium- and highly educated 
individuals, it also increases the probability of being continuously unemployed/ 
inactive while reducing the likelihood of undergoing a (successful) long search 
for high school graduates and that of being speedy for university graduates. Thus, 
a higher EPL- P index is associated with a more difficult school- to- work transi-
tion for more educated individuals. It also makes the transition more difficult 
for females, who have to cope with an even lower probability of rapidly entering 
paid work.
Finally, ALMP expenditure positively affects the probability of being speedy, 
and it reduces the probability of being in & out unsuccessful. The latter effect is 
larger for highly educated young people and females. The magnitude of these 
effects is, however, quite small.25
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Table 8.5 Predicted probabilities (Pr) and selected marginal effects for ESTs in the first 3 years after leaving education (first phase) in 17 European countries
Successful pathways Unsuccessful pathways
Speedy Long search In & out successful In & out 
unsuccessful
Continuously 
unemployed/ inactive
Return to education
Predicted 
probabilities
Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err.
0.616*** 0.008 0.048*** 0.003 0.025*** 0.002 0.049 *** 0.003 0.203*** 0.007 0.059 *** 0.005
Marginal effects dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err.
Male – 0.169 0.106 0.068 0.050 – 0.010 0.033 0.092** 0.050 0.115 0.108 – 0.096 ** 0.053
Medium education 0.153* 0.090 0.085 0.061 0.014 0.047 0.077 0.059 – 0.322*** 0.095 – 0.006 0.068
High education 1.226*** 0.228 – 0.051 0.087 – 0.018 0.081 – 0.184 0.203 – 0.882*** 0.192 – 0.091 0.107
Age 0.138*** 0.026 – 0.004 0.016 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.013 – 0.118 *** 0.023 – 0.028 0.017
Potential labor 
experience
0.042*** 0.008 – 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.008*** 0.002 – 0.040 *** 0.006 – 0.009 *** 0.003
EPL- T 0.034 0.025 – 0.024** 0.013 0.011 0.010 – 0.051** 0.023 – 0.004 0.026 0.034 0.025
EPL- T* medium 
education
– 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.014 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.009 – 0.018 0.012 0.004 0.014
EPL- T* high 
education
0.009 0.032 0.013 0.017 – 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.015 – 0.002 0.026 – 0.026 0.020
EPL- T* female – 0.005 0.019 0.006 0.008 0.008** 0.004 0.001 0.006 – 0.007 0.014 – 0.003 0.010
EPL- P 0.099 0.206 0.163 0.107 0.064 0.066 – 0.232** 0.118 – 0.083 0.207 – 0.011 0.166
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EPL- P* medium 
education
– 0.009 0.034 – 0.049** 0.024 – 0.005 0.019 – 0.030 0.023 0.101 *** 0.037 – 0.008 0.028
EPL- P* high 
education
– 0.410*** 0.085 0.001 0.036 0.009 0.032 0.072 0.070 0.300*** 0.069 0.028 0.039
EPL- P* female – 0.071* 0.041 0.022 0.019 – 0.015 0.013 0.033** 0.018 0.060 0.041 – 0.030 0.023
ALMPs 0.011** 0.005 – 0.003 0.002 – 0.001 0.002 – 0.007*** 0.003 – 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004
ALMPs* medium 
education
– 0.006 0.005 – 0.003 0.003 – 0.002 0.003 – 0.004 0.003 0.011 ** 0.005 0.004 0.003
ALMPs* high 
education
0.010 0.017 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.003 – 0.020** 0.009 – 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.009
ALMPs* female 0.002 0.005 – 0.001 0.003 0.002** 0.001 – 0.005** 0.003 – 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002
Notes: Sample of young individuals (aged 16– 34 years) observed for 36 months. Complete estimation results are available from the authors.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: Authors’ estimations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2006– 2012).
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The effect of the economic crisis on the transition from school to work is illus-
trated in Figure 8.2, which shows the predicted probabilities by trajectory type in 
various European countries for the subperiods 2005– 2007 and 2009– 2011. The 
graphs highlight the overall negative impact of the Great Recession on school- to- 
work trajectories, but they also reveal some heterogeneity across countries. All 
countries record a reduction in the probability of following speedy trajectories 
and of undergoing a successful search period (with the sole exception of Austria). 
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Figure 8.2 Conditional distribution of young individuals by (first- phase) EST types in 12 
European countries, 2005– 2007 versus 2009– 2011.
Source: Authors’ estimations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2006– 2012).
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Moreover, young people in all the countries studied face a higher degree of insta-
bility, with an increase in the likelihood of experiencing in & out pathways, both 
successful and unsuccessful (again with the sole exception of Austria). Finally, 
the economic crisis has increased the likelihood of being at the margin of the 
labor market by increasing the probability of being continuously unemployed/ 
inactive but, fortunately, also by increasing the probability of returning to educa-
tion (with the exception of the United Kingdom).
8.5.2. employment Quality: The role of individual 
Characteristics and institutions
Table 8.6 shows the predicted probabilities and some selected marginal effects 
for employment security and different pathways of employment- insecure 
individuals approximately 5 years after education exit. In contrast with the first 
phase, in this second phase, females have a significantly lower probability of 
achieving employment security compared to males and a higher probability of 
experiencing inactivity and returning to education. Thus, although males and 
females have similar chances of obtaining good employment outcomes immedi-
ately after leaving education, women’s labor market conditions deteriorate over 
the following few years, with females being substantially less likely to be employ-
ment secure approximately 5 years after having left education.
The employment condition of women in couples is even worse.26 In addition 
to having much lower chances of being employment secure, they are also consid-
erably more likely to have a fragmented career pathway (being prevalently em-
ployed and insecure) or to be out of paid employment (prevalently unemployed 
and inactive). In contrast, males in a couple have a higher probability of being 
employment secure. Educational attainments are crucial also in this phase of 
labor market experience. Higher levels of education are associated with a higher 
probability of being employment secure and with a lower probability of being in 
all the other trajectory types (except for return to education). Potential work ex-
perience also increases the probability of achieving employment security by re-
ducing the risk of experiencing unemployment and the probability of returning 
to education.
Regarding the mix of EPL and ALMP expenditure, some interesting results 
emerge. A more stringent regulation of the use of fixed- term contracts (i.e., a 
higher EPL- T index) increases young people’s probability of being employment 
secure and reduces their probability of experiencing either short employment 
spells or long unemployment spells from one employment spell to the next (i.e., 
being prevalently employed but employment insecure). This is in line with what 
we found in Section 8.5.1 for the first phase, in which a higher level of the EPL- T 
index was associated with a lower probability of following both in & out un-
successful and long- search pathways. However, in this second phase, the effects 
associated with EPL- T are greater for women and low- educated individuals. In 
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Table 8.6 Predicted probabilities (Pr) and selected marginal effects for employment security approximately 5 years after leaving education (second phase) in 15 
European countries
Employment secure
Employment insecure
Return to education
Predicted 
probabilities
Prevalently employed In & out Prevalently unemployed Prevalently inactive
Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err.
0.752*** 0.006 0.089*** 0.004 0.051*** 0.003 0.057*** 0.004 0.029*** 0.003 0.022*** 0.002
Marginal effects dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. Err.
Female – 0.221 *** 0.060 0.055 0.040 0.025 0.031 0.032 0.029 0.063 *** 0.021 0.046 *** 0.015
Female in couple – 0.143 *** 0.019 0.082*** 0.013 – 0.003 0.009 0.030 *** 0.010 0.055 *** 0.006 – 0.021 *** 0.006
Male in couple 0.060 ** 0.025 – 0.005 0.017 – 0.010 0.011 – 0.022 0.014 – 0.013 0.011 – 0.010 0.007
Living in family – 0.039** 0.017 0.031*** 0.012 – 0.021*** 0.008 0.028*** 0.009 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.004
Medium education 0.293 *** 0.104 – 0.112 * 0.066 – 0.005 0.051 – 0.142 *** 0.040 – 0.060 ** 0.027 0.026 0.024
High education 0.690 *** 0.116 – 0.222*** 0.072 – 0.115 ** 0.059 – 0.252*** 0.051 – 0.086 *** 0.032 – 0.014 0.028
Age 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.003 – 0.004* 0.003 0.002 0.002 – 0.001 0.001 – 0.005 *** 0.001
Potential labor 
experience
0.019 *** 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 – 0.014 *** 0.001 0.000 0.001 – 0.006 *** 0.001
EPL- T 0.128 *** 0.049 – 0.116 *** 0.034 0.014 0.026 – 0.044 ** 0.021 0.021 0.014 – 0.003 0.012
EPL- T* medium 
education
– 0.053** 0.023 0.041 *** 0.015 0.000 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.003 0.008 – 0.003 0.005
EPL- T* high 
education
– 0.052** 0.024 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.011 0.019 * 0.010 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.005
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EPL- T* female 0.052 *** 0.014 – 0.015* 0.009 – 0.001 0.007 – 0.013 * 0.007 – 0.009 0.006 – 0.014 *** 0.004
EPL- P 0.077 0.176 – 0.042 0.100 – 0.195* 0.117 0.108 0.086 – 0.029 0.034 0.082 0.085
EPL- P* medium 
education
0.027 0.028 – 0.021 0.019 – 0.008 0.015 0.009 0.012 0.005 0.008 – 0.011 ** 0.005
EPL- P* high 
education
– 0.084*** 0.030 0.028 0.019 0.015 0.016 0.031 ** 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.006
EPL- P* female 0.020 0.021 – 0.008 0.014 – 0.007 0.011 – 0.001 0.010 – 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.004
ALMPs 0.886 *** 0.341 0.087 0.221 – 0.304* 0.158 – 0.562*** 0.146 – 0.049 0.112 – 0.060 0.069
ALMPs* medium 
education
– 1.063 *** 0.267 0.263 0.165 0.104 0.122 0.338 *** 0.116 0.159 ** 0.082 0.199 *** 0.054
ALMPs* high 
education
– 1.221 *** 0.291 0.370** 0.178 0.138 0.134 0.342 ** 0.146 0.165 * 0.092 0.206 *** 0.062
ALMPs* female 0.082 0.150 0.029 0.099 0.018 0.069 0.048 0.084 – 0.106 * 0.064 – 0.071 ** 0.034
Notes: Sample of young individuals (aged 16– 34 years) observed for 36 months. Complete estimation results are available from the authors.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: Authors’ estimations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2006– 2012).
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other words, a more stringent regulation of the use of temporary contracts is 
likely to reduce the probability of having fragmented trajectories in both phases, 
facilitating the achievement by young people of an employment- secure condi-
tion approximately 5 years after leaving education,27 with more marked effects 
over time for the weakest groups (women and low- educated young people). This 
finding may be related to the gender and educational segmentation in employ-
ment contracts— that is, to the fact that women and low- educated individuals are 
overrepresented in fixed- term contracts (Petrongolo 2004; Muffels 2008).
The effects associated with EPL- P are similar to those that emerged in Section 
8.5.1. A more stringent regulation of individual dismissals (i.e., a higher EPL- P 
index) is associated with a lower probability of being in & out and with some 
adverse effects for highly educated individuals (a lower probability of being em-
ployment secure and a higher probability of being prevalently unemployed). In 
other words, where the regulation of individual dismissals is more restrictive, the 
relative advantage of highly educated workers (compared to individuals with me-
dium or low education) in terms of rapid labor market entry and of employment 
security is reduced. A possible explanation is that the higher the individual wage, 
the higher is the expected (discounted) total labor cost that firms face when it 
is more difficult for them to fire a worker. In any case, the magnitude of these 
effects decreases over time.
ALMP expenditure has positive effects as in the first phase, but in this second 
phase it is more differentiated across education levels. Higher ALMP expend-
iture is associated with a lower probability of being prevalently unemployed 
for all young people, but with larger effects for low- educated individuals. This 
lower probability of being prevalently unemployed is compensated by a higher 
probability of being employment secure for low- educated young people and by 
a higher probability of returning to education for high school and university 
graduates. In this case, the magnitude of the effects is much larger than those 
presented in Section 8.5.1.28
In Table 8.7, we consider the combined condition of employment and income 
security (outcome “secure”) and the combined condition of income success 
and a good education– occupation match (outcome “success”). We report the 
predicted probabilities and the marginal effects for the secure/ success outcomes 
and for only three trajectory types among the insecure/ unsuccessful groups (al-
most always in employment, prevalently employed, and in & out). For the other 
trajectory types (prevalently unemployed, prevalently inactive, and return to ed-
ucation), the predicted probabilities and marginal effects are very similar in sign, 
magnitude, and significance to those obtained for employment security.
The first interesting result is that females and males have the same chances of 
achieving a secure employment condition. The reason is that although females 
are more likely to be employment insecure, they are less likely to be income inse-
cure when following a continuous/ stable employment pathway (i.e., to be almost 
always employed and income insecure).29 By contrast, women living in a couple 
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Table 8.7 Selected predicted probabilities (Pr) and marginal effects for security and success approximately 5 years after leaving education (second phase) in 15 
European countries
Secure
Insecure
Successful
Unsuccessful
Almost always 
employed
Prevalently 
employed In & out
Almost always 
employed
Prevalently 
employed In & out
Predicted 
probabilities
Pr St. 
Err.
Pr St. 
Err.
Pr St. 
Err.
Pr St. 
Err.
Pr St. 
Err.
Pr St. 
Err.
Pr St. 
Err.
Pr St. 
Err.
0.44 *** 0.01 0.24*** 0.01 0.15 *** 0.01 0.06 *** 0.00 0.17 *** 0.01 0.46 *** 0.01 0.19 *** 0.01 0.06*** 0.00
Marginal 
effects
dy/ dx St.  
Err.
dy/ dx St.  
Err.
dy/ dx St.  
Err.
dy/ dx St.  
Err.
dy/ dx St.  
Err.
dy/ dx St. 
Err.
dy/ dx St. Err. dy/ dx St. 
Err.
Female 0.10 0.07 – 0.29 *** 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 – 0.14 *** 0.05 – 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03
Female in 
couple
– 0.18 *** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.12 *** 0.02 – 0.01 0.01 – 0.11 *** 0.02 – 0.08 *** 0.02 0.13 *** 0.02 – 0.01 0.01
Male in couple 0.03 0.03 0.04 ** 0.02 – 0.01 0.02 – 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 – 0.01 0.01
Living in family – 0.05 ** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 ** 0.02 – 0.03 *** 0.01 – 0.10 *** 0.01 0.03 * 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 – 0.02 *** 0.01
Medium 
education
0.53 *** 0.16 – 0.21 0.14 – 0.13 0.09 – 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.15 – 0.06 0.10 – 0.01 0.06
High education 0.67 *** 0.17 0.01 0.15 – 0.19 ** 0.10 – 0.13 ** 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.48 *** 0.16 – 0.11 0.11 – 0.12 * 0.07
Age 0.01 ** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 – 0.01 * 0.00 0.02 *** 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 – 0.01 * 0.00
Potential labor 
experience
0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EPL- T 0.18 *** 0.06 – 0.02 0.05 – 0.14 *** 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.06 – 0.12 *** 0.05 0.01 0.03
EPL- T* medium 
education
– 0.12 *** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 *** 0.02 0.00 0.01 – 0.01 0.03 – 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01
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Secure
Insecure
Successful
Unsuccessful
Almost always 
employed
Prevalently 
employed In & out
Almost always 
employed
Prevalently 
employed In & out
Marginal 
effects
dy/ 
dx
St.  
Err.
dy/ 
dx
St.  
Err.
dy/ 
dx
St.  
Err.
dy/ dx St.  
Err.
dy/ 
dx
St.  
Err.
dy/ dx St. 
Err.
dy/ 
dx
St. Err. dy/ dx St. 
Err.
EPL- T* high 
education
– 0.10 *** 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 * 0.01 – 0.01 0.03 – 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01
EPL- T* female 0.03 ** 0.02 0.03 ** 0.01 – 0.02 * 0.01 – 0.01 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 * 0.02 – 0.02 0.01 – 0.01 0.01
EPL- P 0.19 0.18 – 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.14 – 0.24 * 0.13 – 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.06 0.15 – 0.21 * 0.12
EPL- P* medium 
education
– 0.09 ** 0.04 0.11 *** 0.04 – 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 – 0.02 0.03 0.07 * 0.04 – 0.04 0.03 – 0.01 0.02
EPL- P* high 
education
– 0.14 *** 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 – 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 – 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
EPL- P* female – 0.08 *** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02 0.02 0.02 – 0.01 0.01 – 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 – 0.01 0.01
ALMPs – 1.38 *** 0.49 1.76 *** 0.39 0.42 0.29 – 0.28 * 0.17 0.18 0.34 1.15 *** 0.46 – 0.31 0.33 – 0.32 * 0.18
ALMPs* 
medium 
education
0.80 ** 0.42 – 1.26 *** 0.32 – 0.12 0.23 0.04 0.13 – 0.51 * 0.28 – 0.85 *** 0.37 0.47 * 0.26 0.17 0.14
ALMPs* high 
education
0.78 * 0.43 – 1.43 *** 0.32 – 0.02 0.24 0.09 0.15 – 0.43 0.28 – 1.04 *** 0.38 0.54 ** 0.27 0.19 0.15
ALMPs* female – 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.13 – 0.01 0.07
Notes: Complete estimation results are available from the authors. Marginal effects for the other trajectory types are comparable to those obtained for employment security (see Table 8.6).
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: Authors’ estimations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2006– 2012).
Table 8.7 Continued
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have a significantly lower probability of achieving security because, in addition 
to the usual effects on unemployment and inactivity, they have a higher proba-
bility of being prevalently employed but income insecure.
Major gender differences are observed also when we consider the probability 
of achieving a successful employment condition. Females have substantially 
lower chances than men of achieving success. This is true both when we consider 
the unconditional probability and when we compute the probability of being 
successful conditional on having a stable employment pathway.30 Again, women 
in a couple have worse labor market outcomes. They are even less likely to be 
successful and, among the unsuccessful group, they are considerably less likely to 
have a stable/ continuous pathway and to be prevalently employed.
Thus, gender differences in labor market outcomes emerge quite soon after 
leaving education, and they are mainly related to the greater difficulties expe-
rienced by women in remaining continuously employed, earning high wages, 
and achieving a good match between education and occupation. This clearly 
suggests that well- known gender differences in labor market outcomes (career 
interruptions due to motherhood, job segregation, and wage penalties) have not 
yet been resolved, given that the younger generation of women encounters sim-
ilar problems to the older generation of women.
Higher education levels are associated with a significantly higher probability 
of achieving a secure employment condition. Moreover, young people with a 
university degree are substantially less likely than low- educated individuals to be 
in & out and prevalently employed. Education has no effects on the probability 
of achieving success because of the way in which we have defined it. However, 
among the unsuccessful group, young individuals with a university degree have 
a significantly higher probability of being almost always employed and a lower 
probability of being in & out. Potential labor market experience increases young 
people’s probability of being secure and having a continuous/ stable pathway.
The effects of EPL- T on security are very similar to those described at the be-
ginning of this subsection, confirming that the regulation of temporary contracts 
affects mainly the type of employment trajectory that individuals follow. By con-
trast, the EPL of regular contracts appears to have some additional effects on 
income security. Indeed, a higher EPL- P index is associated with a lower prob-
ability of being secure not only for university graduates but also for medium- 
educated individuals, and even more so for females. This additional effect for the 
latter two groups is driven mainly by an income effect because both high school 
graduates and females have a higher probability of being always employed but in-
come insecure where the EPL- P index is higher. In other words, a more stringent 
regulation of individual dismissals generates some problems in terms of employ-
ment security for highly educated individuals, but it also generates problems in 
terms of low income for those high school graduates and females who are able to 
enter a stable employment trajectory. Higher expenditure on ALMP has a sim-
ilar income effect for low- educated individuals (and to a much lower extent for 
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high school graduates). As a result, the positive effect on employment security 
described at the beginning of this subsection is reversed, and higher ALMP ex-
penditure is associated with lower overall security for low- educated individuals.31
The effect of our policy variables is less widespread for the successful dimen-
sion of employment quality. Interestingly, a higher EPL- T index increases the 
female probability of being successful, and higher ALMP expenditure again 
increases the probability of being almost always employed but unsuccessful for 
low- educated individuals.
8.6. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has highlighted the importance of studying various aspects of youth 
labor market performance from a dynamic perspective. Given that labor markets 
are increasingly characterized by workers moving quite frequently between jobs, 
with possible unemployment spells in between, we argue that it is important to 
go beyond (or to complement) the analysis of jobs’ characteristics and to develop 
new concepts of employment security and employment quality that account for 
various features of individuals’ employment conditions over a certain period of 
time. Our definition of employment quality encompasses four dimensions: em-
ployment security, income security, income success, and a successful match 
between education and occupation, which are identified using information 
pertaining to a 2- year period. We have also presented a new methodology with 
which to analyze ESTs, based on whether they contain a prespecified major out-
come and some other minor features that are relevant for the research question 
being addressed.
We have used this approach for the analysis of young Europeans’ labor 
market experience during the period 2006– 2012. We have examined two phases 
of youth working life:  entry into the labor market (i.e., the transition from 
school to the first relevant employment experience) and the subsequent phase, 
approximately 5  years after leaving full- time education. For the first phase, 
we have analyzed the type and the determinants of ESTs followed in the first 
3 years after education exit. For the second phase, we have focused on young 
people’s probability of achieving a secure employment condition (employment 
security and income security) and a successful employment condition (income 
success and a successful match between education and occupation). For those 
who were not able to achieve these outcomes, we have examined their employ-
ment pathway.
The descriptive analysis shows that successful school- to- work trajectories are 
more frequent in Nordic countries but that this relative advantage vanishes in 
the second phase. By contrast, Southern countries record the worst performance 
in both phases. The impact of the economic crisis on employment trajectories is 
large in the first phase but negligible in the second phase. In the latter phase, the 
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crisis has reduced young people’s probability of achieving income security and a 
successful employment condition.
Our econometric analysis shows that although males and females have sim-
ilar chances of obtaining good employment outcomes immediately after leaving 
education (they have almost the same chances of accessing paid employment 
rapidly), the labor market condition of women deteriorates during the following 
few years. More precisely, women are less likely than men to have achieved em-
ployment security approximately 5  years after leaving education; that is, they 
are considerably more likely to experience career interruptions and have more 
fragmented career pathways. However, if they are able to follow a stable em-
ployment trajectory, they have better chances than men of having a stable labor 
income above the poverty line. On the contrary, they always have less chances 
of being successful even when they manage to remain continuously employed.
The regulation of temporary contracts mainly affects the type of employ-
ment trajectory followed by individuals, whereas the EPL regarding reg-
ular contracts appears to have some additional effects on income security. 
Stricter rules on the use of temporary contracts tend to reduce the proba-
bility of fragmented trajectories in both phases, facilitating the achievement 
by young people of employment security approximately 5 years after leaving 
education, with more marked effects over time for women and low- educated 
young people. A more stringent regulation of individual dismissals generates 
difficulties in the school- to- work transition for highly educated individuals 
and for females, who have to cope with a lower probability of entering paid 
work rapidly. These negative effects remain also in the second phase, reducing 
the chances of being secure not only for university graduates and females but 
also for high school graduates. For the latter two groups, stricter rules on in-
dividual dismissals seem to have adverse effects on income security. Indeed, 
a higher EPL- P increases the likelihood of having a labor income below the 
poverty line when following a continuous employment trajectory. This could 
be the result of a trade- off between earnings levels and job security. ALMP 
expenditures have overall positive effects in the first phase, increasing the 
speed of youth labor market entry, whereas in the second phase (approxi-
mately 5 years after education exit), they are associated with an increase in 
youth employment security but also a decrease in overall security (especially 
for the low educated), presumably because of an increase in income insecu-
rity. Thus, these policies must be considered with caution because ALMPs 
seem to improve labor market outcomes in terms of stability and permanence 
in employment but to have side effects on earnings.
From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that there is still a pressing 
need to enhance women’s chances of remaining continuously in employment 
and moving up the labor income distribution. Indeed, it appears that the well- 
known gender differences in labor market outcomes (career interruptions due 
to motherhood, job segregation, wage penalty, etc.) have not yet been removed. 
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Relaxing the rules on the use of temporary contracts (as has been done mainly 
by Southern countries), besides generating more difficulties for women (and 
low- educated individuals), does not appear to be an effective policy tool with 
which to improve youth employment outcomes in general. In fact, it reduces 
the chances of reaching a relevant employment spell within 3 years after leaving 
education, as well as the chances of achieving a sufficiently secure employment 
condition within the subsequent few years.
NOTES
1 The International Labour Organization has also developed an analytical 
framework to study individuals’ school- to- work transitions. The school- to- 
work transition is defined as the passage from the end of schooling to a stable 
or satisfactory employment condition (Matsumoto and Elder 2010). Young 
people are classified into three categories: (1) “transited” if the job held at the 
moment of the survey is either stable/ secure or satisfactory; (2) “in transi-
tion” if the job is unstable/ insecure and unsatisfactory or if the person is un-
employed or inactive (aims to work later); and (3) “not started transition yet” 
if the person is in education or inactive (not aiming to work later). Young 
people who have transited are further categorized by their “speed” of transi-
tion into “short,” “middling,” and “lengthy” based on the type and the lengths 
of spells experienced.
2 The OM method calculates the minimum distance between any two 
sequences by considering the number of steps that must be enacted in order 
to make both sequences equal, associating a cost with each step. The corre-
sponding matrix of minimum distances is then used in a cluster analysis to 
group sequences into similar “types” or in a discrepancy analysis (Studer 
et al. 2011) to examine the association between activity sequences and one 
or more categorical predictors.
3 See Aisenbrey and Fasang (2010) for a discussion of criticisms of traditional 
OM. See Cornwell (2015) for a review of the OM technique and an update 
on the latest methodological improvements.
4 The outcome that drives our grouping methodology in the first phase of 
youth labor market experience is the achievement of a “relevant” employ-
ment spell, whereas in the second phase it is the prevailing labor market 
status.
5 Other dimensions considered in the literature include education and 
training, working environment, work– life balance, and gender balance.
6 According to recent estimates, nearly 15% of EU employees aged 25– 
64  years are overqualified (European Commission 2012, 360, 388 (Annex 
2)). The studies reviewed by Quintini (2011)— based on educational 
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qualifications— estimate that one in four workers in OECD countries could 
be overqualified and that one in three could be underqualified for their jobs.
7 For the second phase, we consider young people who left education 3– 
5 years before the first interview, evaluating their labor market performance 
in the following 2  years (first 2  years of the survey). This means that for 
some individuals, we evaluate labor market performance at 3 or 4 years after 
exiting full- time education, whereas for others we refer to 4 or 5 or to 5 or 
6 years.
8 IE, LU, NL, and NO are excluded from the analysis because the sample size 
was too small. BG, CY, LT, LV, MT, and RO are excluded because the policy 
variables that we use in the econometric analysis are not available for these 
countries.
9 See Berloffa, Mazzolini, and Villa (2015) and Berloffa et al. (2015) for details 
about the sample selection rules.
10 EU- SILC does not provide daily data. However, by using monthly informa-
tion instead of daily data, we have a sample with less noise due to the ex-
clusion of individuals who change their status very frequently. The monthly 
activity status declared by respondents must have been their status for at least 
2 out of 4 week in 1 month. If there are more than two activities, the main 
activity is the one in which the individual spent the most time.
11 The definition of a relevant employment spell follows the EU- SILC conven-
tion, according to which a 6- month period identifies the first regular job 
and whether individuals ever worked. The time frame of 6 months is a refer-
ence length also for some labor market policies, such as the UK government’s 
Youth Contract wage incentive, which was in place from 2012 to 2014, paying 
an incentive to firms that recruited long- term unemployed young people for 
at least 26 weeks.
12 We consider a 24- month period in order to have all the dimensions of em-
ployment quality referring to the same reference period. Indeed, informa-
tion about income and monthly employment statuses, which is used to 
identify income security, income success, and employment security, refers to 
the calendar year preceding the interview. In contrast, information about the 
type of occupation, which is used to identify education– occupation success, 
refers to the year of the interview. Thus, the only overlapping years for infor-
mation about all four dimensions are the two calendar years preceding the 
third interview.
13 Employment quality is evaluated during the two calendar years corre-
sponding to the first two interviews. In contrast, ESTs cover a 3- year period 
that starts in the calendar year before the first interview. This means that we 
have a time span of 2– 4 years between education exit and the beginning of 
the observation period for second- phase ESTs.
14 We exclude from the analysis those individuals who were inactive for the en-
tire length of the sequence.
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15 Countries are grouped on the basis of geographic criteria, largely for pres-
entational purposes. This grouping is used only for the descriptive analysis, 
whereas the econometric analysis uses country dummies.
16 The data on monthly employment status refer to the year preceding the in-
terview. Thus, for those interviewed in 2006– 2008, the ESTs refer to the pe-
riod 2005– 2007.
17 This share is computed over the entire sample (including those who were 
never employed); if we consider only those who have at least 1  month in 
employment in both years, the share of income successful young people rises 
to 27%.
18 See Berloffa, Mazzolini, and Villa (2015) and Berloffa et al. (2015) for further 
details about the control variables included in the analysis.
19 Because we had a small sample size for some countries (e.g., the Nordic 
countries), we also estimated our models controlling for country- group 
dummies instead of country dummies. The results remained consistent 
across specifications.
20 EPL- P measures the strictness of employment protection against individual 
dismissals, whereas EPL- T measures the strictness of regulation on the use 
of fixed- term and temporary- work agency contracts.
21 ALMPs include training, job rotation and job sharing, employment 
incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, 
and start- up incentives. We are well aware that this variable only provides 
information about the input— that is, how much money was spent and how 
many people participated— but there is no other information available to ac-
count for the efficiency of these ALMP expenditures.
22 Right censoring was considerably more limited in the second phase because 
we examined the prevalent employment condition and the number of status 
changes in defining trajectories. Hence, the employment condition at the 
end of the sequence is less relevant for the definition.
23 The EPL- T index of Spain declined in 2006– 2007 and in 2010– 2011, that of 
Portugal and Sweden declined in 2007– 2008, and that of Greece declined in 
2010– 2011 and in 2011– 2012.
24 This is in line with the data presented in Employment and Social Developments 
in Europe 2014 (European Commission 2014, 77– 78), suggesting that 
reductions in EPL either for permanent workers (during economic 
downturns) or for temporary contracts do not appear to be clearly correlated 
with improvements in the transition from unemployment to employment.
25 The estimated coefficients imply that, for example, an increase in ALMP 
expenditure as a share of per capita GDP from 0.10 to 0.20 increases 
(decreases) the probability of being speedy (in and out unsuccessful) only by 
0.11 (0.07) pp.
26 Instead of controlling for partnership, we could have controlled for parent-
hood. However, we believe that the decision to have children may be more 
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endogenous than the decision to form a couple. Indeed, many authors have 
developed and estimated models of joint fertility and labor supply decisions, 
whereas few studies have explored the interdependencies between females’ 
labor market participation and the choice of living in a couple.
27 Note, however, that this does not necessarily mean that they stay in the 
same job. Berloffa et  al. (2016) show that an increase in the strictness of 
the regulations on the use of fixed- term contracts raises the likelihood of 
staying almost continuously in the labor market, although not with the same 
employer.
28 An increase in ALMP expenditure as a share of per capita GDP from 0.10 
to 0.20 increases the probability of being employment secure by 8.9 pp and 
decreases the probability of being prevalently unemployed by 5.6 pp.
29 Indeed, estimation of a multinomial logit model specifically for income 
security shows that males are much less likely to be at the margin of the 
labor market (the probability of being continuously unemployed/ inactive 
or returning to education is 8% for males vs. 22% for females) but much 
more likely to be always employed and income insecure (25% vs. 11%). If 
we compute the probability of being income secure conditionally on having 
continuous/ stable employment, men are actually worse off (the conditional 
probability becomes 68% for males vs. 80% for females).
30 Thus, when women are able to follow a stable employment trajectory, they 
are more likely than men to be income secure but less likely to be successful.
31 The magnitude of the effect is larger than that estimated for employment se-
curity. An increase in ALMP expenditure as a share of per capita GDP from 
0.10 to 0.20 decreases the probability of being secure by 13.8 pp.
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9
YOUTH TRANSITIONS AND JOB QUALITY
hoW lonG should They WaiT and WhaT  
diFFerenCe does The Family make?
Marianna Filandri, Tiziana Nazio, and Jacqueline O’Reilly
9.1. INTRODUCTION
Much attention has been devoted to the issues of job quality, the effects of 
prolonged unemployment, and the influence of families on youth transitions, 
whereas very little has been given to date to examining the interrelationship be-
tween these dimensions. In this chapter, we explore the effects of both persist-
ent unemployment and employment continuity on the likelihood of obtaining a 
good- quality job 3 years after acquiring a secondary or tertiary educational qual-
ification. We are also interested in understanding how family of origin affects 
these strategic transitions for young people in Europe. Specifically, we examine 
the following questions:
 1. Does a longer period in unemployment lead to accessing a better job?
 2. Does employment continuity influence the chances of accessing a 
better job?
 3. Does a bad entry job lead to more adverse employment outcomes later?
 4. How does the social class of the family of origin mediate young people’s 
labor market outcomes?
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European countries differ significantly in their labor market institutional 
settings (particularly in terms of “youth transition regimes”; see Hadjivassiliou 
et  al., this volume) and also with regard to the effects of the Great Recession 
on employment and unemployment (particularly in terms of differences be-
tween young people and prime- age individuals; see Flek, Hála, and Mysíková, 
this volume). Our main hypothesis is that the mechanisms that enable young 
people to pursue a successful strategy for securing good employment outcomes 
in the long term (3– 5 years after acquiring an educational qualification) are sim-
ilar across countries. More precisely, the features of a “successful strategy” are 
similar across countries, notwithstanding their institutional specificities (youth 
transition regime, labor market settings, welfare systems, etc.) and their macro-
economic conditions. We also hypothesize that the family of origin has a strong 
influence on its children’s employment outcomes and that the effects of the 
family social background are similar across countries. Families from the upper 
social classes should be better able to secure successful employment outcomes 
for their offspring, not only by making higher investments in their education 
but also by guiding them toward pursuing more effective employment strategies.
We explore such strategies by testing whether experience of unemployment 
or of discontinuity in employment, or a certain type of entry job, at the time 
when young people complete a level of education reflects on the occupational 
conditions (pay, skill levels, or both) they achieve in employment 3 years later. 
Using monthly employment- status data from the 2005– 2012 longitudinal waves 
of EU- SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), we 
construct individual trajectories covering a period of 36 months following the 
completion of an education level; in addition, we use the cross- sectional ad hoc 
2011 module to explore the effects of the family of origin on these transitions. 
First, we distinguish between different types of good and bad jobs. Second, we 
test for associations with successful transitions to good jobs in five selected 
European countries:  Finland, France, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom. 
Third, we examine the impact of family background on the types of transitions 
young people make.
We hypothesize that families have different capacities— in line with the re-
sources that characterize their social class— to guide, empower, and provide 
backing for their young adult children as these make their initial steps in the 
labor market. Depending on their familial resources, young people from less ad-
vantaged backgrounds might be required to move into work earlier, or they may 
not have the necessary resources to enable them to wait for, gain access to, select, 
or take up promising job opportunities that entail initial losses or higher risks. 
Our findings show that young people from higher social class families were able 
to make transitions into better quality jobs than was the case for youth from 
lower class families. These findings reinforce established knowledge on patterns 
of stratification and raise significant questions about the best locus for policy 
interventions that are designed to reduce inequalities.
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9.2. THEORETICAL DEBATES ON YOUTH 
TRANSITIONS: QUALITY AND TIME
9.2.1. Job Quality
A considerable body of empirical studies has found that job quality affects well- 
being and happiness. Low- quality employment has been associated with lower 
levels of self- reported life satisfaction and happiness, compared to those of 
people with higher quality jobs (Gallie 2013a; Sánchez- Sánchez and McGuinness 
2013; Green et al. 2014; Keller et al. 2014), and this association holds true across 
different institutional settings (Gallie 2007; Kattenbach and O’Reilly 2011). 
Although those in poor- quality jobs have lower levels of life satisfaction, they 
are often more satisfied than people who remain unemployed (Grün, Hauser, 
and Rhein 2010). Overall levels of (dis)satisfaction can be traced to a range of 
different factors, including overeducation, underemployment, and poor employ-
ment conditions (contractual forms and salary levels) (Peiró, Agut, and Grau 
2010). Several factors associated with job characteristics affect levels of well- 
being, such as task autonomy in a job, economic and personal rewards, a stim-
ulating and supportive environment, training opportunities, contract security, 
and work pressure and job control (Gallie 2012; Gallie, Felstead, and Green 2012; 
Gallie 2013b).
“Good” and “bad” jobs can be distinguished in terms of a number of features 
related to material (monetary and nonmonetary) and nonmaterial character-
istics (Jencks, Perman, and Rainwater 1988; Warhurst et  al. 2012; Keller et  al. 
2014). There have been many definitions of “good” and “bad” jobs involving 
both objective and subjective aspects (Russell, Leschke, and Smith 2015). Here, 
we focus on a simple indicator that uses the level of employment and wages to 
distinguish between good and bad jobs. Higher quality jobs are frequently as-
sociated with higher education levels; involve more task complexity, autonomy, 
and control; pay better salaries; and the workers report greater degrees of satis-
faction. This hierarchy is represented in Figure 9.1, which shows the association 
between different labor market statuses and a hierarchy of skills, wages, and re-
ported satisfaction, as found in the literature (Layard 2004). At the bottom are 
the unemployed, followed by the inactive (whose lack of economic autonomy is 
to a certain degree chosen or accepted without bearing the cost of searching for 
a job as well as the additional psychological loss), those employed in low- quality 
jobs, and, at the top, those with high- quality, “good” jobs.
Very limited attention has been given in these debates to how occupational 
positioning specifically affects young people’s entrance to work (as an excep-
tion, see Russell et al. 2015). It has been well established that early job mismatch 
and precarious employment trajectories have deleterious effects in later life. 
McGuinness and Wooden (2009) illustrate how early transitions resulting in skill 
mismatch have long- term consequences that render it difficult for young people 
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to make up for the costs of an early mismatch in their later careers. Empirical 
evidence shows that beginning a professional career with a “bad job” (i.e., low 
skilled, low paid, or both) can become a career trap (Scherer 2004; Blossfeld 
et  al. 2008; Gash 2008; Barbera, Filandri, and Negri 2010; Barone, Lucchini, 
and Schizzerotto 2011; Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2011; Hillmert 2011; Wolbers, 
Luijkx, and Ultee 2011; Reichelt 2015; Mooi- Reci and Dekker 2016).
9.2.2. how long should They Wait?
Longer periods in unemployment can result from two different circumstances: not 
finding employment or waiting for the right opportunity. The decision to be se-
lective and risk waiting for a better opportunity— rather than accepting “any” 
job— prolongs the duration in unemployment. But it could also be seen as a stra-
tegic move, if there is a possibility it could lead to better outcomes over time. This 
is a particularly salient decision for young people moving into work for the first 
time. Especially during the early stages of one’s career, it is possible that poor- 
quality jobs can lead to better opportunities later on. For example, internships 
and short- term training contracts can be used as signaling and screening devices 
by employers who will later offer better employment opportunities (Scherer 
2004). However, in the process of waiting, young people will incur a longer un-
employment spell(s), increasing their risk of not finding an entry opportunity at 
all (Flek et al., this volume).
The apparent individualized choice of a young person also needs to be 
contextualized in relation to the person’s family resources and his or her ability to 
wait (Bernardi 2007; Medgyesi and Nagy, this volume). Wealthier families have a 
range of resources that can allow their children to wait longer, be more selective, 
and be guided more effectively toward successful employment routes (McKnight 
Skills
Wage
Satisfaction
Employed (good job)
Employed (bad job)
Inactive
Unemployed
Figure 9.1 Scale of occupational positioning based on skills, wage, and satisfaction.
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2015). Those from less advantaged backgrounds might be required to move into 
work earlier, depending on the resources available from their families or the wel-
fare state, or they may not have the necessary resources to enable them to avail 
of opportunities and may thus instead become NEETs— young people not in 
education, employment, or training (see Mascherini, this volume; Zuccotti and 
O’Reilly, this volume).
Youth labor markets are frequently characterized by high levels of turbulence 
and transitions (Flek et al., this volume; Berloffa et al., this volume). “Flexible” 
forms of employment are often associated with poor job quality, although for 
some, these options may be the only practical way to remain in employment 
(O’Reilly et al. 2015; Gebel and Giesecke 2016; Grotti, Russell, and O’Reilly, this 
volume). Some authors have suggested that “any kind of job, be it short- term, 
part- time or subsidized, is better than no job at all to forestall unemployment 
hysteresis and deskilling” (Hemerijck and Eichhorst 2010, 327). The implication 
is that any form of inclusion in the labor market is better than being excluded. 
But is it really always the case that any job is better than none? How long should 
young people wait to find a good match? And what factors affect the opportunity 
to be able to wait for a better offer?
We are not interested here in highlighting existing differences across the five 
countries considered in the study. Rather, we intend to identify the characteris-
tics of a “successful strategy” and to test whether such strategies are associated 
with individual and family characteristics. We test if families have a different 
ability to empower, guide, and support their offspring in line with their social 
class positioning and whether family (dis)advantages have similar effects across 
countries.
9.2.3. data and methods
To answer these questions, we use longitudinal (from 2005 to 2012) and cross- 
sectional (2011) data from EU- SILC surveys. Although the data cover young 
people’s transitions through the labor market before and during the recession— 
with its different moments of onset and different impacts across countries— the 
empirical analyses do not focus on how the crisis affected young people’s degree 
of success in employment. We test instead for the role of the families of origin 
in helping their children secure a successful placing in the labor market. For 
the longitudinal part, which focuses on later outcomes of early experiences, we 
selected all young people (aged 19– 34 years) who had successfully completed a 
spell in higher education by their second interview and then followed them for 
the subsequent 3 years; this provided us with four valid interviews. For the cross- 
sectional part, which explores the effects of the family of origin, we selected 
young people (aged 19– 34 years) who had obtained a high school diploma or 
a third- level degree within the 5  years previous to the time of the interview 
in 2011.1 We adopted this strategy to maximize the sample size and the statis-
tical power for the first two sets of analyses. The third analysis— of the impact 
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of family background on young people’s occupational condition— considers a 
longer period of 5 years.2
We focus our examination on five countries that exemplify the five transition 
regimes developed by Pohl and Walther (2007) and discussed by Hadjivassiliou 
et  al. (this volume):  universalistic (Finland), employment- centered (France), 
subprotective (Italy), post- socialist (Poland), and liberal (United Kingdom) 
(Table 9.1). The choice of these countries has the benefit of drawing on their 
larger sample size in the EU- SILC data, as well as their correspondence to theo-
retical predictions about different youth transition regimes.
The first set of multivariate analyses uses separate logit models to predict the 
effect of early unemployment on the likelihood of young people being in skilled 
and/ or well- paid occupations 3 years after completing their education. We ex-
plore the overall duration and frequency of unemployment spells. The second set 
of models explores successful transitions to good jobs in a selection of European 
countries— by level of education achieved. The final analyses use cross- sectional 
multinomial logit models to examine the impact of family background on the 
types of transitions young people have been making. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the inequalities emerging from this examination.
9.3. GOOD AND BAD JOBS: A TYPOLOGY OF SUCCESSFUL 
OUTCOMES
Using the dimensions of skills and wages, we develop a typology to compare 
transitions to one of four possible outcomes: “successful,” “investment,” “need,” 
and “failure” jobs (Figure 9.2). A “successful” state is when young people enter 
a skilled and well- paid job. An “investment” state is when a skilled position has 
been achieved with the trade- off of a lower salary (skilled but low- paid job). 
Jobs requiring higher skills or qualifications may initially be poorly paid (entry 
positions as a screening device) but over time result in increasing wage returns. 
Well paid is defined as above the median wage of all employed individuals by 
all ages in each country each year.3 A “need” state is when the job is low or un-
skilled, and the wages can be either high or low. A “failure” state is when the 
wages are low and the job is unskilled; a failed transition also includes those who 
end up in unemployment or inactivity. Individuals still in education (students) 
are excluded from this analysis.
Table 9.1 Analytical sample size by country (number of cases)
Database Finland France Italy Poland United Kingdom
Cross- sectional, 2011 238 720 814 695 223
Longitudinal, 2005– 2012 329 1,016 896 965 309
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Skilled occupations are defined on the basis of ISCO- 88 codes (International 
Standard Classification of Occupations):  high- skilled nonmanual occupations 
(ISCO 11– 34), low- skilled nonmanual occupations (ISCO 41– 52), skilled 
manual occupations (ISCO 61– 83), and elementary occupations (ISCO 91– 93) 
(Pintelon et al. 2011, 56– 7). We consider both manual and nonmanual skilled 
occupations.
9.3.1. unemployment duration and employment 
outcomes
Having completed their studies, young people ideally achieve speedy insertion 
into the labor market and then maintain continuous employment.4 However, 
they may instead remain out of employment for a longer period of time either 
voluntarily, because they choose to wait, or involuntarily, because they are unable 
to find a suitable job. We test the effect of unemployment duration in the early 
phase of young people’s careers on their probability of accessing a high- wage 
occupation, a skilled occupation, or both conditions jointly (a “success” state).
We codified the overall duration in unemployment over the 48 observation 
months (Figure 9.3). “None” refers to individuals who had either no time or 
a maximum of 1  month in unemployment; “short” refers to those with up to 
6  months of unemployment; and “medium- long” refers to those who experi-
enced a total duration of an (accumulated) unemployment spell(s) lasting longer 
than 6 months. The sample is composed of all individuals with four completed 
interviews who were employed in the final observation.
We ran separate logit models on the EU- SILC longitudinal monthly data, 
predicting— for those employed— the occupational condition reached 3  years 
after completing a secondary or tertiary qualification. Three different models 
explored the probability that these employed would be found in a high- wage 
occupation, in a skilled occupation, or in a state of occupational “success” (both 
high- wage and skilled occupation). The results for the effect of the average du-
ration in unemployment in the three models are shown jointly in Figure 9.3. All 
models use controls for age, gender, country, and number of employment inter-
ruption episodes; they also account for the differences based on education level.
High wage Success
Investment
Need
Failure
Low wage
High wage
Low wage
Unemployed
Skilled
Unskilled
Inactive
Student
Figure 9.2 Typology of occupational positioning based on skills and wage.
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We find no significantly observable difference in any of the outcomes analyzed 
for those who had been unemployed for up to 6 months (a relatively short period 
of unemployment) compared to those who had never been unemployed; the ex-
ception to this result regarded third- level graduates, who had a lower probability 
of being in a high- wage job if they had been unemployed. Differences in the ef-
fect of unemployment duration were more perceptible in wage attainment than 
in achieving a skilled occupation after 3 years (Figure 9.3, top graphs), especially 
for those with a tertiary level of education. The probability of having a high- 
wage position after 3 years (Figure 9.3, top left graph) was considerably lower 
for graduates who had been unemployed for more than 6 months (medium- long 
duration) than for those who had never been unemployed (none) or those who 
had been unemployed for 6 months or less (short duration).
The relationship between unemployment duration and labor market outcome 
seems to be similar in the five countries studied. There are, of course, differences 
in the “baseline” probabilities of being in each state (high skills, high wage, or 
successful occupation) in the five countries, which reflect the specificities of the 
different national labor markets. However, the differences in the effects of the 
duration of unemployment are not statistically significant between countries (the 
interaction effects with country dummy variables were not statistically signifi-
cant). Although small sample sizes of young people in each country might make 
country- specific effects difficult to detect, we found empirical evidence of a sim-
ilar mechanism, across contexts, linking length of unemployment to successful 
None Short Medium-long
High wage Skilled
Secondary
Secondary
Success
0
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Tertiary
Figure 9.3 Predicted probability of young people (aged 19– 34 years; 3 years after acquiring 
a qualification) being in a high- wage, skilled, or successful job by level of education and 
unemployment duration.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2005– 2012).
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outcomes (especially wages).5 The results reveal how, in these countries— 
especially around the initial stage of the employment career— experiencing a 
small amount of turbulence (up to 6 months of unemployment) does not seem 
to weigh heavily on short- term employment outcomes.
9.3.2. Continuity in employment and employment 
outcomes
We further explore any effects of the entry process on the employment out-
come 3 years after obtaining a qualification. Specifically, we test for effects due 
to the timing of unemployment. We distinguish between those with few or no 
unemployment spells during job search and those with a greater number of un-
employment spells in the early search period (i.e., the number of employment 
interruptions they experienced). We examine the effect of continuity in em-
ployment, where “continuity” is defined as having at most one spell of unem-
ployment. In other words, the current employment situation is achieved with 
no employment interruptions, or with only one, as opposed to those with more 
frequent interruptions creating a more intermittent employment trajectory.
The outcomes of those employed 3  years after obtaining a secondary- or 
tertiary- level qualification (Figure 9.4) show that continuity in employment does 
not seem to affect the skills level of the occupation achieved, and that it only 
slightly affects the chances of “successful” transitions for those with a secondary- 
level qualification. This indicates a greater likelihood of higher wages being 
Continuous Intermittent
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Secondary Tertiary
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Figure 9.4 Predicted probability of young people (aged 19– 34 years; 3 years after acquiring 
a qualification) being in a high- wage, skilled, or successful job by level of education and 
employment continuity.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2005– 2012).
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reached by those who have been continuously employed (Figure 9.4, top left 
graph).
Continuity has a marginally significant effect on the probability of being in 
a “successful occupation” for those with secondary- level education (Figure 9.4, 
bottom left graph; confidence intervals at the 95% level). This result points to a 
small positive effect of quick entry (at most one unemployment spell after leaving 
education): The shorter the search (the quicker the entry after finishing educa-
tion), the slightly more likely the young person is to be found in a successful oc-
cupation. Again, no statistically significant effect was found for the differences in 
the relationship between continuity and occupational outcome across countries. 
Although each country has a unique labor market structure (reflected in the dif-
ferent chances of being employed or having experienced continuity), the effect of 
employment continuity again seems to be working in the same direction in each 
separate context.
In summary, the previous results suggest that both employment continuity 
and taking less time to find the first job are associated with some advantages but 
that these are quite small. We detected some minor effects on the employment 
outcomes investigated (high wage, skilled employment, or “successful” occu-
pation) from entering employment quickly or not spending too long in un-
employment during this relatively brief window of observation (3 years). This 
result could be specific to the early stage in the employment career, confirming 
that despite a clear but weak advantage of continuous employment and an early 
start, a brief period of unemployment does not appear to impair subsequent 
outcomes as much as we might have expected. In fact, it is the medium- to 
long- term experience of unemployment (of 6 or more months during the 
3 years) that has a more substantial impact. Whether this experience consists 
of a single short spell or of the accumulation of several shorter spells, longer 
periods of unemployment clearly have a negative effect on the chances of oc-
cupational success, especially in terms of wages and for those with tertiary 
education (see Figure 9.3). A slightly longer initial delay before first entering 
employment, or a turbulent beginning (see Figure 9.4), seems to have affected 
the wage dimension the most for university graduates. For younger workers, 
these factors have more of an impact on their likelihood of making a transition 
to a “successful” job. And although the specific institutional arrangements of 
each country are crucial in defining the chances of being employed and the du-
ration of unemployment (Hipp, Bernhardt, and Allmendinger 2015), our data 
reveal the relevance of continuity in employment or unemployment in excess 
of 6 months on later occupational outcomes regardless of the national context. 
Having examined the likelihood of transitions into successful jobs measured 
in terms of their wages or skill profiles, we now turn to examining access to 
occupations after graduating from school or college and the effect on the kind 
of job achieved 3 years later.
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9.4. COMPARING EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES: WELL BEGUN 
IS HALF DONE
The analyses presented so far support the idea that a quick transition into any 
job is always better than joblessness, although the effects are not very substantial 
and are mostly statistically significant only for longer unemployment durations. 
But does this give us the full picture? The empirical evidence presented so far is 
not enough to show how young people are being trapped into poorly paid and 
low qualified jobs. We have shown an association between speedier entry with 
fewer interruptions and an overall slightly more favorable employment outcome. 
To enrich our understanding, it is important to further explore young people’s 
initial position in the labor market and how this changes over time: We compare 
initial job status on completion of education with that observed 3 years later (for 
those who were employed).
Here, we do not focus directly on how the occupational conditions of young 
people change across different countries (reflecting their institutional contexts 
and already investigated in the literature). Rather, we examine whether the 
strategies pursued by young people are different across countries in their effects. In 
other words, regardless of the larger or smaller amount of “successful” positions 
observed in each country, we investigate which are the most effective strategies 
for young people to achieve these positions. Specifically, we focus on the rele-
vance of a “good employment entry” for a good match in skilled occupations. 
Occupational characteristics, especially task complexity (as a proxy for occupa-
tional skills in this study), are a predictor of likelihood of employment success 
(Reichelt 2015).
Moving from a cross- sectional to a longitudinal perspective (Figure 9.5), we 
can observe that all countries’ trends move in the same direction over time. In 
general, we can observe that despite similar trends across countries, the starting 
levels are rather different, particularly for the United Kingdom, which has a 
higher share of young people either unemployed or employed in unskilled or 
low- paid occupations even before the completion of an education. In a context of 
prevailing stability during the 4- year period considered here, the statistically sig-
nificant differences are concentrated in the bottom two graphs in Figure 9.5: the 
conditions of “failure” and “student.” On the one hand, “student” decreased— as 
individuals achieved a secondary or tertiary education— and, on the other hand, 
“failure” transitions increased.
The trends for the share of students deserve additional consideration regarding 
the education level achieved. As reflected in the literature, the probabilities of 
being enrolled in education or being in a condition of “success” vary substan-
tially between graduates from secondary and tertiary education. Achieving a 
secondary- level qualification is associated with higher chances of continuing in 
education, whereas obtaining a tertiary degree is associated with higher chances 
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of reaching a skilled position, either well paid or not. In line with the litera-
ture, our data confirm a competitive advantage of tertiary graduates compared 
to upper secondary school- leavers. This is shown at aggregate level in Figure 9.6, 
but it is true for all countries considered: The secondary educated are more fre-
quently found in the “failure” transitions compared to graduates; they are also 
less likely than graduates to be in “success” transitions.
Turning to analyzing the early development of occupational conditions after 
completion of education (separately by education level achieved), we explore the 
effect of entry occupational conditions on the job held 3 years later (using the 
typology devised in Figure 9.2). We estimated multinomial logit models with 
EU- SILC longitudinal data separately for the secondary and tertiary educated, 
adopting controls for age, sex, and country.
For every initial condition, the results in Figures 9.7 and 9.8 show the dif-
ference in probabilities for every final occupational status compared to being 
students. In other words, positive (above the central horizontal line) or nega-
tive (below the line) estimates illustrate how more(/ less) likely it is for a young 
person to be found in the referred occupational condition (titles of graphs) 
rather than in education after 3 years, given the initial condition (x axis of each 
graph). Figure 9.7 shows a high stability over time for all statuses. For those who 
accomplished a secondary level of education, being in a “failure” state is associ-
ated with a higher probability of remaining so after 3 years (Figure 9.7, “Failure” 
graph, point above the line). A high degree of stability is also true for all other 
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Figure 9.5 Shares of young people (aged 19– 34 years; observed in their transition after acquiring 
a qualification) by occupational typology and country over the 4 years observed.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2005– 2012).
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Figure 9.6 Shares of young people (aged 19– 34 years; 3 years after acquiring a qualification) by 
typology and educational qualification.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2005– 2012).
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Figure 9.7 Difference in predicted probabilities for every occupational status compared to being 
students (young people aged 19– 34 years; 3 years after concluding secondary education).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2005– 2012).
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statuses: need, investment, and success. However, as can be seen in the graph at 
the top left of Figure 9.7, those who were initially in an “investment” state also 
have somewhat higher chances of being found in a “success” state later (Figure 
9.7, “Success” graph, second point above the line). This effect is small but statis-
tically significant. The results are very similar for the tertiary educated (Figure 
9.8), except for an even stronger effect of “investment” on the likelihood of “suc-
cess”; that is, those who began in a skilled job that was initially poorly paid (“in-
vestment” status) have a much higher likelihood of later success.
The relevance of entering the labor market with a good job is found in all 
national contexts, with no statistically significant difference across countries. 
Therefore, even if we cannot conclude that the strength of the relationship is 
necessarily the same— due to the small sample sizes— our results suggest that the 
strategy of securing a good entry is valid everywhere.
In summary, we found a high persistence in statuses over the initial years 
of young people’s employment careers, which highlights the relevance of the 
characteristics of the entry job. We also found that accepting a job that matches 
the jobseeker’s level of education, even if poorly paid at the beginning but with 
increasing returns over time, qualifies “investment” choices as a possible real 
strategic move in the labor market that is associated with a higher likelihood of 
“success.” Finding a good job to start with makes a major difference, especially 
for third- level graduates.
Tertiary education
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Figure 9.8 Difference in predicted probabilities for every occupational status compared to being 
students (young people aged 19– 34 years; 3 years after concluding tertiary education).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC longitudinal data (2005– 2012).
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9.5. WHAT DIFFERENCE DO FAMILIES MAKE WITH REGARD 
TO HOW LONG ONE CAN WAIT?
The probability of being in one of the four outcome states of the proposed ty-
pology (success, investment, need, or failure; see Figure 9.2) varies according 
to the duration experienced in unemployment, the continuity of employment, 
and the conditions of entry into the labor market. To understand how this varies 
according to young people’s social class of origin, we used the cross- sectional 
EU- SILC 2011 data, which contain a special ad hoc module on intergenerational 
transmission of disadvantages. In this module, it is possible to obtain infor-
mation on the education level achieved by young people’s parents and also for 
those who have already left the family of origin.6 The subsample for our analysis 
comprises all young people aged 19– 34 years who had obtained a secondary or 
tertiary educational qualification less than 5 years previously, for a total of 11,824 
young people. We estimated the probability of being found in one of the four 
states illustrated in the typology described in Section 9.3 (see Figure 9.2). We 
tested for the social class of origin as defined on the basis of the higher educa-
tion level between young people’s mothers and fathers (criteria of dominance; 
Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Social class of origin, as based on education, is 
classified in three categories: high (tertiary), middle (upper secondary), and low 
(primary and lower secondary).
Multinomial logit models are controlled for sex, age, living independently 
or with parents, and country. For ease of interpretation, we again present the 
main results in the form of average predicted probabilities (marginal effects). 
Specifically, we illustrate the differences in probability for each category with re-
spect to living with one’s own parents and coming from a lower class (Figure 9.9, 
“IN Low class”).
Results from Figure 9.9 clearly show a statistically significant effect of so-
cial class of origin on young people’s occupational conditions within 5  years 
of obtaining an educational qualification. Among those who have left the pa-
rental household, we see that belonging to a high or middle social class increases 
the probability of being in a “success” status (Figure 9.9, first two lines of top 
left graph). All else being equal, success is more likely for the more advantaged 
strata of young people (a result in line with McKnight (2015) for the United 
Kingdom). We also show that among those who reside with their parents, youth 
from the high class have a lower probability of being in an “investment” con-
dition (i.e., skilled job but low paid) compared to their peers from the low and 
the middle class (Figure 9.9, top right graph). These results point to a better ca-
pacity of wealthier families to have their children proceed more frequently and 
rapidly into skilled and well- paid occupations (be it through counseling, guid-
ance, referrals, soft skills, or social networks), whereas lengthy co- residence with 
one’s parents and resorting to initially low- paid occupations might be the most 
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effective strategy for children from other backgrounds for finding employment 
that is consistent with their qualifications.
Longer co- residence could be an effective way for young people from the 
middle class to be able to obtain/ accept skilled jobs, albeit (at least initially) 
poorly paid, but with interesting prospects of future opportunities. We also show 
that the probability of being found in a “failure” condition is lower for young 
people from the higher class, regardless of their residential independence from 
their parents, whereas it is lower for children from the middle class only when 
they still live in the parental home (Figure 9.9, “Failure” graph). Finally, a sim-
ilar effect of social class of origin and co- residence with one’s parents is also 
found around the decision to continue education (Berloffa et al. 2015; Berloffa, 
Matteazzi, and Villa, this volume). It is young people from the high class, and 
those from the middle class living with their parents, who have a higher proba-
bility of remaining enrolled in the education system and making further educa-
tional investments (Figure 9.9, bottom graph). The role of the family of origin is 
relevant in all countries. In this last analysis, we tested again for the interaction 
effect with the country of residence of the young people, and it did not prove to 
be statistically significant. We believe that all these findings highlight the per-
sistence of a clear class divide for young people, regardless of the country con-
text. The pursuit of “higher profile” career paths, here skilled jobs, is made easier 
for youth from the higher social class, whereas for children from other social 
backgrounds, the routes to success are strewn with obstacles. Staying longer in 
the parental home seems the most viable option for securing better employment 
Success
OUT High class
OUT Middle class
OUT Low class
IN High class
IN Middle class
IN Low class
OUT High class
OUT Middle class
OUT Low class
IN High class
IN Middle class
IN Low class
–.3 –.2 –.1 0 .1 .2 .3
–.3 –.2 –.1 0 .1 .2 .3 –.3 –.2 –.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Investment Need
Failure Student
Figure 9.9 Differences in the predicted probability of being in each employment condition 
by social class of origin for young people (aged 19– 34 years and who obtained a high school 
diploma or a third- level degree within the previous 5 years).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU- SILC cross- sectional data (2011).
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prospects for children from the middle class, whereas prospects are not as prom-
ising for children from the lower class.
9.6. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have shown that although both an early start and contin-
uous employment are associated with more favorable outcomes (especially for 
the highly educated), these effects are relatively small and do not support the 
idea that any job is necessarily always better than joblessness, at least for a brief 
initial period. We have also shown, given a high degree of status stability over 
time, that the starting employment is highly predictive of subsequent outcomes. 
This explains why a well- matched start in terms of skills level, even if it entails a 
trade- off in accepting a lower salary or taking longer to find the right job, often 
seems to be a more successful strategy for securing better outcomes in the long 
term, especially for third- level graduates; similar results for Germany were found 
by Voßemer and Schuck (2016). Overall, careful career planning might include 
the risk of some initial turbulence, or a slightly longer period of unemployment, 
caused by giving up on unskilled job offers, but it can also enable the chance to 
find a better job fit.
Exploring the effects of initial occupations on later outcomes of qualified 
young people, we have also demonstrated that being poorly paid initially but 
in skilled occupations (an “investment” strategy) can represent an opportunity 
for young people that can result in a more successful positioning in the labor 
market. In contrast, unskilled occupations for qualified young people (“need” 
and “failure” strategies) can become an employment trap that is difficult to re-
verse in the long term; Reichelt (2015) presented similar findings for Germany. 
For qualified young people, it appears easier to pursue wage increases with tenure 
than it is to move from an unskilled to a skilled occupational position.
Finally, higher education still provides a significant stepping stone to a profes-
sional job and a successful position in the labor market. However, the capacity of 
young people to pursue tertiary education is still strongly stratified by family so-
cial class background and family/ household work intensity (Berloffa, Matteazzi, 
and Villa, this volume).
Our analyses find support for a strong influence of the family social back-
ground on the strategies pursued and the occupational conditions (in terms of 
pay and skill levels) achieved by young individuals within 5 years of completing 
their education. These findings suggest a strong familial influence on young 
peoples’ (un)successful employment outcomes. They point to mechanisms 
related to higher class families’ greater success in informing (through ad-
vice and guidance), supporting (possibly through social networks, building 
aspirations, and more effective guidance through the education and employ-
ment systems), and possibly providing backup (through economic support 
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and/ or longer co- residence) for young peoples’ employment strategies. We 
have shown that the more effective strategies— those more likely to lead to 
better outcomes— often entail initial losses such as higher risks (longer or 
more likely unemployment) or investments (lower pay). These findings are in 
line with analyses on the risk of education and skill mismatch (McGuinness, 
Bergin, and Whelan, this volume), search methods for first employment, and 
the impact of unemployment duration on a successful job search (Flek et al., 
this volume).
Concerning country differences, we found different baseline shares of young 
people in each occupational status across countries, reflecting differences in the 
national institutional and economic contexts. However, we found no statistically 
significant evidence of different mechanisms linking duration in unemployment, 
continuity of employment, entry jobs, or social class of the family of origin to the 
degree of success in employment 3– 5 years after acquiring an educational quali-
fication in the five selected cases from the youth transition regimes typology. Our 
understanding is that mechanisms linking class influences to young people’s em-
ployment outcomes, net of country- specific baseline levels, overtake specificities 
of youth transition regimes. We found young adults from the high social class to 
be in a more favorable position than those from the low class. We suppose that 
this advantage could be further exacerbated by the persistence of the recent ec-
onomic downturn, which has led young people to increasingly struggle to make 
their way into stable employment in all countries analyzed (see Grotti et al., this 
volume). However, we did not focus on the effects of the Great Recession; thus, 
how the crisis affects the degree of success in employment for young people re-
mains to be to be explored. Younger people and later entrants tend to be more 
affected than adults by recessions and stagnation and also to be more exposed to 
the differing capacities of their families to shield and support them. This is not 
only because the unemployment rate of young people rises more than that of 
adults during a recession but also because young people caught by the crisis are 
more vulnerable to its effects. They are likely to suffer the economic downturn 
for longer (being unemployed or in underemployment) and to have its effects 
spill over into their subsequent career steps (reduced contributions, weaker ca-
reer opportunities, and higher unemployment risks). Young people will have to 
endure the consequences of their current fragility for a lengthier period also be-
cause they are at a formative stage in their lives. We limit our analysis to the ini-
tial 3– 5 years for reasons of data availability, but further analyses should explore 
longer term consequences (Mooi- Reci and Wooden 2017). The quality of em-
ployment is also important (Van Lancker 2012). We considered wages and skills 
levels, but contractual security and long- term perspectives are also extremely 
important for young people’s transitions to adulthood (Blossfeld et  al. 2005). 
The growing incidence of temporary contracts is an issue of concern, particu-
larly in those countries more strongly affected by the crisis in Europe. Although 
temporary jobs may facilitate the entry of young people into work, they might 
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lead to a precarious career rather than to permanent employment (Scherer 2005; 
Brzinsky- Fay 2007; O’Higgins 2010; Gebel and Giesecke 2016).
Our results suggest that as inequalities widen, parents’ ability to invest in their 
children’s success not only remains salient but also becomes even more important 
in determining life chances and sustaining inequalities. Given the strong influ-
ence that households’ characteristics and families of origin exert in the strategies 
pursued by young people in accessing and establishing employment careers, 
further rises in unequal access to employment and income for households 
would jeopardize lower class young peoples’ life chances and opportunities. 
Alternatively, they would unevenly strain families who have to compensate for 
retrenched welfare and increasingly fragile markets, with the higher pressure 
placed on more fragile families. Because the outcomes of employment careers 
seem so strongly influenced by what happens in the early period of establish-
ment in the labor market, a comprehensive investment strategy in young people’s 
transitions to employment should become a priority.
NOTES
1 Our sample selection might include some university dropouts but cannot in-
clude high school dropouts, given that we define success as “matching” be-
tween (at least) secondary level of education and a skilled job; thus, we are 
studying entrance into skilled employment (i.e., requiring at least a secondary- 
level qualification).
2 Had it been possible, we would also have chosen 5 years for the first two sets of 
analyses, but EU- SILC data do not allow this. Narrowing the observation window 
for the analyses of family influences to only approximately 3 years— when a longer 
time span was available— would have unnecessarily reduced the sample size.
3 Country- and yearly based figures computed on annual wages of full- time 
employed.
4 Employment continuity in this case does not necessarily imply continuity in 
the same job; rather, we modeled it as an absence of periods of unemployment.
5 In other words, we cannot exclude that the effect of the duration in unemploy-
ment is stronger in one country than in another, but the direction of the rela-
tionship is definitely similar and relevant. This also applies when we examine 
the descriptive statistics.
6 Building an indicator of the social class of origin on the basis of available EU- 
SILC data is subject to two limitations. The first concerns the framing of the 
question: The ad hoc module asks about parents’ education level when the 
respondent was aged 14 years, whereas for those who live with their parents 
the measure is taken at the time of interview. The second, more serious limi-
tation is that information about the parents of those who live independently 
is only requested of people aged between 25 and 59 years. This means that we 
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are lacking information on those who had already left the parental home at 
the time of interview but are not yet 25 years old. In our sample, this group 
amounts to approximately 17%.
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THE WORKLESSNESS LEGACY
do WorkinG moThers make a diFFerenCe?
Gabriella Berloffa, Eleonora Matteazzi, and Paola Villa
10.1. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of intergenerational inequality and social mobility has attracted 
increasing attention in the past few decades. Several contributions have analyzed 
the influence of family background on educational and occupational attainments, 
highlighting either an intergenerational income inequality (Corak 2006; d’Addio 
2007; Bjorklund and Jäntti 2009; Blanden 2013) or an intergenerational correla-
tion of jobs and occupations between fathers and sons (Solon 1992; Black and 
Devereux 2011). A  number of studies have focused on the intergenerational 
transmission of worklessness (see Section 10.2 for details). However, almost all 
of these contributions focus on a single country and on the influence of the oc-
cupational condition of either the father or the mother on their children’s labor 
market outcomes. This chapter analyzes the intergenerational transmission of 
worklessness in a cross- country comparative perspective, investigating whether 
this transmission varies according to the gender of parents and the gender of 
their children and also across European country groups.
The contribution made by this chapter is threefold. First, this is the first com-
parative study at the European level on the influence of parents’ employment 
status during their children’s adolescence on the risk of worklessness among 
young people (aged 24– 35  years). In fact, national- specific socioeconomic 
structures and labor market institutions are likely to affect the various channels of 
the intergenerational transmission of worklessness: economic, genetic, cultural/ 
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familial, and social. As we argue in Section 10.2, the intergenerational correlation 
of worklessness should be higher in countries characterized by prolonged per-
manence of youth in the family of origin, low levels of borrowing among young 
people, social norms based on traditional gender roles within families, less devel-
oped and less efficient public employment and youth support services, low par-
ticipation in active labor market policies (ALMPs), and less liberal labor markets. 
Thus, this chapter enhances the understanding of how labor market institutions 
and welfare systems affect labor market outcomes in a comparative perspective 
(Scruggs and Allan 2006; Gallie 2007; Halleröd, Ekbrand, and Bengtsson 2015).
Second, we consider the employment condition of both parents. When con-
trolling for the employment status of a single parent, the estimated effect might 
also capture the spouse’s effect due to assortative mating in marriage. Controlling 
for the employment condition of both parents limits this type of problem. 
Furthermore, it allows us to study the extent to which a young person’s prob-
ability of being workless varies according to the family employment structure. 
For instance, we can compare the outcomes for children who grew up in a dual- 
earner family, in a male- breadwinner family, or with a lone working mother.
Third, we consider the effect of the mother- in- law’s employment condition. 
Indeed, there may be a positive correlation between the participation in em-
ployment of women and that of their mother- in- laws via their husbands’/ sons’ 
attitudes toward domestic work and female labor market participation (Del Boca, 
Locatelli, and Pasqua 2000; Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004; Kawaguchi and 
Miyazaki 2009; Farré and Vella 2013).
Our empirical findings show that having had a working mother during ad-
olescence considerably reduces the likelihood of being workless for both sons 
and daughters in all country groups except the Nordic countries. In contrast, 
the effects of fathers’ and mother- in- laws’ working condition are less widespread 
across countries.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 10.2 reviews the relevant litera-
ture, Section 10.3 presents the data and the estimation methodology, Section 10.4 
discusses the main empirical findings, and Section 10.5 concludes the chapter.
10.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND
A number of studies have dealt with the intergenerational correlation of work-
lessness.1 There is a robust consensus on the existence of a positive correlation 
between the worklessness of fathers and their sons (O’Neill and Sweetman 1998; 
Corak, Gustafsson, and Österberg 2004; Oreopoulos, Page, and Huff Stevens 
2008; Macmillan 2010, 2013; Mader et al. 2015), between fathers and all their 
children (Johnson and Reed 1996; Bratberg, Nilsen, and Vaage 2008; Ekhaugen 
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2009; Gregg, Macmillan, and Nasim 2012; Zwysen 2015), and between mothers 
and their daughters’ labor market participation (Del Boca et  al. 2000; Fortin 
2005; Fernández 2007; Farré and Vella 2013). However, almost all of these studies 
focus on the effect of the employment condition of only the father or only the 
mother on their children’s worklessness. Only Ekhaugen (2009) considers the 
unemployment status of both parents, but she does not distinguish between fa-
thers’ and mothers’ unemployment experiences.2
Several explanations for the existence of an intergenerational transmission 
of labor outcomes within households have been advanced in the literature. To 
begin with, parents’ economic resources affect their offspring’s labor market 
outcomes through higher investments in educational achievements (Becker and 
Tomes 1986). However, some authors have recently emphasized the direct im-
pact of the family of origin on offspring employment and earnings, even when 
controlling for education (Mocetti 2007; Raitano 2011; Franzini, Raitano, and 
Vona 2013). Thus, other types of effects need to be considered. First, household 
income and wealth may affect children’s employment status and their job search 
process by leading to different reservation wages or by making it easier to start 
an independent economic activity. Second, in addition to economic resources, 
there are other possible channels of influence that interact with each other: (1) 
genetic, (2)  cultural/ familial, and (3)  social. The genetic channel operates 
through the inheritance of cognitive traits and soft skills that may influence 
career advancements (Bowles and Gintis 2002). The cultural/ familial channel 
works through the parental effect on offspring’s preferences, values, and attitudes. 
Specifically, parental work experience can modify young adults’ aspirations and 
attitudes toward education and labor market participation— that is, their eval-
uation of paid work and their sense of stigma, their attitudes toward relying on 
welfare benefits and toward gender roles, and so on (Ekhaugen 2009; Macmillan 
2010; Schoon et al. 2012; Zwysen 2015). Last, the social channel works through 
family networks. It is well known that family members’ employment status can 
play a role through the social network on which young individuals are able to 
rely when they are searching for a job (Montgomery 1991; Granovetter 1995; 
Rees 1996; Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel 2000; Topa 2001). In particular, sev-
eral studies find that children of nonworking parents are more disadvantaged in 
the labor market compared with young people whose parents are working and 
maintain a network of social contacts (O’Neill and Sweetman 1998; Corak and 
Piraino 2010).3
These three distinct channels might work differently across European coun-
tries, depending on national- specific socioeconomic structures and institutional 
contexts. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies in the literature 
dealing with this issue. We now present some hypotheses about the influence of 
various institutions on the ways in which these channels might operate (they are 
summarized in Table A10.1 in the Appendix).4 Recall that we are interested in 
effects other than those on education.
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First, the effect of household economic resources on an individual’s reser-
vation wage might be low or even null in countries in which attitudes toward 
independence are strong and young people leave the family of origin quite 
early. The economic channel should also be less important in those countries 
in which it is easier or “more normal” for young people to have debts— for ex-
ample, housing debts or student loans. As a consequence, the intergenerational 
correlation of worklessness related to the economic channel should be lower in 
countries in which youth economic independence occurs earlier (e.g., Nordic, 
English- speaking, and Continental countries) and in which borrowing is more 
common among young people (e.g., Nordic and English- speaking countries, but 
also Eastern countries regarding student loans).5
Second, regarding the cultural channel, we expect that children’s imitation of 
their parents’ condition will be stronger in contexts in which values are shared 
by the majority of people. Thus, the intergenerational correlation of worklessness 
should be lower in countries in which social norms are in favor of female par-
ticipation in the labor market (e.g., Nordic, Continental, and Eastern countries) 
and should be higher in countries in which women are expected to be the main 
family caregivers (e.g., Mediterranean countries). However, it may also be that 
the transmission of attitudes toward paid work within families prevails over the 
social norms. Parental views about the importance of paid work may have 
persist ent effects on their children’s choices (Mooi- Reci and Bakker 2015).
Third, the extent of the effect related to the social channel (i.e., family 
networks) is likely to be affected by labor market institutions, such as the devel-
opment and efficiency of public employment services (PES), the extent of ALMP, 
and so forth. The intergenerational correlation of worklessness should be lower 
in countries in which recourse to PES for finding a job is more widespread (e.g., 
Continental and Eastern countries) and in which participation in ALMP is high 
(e.g., Nordic and Continental countries). It should also be lower in countries 
in which hiring is more competitive and labor markets are more liberal (e.g., 
English- speaking countries), whereas it should be higher in countries in which 
family and informal networks matter more for finding a job (e.g., Mediterranean 
countries).
Finally, the genetic channel should become more relevant in countries with 
more competitive labor markets and education systems and with higher youth 
unemployment rates.
Based on the preceding discussion, our hypothesis is that the extent of the in-
tergenerational correlation of worklessness is greater in countries characterized 
by prolonged permanence in the parental home, low levels of borrowing 
among young people, social norms based on traditional gender roles and a 
familialistic welfare system (in which women are expected to provide care to 
frail family members), less efficient and/ or developed PES and education and 
training institutions, less efficient youth support services, low participation in 
ALMP, and a less liberal labor market. In particular, we expect the extent of the 
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intergenerational correlation of worklessness to be lower in Nordic, English- 
speaking, and Continental countries and to be greater in Mediterranean and 
Eastern countries.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on the intergenerational cor-
relation of worklessness by distinguishing between the effect of mothers’ and fa-
thers’ worklessness on their sons’ and daughters’ employment status (considered 
separately). From previous studies, we expect that having had a working mother 
reduces female worklessness, whereas having had a working father reduces 
male worklessness. However, we have no prior hypotheses about the effect of 
fathers’ working conditions on their daughters’ employment or about the effect 
of mothers’ working conditions on their sons’ employment. Indeed, whereas the 
effect of the economic channel should be similar for both sons and daughters, the 
effects related to the cultural and social channels might be more differentiated 
across genders.
In addition to parental gender role attitudes, husbands’ attitudes can also 
influence female participation in paid employment. There is evidence in the 
literature of a link between the labor market participation of women and 
that of their mother- in- laws via their husbands/ sons (Fernández et al. 2004; 
Kawaguchi and Miyazaki 2009; Farré and Vella 2013). In other words, women 
married to men whose mothers worked are more likely to be employed them-
selves. Fernández et  al. (2004) identify two possible channels:  Growing up 
with a working mother may either shape men’s preferences for a working wife 
or provide men with a set of household skills and attitudes toward house-
work that make them better partners for working women. In this chapter, 
we examine whether the working condition of the mother- in- law plays a role 
in explaining female employment in all European countries or only in some 
of them.
10.3. DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
This study is based on European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU- SILC) data, which encompass extensive and comparable cross- 
sectional and longitudinal microdata at both the household and the individual 
level in 26 European countries. We use the 2011 wave because it provides sub-
stantial information on parental education and occupation through the ad hoc 
module on the intergenerational transmission of disadvantages. We select a 
sample of young people aged 25– 34 years.6 We then model their employment 
status (employed; not in employment, education, or training (NEET);7 or in ed-
ucation) as a function of individual characteristics at the time of the interview 
and of family educational and occupational background in the period when the 
individual was approximately 14 years old. In order to estimate the intergenera-
tional correlation of worklessness, we consider as workless young adults who are 
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NEET at the time of the interview and parents who were not in paid work when 
their children were adolescents.
The descriptive and econometric analyses are carried out separately for five 
groups of countries that are representative of the great heterogeneity of European 
labor market institutions and welfare systems:8 Nordic (DK, FI, NO, and SE), 
Continental (AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, and NL), English- speaking (IE and UK), 
Mediterranean (CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, and PT), and Eastern European (BG, CZ, 
EE, HU, HR, PL, RO, and SK). We grouped countries according to our expec-
tations about the effects of the various intergenerational transmission channels 
discussed in Section 10.2. These country groups also correspond to the clas-
sification adopted by Walther (2006), who defines different regimes of youth 
transitions. Eastern European countries are treated as a separate group because, 
according to Fenger (2007), half a century of communist rule has left institutional 
legacies that set Eastern European countries apart from other welfare systems.
We model the individual choice with respect to employment status as a mul-
tinomial logit model. Given that fathers’ and mothers’ employment conditions 
during their children’s adolescence may impact differently on the labor market 
outcomes of their sons and daughters, we run separate analyses for young males 
and females. The set of control variables includes the following:
 1. Individual characteristics: Age, educational attainment (at most lower 
secondary, at most upper secondary, and tertiary education), citizen-
ship (individuals from non- EU countries), and motherhood status 
(young females with at least one child)9
 2. Partner’s educational attainment (at most lower secondary, at most 
upper secondary, and tertiary education)
 3. Cohabitation with parents at the time of the interview
 4. Presence of parents when the young person was 14  years old (both 
parents present, only one parent present, or no parents present)
 5. Parents’ characteristics when the young person was 14  years 
old: Employment status (employed), occupation (in a high- status oc-
cupation such as manager, professional, technician, or associate pro-
fessional), and education level (tertiary education)
 6. Mother- in- law’s employment status (employed) when the husband/ wife 
was aged approximately 14 years10
 7. Country and quarter of the interview dummies
Table 10.1 shows some descriptive statistics regarding our sample of analysis. 
Cross- country differences in individual characteristics are in line with what is 
expected from official statistics. Nordic and Continental countries exhibit the 
highest shares of employed young people: More than 80% of males and more 
than 70% of females are in employment. They also show the lowest shares of 
NEETs. By contrast, Mediterranean and Eastern European countries record the 
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Table 10.1 Descriptive statistics of young people by country group and gender (individuals aged 25– 34 years in 2011)
Nordic countries English- speaking 
countries
Continental  
countries
Mediterranean 
counties
Eastern countries
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
Employment status
Employed 0.84 0.73 0.81 0.66 0.85 0.72 0.75 0.63 0.80 0.65
NEET 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.31 0.09 0.23 0.21 0.32 0.17 0.33
In education 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
Education
Low 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.33 0.25 0.14 0.25
Medium 0.51 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.52 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.62 0.37
High 0.37 0.56 0.52 0.52 0.38 0.43 0.27 0.38 0.24 0.38
Parenthood status
Parent 0.37 0.56 0.40 0.63 0.33 0.51 0.22 0.42 0.35 0.60
Cohabiting with parents (at the time of the interview)
Yes 0.05 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.56 0.40 0.59 0.42
Presence of parents (when the young person was approximately age 14 years)
Two parents 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.90 0.89 0.85 0.84
One parent 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.14
No parents 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
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Household occupational structure (when the young person was approximately age 14 years)
Two- parent households (%)
Both parents working 0.80 0.80 0.58 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.43 0.45 0.82 0.81
Only father working 0.12 0.13 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.53 0.51 0.14 0.14
Only mother working 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Neither parent 
working
0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
One- parent households (%)
Lone working mother 0.71 0.70 0.43 0.42 0.64 0.70 0.58 0.55 0.77 0.77
Lone nonworking 
mother
0.12 0.14 0.23 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.08 0.10
Notes: Nordic countries: DK, FI, NO, and SE; Continental countries: AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, and NL; English- speaking countries: IE and UK; Mediterranean countries: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, and PT; 
Eastern European countries: BG, CZ, EE, HU, HR, PL, RO, and SK.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EU- SILC 2011 cross- sectional data.
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highest shares of NEETs— approximately 20% of males and more than 30% of 
females— whereas the English- speaking countries are somewhere in between, 
with high shares of employed young men and high shares of young women as 
NEETs.11 The five groups of countries are quite different in terms of youth edu-
cational attainments: Nordic and English- speaking countries record the highest 
shares of highly educated young people, whereas Mediterranean and Eastern 
countries have remarkably high shares of young individuals with low education 
levels. Generally, females are more educated than males. Mediterranean coun-
tries stand out for the lowest share of young people with at least one child and for 
a very high proportion of young adults living with their parents.
Our main interest is in examining the way in which young people’s employ-
ment outcomes vary according to their parents’ working condition when the 
young people were aged approximately 14 years. First, we consider both one- and 
two- parent families because this is a policy- relevant distinction and also because 
the share of young people who grew up with only one parent is not negligible. 
Indeed, as shown in Table 10.1, in Nordic, English- speaking, and Continental 
countries, for almost one out of five individuals in our sample, only one parent 
was present when the individual was aged approximately 14 years. However, for 
this group we consider only lone mother households, distinguishing between 
working and nonworking mothers, because the share of lone father families is 
very low and generally the lone father is employed.
Second, for two- parent households, we distinguish between dual- earner (or 
work- rich) families (in which both parents were working), male- breadwinner 
families (in which only the father was working), female- breadwinner families 
(in which only the mother was working), and workless (or work- poor) families 
(in which neither parent was working).12 Table 10.1 confirms the findings of 
Anxo et al. (2007) and Van Dongen (2009), showing that the dual- earner model 
predominates in Nordic and Eastern countries, whereas the male- breadwinner 
model predominates in the Mediterranean countries.
Table 10.2 reports the key descriptive statistics for our subsequent empirical 
analysis: It shows the shares of young people (aged 25– 34 years in 2011) by em-
ployment status (employed, NEET, and in education), household employment 
structure during adolescence, and group of countries. As expected, the share of 
NEETs increases for both males and females, moving from work- rich to work- 
poor households (in both one- and two- parent households). Three other, not so 
well known stylized facts appear in Table 10.2. First, no systematic differences 
emerge in the shares of students (in this age group) across household employ-
ment structures. Second, within workless families, the youth employment condi-
tion is more problematic in two- parent than in one- parent families (with the sole 
exception of males in Nordic countries). Third, in all country groups, daughters 
of lone working mothers display better employment outcomes than those who 
grew up in a male- breadwinner family. For sons, this is not always the case: Sons 
of lone working mothers are better off in English- speaking countries, whereas 
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Table 10.2 Youth employment status by household employment structure, country group, and gender (individuals aged 25– 34 years in 2011)
Nordic countries English- speaking 
countries
Continental  
countries
Mediterranean 
countries
Eastern countries
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
Two- parent household with both parents working
Employed 0.85 0.77 0.88 0.72 0.88 0.77 0.76 0.68 0.83 0.68
NEET 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.25 0.09 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.14 0.29
In education 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02
Two- parent household with only father working
Employed 0.87 0.63 0.76 0.64 0.85 0.67 0.76 0.61 0.75 0.55
NEET 0.09 0.27 0.21 0.34 0.10 0.29 0.21 0.36 0.23 0.44
In education 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Two- parent household with only mother working
Employed 0.75 0.66 0.87 0.55 0.84 0.67 0.59 0.55 0.74 0.61
NEET 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.45 0.11 0.27 0.33 0.35 0.24 0.38
In education 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.01
Two- parent household with neither parent working
Employed 0.77 0.61 0.57 0.42 0.68 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.66 0.45
NEET 0.18 0.31 0.40 0.50 0.23 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.32 0.51
In education 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04
(continued)
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Nordic countries English- speaking 
countries
Continental  
countries
Mediterranean 
countries
Eastern countries
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
One- parent household with working mother
Employed 0.83 0.70 0.84 0.75 0.82 0.72 0.75 0.64 0.76 0.63
NEET 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.23 0.19 0.32 0.22 0.34
In education 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
One- parent household with nonworking mother
Employed 0.72 0.57 0.66 0.54 0.80 0.64 0.70 0.57 0.65 0.56
NEET 0.16 0.36 0.31 0.43 0.17 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.33 0.44
In education 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
Notes: For country groups, see notes to Table 10.1. Household employment structure refers to when young people were aged approximately 14 years.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EU- SILC 2011 cross- sectional data.
Table 10.2 Continued
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no relevant differences emerge in the other country groups. In Section 10.4, 
we verify whether these differences remain after controlling for individual and 
country characteristics.
10.4. RESULTS
This section presents the estimated marginal effects of the multinomial logit 
models and predicted outcome probabilities.
10.4.1. marginal effects
The estimated marginal effects of the multinomial logit models for the five 
country groups are shown in Tables S10.1– S10.5 (see Supplementary Material). 
Selected results regarding the effect of parents’ working status on youth em-
ployment outcomes are reported in Table A10.2 in the Appendix. Regarding 
individual characteristics, age increases females’ employment probability in all 
country groups and reduces their probability of being NEET, whereas it has only 
weak effects on male employment outcomes. Educational attainments have, as 
expected, very large and significant effects in all country groups for both men 
and women: The higher the education level, the higher is the employment prob-
ability and the lower is the probability of being NEET. It is worth noting that the 
marginal effects are greater for females than for males, suggesting that education 
plays a more important role for women in avoiding poor labor market outcomes 
and accessing employment.13 For young women, both living in a couple and 
having children generally reduce the probability of being employed and increase 
that of being NEET. However, although the effects of motherhood are significant 
in all country groups, those associated with living in a couple are significant only 
in Mediterranean and Eastern countries.14 For young men, living in a couple 
either has no effect on their employment outcomes or the effects go in the op-
posite direction than for women. English- speaking countries are the only excep-
tion: Here, young males living with a partner have a higher probability of being 
NEET. Young individuals who still live with their family of origin are less likely 
to be employed and more likely to be NEET in all country groups, although the 
magnitude of the effect is smaller for men than for women.15
The cultural and social capital of parents, captured by their education level 
and type of occupation when their children were aged approximately 14 years, 
does not appear to have systematic effects on the employment status of young 
adults.16 The working conditions of parents during their children’s adolescence, 
instead, seem to play a more decisive role, with noticeable differences between 
young women and young men across Europe. For young women, having had a 
working mother increases the probability of being employed and reduces that of 
being NEET in all country groups but the Nordic countries. In English- speaking, 
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Mediterranean, and Eastern countries, the father’s employment condition 
reinforces the effect of the mother’s working condition by further increasing 
the employment probability and reducing the probability of being NEET. For 
young men, having had a working father during adolescence matters only in 
Nordic, Mediterranean, and Eastern countries, where it increases the probability 
of being employed and decreases that of being NEET. These effects are reinforced 
in Mediterranean and Eastern countries if the individual also had a working 
mother. Interestingly, having had a working mother positively affects male labor 
market outcomes also in English- speaking and Continental countries, where the 
working status of the father has no significant effects.
In other words, having had a working mother during adolescence reduces the 
likelihood of being workless for both sons and daughters in all country groups 
except the Nordic countries. The effects of fathers’ working conditions, by con-
trast, are less widespread. Fathers’ employment is important for both sons and 
daughters in the Mediterranean and Eastern countries, only for daughters in the 
English- speaking countries, and only for sons in the Nordic countries.
Interestingly, we find evidence of a significant “mother- in- law effect” for 
women in Continental, Mediterranean, and Eastern countries. Being married to 
a partner whose mother was working during his adolescence is associated with 
a higher probability for women of being employed and a lower probability of 
being NEET, with larger effects in the Mediterranean countries. As expected, the 
effect associated with the working condition of the mother- in- law is generally 
not significant for men, with the exception of Eastern countries, where having a 
mother- in- law who was working during his spouse’s adolescence increases male 
employment probability and decreases the probability of being NEET.
10.4.2. Predicted outcome probabilities
Considering only marginal effects does not allow us to fully capture the 
differences between young people with respect to their parents’ working con-
dition during adolescence. Thus, in this section, we compare, ceteris paribus, 
the overall effect of having lived in a specific household type— for example, in 
a two- parent work- rich household, in a two- parent work- poor household, or 
with a nonworking lone mother. To do this, we first predict the probability of 
being NEET for “fictitious” individuals who have all the individual characteris-
tics equal to the sample mean of their country group, except for education level 
and the presence and work experience of parents.17 Second, we test whether the 
probability associated with a particular household type is larger or smaller than 
the others, and we compute the odds of being NEET for young adults who grew 
up in two different household types.18 Table 10.3 shows some selected odds ratios 
for young adults with a high school diploma and a university degree, who repre-
sent the majority of our sample.
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Table 10.3 NEET odds ratios of young people by household employment structure, gender, and country groups (individuals 
aged 25– 34 years in 2011)
2P- 0W
2P- 2W
P(N|2P- FW)
P(N|2P- 2W)
P(N|2P- 0W)
P(N|2P- FW)
P(N|1P- 0W)
P(N|1P- 1W)
P(N|1P- 0W)
P(N|2P- 0W)
P(N|1P- 1W)
P(N|2P- FW)
Young individuals with a high school diploma (medium- educated individuals)
Females
Nordic countries 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
English- speaking countries 1.52 1.21 1.26 1.00 1.00 1.00
Continental countries 1.60 1.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mediterranean countries 1.41 1.20 1.17 1.00 1.00 1.00
Eastern countries 1.59 1.38 1.16 1.00 0.83 0.82
Males
Nordic countries 1.92 1.00 1.81 1.00 1.00 1.00
English- speaking countries 1.68 1.55 1.00 1.96 1.00 1.00
Continental countries 1.51 1.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mediterranean countries 2.35 1.17 2.01 1.00 1.00 1.38
Eastern countries 2.06 1.42 1.45 1.39 1.00 1.00
Young individuals with a university degree (highly educated individuals)
Females
Nordic countries 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
English- speaking countries 1.77 1.28 1.39 1.00 1.00 1.00
Continental countries 1.67 1.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mediterranean countries 1.50 1.23 1.22 1.00 1.00 1.00
Eastern countries 1.70 1.44 1.19 1.00 0.80 0.80
(continued)
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2P- 0W
2P- 2W
P(N|2P- FW)
P(N|2P- 2W)
P(N|2P- 0W)
P(N|2P- FW)
P(N|1P- 0W)
P(N|1P- 1W)
P(N|1P- 0W)
P(N|2P- 0W)
P(N|1P- 1W)
P(N|2P- FW)
Males
Nordic countries 1.94 1.00 1.83 1.00 1.00 1.00
English- speaking countries 1.71 1.57 1.00 2.06 1.00 1.00
Continental countries 1.53 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mediterranean countries 2.43 1.18 2.07 1.00 1.00 1.40
Eastern countries 2.20 1.46 1.51 1.45 1.00 1.00
Notes: For country groups, see notes to Table 10.1. Household employment structure refers to when young people were aged approximately 14 years. Numbers in 
bold are significantly different from 1 at 5% significance level.
2P- 2W, two- parent households with both parents working; 2P- FW, two- parent households with only the father working; 2P- MW, two- parent households with only 
the mother working; 2P- 0W, two- parent households with neither parent working; 1P- MW, lone mother households with working mother; 1P- 0W, lone mother 
households with nonworking mother.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EU- SILC 2011 cross- sectional data.
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Inspection of Table 10.3 shows that, ceteris paribus, the probability of being 
NEET is substantially higher for young people who grew up in two- parent work- 
poor households as opposed to work- rich families. Females with a high school 
diploma and whose parents were workless during their adolescence have an 
approximately 40%– 60% higher probability of being NEET than those whose 
parents were working (except in the Nordic countries). For medium- educated 
males, the difference is much larger: It ranges from 50% to more than 100% (and 
is very large even in the Nordic countries). These percentages are even larger for 
highly educated young people.
The odds between work- poor and male- breadwinner families, and between 
the latter and dual- earner households, reveal the significant and widespread effect 
of the mother’s working condition and the less generalized (but relevant where 
it occurs) effect of fathers’ employment. Young people who grew up in male- 
breadwinner families have, independently of their gender, a 20%– 60% higher 
probability of being NEET than those who grew up in dual- earner households 
in all country groups except the Nordic countries. In other words, having had a 
working mother reduces the NEET probability by 15%– 38% for both males and 
females, whatever their education level.
Fathers’ employment has more differentiated effects both by gender and across 
countries. In English- speaking, Mediterranean, and Eastern countries, females 
who grew up in work- poor households have a 15%– 40% higher probability of 
being workless compared to those who grew up in male- breadwinner families. In 
other words, having had a working father reduces females’ NEET probability by 
13%– 29% in these countries, whereas it has no significant effects in Nordic and 
Continental countries. For males, fathers’ worklessness during their adolescence 
has very large effects in Nordic and Mediterranean countries, moderate effects 
in Eastern countries, and no effects in English- speaking and Continental coun-
tries. In the Nordic and Mediterranean countries, males’ probability of being 
NEET is 80%– 100% higher if they grew up in a work- poor household, compared 
to those who grew up in a male- breadwinner family, whatever the education 
level. In Eastern countries, medium- educated (highly educated) males coming 
from work- poor households have a 45% (51%) higher likelihood of being NEET 
compared to young men who grew up in male- breadwinner families.
Among children of lone mothers, in all country groups, no significant 
differences emerge in females’ risk of being NEET according to the lone mother’s 
working condition. Sons of workless lone mothers, by contrast, have a much 
higher risk of being workless than sons of working lone mothers in English- 
speaking and Eastern countries (approximately 100% and 40%, respectively).
Finally, we can compare the situation of children who grew up in one- and 
two- parent households. Two comparisons deserve attention: (1) between work- 
poor families with one and two parents and (2) between lone working mothers 
and male- breadwinner families. Ceteris paribus, children who grew up in work- 
poor families have the same probability of being NEET, independently of whether 
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both parents or only one parent was present. The only exception regards young 
women in Eastern countries, for whom the presence of only the mother actu-
ally reduces their probability of being workless. Interestingly, children who grew 
up with a lone working mother are not disadvantaged compared to those who 
grew up in a male- breadwinner two- parent household, except for young men 
in Mediterranean countries. In Eastern countries, daughters whose lone mother 
was working are even less likely to be workless compared to those who grew up 
in male- breadwinner families. These results suggest that the relative advantage 
of children of lone working mothers (compared to young people coming from 
male- breadwinner families) that emerged from the descriptive analysis is gener-
ally explained by different individual characteristics. Indeed, when controlling 
for individual attributes, no significant differences in the NEET risk are found 
between young people who grew up in these two household types, with very few 
exceptions.
In summary, some unexpected qualitative results emerge from our analysis. 
First, male worklessness is affected only by mothers’ employment in English- 
speaking and Continental countries and only by fathers’ employment in Nordic 
countries. Both parents play a role in Eastern and Mediterranean countries. 
They have similar effects in Eastern countries, whereas fathers’ employment is 
much more relevant in Mediterranean countries. Second, young females’ work-
lessness depends on the working condition of both parents in English- speaking, 
Mediterranean, and Eastern countries, whereas only mothers’ employment 
seems to matter in Continental countries. Third, the presence of only one parent 
does not lead to a systematic disadvantage. In particular, no differences emerge in 
children’s worklessness risk between one- and two- parent work- poor households 
or between lone working mothers and male- breadwinner families (with very few 
exceptions).
In order to compare the magnitude of these effects, we consider the per-
centage increase in the NEET risk associated with the worklessness status of 
parents (ceteris paribus). We use this percentage increase as our measure of 
the extent of the intergenerational transmission of worklessness in the var-
ious countries. In Section 10.2, we expected to find a larger intergenerational 
correlation of worklessness in Mediterranean and Eastern countries and a 
smaller correlation in Nordic, English- speaking, and Continental countries. 
Our empirical results are partly in line with these expectations, and partly 
they contradict them.
As expected, the intergenerational transmission of worklessness is small, ac-
tually null, in Nordic countries, but only for daughters. Surprisingly, the trans-
mission of worklessness from fathers to sons is particularly large in this country 
group (males’ NEET risk increases by 80% if the father was workless during 
their adolescence compared to the case in which he was working). As expected, 
the intergenerational transmission of worklessness is larger in Mediterranean 
countries, but only for sons, and only with respect to fathers’ employment. For 
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daughters, the effect of mothers’ worklessness (and of both parents) is actually 
lower in Mediterranean countries than in other country groups.
Considering the two types of relationship that received more attention in the 
literature (that between mothers and daughters and that between fathers and 
sons), our results show that, unexpectedly, the transmission of worklessness be-
tween mothers and daughters is similar in all country groups (except the Nordic 
countries), although it is slightly larger in Eastern and Continental countries. 
The transmission between fathers and sons, by contrast, is more differentiated: It 
is higher in Mediterranean and Nordic countries and null in English- speaking 
and Continental countries.
Given that in our analysis we control for variables that possibly capture the 
influence of intergenerational transmission channels (i.e., parental employment 
status, education level, and type of occupation), unexpected findings may be the 
result of the effect of unobserved cultural factors or attitudes (i.e., unobserv-
able family traits for which we cannot control) that are transmitted within the 
family and that induce individuals to adopt a labor market behavior that deviates 
from social norms. Or, their behavior may result from the role of informal so-
cial networks. In other words, social networks, which are supposed to play a role 
mainly in Mediterranean countries, matter in helping people find a job also in 
the other country groups.
Finally, our analysis reveals some important innovative evidence of the effects 
of these relationships, which has not to date been acknowledged in the liter-
ature on intergenerational transmission of inequalities and access to employ-
ment. Interestingly, the transmission of worklessness between mothers and sons 
is present in all country groups (except the Nordic countries); it is highest in 
English- speaking countries and lowest in Mediterranean countries. The trans-
mission of worklessness between fathers and daughters is less widespread: null 
in Continental and Nordic countries, highest in English- speaking countries, and 
somewhat lower in Mediterranean and Eastern countries.
10.5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has examined how the intergenerational transmission of workless-
ness varies across different groups of European countries— characterized by dis-
tinct labor market institutions and welfare systems— and according to the gender 
of parents and the gender of their children. To this end, we have used a sample 
of young males and females aged 25– 34 years from the EU- SILC cross- sectional 
data (2011), as well as information about the working conditions of their parents 
when the young people were aged approximately 14  years (from the ad hoc 
module on the intergenerational transmission of disadvantages).
Our empirical analysis has revealed that, ceteris paribus, having had a work-
less mother during adolescence increases the likelihood of being workless at 
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approximately 30 years of age for both sons and daughters in all country groups 
but the Nordic countries. The magnitude of the effect is quite similar across all 
country groups: The NEET risk for both males and females increases by approx-
imately 20%– 35% if the mother was workless, with somewhat larger effects in 
Eastern countries (by 40%) and between mothers and sons in English- speaking 
countries (by 55%).
Conversely, the effects of fathers’ working conditions are less widespread. 
Fathers’ employment is important for both sons and daughters in Mediterranean 
and Eastern countries, only for daughters in English- speaking countries, and 
only for sons in Nordic countries. The magnitude of the effect is also more 
differentiated: Males’ NEET risk increases by 80%– 100% if their father was work-
less in Mediterranean and Nordic countries and only by 48% if he was workless 
in Eastern countries. The transmission between fathers and daughters is much 
smaller: Approximately 15%– 20% in Mediterranean and Eastern countries and 
30% in English- speaking countries.
Unexpectedly, the percentage increase in the NEET risk associated with fathers’ 
worklessness (ceteris paribus) is very large in Nordic countries and quite similar to 
that in Mediterranean countries. Again unexpectedly, the effect of mothers’ work-
lessness is quite similar in all country groups (except in Nordic countries) and actu-
ally lower in Mediterranean countries. These results suggest that the consequences 
of different labor market institutions, family models, and welfare systems for the 
intergenerational transmission of worklessness are not very clear- cut. In particular, 
more research is needed to understand the link between fathers’ and sons’ employ-
ment experiences in Nordic and Mediterranean countries.
Another interesting result of our analysis is that the presence of only one 
parent does not lead to a systematic disadvantage. In particular, no differences 
emerge in the probability of being workless for young people growing up in one- 
and two- parent work- poor households or between those who grew up with lone 
working mothers or in male- breadwinner families (with very few exceptions). 
These results suggest that a key challenge for policymakers is that policies should 
not be limited to enhancing the employment probability of disadvantaged 
youth; rather, they should consider in parallel the difficulties faced by parents of 
teenagers. In fact, the adolescents who grew up in the years of the Great Recession 
with workless parents, particularly workless mothers, might suffer in the future 
when they start their working life. Perhaps the strongest policy implication that 
can be drawn from our analysis is that policymakers should pay attention to 
mothers’ employment not only when their children are in their early years of 
life but also during the children’s adolescence. Helping mothers to remain in or 
re- enter the labor market might have important consequences for their children’s 
future employment prospects. Last, our results also suggest a need for policy 
initiatives aimed at fostering equality of opportunities by reducing the effects of 
parental background characteristics on individuals’ own life chances.
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NOTES
1 For the purpose of this research, people are defined as “workless” if they are 
unemployed or inactive. We do not distinguish between these latter two states 
because of the difficulties involved in differentiating between them. In par-
ticular, discouraged worker effects or entitlement rules for welfare benefits 
may bias the responses of individuals. Moreover, discouraged workers (i.e., 
available to work but not searching for a job), usually classified as inactive, are 
more similar in terms of behavior to the unemployed than to other inactive 
individuals (Centeno and Fernandes 2004).
2 Some of these studies are interested in determining whether there is a 
causal link between fathers’ and children’s worklessness. Empirical findings 
for Norway (Ekhaugen 2009), Sweden (Corak, Gustafsson, and Österberg 
2004), the United Kingdom (Johnson and Reed 1996; O’Neill and 
Sweetman 1998; Macmillan 2010), and Germany (Mader et  al. 2015)  in-
dicate a positive intergenerational correlation of unemployment but not 
a clear causal effect. Differently, Corak, Gustafsson, and Österberg (2004) 
and Oreopoulos et al. (2008) find evidence of a causal intergenerational ef-
fect in Canada.
3 Reliance on friends and relatives when searching for a job has increased over 
time. The effectiveness of networks depends on the characteristics of the 
jobseeker, his or her social ties, and the labor market institutions. For instance, 
unemployed women are less likely than unemployed men to rely on informal 
networks, and more educated jobseekers are more likely to count on friends 
and relatives when searching for a job (Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004).
4 These hypotheses have been formulated on the basis of the review of the lit-
erature on the various channels through which parents’ employment status 
during young people’s adolescence might affect their children’s employment 
outcomes when adults. See Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa (2017) for a review 
of the literature highlighting the channels through which the intergenera-
tional transmission of worklessness might operate.
5 According to Eurostat statistics, the mean age of leaving the parental home is 
21 years in Nordic countries, 24.5 years in English- speaking and Continental 
countries, and approximately 29 years in Mediterranean and Eastern countries. 
According to statistics from the Organization for Economic Co- operation 
and Development (OECD), the household debt is approximately 203% of net 
disposable income in Nordic countries, 180% in English- speaking countries, 
135% in Continental countries, 118% in Mediterranean countries, and 65% in 
Eastern countries. Approximately 89% of British students enrolled in tertiary 
education have a student loan, compared to 70% in Norway; 43% in Sweden; 
30% in Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands; and slightly less than 20% in 
Hungary and Estonia.
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6 We cannot include individuals younger than age 25  years because all the 
variables concerning family characteristics in the period when the individual 
was approximately 14 years old can be collected only for individuals aged be-
tween 25 and 60 years at the time of the interview.
7 Individual employment status is defined on the basis of the self- reported ec-
onomic status at the time of the interview.
8 We cannot perform single- country analyses because of limited sample size 
at the country level. However, in order to account for cross- country heter-
ogeneity within country groups, we control for country- fixed effects in our 
econometric models.
9 We do not control for fatherhood status because of the very low percentage 
of young fathers in education or NEET.
10 This information is not available for Nordic countries because only the re-
spondent reports parental background information.
11 The share of NEETs is higher in Finland than in the other Nordic countries, 
and it is similar to what is observed in English- speaking countries. Within 
the Continental group, the Netherlands stands out for the lowest share of 
NEETs, which is close to that of the Nordic countries.
12 In the literature, two main methods are adopted to classify households 
according to the employment status of household members. The first 
distinguishes between workless and non- workless households (as in our ap-
proach); the second classifies households according to a work- intensity in-
dicator (Cantillon and Vandenbroucke 2014). We cannot use this indicator 
because retrospective information on hours and months worked is not avail-
able in our data set.
13 For young women, we find an additional positive effect on the probability 
of still being in education in Mediterranean and Eastern countries, probably 
linked to the longer duration of tertiary education in these countries. This 
effect is observed also for young men in all country groups, except for the 
English- speaking countries.
14 In Continental, Mediterranean, and Eastern countries, motherhood also 
reduces the probability of being in education.
15 Generally, young people still living with their parents are also more likely to 
be in education.
16 When the results are significant, they generally increase the probability that 
the young person will still be in education (see also Filandri, Nazio, and 
O’Reilly, this volume).
17 For these variables, we set the relevant dummies equal to either 1 or 0 ac-
cording to the type of family that we want to consider. To compute the 
probabilities, we use the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit 
models, independently of their significance level.
18 We perform a series of one- sided tests because the direction of the differ-
ence between two probabilities is relevant for the analysis. For those pairs 
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of household types whose probabilities were not statistically different, we 
report an odds ratio equal to 1.
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Table A10.1 Hypotheses about the intergenerational correlation (IC) of worklessness in different country groups by various channels of influence and 
related institutions
Economic channel Cultural channel Social channel
Genetic 
channel
Expected IC of 
worklessness
Leaving the 
parental home 
(average age 
on leaving the 
parental home)a
Levels of 
borrowing 
(housing debts 
and student 
loans)b
Social norms— 
female activity ratec
PES (% of 
jobseekers 
using PES)d
Activation support 
(ALMP participants per 
100 persons wanting 
to work)e
Nordic 
countries
Low IC (early 
economic 
independence)
Low IC (high levels of 
borrowing)
Low IC (high female 
activity rate)
High IC (low %)
Exception: SE 
(quite high %)
Low IC (high %) Low IC Low IC
English- 
speaking 
countries
Medium IC (quite 
early economic 
independence)
Low IC (high levels of 
borrowing)
Medium- low IC (quite 
high female activity 
rate)
Exception: IE 
(moderate activity 
rate)
High IC (low %) n.a. High IC Medium IC
Continental 
countries
Medium IC (quite 
early economic 
independence)
Medium IC (medium 
levels of borrowing)
Exception:
low IC in NL (high levels 
of borrowing)
Medium- low IC (quite 
high female activity 
rate)
Exceptions: BE and LU 
(quite low activity 
rate)
Medium IC 
(quite high %)
Exception: NL 
(low %)
Low IC (high %) Medium 
IC
Medium- Low IC
Mediterranean 
countries
High IC (late 
economic 
independence)
Medium IC (medium 
levels of borrowing)
High IC (low female 
activity rate)
Exception: PT (quite 
high activity rate)
High IC (low %)
Exceptions: EL 
and MT 
(moderate %)
Medium IC (moderate %)
Exception: ES (high %)
High IC High IC
APPENDIX
(continued)
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Economic channel Cultural channel Social channel
Genetic 
channel
Expected IC of 
worklessness
Leaving the 
parental home 
(average age 
on leaving the 
parental home)a
Levels of 
borrowing 
(housing debts 
and student 
loans)b
Social norms— 
female activity ratec
PES (% of 
jobseekers 
using PES)d
Activation support 
(ALMP participants per 
100 persons wanting 
to work)e
Eastern 
European 
countries
High IC (late 
economic 
independence)
High IC (low levels of 
borrowing)
Exceptions: HU and EE 
(quite high use of 
student loans)
Medium- high IC 
(medium female 
activity rate)
Exceptions: HU and 
RO (low activity 
rate)
Low IC (high %)
Exceptions: RO, 
EE, and BG 
(moderate to 
low %)
High IC (low %) High IC Medium- High IC
Notes: Country groups: Nordic (DK, FI, NO, and SE); Continental (AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, and NL); English- speaking (IE and UK); Mediterranean (CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, and PT); and Eastern European (BG, 
CZ, EE, HU, HR, PL, RO, and SK). See Section 10.3 for more details.
aEurostat’s estimated average age of young people leaving the parental household by sex (2011).
bOECD’s data on household debt as a percentage of net disposable income (2014) and on public loans to students in tertiary type A education (2011).
cEurostat’s activity rate for women aged 15– 64 years (2011).
dPublic employment services (European Commission, Directorate- General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion).
eEurostat’s database on labor market policies.
ALMPs, active labor market policies; n.a. = not available; PES, public employment services.
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Table A10.2 Predicted outcome probabilities (Pr) and marginal effects (M) for selected variables from the estimation of multinomial logit models
Country 
group Estimate (E)
Females Males
Employed NEET In education Employed NEET In education
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
Nordic Pr 0.798 *** 0.013 0.139 *** 0.011 0.063 *** 0.008 0.907 *** 0.009 0.066*** 0.007 0.028*** 0.005
M: Working father 0.023 0.042 0.006 0.035 –0.029 0.025 0.059** 0.023 –0.040** 0.020 –0.019* 0.011
M: Working mother 0.027 0.033 - 0.036 0.026 0.009 0.020 –0.003 0.022 –0.004 0.018 0.006 0.012
M: Working lone 
mother
0.022 0.070 – 0.031 0.051 0.009 0.046 0.049 0.041 – 0.009 0.035 – 0.040** 0.020
M: Working 
mother- in- law
— — — — — — 
English- 
speaking
Pr 0.710 *** 0.015 0.160 *** 0.015 0.022 *** 0.004 0.886*** 0.012 0.110 *** 0.012 0.005*** 0.002
M: Working father 0.090* 0.052 – 0.086* 0.052 – 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.032 – 0.009 0.032 0.000 0.004
M: Working mother 0.061 * 0.035 – 0.059* 0.035 – 0.002 0.006 0.047 * 0.027 – 0.048* 0.027 0.001 0.003
M: Working lone 
mother
0.024 0.073 – 0.014 0.072 – 0.010 0.011 0.041 0.053 – 0.036 0.052 – 0.005 0.006
M: Working 
mother- in- law
0.039 0.036 – 0.033 0.036 – 0.006 0.007 0.045 0.030 – 0.036 0.030 – 0.008* 0.005
(continued)
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Country 
group Estimate (E)
Females Males
Employed NEET In education Employed NEET In education
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
Continental Pr 0.759 *** 0.006 0.187 *** 0.006 0.018 *** 0.002 0.921 *** 0.005 0.063*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.002
M: Working father 0.031 0.029 – 0.037 0.028 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.016 – 0.008 0.015 – 0.003 0.006
M: Working mother 0.059*** 0.013 – 0.055*** 0.013 – 0.004 0.003 0.024 *** 0.008 – 0.018** 0.008 – 0.005* 0.003
M: Working lone 
mother
– 0.033 0.033 0.026 0.032 0.007 0.009 – 0.028 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.013 * 0.007
M: Working 
mother- in- law
0.032 ** 0.013 – 0.034 *** 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.011 – 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.004
Mediterranean Pr 0.682*** 0.006 0.306 *** 0.006 0.012 *** 0.002 0.808*** 0.006 0.184 *** 0.006 0.009*** 0.002
M: Working father 0.069** 0.030 – 0.060** 0.030 – 0.010 *** 0.004 0.144 *** 0.025 – 0.140 *** 0.024 – 0.004 0.003
M: Working mother 0.056*** 0.014 – 0.056*** 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.031 *** 0.012 – 0.028** 0.012 – 0.003* 0.002
M: Working lone 
mother
0.008 0.045 – 0.010 0.045 0.002 0.006 0.023 0.041 – 0.022 0.041 – 0.001 0.004
M: Working 
mother- in- law
0.099*** 0.018 – 0.089*** 0.017 – 0.011 * 0.006 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.008
Eastern Pr 0.691 *** 0.005 0.307 *** 0.005 0.002 *** 0.000 0.859*** 0.004 0.139 *** 0.004 0.002*** 0.000
M: Working father 0.053 * 0.027 – 0.055** 0.027 0.002 0.002 0.057 *** 0.017 – 0.057*** 0.017 – 0.001 0.001
M: Working mother 0.104 *** 0.015 – 0.104 *** 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.050*** 0.010 – 0.049*** 0.010 0.000 0.000
M: Working lone 
mother
– 0.056 0.038 0.053 0.038 0.003 * 0.001 0.002 0.024 – 0.003 0.024 0.001 0.001
M: Working 
mother- in- law
0.033 ** 0.015 – 0.033 ** 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.036 *** 0.012 – 0.035*** 0.012 – 0.001 0.001
Notes: Dummies for country, quarter of interview, and missing information about parents’ working status and education level are introduced. – , not controlled for. Marginal effects are computed at the 
sample mean of the variables.
Source: EU- SILC 2011 data for young people aged 25– 34 years; see text for details.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Table A10.2 Continued
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Country 
group Estimate (E)
Females Males
Employed NEET In education Employed NEET In education
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
E St. 
Err.
Continental Pr 0.759 *** 0.006 0.187 *** 0.006 0.018 *** 0.002 0.921 *** 0.005 0.063*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.002
M: Working father 0.031 0.029 – 0.037 0.028 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.016 – 0.008 0.015 – 0.003 0.006
M: Working mother 0.059*** 0.013 – 0.055*** 0.013 – 0.004 0.003 0.024 *** 0.008 – 0.018** 0.008 – 0.005* 0.003
M: Working lone 
mother
– 0.033 0.033 0.026 0.032 0.007 0.009 – 0.028 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.013 * 0.007
M: Working 
mother- in- law
0.032 ** 0.013 – 0.034 *** 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.011 – 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.004
Mediterranean Pr 0.682*** 0.006 0.306 *** 0.006 0.012 *** 0.002 0.808*** 0.006 0.184 *** 0.006 0.009*** 0.002
M: Working father 0.069** 0.030 – 0.060** 0.030 – 0.010 *** 0.004 0.144 *** 0.025 – 0.140 *** 0.024 – 0.004 0.003
M: Working mother 0.056*** 0.014 – 0.056*** 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.031 *** 0.012 – 0.028** 0.012 – 0.003* 0.002
M: Working lone 
mother
0.008 0.045 – 0.010 0.045 0.002 0.006 0.023 0.041 – 0.022 0.041 – 0.001 0.004
M: Working 
mother- in- law
0.099*** 0.018 – 0.089*** 0.017 – 0.011 * 0.006 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.008
Eastern Pr 0.691 *** 0.005 0.307 *** 0.005 0.002 *** 0.000 0.859*** 0.004 0.139 *** 0.004 0.002*** 0.000
M: Working father 0.053 * 0.027 – 0.055** 0.027 0.002 0.002 0.057 *** 0.017 – 0.057*** 0.017 – 0.001 0.001
M: Working mother 0.104 *** 0.015 – 0.104 *** 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.050*** 0.010 – 0.049*** 0.010 0.000 0.000
M: Working lone 
mother
– 0.056 0.038 0.053 0.038 0.003 * 0.001 0.002 0.024 – 0.003 0.024 0.001 0.001
M: Working 
mother- in- law
0.033 ** 0.015 – 0.033 ** 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.036 *** 0.012 – 0.035*** 0.012 – 0.001 0.001
Notes: Dummies for country, quarter of interview, and missing information about parents’ working status and education level are introduced. – , not controlled for. Marginal effects are computed at the 
sample mean of the variables.
Source: EU- SILC 2011 data for young people aged 25– 34 years; see text for details.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Table S10.1 Predicted outcome probability (Pr) and marginal effects (Mfx) in Nordic countries by gender
Females Males
Employed NEET In education Employed NEET In education
Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err.
Predicted outcome 
probability
0.798*** 0.013 0.139 *** 0.011 0.063 *** 0.008 0.907*** 0.009 0.066 *** 0.007 0.028*** 0.005
Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err.
Individual characteristics at the time of the interview
Age 0.027*** 0.004 – 0.011 *** 0.003 – 0.016*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.003 0.000 0.002 – 0.010 *** 0.001
Own 
education: medium
0.158 *** 0.041 – 0.147 *** 0.035 – 0.012 0.023 0.060*** 0.021 – 0.088 *** 0.015 0.028** 0.014
Own education: high 0.217 *** 0.043 – 0.180 *** 0.036 – 0.037 0.024 0.072*** 0.022 – 0.106 *** 0.016 0.034 ** 0.015
Partner’s 
education: medium
0.059 0.041 – 0.055 * 0.033 – 0.005 0.026 0.021 0.036 – 0.050 ** 0.023 0.029 0.028
Partner’s 
education: high
0.036 0.042 – 0.034 0.034 – 0.002 0.027 0.021 0.037 – 0.048 ** 0.024 0.028 0.029
Citizenship – 0.298*** 0.067 0.189 *** 0.054 0.109 *** 0.030 – 0.052 0.051 0.081 ** 0.040 – 0.029 0.028
Living with parents – 0.167 *** 0.057 0.162 *** 0.047 0.005 0.032 – 0.017 0.024 0.039 ** 0.020 – 0.022 0.014
Living in couple – 0.024 0.044 0.056 0.037 – 0.033 0.026 0.075** 0.035 – 0.026 0.021 – 0.049* 0.028
Motherhood – 0.129 *** 0.024 0.140 *** 0.021 – 0.010 0.013 — — — 
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Presence of parents when the young person was aged 14 years
Lone parent family – 0.005 0.069 0.039 0.049 - 0.034 0.046 – 0.035 0.037 – 0.003 0.030 0.039* 0.021
Parentless 0.050 0.066 – 0.023 0.050 – 0.027 0.043 0.028 0.037 – 0.004 0.031 – 0.023 0.019
Family background information
Working father 0.023 0.042 0.006 0.035 – 0.029 0.025 0.059** 0.023 – 0.040 ** 0.020 – 0.019 * 0.011
Working mother 0.027 0.033 – 0.036 0.026 0.009 0.020 – 0.003 0.022 – 0.004 0.018 0.006 0.012
Working lone mother 0.022 0.070 – 0.031 0.051 0.009 0.046 0.049 0.041 – 0.009 0.035 – 0.040** 0.020
Working 
mother- in- law
— — — — — — 
Father’s occupation – 0.036 0.032 0.038 0.028 – 0.002 0.017 0.006 0.021 – 0.022 0.019 0.016 * 0.008
Mother’s occupation 0.058* 0.031 – 0.053 * 0.027 – 0.005 0.015 – 0.019 0.021 0.012 0.019 0.008 0.009
Father’s education – 0.016 0.029 0.001 0.026 0.015 0.016 – 0.005 0.019 0.006 0.018 – 0.001 0.008
Mother’s education – 0.071 *** 0.027 0.038 0.024 0.033 ** 0.014 – 0.003 0.019 – 0.010 0.017 0.013 0.008
Observations 1,119 281 140 1,282 146 102
Notes: Dummies for country, quarter of interview, and missing information about parents’ working status and education level are introduced. – , not controlled for. Marginal effects are computed at 
the sample mean of the variables.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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Table S10.2 Predicted outcome probability (Pr) and marginal effects (Mfx) in English- speaking countries by gender
Females Males
Employed NEET In education Employed NEET In education
Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err.
Predicted outcome 
probability
0.710 *** 0.015 0.160 *** 0.015 0.022 *** 0.004 0.886 *** 0.012 0.110 *** 0.012 0.005 *** 0.002
Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. 
Err.
Individual characteristics at the time of the interview
Age 0.016 *** 0.006 – 0.013 ** 0.006 – 0.003 ** 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004 – 0.001 * 0.001
Own education: 
medium
0.187 *** 0.055 – 0.189 *** 0.053 0.002 0.008 0.120 *** 0.035 – 0.123 *** 0.034 0.003 0.006
Own education: 
high
0.386 ** 0.058 – 0.384 *** 0.056 – 0.001 0.009 0.156 *** 0.034 – 0.157 *** 0.033 0.001 0.005
Partner’s 
education: 
medium
0.104 ** 0.052 – 0.080 0.051 – 0.024 *** 0.009 0.110 * 0.065 – 0.160 *** 0.058 0.051 * 0.030
Partner’s 
education: high
0.065 0.054 – 0.050 0.053 – 0.015 0.010 0.188 *** 0.067 – 0.241 *** 0.060 0.053 * 0.029
Citizenship – 0.206 *** 0.065 0.186 *** 0.064 0.020 ** 0.009 – 0.110 ** 0.055 0.097 * 0.054 0.014 ** 0.007
Living with parents – 0.049 0.064 0.056 0.063 – 0.007 0.007 – 0.049 * 0.029 0.048 * 0.029 0.001 0.002
Living in couple – 0.035 0.053 0.039 0.052 – 0.004 0.008 – 0.083 0.065 0.144 ** 0.057 – 0.061 * 0.032
Motherhood – 0.320 *** 0.037 0.314 *** 0.037 0.006 0.005 — — — 
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Presence of parents when the young person was aged 14 years
Lone parent family 0.003 0.054 – 0.006 0.053 0.003 0.008 – 0.086 ** 0.040 0.083 ** 0.039 0.002 0.005
Parentless 0.565 0.404 – 0.411 0.389 – 0.155 *** 0.052 – 0.240 ** 0.101 0.299 *** 0.095 – 0.058 * 0.032
Family background information
Working father 0.090 * 0.052 – 0.086 * 0.052 – 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.032 – 0.009 0.032 0.000 0.004
Working mother 0.061 * 0.035 – 0.059 * 0.035 – 0.002 0.006 0.047 * 0.027 – 0.048 * 0.027 0.001 0.003
Working lone 
mother
0.024 0.073 – 0.014 0.072 – 0.010 0.011 0.041 0.053 – 0.036 0.052 – 0.005 0.006
Working 
mother- in- law
0.039 0.036 – 0.033 0.036 – 0.006 0.007 0.045 0.030 – 0.036 0.030 – 0.008 * 0.005
Father’s occupation – 0.017 0.035 0.013 0.034 0.004 0.006 0.075 *** 0.029 – 0.076 *** 0.028 0.001 0.002
Mother’s 
occupation
0.008 0.045 – 0.015 0.045 0.007 0.007 – 0.001 0.033 – 0.002 0.032 0.002 0.003
Father’s education – 0.025 0.045 0.022 0.045 0.003 0.008 – 0.035 0.033 0.037 0.032 – 0.003 0.003
Mother’s education – 0.017 0.049 0.028 0.049 – 0.011 0.009 – 0.069 ** 0.030 0.064 ** 0.029 0.005 0.003
Observations 849 406 37 740 149 30
Notes: Dummies for country, quarter of interview, and missing information about parents’ working status and education level are introduced. – , not controlled for. Marginal effects are computed at the 
sample mean of the variables.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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Table S10.3 Predicted outcome probability (Pr) and marginal effects (Mfx) in Continental countries by gender
Females Males
Employed NEET In education Employed NEET In education
Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err.
Predicted outcome 
probability
0.759 *** 0.006 0.187 *** 0.006 0.018 *** 0.002 0.921 *** 0.005 0.063*** 0.004 0.016 *** 0.002
Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err.
Individual characteristics at the time of the interview
Age 0.011 *** 0.002 – 0.006*** 0.002 – 0.005*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 – 0.005*** 0.001
Own education: 
medium
0.119 *** 0.020 – 0.136 *** 0.019 0.017 ** 0.008 0.035*** 0.011 – 0.060*** 0.009 0.026*** 0.007
Own education: 
high
0.192 *** 0.022 – 0.203*** 0.021 0.011 0.008 0.061 *** 0.013 – 0.081 *** 0.010 0.020*** 0.008
Partner’s 
education: 
medium
0.063 *** 0.022 – 0.057*** 0.020 – 0.007 0.008 0.037** 0.017 – 0.048*** 0.013 0.011 0.012
Partner’s 
education: high
0.020 0.023 – 0.027 0.022 0.007 0.008 0.043** 0.018 – 0.060*** 0.015 0.017 0.011
Citizenship – 0.189 *** 0.026 0.170 *** 0.025 0.020*** 0.006 – 0.076*** 0.014 0.048*** 0.013 0.028*** 0.006
Living with parents – 0.063 *** 0.024 0.054** 0.024 0.010 *** 0.004 – 0.031 *** 0.009 0.025*** 0.008 0.007*** 0.003
Living in couple – 0.036 0.025 0.052** 0.024 – 0.016 * 0.008 0.055*** 0.016 – 0.023* 0.013 – 0.032*** 0.011
Motherhood – 0.254 *** 0.014 0.263*** 0.013 – 0.009** 0.004 — — — 
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Presence of parents when the young person was aged 14 years
Lone parent family 0.023 0.029 – 0.022 0.028 – 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.016 0.005 0.014 – 0.011 * 0.007
Parentless – 0.096 * 0.050 0.084* 0.048 0.012 0.013 – 0.024 0.031 0.006 0.028 0.018 * 0.010
Family background information
Working father 0.031 0.029 – 0.037 0.028 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.016 – 0.008 0.015 – 0.003 0.006
Working mother 0.059 *** 0.013 – 0.055*** 0.013 – 0.004 0.003 0.024*** 0.008 – 0.018 ** 0.008 – 0.005* 0.003
Working lone 
mother
– 0.033 0.033 0.026 0.032 0.007 0.009 – 0.028 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.013 * 0.007
Working 
mother- in- law
0.032 ** 0.013 – 0.034*** 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.011 – 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.004
Father’s 
occupation
0.003 0.014 – 0.007 0.014 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.009 – 0.007 0.008 0.006** 0.003
Mother’s 
occupation
– 0.002 0.018 – 0.001 0.018 0.003 0.003 – 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.003
Father’s education – 0.021 0.017 0.012 0.017 0.009*** 0.004 – 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.008** 0.003
Mother’s 
education
0.017 0.020 – 0.022 0.020 0.005 0.003 – 0.004 0.011 – 0.004 0.010 0.008*** 0.003
Observations 4,111 1,327 248 4,333 480 257
Notes: Dummies for country, quarter of interview, and missing information about parents’ working status and education level are introduced. – , not controlled for. Marginal effects are computed 
at the sample mean of the variables.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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Table S10.4 Predicted outcome probability (Pr) and marginal effects (Mfx) in Mediterranean countries by gender
Females Males
Employed NEET In education Employed NEET In education
Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err.
Predicted outcome 
probability
0.682 *** 0.006 0.306*** 0.006 0.012 *** 0.002 0.808 *** 0.006 0.184 *** 0.006 0.009*** 0.002
Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err.
Individual characteristics at the time of the interview
Age 0.014 *** 0.002 – 0.011 *** 0.002 – 0.003*** 0.001 0.010 *** 0.002 – 0.007*** 0.002 – 0.003*** 0.001
Own education: 
medium
0.088 *** 0.016 – 0.106 *** 0.016 0.018 *** 0.004 0.076 *** 0.012 – 0.089*** 0.012 0.014 *** 0.003
Own education: 
high
0.181 *** 0.018 – 0.190 *** 0.017 0.009*** 0.003 0.104 *** 0.015 – 0.116 *** 0.014 0.012 *** 0.003
Partner’s 
education: 
medium
0.049 *** 0.019 – 0.053*** 0.018 0.004 0.006 0.074 *** 0.023 – 0.074 *** 0.022 – 0.001 0.010
Partner’s 
education: high
0.062 *** 0.024 – 0.071 *** 0.024 0.009 0.007 0.149 *** 0.030 – 0.147 *** 0.029 – 0.001 0.010
Citizenship – 0.095 *** 0.022 0.104 *** 0.022 – 0.009* 0.005 – 0.044 ** 0.023 0.061 *** 0.022 – 0.017 * 0.009
Living with parents – 0.141 *** 0.018 0.128 *** 0.018 0.013 *** 0.004 – 0.097 0.014 0.088*** 0.014 0.009*** 0.003
Living in couple – 0.110 *** 0.022 0.119 *** 0.022 – 0.009* 0.005 0.034 0.021 – 0.018 0.020 – 0.016 * 0.009
Motherhood – 0.175 *** 0.016 0.187 *** 0.016 – 0.012 *** 0.003
Presence of parents when the young person was aged 14 years
Lone parent family – 0.012 0.038 0.021 0.037 – 0.009 0.006 0.028 0.032 – 0.029 0.032 0.001 0.003
Parentless 0.047 0.048 – 0.053 0.047 0.006 0.006 0.098 *** 0.037 – 0.095*** 0.037 – 0.003 0.005
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Family background information
Working father 0.069 ** 0.030 – 0.060** 0.030 – 0.010 *** 0.004 0.144 *** 0.025 – 0.140 *** 0.024 – 0.004 0.003
Working mother 0.056 *** 0.014 – 0.056*** 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.031 *** 0.012 – 0.028** 0.012 – 0.003* 0.002
Working lone 
mother
0.008 0.045 – 0.010 0.045 0.002 0.006 0.023 0.041 – 0.022 0.041 – 0.001 0.004
Working 
mother- in- law
0.099 *** 0.018 – 0.089*** 0.017 – 0.011 * 0.006 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.008
Father’s 
occupation
0.022 0.018 – 0.028 0.018 0.006*** 0.002 – 0.029 ** 0.014 0.026** 0.013 0.003* 0.002
Mother’s 
occupation
– 0.009 0.026 0.002 0.026 0.008*** 0.003 – 0.009 0.020 0.003 0.020 0.006** 0.002
Father’s education – 0.034 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.006** 0.003 – 0.028 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.008*** 0.002
Mother’s 
education
– 0.039 0.031 0.041 0.031 – 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.024 – 0.001 0.024 0.001 0.002
Observations 4,396 2,214 321 4,991 1,382 302
Notes: Dummies for country, quarter of interview, and missing information about parents’ working status and education level are introduced. Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean of 
the variables.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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Table S10.5 Predicted outcome probability (Pr) and marginal effects (Mfx) in Eastern countries by gender
Females Males
Employed NEET In education Employed NEET In education
Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err. Pr St. Err.
Predicted 
outcome 
probability
0.691 *** 0.005 0.307 *** 0.005 0.002*** 0.000 0.859*** 0.004 0.139 *** 0.004 0.002 *** 0.000
Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err. Mfx St. Err.
Individual characteristics at the time of the interview
Age 0.019 *** 0.002 – 0.018 *** 0.002 – 0.001 *** 0.000 0.002 0.001 – 0.001 0.001 – 0.001 *** 0.000
Own education: 
medium
0.219 *** 0.018 – 0.222 *** 0.018 0.003*** 0.001 0.125 *** 0.009 – 0.127 *** 0.009 0.002 *** 0.001
Own education: 
high
0.310 *** 0.020 – 0.313 *** 0.020 0.002* 0.001 0.198 *** 0.013 – 0.200*** 0.013 0.002 ** 0.001
Partner’s 
education: 
medium
0.008 0.021 – 0.037 * 0.020 0.029*** 0.005 0.053*** 0.015 – 0.070*** 0.015 0.017 *** 0.004
Partner’s 
education: 
high
0.002 0.025 – 0.033 0.025 0.030*** 0.005 0.098*** 0.020 – 0.118 *** 0.019 0.020 *** 0.004
Citizenship – 0.076* 0.045 0.078 * 0.045 – 0.002 0.002 – 0.063*** 0.021 0.062*** 0.021 0.001 0.001
Living with 
parents
– 0.056*** 0.012 0.055 *** 0.012 0.001 ** 0.000 – 0.039*** 0.010 0.038*** 0.009 0.001 *** 0.000
Living in couple – 0.053** 0.025 0.084 *** 0.025 – 0.031 *** 0.005 0.026* 0.015 – 0.005 0.015 – 0.020 *** 0.005
Motherhood – 0.265*** 0.014 0.267 *** 0.014 – 0.001 ** 0.000
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Presence of parents when the young person was aged 14 years
Lone parent 
family
0.073** 0.034 – 0.070 ** 0.034 – 0.004*** 0.001 – 0.027 0.023 0.027 0.023 0.000 0.001
Parentless 0.002 0.035 – 0.007 0.035 0.004*** 0.002 0.054** 0.022 – 0.054** 0.022 0.000 0.001
Family background information
Working father 0.053* 0.027 – 0.055 ** 0.027 0.002 0.002 0.057*** 0.017 – 0.057*** 0.017 – 0.001 0.001
Working mother 0.104 *** 0.015 – 0.104 *** 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.050*** 0.010 – 0.049*** 0.010 0.000 0.000
Working lone 
mother
– 0.056 0.038 0.053 0.038 0.003* 0.001 0.002 0.024 – 0.003 0.024 0.001 0.001
Working 
mother- in- law
0.033** 0.015 – 0.033 ** 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.036*** 0.012 – 0.035*** 0.012 – 0.001 0.001
Father’s 
occupation
– 0.008 0.017 0.007 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.012 – 0.013 0.012 0.001 *** 0.000
Mother’s 
occupation
0.005 0.015 – 0.006 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.011 – 0.009 0.011 0.001 * 0.000
Father’s 
education
– 0.008 0.021 0.007 0.021 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.015 – 0.011 0.015 0.000 0.000
Mother’s 
education
0.005 0.021 – 0.006 0.021 0.001 * 0.000 – 0.026* 0.014 0.025* 0.014 0.001 * 0.000
Observations 6,406 3,239 226 7,939 1,710 231
Notes: Dummies for country, quarter of interview, and missing information about parents’ working status and education level are introduced. Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean 
of the variables.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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STUCK IN THE PARENTAL NEST?
The eFFeCT oF The eConomiC Crisis on younG  
euroPeans’ liVinG arranGemenTs
Fernanda Mazzotta and Lavinia Parisi
11.1. INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession has had a profound impact on the process of young 
people’s transitions into adulthood. In particular, youth unemployment has 
increased disproportionately during the economic crisis, often leading young 
people to remain living with their parents. In fact, a number of studies have 
found that the share of young people living with their parents increased in 
many European countries in the early years of the crisis (Aassve, Cottini, and 
Vitali 2013). This chapter aims to expand on previous studies by providing a 
comparative analysis of home- leaving and home- returning by young people 
in 14 European countries during the period 2005– 2013, which covers the 
years prior to, during, and after the recession of 2008– 2009.1 Drawing on the 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU- SILC), the 
chapter analyzes, first, the probability of youth (aged 18– 34  years) leaving 
home and, second, the probability of youth (aged 20– 36 years) returning home 
(i.e., “boomeranging”).
Exploiting the nature of EU- SILC’s longitudinal data, we consider the two 
phenomena— leaving home and returning home— in a dynamic way; in other 
words, the same individual is observed in two consecutive years by living ar-
rangement (i.e., living in the parental home or independently in the first year 
and living independently or returning to the parental home in the subsequent 
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year). Living arrangements are strongly linked to employment and partnership.2 
For this reason, we simultaneously model these three outcomes:  living inde-
pendently, finding employment, and being in a partnership (either married or 
cohabiting with the partner). Our main hypothesis regarding the effects of the 
Great Recession is that it reduces the probability of leaving home and increases 
the probability of returning home.
Three main research questions are investigated in this chapter: Is there a neg-
ative (positive) effect of the Great Recession on leaving (returning) home? Does 
the effect persist after considering the two main drivers of leaving and returning 
home (i.e., employment and partnership)? Are there significant differences 
across country groups?
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.2 provides a literature review, 
and Section 11.3 discusses the data used and the research design. In Section 11.4, 
we present descriptive statistics with regard to the effect of the crisis on leaving 
and returning home. We present our econometric model in Section 11.5 and dis-
cuss the empirical results in Section 11.6.
11.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature analyzing the decision of young adults to live with their parents 
(or, conversely, to leave the parental home) identifies four different sets of 
determinants:  (1) age- related events (in particular, employment and partner-
ship), (2)  institutional and cultural factors (labor market regulations, welfare 
provisions, and social norms), (3)  macrostructural factors (i.e., labor market 
characteristics, economic cycles, and housing market conditions), and (4) ra-
tional choice/ exchange perspectives and preferences of children and parents.
The first group of determinants deals with young adults’ involvement in age- 
related events such as completing school, getting a job, starting a career, forming 
a family, or bearing children. Any of these events can lead to a decision to leave 
the parental home (Berngruber 2015). Among these events, partnership and 
employment are found to play a crucial role. Indeed, partnership is the most 
widely reported factor behind young adults’ decisions to leave home: Adult chil-
dren in partnerships are more likely to leave the parental home than are their 
unpartnered peers (O’Higgins 2006; Hank 2007; Lei and South 2016). Getting a 
job is widely reported as another crucial event. For instance, Jacob and Kleinert 
(2008) find that, in Germany, nonemployment delays household formation and 
that the longer young adults have been unemployed, the less likely they are to 
leave home. Ayllón (2015) finds that employment and leaving home are two 
closely linked phenomena in Southern Europe but that the same is not true in 
Nordic countries. Mazzotta and Parisi (2015a) provide evidence that employed 
young people in Italy are more likely to leave the family of origin than are jobless 
youth, after controlling for parental background.
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The second group of determinants concerns institutional and cultural factors 
such as labor market regulations, welfare provisions (unemployment benefits 
and social assistance), and social norms (Billari 2004; Chiuri and Del Boca 2010; 
Settersten and Ray 2010). Labor market regulations (e.g., employment protec-
tion legislation or active labor market policies) and the generosity of the welfare 
state (i.e., social assistance and unemployment benefits)— both of which differ 
across countries— affect both the economic independence of young people and 
access to affordable accommodation. It has been shown that leaving the parental 
home is closely linked to the probability of young people receiving social as-
sistance in the Nordic countries (Ayllón 2015). Social norms and culture differ 
significantly by country (as discussed later in this section) and by gender, albeit 
with some similarities across countries (related to gender roles in paid and un-
paid work), which explains some differences between women and men in the 
decision to leave home. Women have a lower threshold for economic independ-
ence and are more likely to start a family during unemployment than are men 
(Ermisch 1999).
The third group of determinants concerns macrostructural factors, such as 
labor market characteristics (youth/ prime- age unemployment rate and labor 
market segmentation), the economic cycle (i.e., economic growth and down-
turn), and housing conditions. In particular, the prices and the scarcity of rented 
housing are acknowledged in the literature as reasons that explain young people 
delaying leaving the parental home (Aassve et al. 2002; Iacovou 2002; Gökşen 
et al. 2016). Martins and Villanueva (2006) show that differences in mortgage 
markets across Europe can explain up to 20% of the cross- country variance 
in establishment of new households. Given that comparable data on housing 
market conditions are not available for a large number of EU countries or over 
time (2005– 2013), we limit the focus of our empirical analysis to the other two 
key determinants of leaving and returning home, namely employment and 
partnership.
Finally, the fourth set of determinants considered in the literature concerns 
rational choice/ exchange perspectives and preferences. Children are assumed 
to compare the costs and benefits of living with their parents with alternative 
living arrangements and to then choose the arrangement that offers the most 
highly valued net benefits. This could depend on the intra- household transfer 
of time and money, the personal income of young adult children, family in-
come, or the health of parents (Ermisch 1999; Manacorda and Moretti 2006; 
Mazzotta and Parisi 2015b). Medgyesi and Nagy (this volume) study the ex-
tent to which young adults living with their parents contribute to household 
expenses. They find that the majority of young adults benefit from intra- 
household sharing of resources within the family. However, a small group of 
young adults living at home (mainly in Eastern European countries) tend to 
support their parents: Their contribution to the household budget is higher 
than that of their parents.
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Differences across countries in the share of young people living at home 
are explained in the literature mainly on the basis of both institutional/ cul-
tural factors and macrostructural determinants. Jones (1995) and Reher (1998) 
identify Southern and Eastern European cultural roots as reasons for late 
home- leaving and also for the strong synchronization between leaving and first 
marriage. Others emphasize the poor economic conditions (related to labor 
market conditions) for young adults in Southern countries (Saraceno 2015). 
Esping- Andersen (1999) focuses on the peculiarities of the Southern European 
welfare system, which is characterized by a lack of support for young unemployed 
people and by the crucial role played by the family in helping them. Reher argues 
that Northern countries, characterized by early home- leaving, have “weak” 
family ties and a sense of “social,” rather than familial, solidarity with elderly or 
frail members of society. In Nordic and Continental countries, parents with high 
incomes help their children leave home, whereas in Southern and some Eastern 
European countries, parents seem to use their high incomes to delay the depar-
ture of children (Iacovou 2010). The decision to co- reside could also depend on 
parents’ economic needs (Medgyesi and Nagy, this volume).
Studies on young people returning home are scarce and mainly focus on re-
turning migrants (see Le Mare, Promphaking, and Rigg 2015; Masso et al., this 
volume).3
The four groups of determinants outlined previously for the analysis of young 
people’s reasons for leaving the parental home can also apply to their reasons for 
returning home. For instance, young people are more likely to return to the pa-
rental home at the end of formal education. Stone, Berrington, and Falkingham 
(2014) indicate the awarding of a final degree as a key turning point for students 
deciding to return home.4 Several other studies highlight the importance of a 
change in economic activity status (i.e., becoming unemployed) in fostering a 
potential return to the parental home. Separation and divorce increase the like-
lihood of returning to live with one’s parents (DaVanzo and Goldscheider 1990; 
Mitchell, Wister, and Gee 2000); however, the association between partner-
ship dissolution and returning home is moderated by gender and parenthood 
(Stone et al. 2014). Overall, men are more likely than women to return to the 
parental home following the dissolution of marriage or cohabitation (Ongaro, 
Mazzuco, and Meggiolaro 2009). Studies have also found that returning home 
is related to institutional factors, such as welfare provisions (Berrington, Stone, 
and Falkingham 2013) and cultural norms (Boyd and Pryor 1989). Returns to 
the parental home at the end of formal education are likely to increase as a result 
of rising levels of student debt and a weaker graduate jobs market (Andrew 2010; 
Clapham et al. 2012); economic status and employment conditions can also in-
crease the likelihood of returning home (Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1999). 
Finally, with regard to the economic crisis, together with later home- leaving, 
studies have found evidence of a “boomerang” phenomenon in France, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom, with increasing numbers of young people returning 
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to their parents’ home after having lived independently (Plantenga, Remery, and 
Samek Lodovici 2013).
11.3. RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to examine the phenomena of both leaving and returning home in 14 
EU countries (AT, BE, CY, CZ, EE, ES, FR, IT, LT, LU, LV, PL, PT, and SI),5 we 
used EU- SILC longitudinal data. We considered eight panels covering the period 
from 2005 to 2013.6 For each panel, we considered periods of 2 years each (e.g., 
for the panel from 2005 to 2008, there are three 2- year periods: 2005– 2006, 2006– 
2007, and 2007– 2008), and for each 2- year period we considered the change (or 
not) in living arrangements between the two points in time (i.e., the beginning, 
time t, and the end, time t + 1). Thus, the first dependent variable is the observed 
transition of leaving the parental home (L). L describes whether young people 
who were living in the family of origin at time t are still living with their parents 
at t + 1 or have left.7 The second dependent variable is the observed transition of 
returning to the parental home (R). R describes whether young Europeans who 
were living on their own at time t are still living without their parents at t + 1 or 
have returned to live with at least one of them.8
We constructed two samples— one for those leaving and one for those re-
turning. The leaving- home sample consists of young people aged 18– 34 years 
the first time they are observed. The returning- home sample consists of young 
people aged 20– 36 years the first time they are observed. We excluded students 
from both samples so as to make the results comparable across countries.9 In 
order to improve the interpretation of the results, we grouped countries in four 
classes: Continental, Southern, Eastern, and Baltic countries. Both the descrip-
tive and the econometric analyses are carried out separately for the four groups 
of countries. The small sample size at the single- country level (above all for the 
sample of returning home) makes it necessary to group countries.
Given the great heterogeneity of European labor market institutions and wel-
fare systems, to group countries we follow the classification developed by the 
European Commission (2006, 2007). Using a principal component analysis, 
the European Commission groups 18 European countries according to three 
dimensions of labor market/ flexicurity systems:  income/ employment security, 
numerical external flexibility/ employability, and tax distortions.
The Continental group of countries (AT, BE, FR, and LU) is characterized by 
(1) intermediate to high security, (2) intermediate to low flexibility, and (3) inter-
mediate to high taxation. In this group, social benefits are targeted at individuals 
who belong to specific categories, such as a specific type of family or a specific 
type of worker. In the Southern group of countries (CY, ES, IT, and PT), wel-
fare coverage tends to be “residual” and largely left to the family. It tends to be 
characterized by (1) relatively low security, (2)  low flexibility, and (3) no clear 
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pattern on taxation. The Eastern group (CZ, PL, and SI) is characterized by 
(1) insecurity, (2) intermediate to high flexibility, and (3) intermediate to high 
taxation. Finally, we distinguish the Baltic group of countries (EE, LT, and LV) 
from the Eastern European group because the Baltic countries are more sim-
ilar to the Continental countries with regard to family formation (Eurofound 
2014) and implemented flexibility/ protection patterns (Anca 2012).
11.4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics on key variables, focusing on the 
role of the economic crisis across the four groups of countries. Table 11.1 shows 
the share of young people (aged 18– 34 years) leaving home during the period 
under consideration (2005– 2013). The lowest percentage of youth leaving the 
parental home is found in the Eastern, Baltic, and Southern European coun-
tries (on average, 3.0%, 4.5%, and 5.9%, respectively, over the entire period). The 
highest percentage is found in the Continental countries (13.6%, on average, 
over the entire period). Except for the Eastern countries, where the exit rate is 
very low for all the years considered, descriptive statistics show that the other 
three groups of countries register a decrease in the share of young people leaving 
home between 2005 and 2013.10 However, whereas for the Continental countries 
we detect two decreases— one just after the onset of the crisis (2009– 2010), from 
Table 11.1 Observed rate of home- leaving at time t + 1 for young people (aged 
18– 34 years) living with their parents at time t (students are excluded) by group 
of countries, 2005– 2013 (%)
Year Continental Southern Eastern Baltic Total
2005– 2006 15.5 6.3 3.3 6.9 9.4
2006– 2007 15.6 5.8 3.3 5.5 8.8
2007– 2008 12.8 7.0 3.1 3.7 8.3
2008– 2009 15.3 6.2 3.3 3.4 9.1
2009– 2010 10.8 5.0 2.7 4.9 6.7
2010– 2011 14.3 7.3 2.7 4.5 9.2
2011– 2012 12.5 4.8 3.4 3.4 7.4
2012– 2013 9.8 4.1 2.2 3.9 5.5
Total 13.6 5.9 3.0 4.5 8.2
Sample size 2,890 4,492 1,640 1,021 10,043
Notes: Percentages are calculated each year as the number of young people who have left home at time  
t + 1 divided by the total number of young people (excluding students) living in the parental home at time t. 
Continental countries: Austria, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg; Southern countries: Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain; Eastern countries: Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia; Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania.
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15.3% to 10.8%, and another (in 2011) from 14.3% to 12.5%— the effect in the 
Southern countries is postponed to 2011 (with a decline from 7.3% to 4.8%).
With regard to returning to the parental home (Table 11.2), all four groups 
of countries show very low rates (less than 1% on average). However, we do 
find differences during the economic crisis. Whereas in Continental countries 
we observe an increase from 0.4% to 1.2% at the beginning of the recession 
(2008– 2009), in Southern countries the increase does not occur until 2011– 
2012. Overall, the rate of home- returning decreases for all groups of countries in 
2012– 2013 (see Table 11.2).11
When studying the effect of the economic crisis on leaving and returning 
home, we should consider, separately, the probability of finding a job and the de-
cision to form a family. Figure 11.1a presents the percentage of employed among 
young people who are still living with their parents at time t + 1, compared to 
those who have left home at time t + 1. Figure 11.1b presents the percentage of 
individuals in partnerships among young people who are still living with their 
parents at time t + 1, compared to those who have left home to live independently.
Young people who have left home are more likely to be employed than those 
who are still living with their parents (83% vs. 70%, on average),12 and this differ-
ence is higher for Continental countries, suggesting that young people decide to 
leave the parental home once they have found a job (see Figure 11.1a). The same 
pattern is found for partnerships:13 Young people who have left home are more 
likely to be in a partnership than those who are still living with their parents. 
On average, 55% of those leaving home are in a partnership at t + 1 (for Eastern 
Table 11.2 Observed rate of home- returning at time t + 1 for young people (aged 
20– 36 years) living away from parents at time t (students are excluded) by group 
of countries, 2005– 2013 (%)
Year Continental Southern Eastern Baltic Total
2005– 2006 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.6
2006– 2007 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6
2007– 2008 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.7
2008– 2009 0.4 1.1 0.4 1.4 0.6
2009– 2010 1.2 1.2 0.5 1.4 1.1
2010– 2011 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.6
2011– 2012 0.8 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.9
2012– 2013 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.5
Total 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.7
Sample size 543 803 378 262 1,986
Notes: Percentages are calculated each year as the number of young people who returned home at time t + 1 
divided by the total number of young people (excluding students) living independently at time t. Continental 
countries: Austria, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg; Southern countries: Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; 
Eastern countries: Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia; Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 11.1 (a) Share of young people employed at time t + 1 by group of countries, 
distinguishing between those who stayed at home (stayers) and those who left home (leavers) 
in the period under consideration (confidence interval at 95% level). (b) Share of young 
people in a partnership at time t + 1 by group of countries, distinguishing between those who 
stayed at home (stayers) and those who left home (leavers) in the period under consideration 
(confidence interval at 95% level).
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countries, the percentage is particularly high at approximately 70%), compared 
to approximately 4% for those who stayed at home (17% and 12%, respectively, 
for the Eastern and Baltic countries; see Figure 11.1b). The Baltic and Eastern 
European countries have particularly high shares of people in a partnership 
and living with their parents. In general, for all groups of countries, partner-
ship seems to be more important than employment in explaining home- leaving 
(there are statistically significant differences in the percentages of partnership 
among leavers and stayers).
As a result of the depth and duration of the economic crisis, young people 
are less likely to be in employment in Continental, Southern, and Baltic coun-
tries (see Figure 11.1a).14 Whereas the differences are statistically significant for 
those who remained in the parental home, there are no statistically significant 
differences for those who left. Our results are in line with those found by the 
European Commission (2014, 32, Table 15) and are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that during the economic crisis, young people have a greater need to find a 
job as a precondition for leaving home. Finally, we do not find statistically sig-
nificant differences for the share of young people in a partnership across time 
periods among stayers, whereas the changes found for leavers do not follow a 
precise trend (see Figure 11.1b). In summary, young people who leave home are 
likely to be working or in a partnership, especially in the Southern countries.
In Continental countries, being employed is the main factor associated with 
leaving the parental home, given that in these countries young people also 
leave when they are single.15 Thus, we find different cultural patterns (in ac-
cordance with the literature), with (single) young people in Continental coun-
tries becoming independent (much earlier), whereas in Southern and Eastern 
countries they mainly leave home in order to start a family (and/ or a relation-
ship). Moreover, in Continental countries, employment status is more impor-
tant than partnership status in explaining the decision to leave home, whereas 
the opposite is true for the other country groups. This finding does not change 
as a result of the economic crisis; in fact, in Southern countries, the crisis has 
worsened the employment conditions of young individuals who remain in the 
parental home.
Figures  11.2a and 11.2b show the patterns for employment and partner-
ship, distinguishing between those who had not returned home (labeled as 
alone or living independently) and those who had returned home at time t 
+ 1. Figure 11.2a shows that even though individuals who return home are on 
average more likely not to be employed than those who continue to live inde-
pendently,16 we find the most important differences across time periods. There 
is a very low proportion of not employed at the beginning of the period in the 
sample of youth living independently, with no differences in the Southern and 
Baltic countries between not employed as a share of those who returned home 
and not employed as a share of those who did not return home. For the Southern 
countries, we observe an increase in the share of people who are not employed 
   34
(a)
Continental(b) Southern
Eastern Baltic
Figure 11.2 (a) Share of young people not employed at time t + 1 by group of countries, 
distinguishing between those who lived independently (stayers) and those who returned home 
(returned) in the period under consideration (confidence interval at 95% level). (b) Share of 
young people not in a partnership at time t + 1 by group of countries, distinguishing between 
those who lived independently (stayers) and those who returned home (returned) in the period 
under consideration (confidence interval at 95% level).
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across all the periods, with sharper differences among those who return home 
(see Figure 11.2a). Moreover, there is a large proportion of people not employed 
in the very last period for all the countries, above all for those who return home in 
the Eastern, Baltic, and Southern countries (approximately 26% for Eastern and 
Baltic countries and approximately 60% for Southern countries). For Continental 
countries, the percentages of not employed among the young people living inde-
pendently (defined as stayers in Figure 11.2a) are very low and stable across all 
periods observed, whereas the shares of not employed among those who return 
home (defined as returned in Figure 11.2a) show a decrease in 2010 (stable across 
the years for stayers, decreasing in 2010 for returners).
The effect of partnership dissolution is statistically significant for almost all 
countries (Eastern Europe being the exception): Young people without a partner 
return home more often than do young people with a partner, and the propor-
tion is quite high (approximately 90% in some countries). This pattern is less 
strong for Eastern countries, where (in line with Iacovou 2010) young people 
are often found living with a partner in the same house as their parents. In short, 
partnership status does not appear to influence the decision to return home.
The difference in the percentage of not employed young people among those 
who return home and those who do not return home is lower than the differ-
ence in the percentage of returners and non- returners who are not in a partner-
ship. With regard to leaving home, it seems that partnership is more important 
than not having a job in predicting the probability of returning home. Across 
subperiods, there are neither clear nor significant patterns in the Continental or 
Baltic countries, whereas in the Southern countries the percentage of partner-
ship breakups increases among those who return home, and the opposite is true 
in Eastern countries (these effects are statistically significant).
11.5. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY
The aim of the econometric analysis is to disentangle the effect of the economic 
crisis on the probability of leaving (returning) home after controlling for employ-
ment and the partnership status of young people.17 The method used to estimate 
the two probabilities is a trivariate probit model. This is a simulation method for 
maximum likelihood estimation of a multivariate probit regression model. The 
model controls for unobservable factors that influence the probability of leaving 
(returning) home, of being employed (not employed), and of being in a couple 
(not in a couple). It is necessary to consider the mutual correlation between the 
three outcomes in order to avoid biased results.18 Moreover, this is a type of first- 
order Markov approach. It takes into account pairs of observations in two con-
secutive years, namely t and t + 1 for each individual. In year t, the young person 
lives with his or her parents (or independently), and in year t + 1 he or she has 
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left (returned) home. This strategy improves the existing models in the literature 
by controlling for feedback effects; unobserved heterogeneity; nonrandom se-
lection of the sample; and unobserved cross- process correlations between living 
arrangement, employment, and partnership.
The model for leaving home considers three dependent variables: the prob-
ability of leaving home (Lt + 1), the probability of being employed (Et + 1), and 
the probability of having a partner (Pt + 1). The model can be identified by func-
tional form, but we also include the following variables (in only one equation at a 
time): the household crowding index at time t in equation Lt + 1, the employment 
status at time t in equation Et + 1, and whether or not the person is living not just 
with one but with both parents at time t in equation Pt + 1. To examine the ef-
fect of employment and partnership on the probability of leaving home, we also 
include, in equation Lt + 1, the probability of being employed and of being in a 
relationship at time t + 1. Other control variables (i.e., gender— male or not; age 
and age squared; education— two dummies for secondary education and tertiary 
education, with compulsory education as the reference category; and general 
health status— good health or not) have been chosen in accordance with the lit-
erature. We further include in equation Lt + 1 parents’ income at time t (expressed 
as the logarithm of the sum of the income of both parents) and personal income 
of the young person at time t (expressed as the logarithm of his or her personal 
income).
The model for returning home simultaneously estimates the probability of 
returning home (Rt + 1), the probability of not being in partnership (UPt + 1), 
and the probability of not being employed (NEt + 1). We include the following 
variables to identify the model: the crowding index and whether the person has 
children at time t + 1 in equation Rt + 1, whether the person has children and 
whether the person is not employed at t + 1 in equation UPt + 1, and whether the 
person is not employed at time t in equation NEt + 1. We also include, in Rt + 1, 
the probability of not being employed at t + 1 and the probability of not being in 
a relationship at t + 1. Other control variables (i.e., gender, age and age squared, 
education, general health status, and personal income at time t + 1) are included 
as described for the home- leaving model.
The three outcomes (for the models for both leaving and returning home) can 
be correlated independently. The correlations relate to unobservable traits such as 
ability, intelligence, personality traits, ambition, quality of the relationship with 
parents, family background, and so forth. We estimate the correlation among the 
three error terms as follows: whether positive, unobservable individual factors de-
termining the outcome of primary interest (i.e., leaving or returning) are also posi-
tively associated with the other two outcomes (being employed and having a partner 
for leaving, and not being employed and not being in a partnership for returning).
We claim that only by acknowledging correlation effects between the three 
processes can we properly deal with endogeneity problems that may arise when 
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studying life transitions that possibly take place in a sequential manner and/ or 
simultaneously (Siegers, de Jong- Gierveld, and van Imhoff 1991; Mulder and 
Wagner 1993; Billari, Philipov, and Baizán 2001).
Together with the estimated coefficients (provided in Tables 11.3 and 11.4), 
we also calculate predicted probabilities (Figures 11.3 and 11.4) and their confi-
dence intervals so as to analyze whether there is evidence of a time trend or not 
across groups of countries.
Table 11.3 Trivariate probit model for probability of leaving home by group 
of countries
Probability of leaving home Continental Southern Eastern Baltic
Log parents’ income at t – 0.027** – 0.017*** 0.008 – 0.028***
Log personal income at t 0.065*** 0.027*** 0.046*** 0.040***
2005– 2006 0.170** 0.109** 0.061 0.111
2006– 2007 0.150** 0.055 0.09 0.030
2007– 2008 0.019 0.116*** 0.057 – 0.151**
2008– 2009 0.220*** 0.122*** 0.119* – 0.249***
2010– 2011 0.152** 0.245*** – 0.059 – 0.063
2011– 2012 0.142* 0.000 0.081 – 0.186**
2012– 2013 – 0.100 – 0.085 – 0.111 – 0.131
Male – 0.080* – 0.036 – 0.094** – 0.174***
Age 0.093 0.117*** – 0.027 0.208***
Age squared – 0.003** – 0.002*** 0.000 – 0.004***
Tertiary education 0.789*** 0.175*** – 0.05 – 0.077
Secondary education 0.394*** 0.059** – 0.119** – 0.002
Good health at t 0.120* 0.089** – 0.041 – 0.179***
House crowded at t 0.217*** 0.231*** 0.031 0.095*
In a partnership at t + 1 2.169*** 1.644*** 1.458*** 0.975***
Employed at t + 1 0.215*** 0.199*** – 0.062 0.000
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant – 4.015*** – 4.413*** – 1.525** – 4.178***
No. of observations 27,386 75,774 44,544 21,445
Log likelihood – 2.74E + 08 – 2.51E + 08 – 1.30E + 08 – 1.40E + 07
Notes: Continental countries: Austria, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg; Southern countries: Cyprus, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain; Eastern countries: Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia; Baltic countries: Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. The likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis ρ21 = ρ31 = ρ32 = 0 is statistically different from 
zero at the 1% level. Estimates do not consider students. Estimates are clustered at the individual level.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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11.6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents and discusses estimates for both models regarding the prob-
ability of leaving and returning home. The models are estimated separately for 
the four groups of countries. We present estimates that include country dummies 
(within each country group— not reported) and year dummies. Table 11.3 shows 
estimates for the probability of leaving home.19 To disentangle the effect of the 
economic crisis, we include year dummies, excluding the period 2009– 2010, and 
we calculate predicted probabilities for each year plotted in Figure 11.3.
The correlation between the error terms (ρ) is significantly different from 
zero.20 Thus, the three equations are strongly related:  The same unobservable 
factors positively affect the probability of leaving, of being employed, and of 
Table 11.4 Trivariate probit model for probability of returning home by group 
of countries
Probability of returning 
home
Continental Southern Eastern Baltic
Log personal income at t + 1 0.013 0.000 0.008 – 0.008
2005– 2006 – 0.408*** – 0.012 0.256*** – 0.241**
2006– 2007 – 0.335*** – 0.145* – 0.059 – 0.235**
2007– 2008 – 0.372*** 0.006 0.001 – 0.244*
2008– 2009 – 0.485*** 0.005 – 0.05 0.082
2010– 2011 – 0.437*** – 0.081 0.166 – 0.097
2011– 2012 – 0.138 0.058 – 0.068 – 0.371***
2012– 2013 – 0.594*** – 0.027 – 0.151 – 0.396***
Male 0.078 0.055 – 0.041 0.218***
Age – 0.177** – 0.247*** – 0.151** – 0.162*
Age squared 0.002 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003
Tertiary education – 0.482*** – 0.119** – 0.530*** – 0.300***
Secondary education – 0.165** – 0.05 – 0.272*** – 0.002
Is a parent – 0.196** – 0.351*** – 0.167** – 0.173**
Good health at t – 0.049 – 0.072 – 0.047 0.111
House crowded at t – 0.092*** – 0.237*** – 0.155*** – 0.119**
Not in a partnership at t + 1 1.021*** 1.138*** 0.506*** 0.796***
Not employed at t + 1 0.238*** 0.222*** 0.105 0.189**
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.835 2.869*** 0.585 0.738
No. of observations 97,157 74,607 63,122 28,931
Log likelihood – 7.91E + 08 – 2.92E + 08 – 1.14E + 08 – 2.17E + 07
Notes: See notes to Table 11.3.
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being in a relationship. This indicates that a trivariate probit technique is appro-
priate in this context.
Looking at the coefficients of the time dummies, we can see that young people 
are more likely to leave home before and after 2009– 2010; in other words, there 
is a crisis effect, given that the probability of leaving is lower just after the onset 
of the Great Recession compared to the other periods (i.e., the coefficients of all 
time dummies are positive compared to 2009– 2010; see Table 11.3). And the 
effect also holds after including employment and partnership. Figure 11.3 plots 
the marginal predicted probabilities of leaving home. The results confirm the de-
scriptive statistics, showing that in Southern, Baltic, and Eastern European coun-
tries, the probability of leaving home is lower compared to that in Continental 
countries (approximately 3%– 6% and 12%– 15%, respectively). There are no 
striking differences over time with the exception of the Continental countries, 
where we observe a decrease in the probability of leaving (in particular, there are 
two declines: one in 2009– 2010 and another in 2012– 2013).
Thus, the probability of leaving home in Southern and Eastern European 
countries (the lowest in comparative terms) turns out to be rather stable in the 
period considered (2005– 2013), whereas a decrease is recorded in Continental 
countries. The crisis has therefore reduced the probability of leaving home in 
those countries that were both less affected by the economic downturn and 
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Figure 11.3 Marginal predicted probabilities of leaving home by group of countries and across 
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where young people were used to living independently at a relatively young age. 
In the Southern and Eastern countries, by contrast, where young people were hit 
hardest by the economic crisis, we do not observe the sharp decrease in the prob-
ability of home- leaving one might have expected (Aassve et al. 2013). This may 
be due to the fact that these countries already recorded the highest percentage of 
young adults living in the parental home at the beginning of the observed period 
(i.e., before the Great Recession). This implies that the economic crisis hit a large 
share of those young individuals (aged 18– 34 years) who were already somehow 
“protected” by their family of origin (i.e., living with their parents). Therefore, 
the change observed in the probability of youth leaving home during the Great 
Recession is smaller in these two groups of countries (Southern and Eastern) 
than in the others. Moreover, in these countries, cultural factors (which tend to 
be relatively stable over time) may play a stronger role than economic conditions 
(which fluctuate with the economic cycle) in explaining living arrangements.
As already seen in the descriptive statistics (see Section 11.4), leaving home is 
strongly connected to partnership, and indeed it seems to be more closely linked 
to partnership than to employment: In all groups of countries considered, the 
coefficient of partnership is positive and strongly significant compared to that 
of employment, which is smaller and not significant in the Eastern and Baltic 
countries. Partnership thus has a strong effect on leaving home: The more young 
people enter a partnership (including marriage), the more likely they are to leave 
home. Employment is a good predictor of leaving home in Continental and 
Southern countries: Being employed positively affects the probability of leaving. 
However, employment has an indirect effect through partnership in those coun-
tries (Baltic and Eastern) where we do not find a direct effect.
With regard to demographic variables, the results are in line with the litera-
ture. Women have a lower income threshold for independence: They leave the 
parental home more often than men in all countries except the Southern coun-
tries. The difference observed between men and women may be due to the fact 
that the impact of unemployment differs by gender: Women may be more in-
clined to start a family, whereas men try to find a more stable job first (Plantenga 
et al. 2013); also, women enter partnerships at a lower age (Eurostat 2009).
High parental income (in Southern, Continental, and Baltic countries) is as-
sociated with a lower probability of leaving home. Higher personal education 
and good health unambiguously increase the probability of leaving home in 
Continental and Southern countries. A downward correlation exists between age 
and leaving, such that the most likely to leave are individuals aged approximately 
29 and 26 years, respectively, for the Baltic and Southern countries.
Table 11.4 presents estimates for a trivariate probit model for the probability 
of returning home, and Figure 11.4 plots the marginal predicted probabilities 
across time periods. Looking at the dummies that explain the difference between 
time periods, we find that there is a time effect only in the Continental and Baltic 
countries, where the probability of returning home is always lower compared 
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to 2009. In contrast with Stone, Berrington, and Falkingham’s results (2012), 
the period is still statistically significant when we include what they call turning 
points (e.g., separation or unemployment). This result implies that the economic 
crisis has a direct effect on returning home, given that it produces uncertainty 
about the future. However, when we plot the predicted marginal probability 
of returning home (see Figure 11.4), we observe that, also in Southern coun-
tries, the probability of returning home constantly increases for all the periods 
considered. This increase— observed already in 2007 (before the crisis) in the 
Southern countries— may be due to structural or cultural factors, but it has been 
exacerbated by the Great Recession.
Continental and Eastern countries have the lowest percentage of individuals 
returning home, with a jump just after the onset of the crisis (2009– 2010), whereas 
in Eastern countries the effect does not appear until 2011 (but the difference is 
not significant). In Baltic countries, we record an increase that lasts longer— from 
2008– 2009 until 2010– 2011. The predicted probability of returning to the pa-
rental home for countries in these three groups becomes stable at approximately 
0.5%. This low rate (especially in the Continental countries) has been related to 
relatively generous welfare- state benefits and to cultural factors, given that both 
young people and their parents greatly value independence compared to their 
Southern counterparts (Iacovou 2010). For the Eastern and Baltic countries, this 
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Figure 11.4 Predicted probabilities of returning home by group of countries and across time 
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result may depend on emigration— that is, on the necessity for young people to 
leave their country of origin.
Thus, the result that merits highlighting is that Southern European countries 
show an increase in boomeranging throughout the entire period considered (be-
ginning in 2005), which may indicate a long- term as opposed to a cyclical trend. 
This finding differs from that for the Continental countries, where the increase 
starts just after the onset of the crisis (2009– 2010), whereas in the Baltic coun-
tries we record an increase that lasts longer— from 2008– 2009 until 2010– 2011.
Again, we confirm the hypothesis already observed for leaving: Just as part-
nership had a strong effect on leaving home, being single has a very strong effect 
on returning home. In fact, union dissolution is a key determinant of returning 
home. Similarly, not being employed increases the probability of returning home 
in the Continental, Southern, and Baltic countries (the result also holds if we 
exclude inactives).
With regard to the other control variables, the most important result is that 
being alone increases the likelihood of returning to the parental home. In fact, 
young parents (both mothers and fathers) are less likely to return to the parental 
home than are individuals without children, just as individuals living in crowded 
families (usually with more than one child or other relatives) are less likely to 
return to living with their parents. Higher education decreases the probability of 
returning home, whereas health does not have any effect. Men are more likely to 
return home only in the Baltic countries.
11.7. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has examined the influence of the Great Recession on the proba-
bility of leaving or returning to the parental home in Europe. The transition into 
adulthood in the form of leaving the parental home to establish an autonomous 
household is highly variable across European countries. Our findings reveal 
that Southern, Baltic, and Eastern European countries have lower leaving rates 
compared to Continental countries and that the crisis has not exacerbated this 
difference. In the former groups of countries, leaving the family of origin is not 
as highly valued as in Continental countries. Also, before the Great Recession, a 
high share of young adults were living in the family of origin in Southern, Baltic, 
and Eastern European countries. Thus, in these countries, cultural factors (which 
tend to be relatively stable over time) may play a stronger role than economic 
conditions in decisions to leave home. So when youth unemployment started to 
increase dramatically, many young adults in these countries were still living at 
home. In short, these youth were caught by the crisis and by its effects, but they 
were already under the protection of the family of origin.
What is striking are the changes observed in Continental countries. We 
observe a decrease in the probability of leaving home during the crisis (in 
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particular, the percentage of home- leavers rises and falls between 2009 and 
2011). Continental countries are still characterized by higher levels of home- 
leaving compared to the other groups of countries, but the deterioration 
in labor market conditions for young people (i.e., difficult school- to- work 
transitions, youth unemployment, and economic hardship) increased the 
uncertainty of youth integration into secure employment, thus lowering the 
probability of leaving home in 2009.
All country groups experience an increase in the percentage of people re-
turning home, with the exception of the Eastern countries. There are also notice-
able differences across countries regarding timing: Southern European countries 
register an increase throughout the entire period; Continental countries show 
an increase in the very first period, after the onset of the crisis; and in the Baltic 
countries, the effect occurs earlier (in 2008– 2009) and lasts longer. However, for 
the latter group of countries, the returning rate stabilizes at its lowest percentage 
toward the end of the period considered. Previous studies analyzing home- 
leaving have shown that in Southern European countries, late home- leaving 
contributes to a lower probability of returning (Iacovou and Parisi 2009). We find 
instead that returning home has increased in Southern countries and that this 
trend has been exacerbated by the Great Recession. In these countries, young 
people are less likely to be entitled to welfare benefits/ assistance compared to 
their Continental counterparts; moreover, living with parents is more socially 
acceptable in Southern countries so that they are more likely to return home 
during a long- term economic downturn.
The results regarding the effect of the Great Recession also hold after con-
trolling for partnership and employment. Partnership has a strong effect on the 
probability of both leaving and returning home. Young people in a partnership 
are more likely to leave, just as young people not (or no longer) in a partnership 
are more likely to return home. Employment is a good predictor of leaving home 
in Continental and Southern countries, but it has an indirect effect through part-
nership on leaving home in the Baltic and Eastern European countries. Similarly, 
losing one’s job increases the probability of returning home in Continental, 
Southern, and Baltic countries (the result also holds if we exclude inactives).
Our findings support the hypothesis that parental monetary resources play a 
crucial role in adulthood transitions. More than in previous recessions, the family 
plays a protective role, allowing their adult children to stay longer at home— that 
is, allowing young adults to overcome the economic difficulties faced during the 
Great Recession. This is noticeable especially in those countries (i.e., Continental 
countries, in our study) where economic independence is highly valued (both 
by parents and by children) and school- to- work transitions tend to be smoother. 
In these countries, it is relatively uncommon for older youth to live with their 
parents; therefore, staying at home longer might imply a higher psychological 
cost for both parents and adult children. Conversely, in those countries where 
cultural norms render it socially acceptable for older youth to live with their 
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parents, the psychological costs of postponing home- leaving because of the 
difficulties faced by young people in the labor market might be lower.
NOTES
1 Four Continental countries (AT, BE, FR, and LU), four Southern countries 
(CY, ES, IT, and PT), three Eastern countries (CZ, PL, and SI), and three 
Baltic countries (EE, LT, and LV).
2 Individuals in a partnership are defined here as people who are either mar-
ried or cohabiting.
3 See, for instance, for Europe: Iacovou and Parisi (2009); and for the United 
States: DaVanzo and Goldscheider (1990), Goldscheider and Goldscheider 
(1999), Kaplan (2009), Dettling and Hsu (2014), and Lei and South (2016). 
For specific European countries, see Konietzka and Huinink (2003); 
Konietzka (2010); Stone, Berrington, and Falkingham (2012, 2014); and 
Berngruber (2015).
4 The “turning point” is a key concept in life course theory, referring to an 
event, an experience, or a change in circumstances that significantly alters 
the individual’s subsequent life course trajectory (Stone et al. 2012).
5 We selected 14 countries because of data restrictions. We excluded countries 
that are not included in all the waves from 2005 to 2013 (BG, CH, HR, IE, 
MT, RO, and TR). Greece had to be excluded because of missing information 
for some key variables. The Nordic countries (DK, FI, IS, NO, and SE) were 
excluded because of their sampling design strategy, which is not suitable for 
our dynamic approach. Another four countries (HU, NL, SK, and UK) were 
excluded because they do not collect net personal income for all the waves, 
and this is one of the key variables in the empirical analysis.
6 For each panel, the same individuals were tracked for a maximum of 4 years.
7 The nature of the data does not permit a distinction between those who have 
left home for the first time and those who had previously left, subsequently 
returned, and then left a second time.
8 Because of the relatively short observation period, we do not know when ex-
actly the young people in this sample left the parental home; we only know 
that they left home some time previously and have now returned.
9 Students may bias the results because their attitude toward living arrangements 
is different across countries. In some countries, it is common for students to 
leave home and then return after getting a degree. In other countries, young 
people stay at home to complete their tertiary education, which increases the 
share of individuals living in the parental home only for education purposes. 
We are not interested here in leaving and/ or returning for educational reasons.
10 The differences between the two percentages at the beginning and at the end 
of the period (2005– 2006 and 2012– 2013) are statistically significant at the 
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1% level— except for the Eastern countries, for which the statistical signifi-
cance is at the 5% level.
11 Between 2011 and 2012, the decrease is significant at the 1% level for both 
Continental and Southern countries, and for the entire sample.
12 The mean differences are statistically significant in almost all the periods for 
the Continental and the Southern countries. There are significant differences 
only in some years in the Eastern and in the Baltic countries.
13 The differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level.
14 In the Eastern countries, the differences are not statistically significant for 
either leavers or stayers across the period observed.
15 See Mazzotta and Parisi (2016) for descriptive statistics on different 
destinations after leaving.
16 The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
17 As argued in Section 11.2, it is not possible to control for housing conditions 
given that data on housing markets are not easily available for a large number 
of EU countries or over time.
18 The maximum likelihood estimates of the implied trinomial probit model 
differ sharply from those obtained when either being employed or household 
membership is taken as exogenous (McElroy 1985).
19 Estimates for the probability of being employed and being in a partnership 
are available from the authors on request.
20 Accordingly, the overall likelihood ratio test of ρ21 = ρ31 = ρ32 = 0 is always not 
accepted with Prob > χ2 = 0.0000.
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INCOME SHARING AND SPENDING DECISIONS 
OF YOUNG PEOPLE LIVING WITH THEIR PARENTS
Márton Medgyesi and Ildikó Nagy
12.1. INTRODUCTION
Co- residence rates have increased in many countries during the economic down-
turn (Aassve, Cottini, and Vitali 2013)  as the crisis has induced young adults 
to postpone leaving the parental home or, in some cases, even to return there 
(see Mazzotta and Parisi, this volume). In order to evaluate the consequences 
of rising co- residence with parents for the income situation and material well- 
being of young adults, one needs to understand how incomes are shared in such 
households. This chapter provides quantitative evidence on how young adults in 
co- residence with their parents participate in household finances— an issue that 
is rarely studied in the literature.1
Studies analyzing poverty— including those on youth poverty— are based on 
the usual assumption that income is shared equally among members of the same 
household. This literature thus typically neglects the issue of income sharing 
within households and assumes the nonexistence of intra- household inequality. 
The literature on household money management most often studies couples, 
whereas evidence— especially of a quantitative nature— is scarce regarding other 
household types, including households in which parents live together with adult 
children. Research in demography and related disciplines (family sociology and 
population economics) studies the timing and determinants of the transition to 
independent living, whereas literature on household money management in co- 
residential living is scarce.
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This chapter examines the extent to which young adults living with their 
parents contribute to household expenses and also the extent to which they are 
able to decide autonomously about their expenses on personal consumption and 
leisure activities. The analysis is based on data covering 17 European countries 
from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU- SILC 
2010 special module) on intra- household sharing of resources. The chapter also 
explores the implications of taking into account intra- household sharing of re-
sources for the assessment of the income situation of the young. In particular, 
we investigate the roles of absolute household income, household members’ 
economic needs, and relative income in shaping the observed patterns, also 
describing cross- country differences.
The study finds that income sharing in the household tends to attenuate in-
come differences between household members and tends to help household 
members with low resources. The study also finds that there are inequalities 
in young adults’ experience of co- residence with parents: young adults in low- 
income households tend to contribute more to the household finances and 
to enjoy less independence in their consumption and leisure decisions. Our 
results also show that although the majority of young adults benefit from intra- 
household sharing of resources, there is a smaller group of young adults who 
tend to support their parents in the sense that their contribution to the house-
hold budget is higher. The most significant cross- country differences can be seen 
between the Eastern European and the other European countries, with young 
adults in Eastern Europe making higher contributions to the household budget 
and having less independence in consumption decisions.
The following section presents the related literature and formulates hypotheses 
about the determinants behind the contributions of young adults to household 
budgets and about the financial independence of young adults living in the pa-
rental home. In Section 12.3, we present the data and the methods used in the 
analysis. Section 12.4 presents our results concerning the determinants of young 
adults’ contributions to household budgets and their ability to decide about per-
sonal spending. In Section 12.5, we attempt to evaluate the effect of taking into 
account survey results regarding intra- household sharing of income in the es-
timation of the income situation of young adults. Section 12.6 concludes the 
chapter.
12.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
In many advanced societies, the transition from adolescence to independent 
adulthood has become a slower and more variable process. This prolonged 
life phase between adolescence and adulthood often goes together with 
longer periods of co- residence between young adults and their parents. 
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Co- residential living arrangements can be the result of different life course 
trajectories, however. These include both adult children who have never left 
the parental home and those who have returned home after finishing educa-
tion, after divorcing, or during spells of unemployment (“boomerang kids”). 
Finally, there are also cases in which a parent moves in with an adult child 
(Dykstra et al. 2013). Co- residence can be particularly important in times of 
crisis, when staying with or moving back to one’s parents’ home can be an 
element of the “safety net” provided by the family (Mazzotta and Parisi, this 
volume). Studies such as those by Aassve, Iacovou, and Mencarini (2006) 
and Aassve et al. (2007) show that co- residence can protect the young from 
falling into poverty.2
The benefits of co- residence for the young adult are the support, security, 
and company that living at home provides, as well as the financial advantages 
of such an arrangement. Co- residence with parents may imply some financial 
benefits for the young as they save on paying for rent and utilities, can enjoy 
better housing standards than they could otherwise afford, and the household 
can also benefit from economies of scale. On the other hand, co- residence with 
parents inevitably entails lower levels of autonomy compared to independent 
living (White 2002; Sassler, Ciambrone, and Benway 2008). The young adult has 
to accept the rules of the parental house and has to accept some parental over-
sight over work/ education, free time, social activities, and also money spending. 
In many cases, the parents ask their young adult children to pay for room and 
board and/ or to do housework.
The monetary contributions that young adults make when living in the pa-
rental home are rarely studied in the literature. For instance, the literature on 
income distribution and poverty generally assumes that income (or economic 
well- being) is shared equally among members of the same household and that 
an individual cannot be poor when living in a household that has adequate in-
come. Although several studies suggest that significant inequalities might exist 
within the same family (e.g., Haddad and Kanbur 1990), the assumption of equal 
sharing is adopted by most of the studies, including those on poverty among 
young adults (e.g., Aassve et al. 2006, 2013; Ward et al. 2012).
Most of the research on the living arrangements of young adults concerns the 
timing and determinants of the transition to independent living, whereas litera-
ture on financial arrangements in co- residential living and how such households 
manage finances is scarce. Several studies assume that an intensive monetary 
exchange is taking place between parents and their adult children when they live 
in the same household— without explicitly analyzing such an exchange (White 
1994).3 Financial arrangements in multigenerational households are not at the 
focus of the literature on intra- household inequality, nor is money management, 
because this literature tends to analyze couple households (Yodanis and Lauer 
2007; Nagy, Medgyesi, and Lelkes 2012).
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A central concept of the literature on intra- household inequality is “pooling 
of incomes.” Full pooling of incomes means that all incomes of all household 
members are pooled and all members have full access to the pooled income. 
Partial pooling means that household members contribute only a share of their 
own income to the household budget and keep the rest (Ponthieux 2013). Here, 
we are interested in financial arrangements between young adults and their 
parents living in the same household. Specifically, we study the extent to which 
young adults pool their incomes with other household members or keep their 
incomes separate. We describe the determinants of young adults’ contributions 
to the household budget and assess their effects on the measurement of intra- 
household inequality. In the following, we formulate hypotheses regarding the 
determinants of young adults’ contributions to household budgets when they are 
co- residing with their parents.
12.2.1. household income and young adults’ 
Contributions
The overall level of monetary resources in the household is said to shape 
households’ money management strategies (Yodanis and Lauer 2007). For poor 
households, making ends meet (paying utility bills and having money at the 
end of the month) requires the careful management of the totality of household 
incomes. Under a certain level of household income, there is no “discretionary” 
income that household members can keep for themselves. Thus, we expect that 
in low- income households, the young adult members will keep a lower share of 
their income separate and will contribute more to the common budget. In par-
allel, we expect that young adults in poorer households will have less control over 
spending decisions (hypothesis H1).
12.2.2. household members’ lack of resources and 
young adults’ Contributions
Both economic theories of altruistic transfers (Cox 1987)  and sociological 
theories about contingent transfers (Swartz et al. 2011) imply that household 
members will be inclined, when they can, to help other members in need 
of monetary support. Thus, we expect that young adults will increase their 
contributions to the household budget when their parents have insufficient 
economic resources— for instance, when the parent is single, when parents 
have no work, or when parents live with health limitations. On the other hand, 
young adults’ contributions to the household budget should be lower when 
they find themselves in difficult life circumstances and with insufficient re-
sources. Such difficulties might arise from an unfavorable labor market situa-
tion (e.g., in the case of students or unemployed young people) or might also 
be associated with certain stages of the life course— for instance, young adults 
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with dependent children may be more in need of support (Schenk, Dykstra, 
and Maas 2010) (hypothesis H2).
12.2.3. relative income and young adults’ 
Contributions
The relative income of household members is assumed to influence intra- 
household income allocation. According to altruistic theories of intra- 
household transfers, a skewed distribution of income in the household would 
increase the incentive of the higher earning household member to pool re-
sources and help household members with lower incomes (Cox 1987; Bennett 
2013). When a young adult’s income is significantly lower than that of his or 
her parents, this implies a lower contribution to the household budget by the 
young adult and higher contributions from the parents. When the income dis-
tribution of the household is more equilibrated, contributions to the house-
hold budget should be more equilibrated as well; thus, higher relative income 
of young adults should go together with higher contributions to the house-
hold budget (hypothesis H3).
12.2.4. Cross- Country differences in young adults’ 
Contributions
Cross- country differences in household financial arrangements between 
young adults and their parents might be expected for several reasons. First, 
differing patterns of nest leaving and co- residence lead to differences in the 
composition of the young adult population living with their parents. As the 
literature documents (Mulder 2009), young adults tend to leave the parental 
nest later in the Southern than in the Northern European countries, where 
young adults tend to leave the parental home early (in their early twenties).4 
Western Europe occupies an intermediate position between these two country 
groups, whereas co- residence rates are relatively high in Eastern European 
countries (Dykstra et al. 2013). The composition of the young population still 
living at home is thus likely to be very different across countries, which could 
be partly responsible for cross- country differences in contributions to the 
household budget.
Cross- country differences in income sharing in households might also be 
linked to differences in family norms. For instance, Reher (1998) describes the 
Southern European countries as “strong family countries,” where kin relations 
and family solidarity are of prime importance. By contrast, in Western and 
Northern European countries, more individualistic conceptions of the family 
prevail, and the norm prescribes that young adults should attain economic in-
dependence and leave the parental home at an early age. In more individual-
istic countries, young adults are expected to be independent in their decisions 
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regarding leisure and consumption and could also be more likely to contribute 
to the household budget (hypothesis H4).
12.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
This study uses data for 17 European countries from the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc 
module on intra- household sharing of resources in the EU. This module contains 
household- level and individual- level questions about management of house-
hold finances, covering aspects of income pooling and decision- making about 
expenses and savings. Two questions are particularly relevant for our research 
topic because they provide substantial information on two dependent variables.
The first dependent variable in our analysis measures the degree to which 
respondents contribute to the household budget. The survey question PA010 
asks respondents, “What is the share of income kept separate from the house-
hold budget?” According to the survey description, income that is kept separate 
from the “common household pot” is viewed by the respondent to be his or hers 
and can be used as he or she wishes (Eurostat 2010). By “common household 
budget,” the survey means expenses and savings not primarily concerning one 
person only in the household. The following responses were coded on a 5- point 
scale: (1) all my personal income, (2) more than half, (3) about half, (4) less than 
half, (5) none, and (6) no personal income.
The second dependent variable measures the extent to which other house-
hold members (in this case, parents) have control over the spending decisions 
of young adults. The relevant question (PA090) asks about the “ability to decide 
about expenses for personal consumption, leisure activities, hobbies.” The re-
sponse categories are the following: (1) yes, always, almost always; (2) yes, some-
times; and (3) never or almost never. Here, we reverse the coding of this item 
and use the recoded version as a second dependent variable in our analysis. One 
way parents can gain control over the spending decisions of young adults is to 
ask for monetary contributions to the household budget. Thus, young adults who 
contribute a high share of their income to the household budget will have less 
opportunity to decide about spending on personal consumption.
We restricted our analysis to 17 EU countries representing different geo-
graphical areas in Europe.5 The analysis includes 3 countries from Western 
Europe (Belgium and Luxembourg together with Germany in the case of the 
first dependent variable and together with Ireland in the case of the second de-
pendent variable), 6 countries from Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Malta, Portugal, and Spain), 3 countries from Central– Eastern Europe (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia), 3 Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), 
and 2 countries from Southeastern Europe (Bulgaria and Romania). Our analysis 
studies young adults in the 18- to 34- year- old age group and their households in 
all these countries.
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In the following, we present the measurement of the key explanatory variables 
that are used in the multivariate analysis to investigate the hypotheses described 
previously.
Absolute income of the household is measured using total equivalent house-
hold income. In order to focus on within- country differences in income, we 
divided equivalent household income by the median of the given country and 
used the logarithm of income divided by the country median as an explana-
tory variable.
Lack of personal resources concerns household members who find them-
selves in difficult life circumstances with insufficient personal resources for 
various reasons. Here, we consider three types of such situations: labor market 
difficulties (e.g., unemployment), difficulties related to family structure (e.g., 
having dependent children or being single), and difficulties arising from 
poor health conditions. In the case of young adults, these are captured by 
measures of labor market status (five categories: working full- time, working 
part- time, unemployed, student, and other nonworking) and of whether they 
have children in the household (dummy variable).6 In the case of parents, 
difficulties are captured by measures of parental labor market status (three 
categories of parental work intensity:7 0– 0.5, 0.5– 0.99, and 1), health status 
(dummy variable showing whether either of the parents is seriously limited in 
daily activities because of health problems), and parental family status (three 
categories: single mother, single father, or both parents— or one parent with a 
partner— live in the household).
Relative income is measured by the personal income of the young adults rel-
ative to the average income of their parents. When calculating relative income, 
all income types that are recorded at an individual level in the EU- SILC data set 
(income from employment, self- employment, unemployment benefits, old- age 
and survivors’ benefits, sickness and disability benefits, and education- related 
allowances) were included. Relative income was then transformed into a five- 
category variable: The first category is composed of young adults with incomes 
below 30% of average parental income; in the second group, young adults have 
31%– 50% of average parental income; in the third, young adults have 50%– 80% 
of parental income; the fourth category consists of cases in which young adults 
have income roughly equal to that of average parental income (between 80% and 
120%); and the fifth category is made up of cases in which young adults have 
higher incomes than those of their parents (above 120%).
12.4. DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
In this section, we first provide some descriptive statistics about young adults who 
are living in the parental household in 17 EU countries. We then show differences 
in our two dependent variables before proceeding with the description of the 
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results of the multivariate analysis. Finally, we analyze cross- country differences 
in household financial arrangements.
12.4.1. young adults living in the Parental  
home in europe
The share of young adults living at their parents’ home varies significantly across 
the countries covered by the study. Among those in the 18- to 24- year- old age 
group, the great majority of young adults (more than 75%) are still living in the 
parental home in all countries. The highest percentage of co- resident young 
adults in this age group can be found in Slovakia (96%), whereas the lowest is 
found in Germany (78%). One can find more important differences between the 
country groups regarding co- residence with parents in the 25- to 34- year- old age 
group. In this group, the percentage of those living with their parents is lowest in 
Germany and Belgium (13%– 17%), whereas the highest percentages are found 
in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Malta, and Greece, where more than half of those in this 
age group are living in the parental home.
Differences in the share of co- resident youth lead to differences in the com-
position of the population of young adults living with parents. Because this pop-
ulation is typically older in the case of the Southern and Southeastern European 
countries, it is not surprising that a relatively high percentage of them have a 
job, whereas the percentage of students is lower compared to Western European 
countries. The percentage of working youth is highest among those residing in 
the parental home in Malta (61%), Portugal (53%), and Greece (48%).
Differences in the age and labor market status of co- resident young adults 
lead to differences between countries in terms of their relative income situation. 
The relative income situation of the young adult is described by comparing his 
or her personal income with the average income of parents, as described in the 
methodological section (see Figure 12.1). Whereas the majority of youth aged 
18– 24 years have a lower income compared to their parents in every country, in 
the case of the 25- to 34- year- old age group, this is only true for 5 out of 17 coun-
tries. The share of young adults who have similar or higher income compared 
to their parents is lowest in Germany, whereas it is highest in Malta. There is 
considerable variation among Western European and Southern European coun-
tries. Belgium and Luxembourg, unlike Germany, have a relatively high per-
centage of young adults with similar or higher income compared to their parents, 
whereas— except for Malta— the other Southern European countries do not ex-
hibit high percentages in this regard.
12.4.2. descriptive analysis
Our first dependent variable describes the proportion of youth personal income 
that is contributed to the household budget and not kept separately. Figure 12.2 
shows the percentage of those contributing at least half of their income to the 
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household budget in the countries included in the analysis (the whole distribu-
tion is shown in Table A12.1 in the Appendix). In all countries, only a minority 
of young adults contribute at least half of their incomes. The percentage of young 
adults contributing at least half of their income is highest in Romania (44%), 
Bulgaria (37%), Hungary (34%), and Latvia (30%). The lowest figures are found 
in the Western European countries (5%– 10%), whereas the Southern European 
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Figure 12.2 Percentage of young adults (aged 18– 34 years) contributing at least half of income 
to household budget by relative income in 17 EU countries, 2010.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household 
sharing of resources.
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Figure 12.1 Percentage of young adults with income higher than 80% of average parental 
income in 17 EU countries, 2010.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household 
sharing of resources.
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countries are in between (approximately 16% or 17%), with the exception of 
Cyprus and Malta, where the percentage is lower.
The second dependent variable shows whether young adults are able to de-
cide about spending on their personal consumption, hobbies, and so forth. 
Figure 12.3 shows the percentage of those who are always able to decide about 
this issue (the whole distribution is shown in Table A12.2 in the Appendix). The 
highest percentage is found in Malta, where 94% of young adults are always able 
to decide about spending on personal consumption, and the second highest per-
centage is detected in Belgium (84%). In Cyprus, Spain, and Luxembourg, this 
is true for 72%– 76% of young adults, whereas in Portugal, Hungary, Slovakia, 
and Ireland, the percentage of those who are always able to decide is somewhat 
lower (61%– 69%). The lowest figure is found in Romania, where only 27% of 
young adults responded that they are always able to decide about their personal 
expenses. The second lowest figure is found in both Bulgaria and Italy, where 
44% of young adults who live with their parents are always able to decide about 
spending on personal consumption. In this case, there is thus more heteroge-
neity within country groups, especially in the case of the Southern and Central– 
Eastern European countries.
Figures 12.2 and 12.3 also show the association between our dependent 
variables and the income of young adults relative to their parents. In every case, 
there is a clear correlation between relative income and contribution to house-
hold expenses. Young adults who have higher income relative to their parents 
are more likely to contribute more than half of their income to the household 
budget compared to young adults who have low income relative to their parents. 
At the same time, it is also true that young adults with high income relative to 
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Figure 12.3 Percentage of young adults (aged 18– 34 years) always able to decide about personal 
spending by relative income in 17 EU countries, 2010.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household 
sharing of resources.
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their parents are more likely to be able to decide about spending on personal con-
sumption. The descriptive evidence thus supports our hypothesis regarding the 
role of relative income. In the following multivariate analysis, we investigate our 
hypotheses while taking into account cross- country differences in the composi-
tion of our sample.
12.4.3. multivariate analysis
To study our hypotheses about the determinants of young adults’ finan-
cial contributions to the household, and their ability to decide about personal 
expenses, ordinal probit regressions were run on pooled models with country 
dummies included.
In addition to the main explanatory variables described previously (meas-
uring need for support, absolute income, and relative income position), the 
models control for variables that have been identified by the literature as af-
fecting income sharing in households. The first group of controls are basic 
sociodemographic variables: gender (Ward and Spitze 1996), age, and education. 
According to Bonke and Uldall- Poulsen (2007), income pooling will be more fre-
quent when there is a need for partners to coordinate their economic behavior. 
A case of coordination that is relevant to our research topic is that of common 
goods in the household (e.g., shared rental of an apartment and shared car). In 
our analysis, we control for tenure status of the dwelling where the household is 
living (three categories: owner occupied/ rented for free, rented at reduced rate, 
and rented at market price). To quantify crowding in the household, we also in-
clude a measure of the number of rooms per household member. Other controls 
included in the analysis are parental migrant status and parental contributions to 
the household budget. Migrant origin was defined as those born in a country dif-
ferent from the country of residence, and we also measure the share of parental 
income contributed to the household budget by parents. It can be expected that, 
ceteris paribus, the contribution of the young adult will be higher in households 
in which there is a norm of income pooling, where parents pool a large share of 
their incomes.
Regarding our first dependent variable— which measures the monetary 
contributions of young adults to the household budget as a percentage of their 
income— the estimated coefficients for all explanatory variables are shown in 
Table A12.3 in the Appendix. To assess the magnitude of the effects, Table 12.1 
provides average marginal effects of the most important explanatory variables 
on the probability that a young adult will contribute all personal income to the 
household budget (this is the highest category of the dependent variable). In 
Model 1, the sample has been restricted to young adults with positive income be-
cause respondents with zero income cannot contribute to the household budget. 
As a robustness analysis, we also run the same model on the sample of those 
aged 25– 34 years (Model 2) because this is the age group for which the issue of 
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monetary contributions is more relevant. We also present results on the entire 
sample of those aged 18– 34 years living in the parental home (Model 3).
The results confirm the role of absolute household income, which has a sta-
tistically negative effect:  The higher the household income, the lower is the 
Table 12.1 Dependent variable: Proportion of co- resident young adults’ (aged 
18– 34 years) personal income contributed to common household budget, average 
marginal effects on the probability of “contributing all personal income” for selected 
explanatory variables, 2010
Model 1: Those 
with positive 
income
Model 2: Those  
aged 25– 34 years
Model 3: All 
those aged 
18– 34 years
Log household income – 0.0212*** – 0.0170*** – 0.0090***
Young adult’s relative income
0%– 30% 0 0 0
30%– 50% 0.0306*** 0.0554*** 0.0424***
50%– 80% 0.0392*** 0.0622*** 0.0482***
80%– 120% 0.0432*** 0.0687*** 0.0506***
120+% 0.0411*** 0.0684*** 0.0485***
Young adult’s labor market status
Works full- time 0 0 0
Works part- time – 0.0060 0.0041 0.0011
Unemployed – 0.0604*** – 0.0690*** – 0.0590***
Student – 0.0782*** – 0.0762*** – 0.0731***
No work, other – 0.0041 – 0.0170 – 0.0264***
Partner in household 0.0774*** 0.0793*** 0.0519***
Child in household 0.0413*** 0.0449*** 0.0389***
Number of parents in household
Only mother 0 0 0
Only father – 0.0073 – 0.0158 – 0.0089
Two parents – 0.0528*** – 0.0475*** – 0.0388***
Parental work intensity
0– 0.5 0 0 0
0.5– 0.99 – 0.0042 – 0.0002 – 0.0032
1 – 0.0082* – 0.0035 – 0.0053*
Parental health limitations 0.0000 – 0.0044 0.0030
Note: Pooled models include all controls and country dummies (see Table A12.3 in the Appendix).
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad- hoc module on intra- household sharing of 
resources in 17 EU countries.
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probability of young adults contributing significantly to the household budget. 
Hypothesis H1 about the role of absolute income is thus confirmed. The variables 
related to the lack of economic resources of young adults and their parents show 
mixed results. The results regarding the employment status of young adults are in 
line with our hypothesis H2. As Table 12.1 shows, students are 8 points less likely 
and unemployed youth are 6 points less likely to contribute all income compared 
to working young adults. Those neither in employment nor in education also 
have a lower probability of contributing to household expenses, but this is visible 
only in Model 3, which includes all members of the 18- to 34- year- old age group 
living in the parental home. Contrary to our expectations, having a child in the 
household actually increases the probability that the young adult will contribute 
all income to the household budget (by 4 points). This might be a result of more 
intensive reciprocity between parents and young adults with dependent children, 
where parents help with grandchild care and young adults increase monetary 
contributions to the household budget.
Also in line with hypothesis H2, young adults contribute a higher frac-
tion of their income when the parent is single. The probability that the young 
adult contributes all personal income to the household budget is 5 points lower 
when both parents live in the household (or one parent with a spouse/ partner). 
Contributions to household income are also less likely if parents work full- time 
during the whole year (work intensity equals 1). Contrary to our hypothesis, pa-
rental health problems are not associated with a higher probability of household 
budget contributions by young adults.
The relative income position of parents and the young is important in deter-
mining the contribution of young adults to the household budget. The higher 
the income of young adults compared to that of their parents, the higher the 
contributions they are likely to make to the household budget. Young adults 
whose incomes are between 31% and 50% of the average income of their parents 
are 3 points more likely to contribute all income to the household budget 
compared to young adults whose incomes amount to 30% or less of their parents’ 
average income. Young adults whose incomes exceed 50% of average parental 
income are 4 points more likely to contribute all their income.
Most control variables exhibit the expected sign (see Table A12.3 in the 
Appendix, Model 1). Higher contributions to the household budget become more 
likely with age. Somewhat surprisingly, education level (ceteris paribus) has a 
negative effect: Those with tertiary education are less likely to make a higher con-
tribution to the household budget. This might be a result of shorter labor market 
experience on the part of those with tertiary education. Young adults in migrant 
households make higher contributions to the household budget. The contribu-
tion to the household budget is larger if parents contribute more from their own 
incomes to the budget. The contribution is also higher if the apartment/ house 
is rented compared to owner- occupied housing. Parental age, overcrowding 
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(number of rooms per household member), and the number of young adults in 
the household have no significant effect.
We checked the robustness of our results concerning the determinants of 
young adults’ financial contributions to households by estimating the pooled 
model for the sample of all young adults aged 25– 34 years (Model 2 in Table 12.1). 
The reason for selecting this age group is that the issue of contribution to house-
hold expenses might be more meaningfully studied among those aged between 
25 and 34 years because many of those aged between 18 and 24 years are still 
obtaining their education. Finally, we also estimated the model for all those aged 
between 18 and 34 years (Model 3 in Table 12.1). As can be seen from Table 12.1, 
the results obtained with different subsamples show similar signs and significance 
to the original estimates. In some cases, the magnitude of the effects seems to be 
different: for instance, total household income or the effect of having no partner 
in the household has a stronger effect on contribution to the household budget in 
the case of the subsamples.
Regarding our second dependent variable— which measures the freedom 
of young adults to decide about their personal expenses— detailed results are 
shown in Table A12.4 in the Appendix, and the average marginal effects for the 
most important explanatory variables can be found in Table 12.2. The first model 
includes only total household income, relative income, and country dummies 
on the right- hand side. In the second model, we add other explanatory variables 
that relate to young adults, whereas the third model also adds parental character-
istics. Ability to decide about expenses on personal consumption is also related 
to the absolute income of the household: Young adults living in more affluent 
households are more likely to be able to decide about spending on personal con-
sumption. This result thus confirms hypothesis H1, similarly to the case of our 
first dependent variable. The pattern among variables related to the lack of per-
sonal resources is also similar. Part- time workers, the unemployed, students, and 
other inactive young adults are less likely to be able to decide about expenses on 
personal consumption compared to those who are working full- time. The effect 
of not working reduces the probability that the young adult is always able to de-
cide about personal expenses by approximately 22– 28 points. Having children 
decreases the probability that young adults can always decide about expenses on 
personal consumption, but the effect is not statistically significant. The variables 
measuring parental needs are expected to have a negative effect. This is con-
firmed in the case of parental family status: When a young adult is living together 
with a single mother, the probability of being able to decide about expenses is 
lower. On the other hand, parents having health limitations does not have a sta-
tistically significant effect. Relative income is also related to the ability to decide 
about personal consumption. In households in which the income of the young 
adult is roughly equal to or higher than the average income of parents, the young 
adult is 7 or 8 points more likely to be able to decide about expenses on personal 
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consumption compared to young adults who have less than 30% of parental in-
come. These results confirm hypothesis H3.
The results regarding the control variables are shown in Table A12.4 in the 
Appendix. There is no statistically significant effect of gender or age. Influence 
over decisions regarding personal consumption increases with educational 
Table 12.2 Dependent variable: Ability of co- resident young adults (aged 18– 34 years) 
to decide about expenses for personal consumption, average marginal effects on the 
probability of “always able to decide” for selected explanatory variables, 2010
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log household income 0.1417*** 0.0762*** 0.0630***
Relative income
0%– 30% 0 0 0
30%– 50% 0.0896*** 0.0207 0.0279*
50%– 80% 0.1388*** 0.0368** 0.0520***
80%– 120% 0.1780*** 0.0556*** 0.0669***
120+% 0.2020*** 0.0641*** 0.0795***
Labor market status
Works full- time 0 0
Works part- time – 0.0523** – 0.0539**
Unemployed – 0.2280*** – 0.2205***
Student – 0.2348*** – 0.2293***
No work, other – 0.2934*** – 0.2823***
Partner in household – 0.0732*** – 0.0841***
Child in household – 0.0126 – 0.0051
Number of parents in household
Only mother 0
Only father 0.0382
Two parents 0.0267**
Parental work intensity
0– 0.5 0
0.5– 0.99 0.0276*
1 0.0063
Parental health limitations 0.0098
Note: Pooled models include country dummies and control variables (see Table A12.4 in the Appendix).
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household sharing of 
resources in 17 EU countries.
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attainment. Young adults living in more spacious housing are more likely to have 
influence over such decisions. Finally, the number of young adults in the house-
hold increases the likelihood that young adults can decide about expenses on 
personal consumption.
12.4.4. differences Between Countries
We study differences between countries by examining estimates for country 
dummies in the pooled models. The country intercepts show the difference in the 
dependent variable that exists between the given country and the country of ref-
erence (Belgium) after controlling for a wide set of explanatory variables. Figure 
12.4 shows the estimates of these country effects for the two dependent variables. 
According to the estimates, the probability that young adults contribute to the 
household budget is highest in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Other Eastern 
European countries and the Baltic states follow in the country ranking. The like-
lihood of contributions is, ceteris paribus, lowest in Luxembourg, Malta, and 
Cyprus. Germany and Belgium follow in the lower part of the country ranking, 
but Portugal, Spain, and Greece are also relatively close to these countries. It is 
clear from the figure that in the case of our two dependent variables, the country 
effects are negatively correlated: countries where young adults are less likely to 
contribute to the household budget are those where they are more likely to be 
able to decide about personal expenses. The main difference between the two 
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Figure 12.4 Differences between countries after controlling for covariates.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household 
sharing of resources.
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cases is that Greece and Italy are closer to the Eastern European countries in the 
case of the dependent variable on independence in consumption.
Overall, our results do not seem to show the expected pattern regarding 
cross- country differences, although information about more countries would be 
needed to properly test our fourth hypothesis. Our expectation was that more 
individualistic values in Western European countries would result in higher 
contributions to the household budget. In contrast to this, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and Germany do not actually seem to be very different from the Southern 
European countries with regard to contributions to the household budget. The 
more important division seems to be between the Eastern European coun-
tries and the rest, with young adults being less independent and contributing 
more to household finances in Eastern Europe. This latter group seems to be 
heterogeneous, however, because Bulgaria and Romania show higher levels of 
contributions and lower levels of independence in consumption compared to 
other countries.
12.5. IMPACT OF TAKING ACCOUNT OF INTRA- HOUSEHOLD 
RESOURCE SHARING ON THE RELATIVE INCOMES 
OF THE YOUNG
As the last step in our analysis, we evaluate the consequences of taking into ac-
count intra- household sharing of resources on the income situation of young 
adults living together with their parents. Our method follows that of Ponthieux 
(2014), who constructs a measure of modified equivalized income, taking into 
account the intra- household sharing of income in households. In the usual cal-
culation of household equivalized income, all incomes of all household members 
are added up and divided by the number of consumption units in the house-
hold. However, the modified equivalent income studied here takes into account 
the fact that household members pool only a part of their incomes. Pooled in-
come (or “public” income) in a household is composed of the personal incomes 
of household members that are contributed to the household budget plus other 
household- level income types (e.g., income from capital or income from cer-
tain social transfers). The total income of a household member is the sum of an 
individual’s personal income kept separate from the household budget plus his or 
her part of the public income of the household.8 To divide the personal incomes 
of household members into income contributed to the household budget and in-
come kept separate for personal purposes, one can make use of responses to the 
survey question discussed in Section 12.3 about the share of income kept sep-
arate from the household budget. To make a numeric illustration possible, one 
needs to make assumptions about the precise share of income corresponding to 
each of the response categories. Here, we assume that keeping less than half of 
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income separate from the budget means keeping 25% of income for one’s own 
use, whereas keeping more than half means keeping 75% of personal income 
separate from the household budget.
As discussed previously, the standard measure of equivalized income used 
in inequality and poverty measurement assumes full pooling of incomes of 
household members and thus assumes equality among household members. 
The modified measure of equivalized income allows household members to 
keep a certain part of their income separate from the household budget (partial 
pooling). Moving from the standard measure to the modified measure is “benefi-
cial” to young adults if their modified equivalized income is higher than standard 
equivalized income. Whether moving to the modified measure is beneficial, neu-
tral, or detrimental to young adults depends on the relative incomes of young 
adults and parents and on their relative contribution levels. The proportion of 
such cases in the sample studies is shown in Table 12.3.
Table 12.3 shows the distribution of young adults in these groups. In all coun-
tries, the majority of young adults would benefit from moving from the standard 
Table 12.3 The effect of taking into account intra- household sharing on the incomes 
of young adults (aged 18– 34 years) in 17 EU countries (%)
Country Modified income 
lower than original 
equivalized income
Modified 
and original 
equivalized 
income equal
Modified income 
higher than 
equivalized income
Total
BE 15.9 7.5 76.7 100
BG 19.7 12.4 67.9 100
CZ 24.3 6.3 69.4 100
DE 18.3 12.9 68.7 100
EE 22.8 6.4 70.8 100
EL 24.8 6.3 68.9 100
ES 11.3 9.8 79.0 100
HU 15.1 17.0 67.9 100
IT 16.9 5.5 77.6 100
LT 15.5 10.3 74.2 100
LU 12.8 4.5 82.7 100
LV 27.7 6.7 65.5 100
MT 33.2 4.1 62.7 100
PT 18.1 9.5 72.5 100
RO 28.6 9.2 62.3 100
SK 30.2 5.9 63.9 100
Note: By equal is meant between ±2% of the original equivalized income.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household sharing of 
resources.
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equivalized income to the modified version. This is mainly due to the fact that 
parents typically contribute a higher share of their income to the household 
budget compared to young adults. The highest percentage of young adults who 
would end up with lower incomes under the modified version can be found in 
Malta (33%), Slovakia (30%), and Romania (29%), whereas the lowest figures 
were found for Spain (11%) and Luxembourg (13%).
The standard assumption of inequality and poverty studies about intra- 
household equality thus means that we underestimate the incomes of the ma-
jority of young adults living with their parents. In reality, their income situation 
is likely to be more favorable than shown by the conventional statistics. There 
is, however, a smaller group of this young adult population for which the con-
ventional estimates overestimate true incomes. This group is in a minority, but 
it is far from negligible; indeed, in some countries, it is close to one- third of the 
young adult population still living in the parental home.
12.6. CONCLUSIONS
This study uses the 2010 EU- SILC special module on intra- household sharing 
of resources to shed light on practices of income sharing in households in 
which young adults live together with their parents. The chapter is novel in two 
respects. First, it provides new quantitative comparative evidence on how young 
adults in co- residence with their parents participate in household finances and 
also on their financial independence. Monetary exchanges in such households 
are rarely studied either in research on family processes or in the literature on 
intra- household allocation. In particular, we studied the main determinants— 
the role of absolute household income, the status of individual economic need 
by household members (parents and adult children), and the relative income of 
young adults— of the contributions of young adults to the household budget and 
their freedom to decide about personal spending. The study also tries to quantify 
the effect of taking into account intra- household income sharing on the meas-
urement of the income situation of young adults.
Our findings on the determinants of contributions to household budgets and 
on the ability to decide about personal expenses broadly confirm our hypotheses 
about the effects of household income, relative income of household members, 
and household members’ material needs. We found that income sharing in 
households tends to benefit household members in need and with low relative 
income. The young pay lower contributions when they are in need (e.g., unem-
ployed or students), but they pay higher contributions if the parents are in need 
of support. Contributions to the household budget increase with the relative in-
come of young adults, albeit sometimes non- monotonically. Overall, this pattern 
is consistent with the view that income sharing in the household tends to atten-
uate income differences between household members.
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Although income sharing moderates differences within households, we found 
inequality between low- and high- income households in the extent to which 
young adults can benefit from intra- household transfers. In households with 
high absolute incomes, young adults contribute less to the household budget and 
are more free to decide about their personal expenses, whereas in low- income 
households, young adults contribute more to the household budget and have 
less independence in consumption decisions. Our hypothesis on cross- country 
differences was only partially confirmed. Young adults living in the parental 
home in Western European countries are the most independent in deciding about 
personal expenses, and they contribute less to the household budget. Moreover, 
Western European countries are not very different from some of the Southern 
European countries. The most important difference is between the Eastern 
European countries and the rest, with young adults being less independent and 
contributing more to household finances in Eastern Europe.
Our results show that the majority of young adults benefit from intra- 
household sharing of monetary resources compared to the conventional as-
sumption of intra- household equality. This happens because parents typically 
have higher incomes than their young adult children and share a larger fraction 
of their incomes with other household members. There is, however, a smaller 
group of young adults (between 11% and 33%) who support their parents eco-
nomically in the sense that their contribution to the household budget is higher. 
Overall, our results suggest that young adults have differing motivations for and 
experiences with co- residence with parents. Some young adults stay at home 
longer in order to enjoy better economic well- being, some stay at home longer 
as a strategy to overcome the difficulties faced in the labor market or on the 
housing market or both, whereas others stay at home longer in order to support 
their family of origin.
The 2010 special module of the EU- SILC on intra- household sharing of re-
sources is a valuable data set for studying intra- household allocation, which 
is seldom covered by large comparative surveys. There are, however, certain 
drawbacks of the survey that impose constraints on the current study. One 
constraint is that we are unable to differentiate between different cases of co- 
residence, such as young adults returning to the parental home and young adults 
who have never left home. Another limitation is that the question about income 
sharing does not explicitly ask what percentage of their income respondents keep 
separate or put into the household budget, so assumptions are required when 
this information is used in calculations.
NOTES
1 Earlier versions of the chapter were presented at the International Sociological 
Association RC28 spring meeting in Budapest (May 8– 10, 2014); at the STYLE 
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Project Consortium Meeting, Grenoble School of Management (March 23– 
24, 2015); and at various seminars. The authors benefitted from comments 
from the editors; from Fatoş Gökşen, Chiara Saraceno, András Gábos, and 
Gábor Hajdu; and also from conference and seminar participants. Research 
assistance was provided by Orsolya Mikecz. Financial support from Bolyai 
János Kutatási Ösztöndíj to Márton Medgyesi is gratefully acknowledged.
2 In the case of the United States, Kahn, Goldscheider, and García- Manglano 
(2013) affirm that young adults have become the more financially dependent 
generation in multigenerational households. This evidence also suggests that 
co- residence with parents might protect the young from falling into poverty.
3 Although financial arrangements between parents and co- resident young 
adults are not at the forefront of research on co- residence or intra- household 
arrangements, there are some studies that cover this area, such as Aquilino 
and Supple (1991), Ward and Spitze (1996), White (2002), and Sassler et al. 
(2008).
4 Several reasons have been put forward for this difference. Some explanations 
highlight the difficulties that young adults face on the labor market and the 
housing market in Southern European countries (Buchmann and Kriesi 2011). 
Others focus on preferences and norms. According to Manacorda and Moretti 
(2006), parental preference for co- residence with young adult children can be 
strong, and parents can bribe children to stay in the parental home. Giuliano 
(2007) also shows the effect of cultural norms on the home- leaving behavior 
of young adults. She demonstrates that value changes (e.g., the sexual revolu-
tion in the 1970s) have different effects on the living arrangements of second- 
generation immigrants in the United States, depending on the cultural norms 
prevailing in their countries of origin.
5 The so- called register countries (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, and Sweden) had to be omitted because only one respondent was 
selected per household to answer the personal questionnaire. Other coun-
tries were not included because of substantive modifications to the expected 
question wording (Austria, France, and Ireland in the case of the first explan-
atory variable) or differences in response categories (France and Ireland) that 
make comparison with other countries difficult. Three other countries were 
not included because of a high percentage of missing values in the case of the 
population aged 18– 34 years (Austria, Poland, and the United Kingdom). In 
the case of the second explanatory variable, Germany had to be excluded, but 
we were able to use the data for Ireland.
6 Health status for young adults is not included in the analysis because this is 
relevant for only a small subsample and these people tend to be outside the 
labor market. This makes it difficult to arrive at a reliable estimate of poor 
health in the case of the young.
7 The work intensity of a household is the ratio of the number of months that 
all working- age household members (aged 16– 64 years) have worked during 
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the income reference year to the total number of months the same household 
members theoretically could have worked during the same period.
8 The part of public income assigned to one household member equals P/ Neq, 
where P is the amount of public income of the household, and Neq measures 
the number of consumption units in the household.
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APPENDIX
Table A12.1 Proportion of personal income contributed by co- resident young adults (aged 18- 34 years) to common household budget in 17 EU 
countries, 2010
Country All income 
separate
Less than half in 
common pot
About half in 
common pot
More than half in 
common pot
All income in 
common pot
No income Total n
BE 31.3 6.8 0.9 3.2 4.7 53.1 100.0 1,311
BG 7.8 12.2 8.6 13.7 14.6 43.1 100.0 2,538
CY 39.4 4.9 1.7 2.4 2.0 49.5 100.0 1,784
CZ 17.8 22.6 6.4 4.1 4.7 44.2 100.0 2,875
DE 47.3 12.8 2.2 3.2 4.3 30.3 100.0 2,146
EE 19.7 9.1 8.2 6.9 5.7 50.5 100.0 1,477
EL 30.9 11.8 5.6 6.5 3.5 41.8 100.0 2,295
ES 35.4 7.2 3.7 3.8 8.4 41.6 100.0 4,572
HU 11.8 10.8 6.9 11.6 15.6 43.3 100.0 3,595
IT 23.2 6.9 3.9 7.6 5.1 53.3 100.0 5,727
LT 9.7 14.3 5.4 6.7 10.7 53.1 100.0 1,792
LU 36.2 7.3 2.1 0.7 2.7 51.1 100.0 1,498
LV 11.0 10.3 7.7 16.7 5.7 48.6 100.0 2,221
MT 65.4 4.3 1.5 4.5 2.4 22.0 100.0 1,838
PT 37.4 9.4 3.4 4.8 8.1 37.0 100.0 1,814
RO 4.9 7.7 7.8 25.2 10.9 43.4 100.0 2,783
SK 17.5 22.1 4.5 12.6 4.5 38.8 100.0 3,344
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household sharing of resources.
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Table A12.2 Ability of co- resident young adults (aged 18– 34 years) to decide about 
spending on personal consumption in 17 EU countries, 2010
Country No Yes, sometimes Yes, always Total n
BE 6.2 10.3 83.5 100.0 1,313
BG 22.8 33.0 44.3 100.0 2,538
CY 6.2 17.6 76.2 100.0 1,784
CZ 21.7 30.3 48.0 100.0 2,855
EE 15.8 30.1 54.1 100.0 1,551
EL 18.0 25.7 56.2 100.0 2,295
ES 8.4 17.2 74.4 100.0 4,573
HU 10.9 25.9 63.3 100.0 3,595
IE 20.7 12.2 67.1 100.0 1,277
IT 29.7 25.8 44.5 100.0 5,727
LT 12.4 39.4 48.2 100.0 1,772
LU 12.5 15.1 72.4 100.0 1,488
LV 25.2 24.8 50.1 100.0 2,221
MT 1.6 4.7 93.7 100.0 1,832
PT 14.6 16.3 69.1 100.0 1,819
RO 36.5 36.6 26.9 100.0 2,783
SK 17.6 21.4 61.0 100.0 3,345
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household sharing of 
resources.
Table A12.3 Dependent variable: Proportion of personal income contributed by co- 
resident young adults (aged 18– 34 years) to common household budget, coefficients 
of ordinal probit model, pooled models
Model 1:  
Those with  
positive income
Model 2:  
Those aged 
25– 34 years
Model 3:  
Those aged 
18– 34 years
Log household income – 0.0961*** – 0.1737*** – 0.1306***
Relative income
0%– 30% 0 0 0
30%– 50% 0.5270*** 0.3000*** 0.5582***
50%– 80% 0.5783*** 0.3681*** 0.6072***
80%– 120% 0.5984*** 0.3985*** 0.6522***
120+% 0.5805*** 0.3826*** 0.6507***
Female 0.0112 0.0319 0.0167
Age 0.0230*** 0.0247*** 0.0226***
Education, three categories
Below upper secondary 0 0 0
Upper secondary 0.0147 – 0.0637* – 0.0721
Tertiary – 0.0946** – 0.1941*** – 0.1890***
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Model 1:  
Those with  
positive income
Model 2:  
Those aged 
25– 34 years
Model 3:  
Those aged 
18– 34 years
Labor market status
Works full- time 0 0 0
Works part- time 0.0084 – 0.0421 0.0277
Unemployed – 0.6501*** – 0.5652*** – 0.6643***
Student – 0.9736*** – 0.8640*** – 0.7811***
No work, other – 0.2270*** – 0.0286 – 0.1227
Partner in household 0.5563*** 0.6351*** 0.6098***
Child in household 0.4167*** 0.3385*** 0.3455***
Number of parents in household
Only mother 0 0 0
Only father – 0.0738 – 0.0458 – 0.1004
Two parents – 0.3735*** – 0.3915*** – 0.3362***
Parents’ average age – 0.0023 – 0.0029 – 0.0024
Parental education level
All below upper secondary 0 0 0
With and without upper 
secondary
0.0085 – 0.0640 – 0.0842
All at least upper secondary – 0.1298*** – 0.1248** – 0.1430**
Parental work intensity
0– 0.5 0 0 0
0.5– 0.99 – 0.0343 – 0.0342 – 0.0015
1 – 0.0574* – 0.0675* – 0.0272
Parent has health limitations 0.0323 0.0004 – 0.0337
Parent migrant origin 0.2196*** 0.2551*** 0.2660***
Contribution of parent to 
household budget
No contribution 0 0 0
Half or less 0.3852*** 0.4020*** 0.4648***
More than half 0.4480*** 0.5348*** 0.5663***
No income 0.5121*** 0.5743*** 0.5886***
Home ownership
Owner/ no rent 0 0 0
Reduced rent 0.0740 0.0917 0.0426
Market rent 0.1921*** 0.2650*** 0.2644***
Table A12.3 Continued
(continued)
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Model 1:  
Those with  
positive income
Model 2:  
Those aged 
25– 34 years
Model 3:  
Those aged 
18– 34 years
Rooms per household member – 0.0531 – 0.0268 – 0.1142*
No. of household members  
aged <18 years
0.0035 0.0042 0.0133
No. of household members  
aged 18– 34 years
– 0.0148 – 0.0246 – 0.0620*
N
Pseudo R2
Note: Pooled models include control dummies (coefficients not shown).
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household sharing of 
resources.
Table A12.3 Continued
Table A12.4 Ability to decide about spending on personal consumption, coefficients 
of ordinal probit model, pooled models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log household income 0.5276*** 0.3055*** 0.2561***
Relative income
0%– 30% 0 0 0
30%– 50% 0.2832*** 0.0774 0.1047*
50%– 80% 0.4570*** 0.1400** 0.1999***
80%– 120% 0.6107*** 0.2159*** 0.2616***
120+% 0.7146*** 0.2514*** 0.3156***
Female 0.0075 0.0103
Age 0.0022 0.0033
Education, three categories
Below upper secondary 0 0
Upper secondary 0.1998*** 0.1482***
Tertiary 0.3086*** 0.2402***
Labor market status
Works full- time 0 0
Works part- time – 0.2311*** – 0.2409***
Unemployed – 0.8278*** – 0.8147***
Student – 0.8481*** – 0.8415***
No work, other – 1.0199*** – 0.9994***
Partner in household – 0.2935*** – 0.3422***
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Child in household – 0.0503 – 0.0206
Number of parents in household
Only mother 0
Only father 0.1544
Two parents 0.1063**
Parents’ average age 0.0036
Parental education level
All below upper secondary 0
With and without upper secondary 0.0573
All at least upper secondary 0.1662***
Parental work intensity
0– 0.5 0
0.5– 0.99 0.1143*
1 0.0255
Parent has health limitations 0.0397
Parent migrant origin – 0.0984
Contribution of parent  
to household budget
No contribution 0
Half or less 0.1148
More than half 0.0573
No income – 0.1565
Home ownership
Owner/ no rent 0
Reduced rent – 0.0088
Market rent – 0.0858
Rooms per household member 0.1374**
No. of household members  
aged <18 years
0.0381
No. of household members  
aged 18– 34 years
0.0450*
N 19,861 19,708 18,596
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.125 0.129
Note: Pooled models include control dummies (coefficients not shown).
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU- SILC 2010 ad hoc module on intra- household sharing of 
resources.
Table A12.4 Continued
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13
WHAT HAPPENS TO YOUNG PEOPLE WHO MOVE 
TO ANOTHER COUNTRY TO FIND WORK?
Mehtap Akgüç and Miroslav Beblavý
13.1. INTRODUCTION
The freedom of movement of citizens across all of Europe has been one of the 
most important achievements of the European Union (EU).1 The size, composi-
tion, and direction of migration flows in Europe have evolved in a continuously 
changing pattern, reflecting various social, economic, and political conjunctures 
and circumstances resulting from both diverse and dynamic pull and push factors 
(Castles 1986, 2006; Constant and Massey 2003). Recent evidence suggests, 
however, that the mobility patterns of the past decade in Europe are mostly 
dominated by youth flows (Eurostat 2011). In particular, educated youth from 
Eastern and Southern Europe have been migrating to regions to the west and 
north that offer relatively more favorable labor market opportunities (Kahanec 
and Zimmermann 2010). However, the recent economic downturn, which has 
contributed to rising youth unemployment, and the challenges faced by young 
people transitioning from education to labor markets have put a strain on the 
labor market transitions of youth. Added to these difficulties are the challenges 
migrants normally face in integrating into destination- country labor markets.
Against the background of human capital and neoclassical models explaining 
migration patterns and motivations (Sjaastad 1962; Bowles 1970; Greenwood, 
Hunt, and McDowell 1986; Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992), and given the evi-
dence that migrants are ever more frequently young, female, and relatively well 
educated, these population movements raise questions concerning the ability 
of destination- country labor markets to integrate migrants in accordance with 
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their human capital endowments. Economic theory predicts a strong correla-
tion between the circumstances of the labor market at origin and in the desti-
nation countries (Martin 2009). Based on this theory, if young individuals move 
mainly to escape stressful economic circumstances in their countries of origin, 
then one wonders what happens to them once they arrive in the destination 
country’s labor markets. Previous results from the migration literature gener-
ally find relatively worse labor market outcomes for foreign- born individuals 
vis- à- vis native peers. In this vein, if international transferability of skills or 
qualification recognition is an issue, then it is possible to observe education– 
occupation mismatches among migrant individuals (Chiswick 2009). In ad-
dition to sociodemographic differences such as education and age, the role of 
ethnic background in the labor market has also been highlighted in explaining 
some of the observed differences compared to native peers (Akgüç and Ferrer 
2015). Furthermore, young migrants sometimes face a double disadvantage: the 
first for their youthfulness, which usually means that they lack work experience 
and therefore have difficulty in making the transition from education to the labor 
market (Brzinsky- Fay 2007), and a second one in the form of the differential and 
discriminatory treatment that is commonly meted out to migrants. All in all, 
analyzing the labor market integration of young migrants has important policy 
relevance because it evidences the (in)effectiveness of labor market institutions 
(e.g., in terms of recognition of foreign qualifications) in tackling possible labor 
market mismatches faced by foreign- born residents in destination countries.
To this end, this chapter addresses the following research questions: Do re-
cently arrived young migrants in Europe differ from native peers with respect 
to socioeconomic and labor market indicators? How do recently arrived young 
migrants from different regions of origin differ among themselves? To what ex-
tent do the observable differences in sociodemographic characteristics explain 
the gaps in the labor market outcomes of young migrants from various regions 
relative to native peers? Do we observe gender gaps in labor market outcomes 
among young migrants?
To address these questions, this chapter conducts a comparative econometric 
analysis of the labor market integration of young migrants of different origins. In 
a departure from the main literature on labor market integration (one exception 
is Spreckelsen, Leschke, and Seeleib- Kaiser, this volume), the chapter focuses on 
youth aged 35 years or younger because this age group accounts for a large share 
of the migrants in Europe in the past two decades. In particular, the analysis 
considers recent migrants who arrived within the past 10 years. Regarding labor 
market integration, the chapter examines a wide range of outcomes, such as (un)
employment, type of job contract (temporary or permanent), self- employment, 
hours worked, and various indicators of occupational mismatch.2 Unlike the 
gen eral approach in much of the previous research, migrants are not treated as a 
homogeneous group, and attention is paid to differences in ethnic origins. In line 
with the recent mobility patterns in Europe, the focus is on young migrants from 
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Eastern and Southern Europe, but other migrant groups are also considered so as 
to give a broader picture. Moreover, the novelty of the chapter is that it analyzes 
the labor market integration of young migrants in a cross- country framework. 
Last, because the gender gap is highlighted as an important factor in migrants’ 
experience, the chapter also contributes to the literature by embedding gender 
aspects in the analysis of the labor market integration of young migrants.
The descriptive findings point to differences in socioeconomic characteris-
tics (e.g., age and education) as well as in labor market indicators (e.g., employ-
ment and occupational mismatch) across different migrant groups and between 
migrants and native peers. Econometric analysis suggests that observable charac-
teristics explain part, although not all, of the differential labor market outcomes 
of migrants. Young Eastern European migrants are found to be overqualified 
for their occupations compared to native peers of destination countries. Young 
Southern Europeans are more likely to be self- employed and to be on a tempo-
rary employment contract. Regarding broader age groups, the younger cohorts 
seem to be performing worse than the older cohorts in terms of unemployment, 
self- employment, contract type, and overqualification, but these differences are 
not always statistically significant and they vary by the origin of individuals. 
Furthermore, important gender gaps are observed among youth in favor of men 
with regard to employment and hours worked per week, and this pattern holds 
for all migrant groups considered.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We first provide a brief 
literature review with a short background on recent migration trends in Europe. 
We next provide a description of the data, variables of interest, and the econo-
metric methodology used for the micro- level cross- country analysis, followed 
by a presentation of the descriptive analysis and the estimation results. Finally, 
we discuss the results along the youth and gender dimensions and provide 
concluding remarks, suggesting areas for future research and discussing issues 
related to policymaking aimed at alleviating migrant and youth vulnerabilities in 
destination labor markets.
13.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The majority of the literature has focused on migrant integration into English- 
speaking countries, examining single- country cases (Chiswick 1978, 1979; Borjas 
1987; Ferrer and Riddell 2008; Constant, Nottmeyer, and Zimmermann 2012). 
Most of these papers examine a limited number of labor market outcomes, such 
as wages (Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1987; Ferrer and Riddell 2008). There are a few 
studies comparing several countries, but even these do not always use compa-
rable data sources (Constant and Zimmermann 2005; Antecol, Kuhn, and Trejo 
2006; Algan et al. 2010). One novelty of this chapter is that it takes a compara-
tive approach and conducts an analysis using harmonized cross- country data on 
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labor market integration covering various outcomes. Notwithstanding a number 
of caveats— discussed in Section 13.3— pooled cross- country data add to our un-
derstanding of differences in the integration of migrant populations across coun-
tries (Adsera and Chiswick 2007).
Most contributions find relatively worse outcomes for migrants compared to 
native peers in the labor markets for various reasons (Chiswick 1978; Adsera and 
Chiswick 2007; Jean et al. 2007). Although part of the nativity gap is related to so-
cioeconomic background, such as education— where the latter has been obtained 
(Akgüç and Ferrer 2015)— and previous labor market experience, another part 
could be caused by skills recognition or transferability issues in destination coun-
tries (Chiswick 2009). Earlier studies also emphasize the assimilation process, 
whereby migrants catch up— if ever— with native outcomes only after a certain 
amount of time has been spent in the country and after obtaining country- 
specific skills (Chiswick 1978). Country of origin and cultural background are 
another set of related factors that determine labor market outcomes (Fernández 
and Fogli 2009; Blau, Kahn, and Papps 2011). Migration motivations, such as 
economic goals, education, political beliefs, or family reunification, might also 
be associated with integration patterns (Akgüç 2014), whereby the experience of 
economic and student migrants seems to more closely approximate that of na-
tive peers. Last, differential treatment in the form of discrimination might also 
lie behind native– immigrant gaps. Considering these dimensions, this chapter 
contributes to the literature by providing further insights into the labor market 
integration of recent young migrants in Europe by controlling for socioeconomic 
and ethnic backgrounds.
In the migration literature, the main focus is usually on working- age 
individuals rather than on migrating youth, except in some contributions, such 
as Seeleib- Kaiser and Spreckelsen (2016) and Spreckelsen et al. (this volume). 
Examining recent young European migrants in the United Kingdom, Seeleib- 
Kaiser and Spreckelsen find that although these migrants are highly integrated 
in terms of employment, they end up in poor- quality jobs. Similarly, Clark and 
Drinkwater (2008) find that recent Eastern European migrants to the United 
Kingdom experience relatively low returns on their education and work in un-
skilled occupations. This chapter likewise focuses on young migrants, but in a 
cross- country framework; the findings are nevertheless similar to those of pre-
vious papers. Although most of the aforementioned reasons for poor integration 
outcomes can be valid for young migrants as well, this group might also face 
the additional challenge of being young and the related risks to labor market 
transitions posed by lack of previous market experience and particularly of skills 
that are specific to the destination country. Finally, to our knowledge, none of the 
earlier studies addresses gender gaps while examining the labor market integra-
tion of youth migrant groups, as is done in this chapter.
As mentioned in Section 13.1, the chapter mainly focuses on Southern and 
Eastern European young migrants, even though other origins are included in 
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order to have a complete picture. The main reason for the focus on these groups 
are the recent mobility patterns in Europe. Regarding Southern Europe, Spain 
has turned from a migration destination during the boom years of 1995– 2000 
into an emigration country during the recent recession, whereby many young 
native peers and foreign residents have left to find employment elsewhere as 
jobs have become scarce (González Gago and Kirzner 2013; Izquierdo, Jimeno, 
and Lacuesta 2016). In the Italian case, despite the stable emigration in the pre- 
and postcrisis periods, the recent composition of migrants has changed to in-
clude more highly educated youth older than age 25 years, which suggests that 
the usual out- migration for study abroad has been replaced by work motives 
with lower return rates (Constant and D’Agosto 2008; Ciccarone 2013), thus 
raising the issue of brain drain (Beine, Docquier, and Özden 2011; Docquier 
and Rapoport 2012). Regarding migrants from Eastern Europe, the major policy 
change influencing their mobility has been the Eastern enlargement of the EU. 
However, EU accession did not immediately give the right of free movement and 
work to the citizens of the new member states,3 with transitional measures of up 
to 7 years restricting free movement for work purposes (Galgóczi, Leschke, and 
Watt 2011; Galgóczi and Leschke 2012).4 Regardless of the transition measures, 
a striking feature of recent migrant flows from Eastern Europe is that they are 
mainly dominated by young and well- educated individuals, as will be shown in 
the empirical analysis.
13.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To conduct the econometric analysis of labor market integration of migrants 
within a cross- country framework, we have at least two options regarding data 
sources: the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU- LFS) and the European 
Social Survey (ESS). Given the focus on Southern and Eastern European origins, 
we opted for the ESS, mainly because it provides detailed country- of- origin 
information. For example, we are not able to distinguish Southern European 
migrants in the EU- LFS, which gives only a broader country- of- origin categori-
zation, such as EU15.
The ESS is a biennial— partly repetitive— cross- section survey including con-
ventional demographic and socioeconomic variables as well as labor market 
indicators relating to diverse populations in more than 30 countries. The 
survey covers all persons aged 15 years or older who are residents within pri-
vate households— regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language, or legal 
status— in the 36 participating countries (mainly in Europe). The survey is acces-
sible via the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.
Using the ESS, we focus on 15 destinations, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These are countries that 
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have received important migrant flows during the past few decades not only from 
within but also from outside Europe (Brücker, Capuano, and Marfouk 2013). The 
migration flows to these destinations have been influenced by and have evolved 
through various economic, social, and political developments during this 
period— for example, the Eastern enlargement of the EU, occasional amnesties 
offered to illegal migrants (e.g., in Spain), rising youth unemployment, and 
widening socioeconomic inequalities. Not all of the 15 countries participated in 
all rounds of the survey, but quite a few of them participated in almost all rounds 
(see Table A13.1 in the Appendix). The total sample has 145,564 observations, 
composed of native- and foreign- born individuals from diverse origins; in fact, 
the sample includes 198 different countries of origin.
In order to have a large enough sample for the econometric analysis, we use all 
available ESS rounds (1– 7) during the period 2002– 2015. We pool the countries 
together and over time and include individuals aged 15– 65 years at the time of 
the survey. Given that young people from various origins have been more mobile 
in Europe in recent years, we pay particular attention to the youth dimension, 
searching for possible heterogeneities and patterns across various countries of 
origin. To this end, we create two age bands using 35 years as the cut- off age, 
whereby individuals are defined as being young if they are aged 35  years or 
younger. In addition to providing standard summary statistics including eve-
ryone, we report additional descriptive information on the youth dimension so 
as to inspect the differences in outcomes by age group.
Regarding the definition of migrants, an individual is defined as a migrant 
if his or her country of birth is different from his or her country of residence at 
the time of the survey. However, this definition of migration, although standard 
in the literature, can be rather broad because it can also include migrants who 
arrived as small children and hence would be considered second- generation 
migrants, which is not the focus of this chapter. Because the focus is mainly on 
first- generation migrants who move for work, we address this potential issue 
by limiting the sample to “recent” migrants who migrated within the previous 
10 years. In this way, we capture— to a large extent— individuals who recently 
migrated as adults or youth. Moreover, because there is no particular informa-
tion on seasonal, circular, or cross- border migration in the data, we are not able 
to capture such temporary migration here.
Given the focus on Southern and Eastern European migrants, because they 
have been among the most mobile groups in Europe recently, we create aggregate 
categories of origins for migrants, in addition to the native peers:5 (1) Southern 
Europe, which includes individuals from Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; 
(2)  Eastern Europe, which includes individuals from EU10 countries— that is, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia; (3)  intra- EU, which consists of individuals from other 
EU countries, excluding Southern and Eastern Europeans; and (4)  non- EU, 
which consists of individuals from countries other than the 28 member states 
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of the European Union.6 The main focus is on Southern and Eastern European 
individuals, but to give a complete picture, residents from non- EU origins as well 
as the other intra- EU countries are also included. In total, approximately 10.3% 
of the population in the sample is foreign born of diverse origins.
While carrying out the descriptive analysis, we also run several t- tests (not 
reported here but available upon request) of mean differences in characteristics 
across various groups in order to check whether the observed unconditional 
differences are statistically significant, in which case analysis across groups is 
justified. Results from these tests point to statistically significant heterogeneities 
in almost all observed characteristics across diverse origins. Therefore, we dis-
tinguish these various subgroups, taking native peers as the reference in the re-
mainder of the econometric analysis.
For a comparative analysis of the socioeconomic characteristics and the labor 
market integration of various populations, we initially examine the uncondi-
tional differences in individual characteristics such as age, gender, household 
size, marital status, number of children, residential area, and educational attain-
ment, in addition to several labor market indicators, such as employment, un-
employment, self- employment, weekly total hours worked in main job (overtime 
included), contract type (temporary/ permanent), and education– occupation 
mismatch. With regard to mismatch, we mainly have in mind overqualification, 
referring to individuals who are capable of handling more complex tasks and 
whose skills are underused, as defined by the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD 2012; see also McGuinness, Bergin, and 
Whelan, this volume).7 Technically, we construct the overqualification indicator 
based on the definition used by Chiswick and Miller (2010) and Aleksynska and 
Tritah (2013): Using information on the average years of educational attainment 
per occupation in each country, an individual is defined to be overqualified 
if his or her education is one standard deviation above the average within the 
occupation.8
The different access years for citizens from Eastern Europe to the labor 
markets of the old member states because of various transitional measures can 
potentially raise issues when one analyzes migration for work, but it is outside 
the scope of this chapter to analyze labor market integration incorporating all 
possible restrictive transitional periods. However, evidence from aggregate data 
by Akgüç and Beblavý (2015) suggests that there has already been a substantial 
and continuous migrant flow from Eastern European countries to Western and 
Northern European countries since the early 1990s. Moreover, taking into ac-
count country and time effects in the econometrics analysis partially captures the 
differential transition periods as well.9
We address the differences in labor market integration by controlling for soci-
oeconomic characteristics and their interactions across different groups analyzed 
within a multivariate regression framework. For the baseline model, each binary 
dependent variable (employment, unemployment, self- employment, contract 
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type, and overqualification) Yict  of individual i in country c at time t is estimated 
by probit using the following model:10
 P Yict =( ) = ( )1 X XΦ β  (13.1)
where X includes dummy variables (ORIic) for five broad origin groups for each 
individual i in country c (native peers, Southern Europeans, Eastern Europeans, 
intra- EU, and non- EU migrants); demographic/ socioeconomic controls (Xict) 
such as age and age squared, gender, household size, marital status, children, 
educational attainment in years, and residential area; and country- fixed effects 
(ηc), year effects (µt), and a random error term (εict). To facilitate the interpreta-
tion of the coefficients, all the estimation results with binary variables report the 
estimated marginal effects of the respective control variable.
For the continuous dependent variable (weekly total hours worked) of indi-
vidual i in country c at time t, we estimate an ordinary least squares version of 
Eq. (13.1):
 Y ORI Xict ic ict c t ict= + + + + +β β β η µ ε0 1 2  (13.2)
where the same notation as before follows. For self- employment, contract type, 
hours worked, and overqualification, we add the condition of “being employed.” 
In this way, we compare, for example, the number of hours worked among em-
ployed individuals only and not also among unemployed. In the models, the 
coefficients of interest are those in front of the origin dummies as well as the 
youth dummy— where relevant— and they are interpreted as the deviation in the 
outcomes from the reference population, consisting of native- born and older 
individuals.
Next, with the aim of exploring heterogeneities in these initial results for 
different age cohorts by origin, we estimate the previous models by interacting 
the origin dummies with the youth dummy. This implies adding the term
β1ORI YOUTHic ict*  into the previous equations, where YOUTHict is an indicator 
of youth (1 if aged 35 years or younger). Furthermore, we explore the gender di-
mension in the analysis by running similar interaction models as with the youth 
dimension but replacing the youth dummy by the gender dummy FEMALEict. 
Finally, we estimate gender gaps across native- born and migrant groups for 
selected labor market outcomes among young individuals only. This last exercise 
allows us to explore the potential heterogeneities and vulnerabilities experienced 
by young migrant women.
With respect to the pooling of data across different countries and over time, as 
we have elected to do in this chapter, there are both advantages and disadvantages 
to this exercise. We acknowledge that pooling different destination countries 
with different economic and welfare- state configurations combined with changes 
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over time makes it difficult to interpret the results— especially in a causal way 
for a particular country. For this reason, we note that outcomes would be likely 
to differ from one destination to another if countries were analyzed separately 
(see Spreckelsen et  al., this volume). At the same time, pooling helps smooth 
out heterogeneities between countries and years and provides a comprehensive 
overview of the general situation that is complementary to the single- country 
analysis at a point in time or over time. Pooling also boosts the sample size, par-
ticularly for migrants. Furthermore, inclusion of country and time effects in 
models with pooled data— as done in this chapter— takes into account part of 
the cross- country and period- related heterogeneities. Finally, in order to have 
representative results both nationally and across countries, we include country 
and design weights provided by ESS when pooling all countries throughout the 
empirical analysis.
13.4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
13.4.1. summary statistics of Main Variables
Table 13.1 displays the main summary statistics for native peers and recent mi-
grant groups of all age groups in the sample. The female ratio is mainly approx-
imately 50% across various population groups, reaching between 55% and 60% 
for Eastern European and intra- EU migrants. This finding is consistent with 
the feminization of migration during recent decades. Migrants tend to live in 
more urban areas than do native peers. The latter finding might be related to 
the prediction by Harris and Todaro (1970) that individuals from less developed 
rural regions are more likely to move to developed urban areas.11 Regarding ed-
ucational attainment, the numbers suggest that recent migrants from Eastern 
Europe, followed by those from intra- EU countries, have acquired more years 
of education compared to native- born individuals. The educational profiles of 
migrants overall seem to be in line with the human capital theory of migra-
tion, which postulates that migrants tend to be relatively well educated notwith-
standing differences across different origins.
Regarding the labor market variables, the employment rate is approximately 
two- thirds for all groups, whereas unemployment is approximately 5% or 6%, on 
average, for native- born individuals, Southern migrants, and intra- EU migrants, 
and it is higher for Eastern European and non- EU migrants (8%– 10%). Self- 
employment is more common among intra- EU migrants and Southern European 
migrants. The average number of weekly hours worked is approximately 39 hours 
for everyone. Regarding contract type, migrants from Eastern European and non- 
EU countries are more likely to be on temporary contracts compared to the rest of 
the sample. This could be due to the fact that these groups are younger than the 
others. At the same time, there has been a general increase in the share of temporary 
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contracts since the early 2000s. Therefore, an econometric estimation that controls 
for sociodemographic characteristics together with time trends can shed light on 
this finding. Finally, the constructed overqualification indicator suggests that na-
tive peers are the least likely to be overqualified in their jobs, whereas non- EU 
migrants are the most likely to be overqualified. Southern Europeans are relatively 
similar to native peers in this regard, whereas Eastern Europeans and intra- EU 
migrants are more likely to be overqualified compared to native peers.
Table 13.1 Summary statistics of main variables (all age groups)
Native 
peers
Southern 
European 
migrants
Eastern 
European 
migrants
Intra- EU 
migrants
Non- EU 
migrants
Female 0.515 0.496 0.549 0.597 0.512
(0.500) (0.500) (0.497) (0.492) (0.500)
Household size 3.050 3.115 3.062 2.800 3.430
(1.377) (1.394) (1.423) (1.330) (1.619)
Married 0.533 0.688 0.587 0.559 0.623
(0.499) (0.463) (0.492) (0.497) (0.485)
No. of children 0.803 0.993 0.781 0.815 1.124
(1.067) (1.094) (1.028) (1.096) (1.284)
Residence in urban area 0.274 0.352 0.362 0.314 0.459
(0.446) (0.478) (0.481) (0.464) (0.498)
Education (years) 13.21 11.52 13.41 14.36 12.96
(3.837) (4.984) (3.538) (4.213) (4.500)
Employed 0.643 0.682 0.653 0.639 0.596
(0.479) (0.466) (0.476) (0.480) (0.491)
Unemployed 0.053 0.062 0.083 0.062 0.099
(0.224) (0.240) (0.275) (0.241) (0.294)
Self- employment 0.135 0.143 0.114 0.148 0.120
(0.341) (0.351) (0.318) (0.355) (0.325)
Total hours of work (week) 38.98 38.80 39.46 38.48 39.25
(13.46) (12.80) (16.02) (13.54) (13.80)
Contract type (temporary) 0.107 0.109 0.170 0.093 0.165
(0.309) (0.311) (0.376) (0.290) (0.371)
Education– occupation 
mismatch
0.147 0.152 0.201 0.199 0.223
Overqualified (0.354) (0.359) (0.401) (0.399) (0.416)
No. of observations 129,395 1,389 2,011 3,832 8,711
Notes: Means are reported, standard deviations are in parentheses. Only migrants who arrived within the 
previous 10 years are included. Intra- EU refers to EU countries other than Southern and Eastern Europe.
Source: ESS (2002– 2015).
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13.4.2. Further inspection of age structures, Migrant 
Backgrounds, and Gender Gaps
Regarding the age structure, a comparative report by Eurostat (2011) on the mi-
grant population in Europe suggests that compared to native peers, the foreign- 
born population is younger and more concentrated in the lower working- age 
group. The figures from the ESS sample, as displayed in Table 13.2, suggest par-
allel results. Although the share of native peers aged 35 years or younger is ap-
proximately one- third, the numbers jump almost twofold among migrants who 
arrived within the past 10  years; for example, approximately two out of three 
migrants from Eastern Europe and non- EU countries are young, whereas slightly 
more than half of Southern Europeans are young. In line with the youth shares, 
recent migrants are, on average, much younger than the native- born population 
(aged 41 vs. aged in their early 30s, respectively).
The youth dimension among migrants is given further inspection in Figure 
13.1, which shows the evolution of youth shares among migrants from the main 
sending regions per survey year. Each column gives the composition of migrants 
aged 35 years or younger by region of origin. For example, in 2002, the majority 
of young migrants (almost 70%) were from non- EU countries, whereas less than 
10% were from Southern and Eastern Europe combined. In 2009, the total share 
of young European migrants increased to more than 40%. Moreover, the relative 
share of young Eastern Europeans has increased significantly since 2008, which 
is likely due both to the changing economic circumstances brought on by the 
global recession and to the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Overall, an increasing 
number of young people of diverse origins seem to be on the move in Europe 
during the past decade.
Table 13.3 examines the gender gaps in different age cohorts in general, 
without distinguishing between migratory origins. To do this, we first estimate 
the mean gaps in outcome between men— the reference group— and women for 
a selected set of variables that are closely associated with labor market perfor-
mance (e.g., educational attainment, employment status, hours worked, contract 
type, and mismatch indicators). In order to investigate whether gender gaps 
differ by age structure, we repeat the first step for young individuals younger 
than age 35 years and for individuals aged 35 years or older, respectively. In this 
Table 13.2 Youth shares and average age by country of origin
Native peers Southern 
Europe
Eastern 
Europe
Intra- EU Non- EU
Youth population share (%; 
recent migrants only)
33.6 53.5 65.5 45.4 65.1
Average age (years) 41.1 33.6 32.1 36.4 32.3
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESS (2002– 2015).
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way, we get a hint as to how gender gaps in selected outcomes evolve across the 
life cycle.12 From the results shown in Table 13.3, we observe that young women 
have significantly more years of education (0.25) compared to young men, 
whereas the difference goes in the opposite direction among older individuals. 
Young women are also 8% less likely to be employed compared to young men, 
and this gap widens to 12% among the older cohorts. In terms of unemployment, 
women in general (regardless of their age cohort) are 1% less likely than men to 
be unemployed, which could be explained by the higher inactivity shares among 
women. The gender gap in self- employment is also in favor of men and widens 
with age, whereas the gender gap in weekly working hours widens by almost 
half in favor of men aged 35 years or older. For the remaining outcomes (e.g., 
contract type and overqualification), the gender gaps remain significant but do 
not differ across age groups. Without claiming causal relations, the econometric 
analysis in Section 13.4.3 acknowledges these differences by taking into account 
sociodemographic and ethnic background as well as variation across countries 
and time.
13.4.3. Baseline Estimation results for recent 
Migrants
Table 13.4 reports the baseline results of estimating Eqs. (13.1) and (13.2). By de-
fault, we always include the broad origin variables (first column of each outcome 
variable) and then add the common set of explanatory variables, comprising 
age, age squared, female dummy, household size, children, education, marital 
status, and urban dummy (second column of each outcome variable) in order to 
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determine whether holding observed characteristics constant modifies the initial 
effects of origins on the labor market outcomes of interest among native- born 
individuals and recent migrants. The improvement of the (pseudo/ adjusted) 
R2 when additional explanatory variables are added implies a better fit of the 
models when the positive influence on this coefficient due to the increase in the 
number of covariates is taken into account.
The results of the baseline employment regressions before introducing ad-
ditional controls suggest that there is no significant difference in employment 
across groups, except for migrants from non- European countries. Once we take 
into account differences in personal characteristics, however, significant gaps 
emerge: For example, migrants from Eastern Europe and intra- EU have lower 
employment levels compared to the native- born population. The explained em-
ployment gap between native- born individuals and non- EU migrants rises to 
12  percentage points once individual controls are held constant. The change 
from column 1 to column 2 in Table 13.4 suggests that migrants have character-
istics that lead to lower employment compared to native peers. The remaining 
coefficients in column 2 have expected signs:  Age increases employment at a 
Table 13.3 Mean gender gaps in labor market outcomes by age groups
(1) (2)
35 years or younger 35+ years
Education (years) 0.249*** – 0.088***
(8.02) (– 3.39)
Employed – 0.080*** – 0.121***
(– 18.02) (– 41.59)
Unemployed – 0.010*** – 0.009***
(– 4.67) (– 6.73)
Self- employment – 0.038*** – 0.096***
(– 12.83) (– 35.51)
Hours worked (week) – 7.076*** – 9.702***
(– 46.17) (– 100.47)
Temporary contract 0.03*** 0.024***
(6.15) (12.64)
Overqualified – 0.013*** – 0.016***
(– 2.87) (– 5.79)
No. of observations 49,068 96,459
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. Reference group is men.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: ESS (2002– 2015).
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Table 13.4 Baseline estimations of labor market performance with full set of control 
variables
Employment Unemployment Self- employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
South 0.030 – 0.021 0.014 0.012 0.023 0.022
(0.028) (0.029) (0.011) (0.010) (0.023) (0.022)
East – 0.026 – 0.072*** 0.027*** 0.021*** – 0.030* – 0.000
(0.020) (0.021) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018)
Intra- EU – 0.015 – 0.078*** 0.016 0.017* 0.017 0.022
(0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Non- EU – 0.073*** – 0.120*** 0.039*** 0.033*** – 0.023*** – 0.015*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Age 0.098*** 0.007*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Age squared – 0.001*** – 0.000*** – 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female – 0.153*** – 0.004*** – 0.072***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Household 
size
– 0.006** 0.001 0.006**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Education 
(years)
0.017*** – 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.055*** – 0.034*** – 0.006
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
No. of children – 0.024*** – 0.005*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
Living in urban 
area
– 0.019*** 0.003 – 0.004
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.198 0.023 0.062 0.024 0.063
No. of 
observations
140,813 139,641 140,813 139,641 92,543 91,960
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Temporary contract Hours of work 
(weekly)
Overqualified
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
South 0.033* 0.046** – 0.436 – 0.529 0.020 0.022*
(0.019) (0.018) (0.781) (0.726) (0.023) (0.013)
East 0.060*** 0.042*** 1.615 0.679 0.048** 0.030***
(0.014) (0.013) (1.385) (0.762) (0.019) (0.009)
Intra- EU – 0.001 0.004 – 0.229 – 0.347 0.071*** – 0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.612) (0.553) (0.014) (0.007)
Non- EU 0.073*** 0.064*** 0.605* 0.580* 0.075*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.356) (0.338) (0.008) (0.004)
Age – 0.017*** 0.965*** – 0.001*
(0.001) (0.055) (0.001)
Age squared 0.000*** – 0.011*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Female 0.017*** – 9.524*** – 0.019***
(0.003) (0.127) (0.002)
Household size 0.007*** – 0.214 0.003**
(0.002) (0.139) (0.001)
Education 
(years)
– 0.000 0.242*** 0.031***
(0.000) (0.018) (0.001)
Married – 0.032*** – 0.462*** – 0.008***
(0.003) (0.158) (0.002)
No. of children – 0.007*** – 0.737*** – 0.003*
(0.002) (0.162) (0.002)
Living in 
urban area
0.001 – 0.643*** – 0.009***
(0.003) (0.138) (0.002)
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.113 0.017 0.159 0.008 0.409
No. of 
observations
92,543 91,960 89,902 89,445 92,226 91,670
Notes: Reference group is native- born individuals. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Individual controls 
include age, age squared, gender, household size, education, marital status, children, and urban residence. Only recent 
migrants who arrived in the destination countries within the previous 10 years are included. Intra- EU refers to EU 
countries other than Southern and Eastern Europe.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: ESS (2002– 2015).
Table 13.4 Continued
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decreasing rate, being female is negatively related to employment, and an ad-
ditional year of education increases employment. Regarding unemployment, 
migrants from Eastern Europe and of non- EU origins have higher chances of 
being unemployed, and adding individual controls does not modify the results 
to any great extent. In terms of self- employment, Eastern Europeans and non- 
EU migrants are less likely (although the significance of the coefficient is barely 
10% for the former group) to be self- employed compared to native peers; how-
ever, this difference almost disappears once individual controls are introduced. 
Regarding contract duration, most migrants— except for intra- EU migrants— are 
more likely (to a varying extent by origin) than native peers to hold a temporary 
job. The estimated gaps in temporary contracts between native- born workers 
and migrants remain significant even after introducing individual controls.
As seen in the unconditional means from the descriptive statistics, weekly 
hours of work do not differ across groups in general for the main groups of 
interest, except for the non- EU migrants, who work slightly more hours than 
the others. Concerning occupational mismatch, all migrants except Southern 
Europeans have a higher chance of being overqualified compared to native- born 
individuals, but this picture changes somewhat once sociodemographic controls 
are introduced. For example, whereas migrants from intra- EU no longer differ 
from native peers, Southern Europeans now appear to be overqualified in terms 
of their educational attainments (although only at 10% significance), together 
with individuals from Eastern Europe and non- EU countries, even though 
the extent of mismatch is reduced for the latter origins once control variables 
are added.
13.4.4. results with Youth interactions and Gender 
Gaps among Youth
Following the baseline estimations, we investigate the labor market outcomes 
of various migrant groups by distinguishing between different age cohorts in 
order to obtain insights into the possible vulnerabilities that young people might 
experience in destination labor markets. To this end, we conduct several addi-
tional exercises.13 First, we rerun similar models by adding an interaction term 
for the youth indicator and the origin dummies (Table 13.5). Next, based on 
these estimation results with youth interactions, we choose the migrant origins 
in which we are interested— Eastern and Southern Europe— and conduct a 
post- estimation mean- differences test (i.e., a t- test) to compare the labor market 
outcomes of young migrants to those of native- born young people (Table 13.6). 
We illustrate the results with youth interactions graphically for selected labor 
market outcomes by origin and by age group, broken down by the 35- year cut- 
off (see Figure 13.2). Finally, we augment the econometric analysis thus far with 
the gender dimension by estimating labor market performance models across 
different migrant origins by gender and by age groups only among individuals 
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Table 13.5 Estimations of labor market performance with youth interactions (with full set of controls)
Employment Unemployment Self- employment Temporary 
contract
Hours (weekly) Overqualified
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
South 0.049 0.018 0.003 0.044* – 0.607 0.012
(0.034) (0.014) (0.025) (0.024) (0.838) (0.018)
East – 0.076*** 0.044*** – 0.015 0.052*** – 0.115 0.030**
(0.028) (0.010) (0.023) (0.019) (0.917) (0.014)
Intra- EU – 0.108*** 0.019* 0.015 0.031** – 0.666 – 0.006
(0.022) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.662) (0.008)
Non- EU – 0.064*** 0.047*** – 0.018* 0.069*** 0.960** 0.048***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.418) (0.005)
Young (age < 35) – 0.071*** 0.016*** – 0.082*** 0.083*** – 1.091*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.184) (0.002)
South*Young – 0.038 – 0.002 0.081 0.001 1.243 0.030
(0.062) (0.021) (0.052) (0.036) (1.684) (0.025)
East*Young 0.119*** – 0.036*** 0.025 – 0.024 2.038 0.002
(0.041) (0.014) (0.035) (0.026) (1.505) (0.018)
Intra- EU*Young 0.145*** 0.001 0.020 – 0.069*** 1.389 0.016
(0.039) (0.019) (0.032) (0.023) (1.187) (0.014)
Non- EU*Young – 0.006 – 0.018*** – 0.004 – 0.013 – 0.683 – 0.026***
(0.020) (0.007) (0.019) (0.012) (0.715) (0.009)
Female – 0.138*** – 0.006*** – 0.073*** 0.018*** – 9.501*** – 0.019***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.128) (0.002)
Household size – 0.055*** – 0.003*** – 0.001 0.018*** – 0.778*** 0.004***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.137) (0.001)
(continued)
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Employment Unemployment Self- employment Temporary 
contract
Hours (weekly) Overqualified
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education (years) 0.028*** – 0.003*** 0.002*** – 0.001** 0.284*** 0.031***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.001)
Married 0.056*** – 0.035*** 0.009** – 0.049*** – 0.008 – 0.011***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.151) (0.002)
No. of children 0.103*** 0.005*** 0.004 – 0.020*** 0.229 – 0.003**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.152) (0.002)
Living in urban area – 0.020*** 0.003 – 0.004 0.000 – 0.650*** – 0.010***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.139) (0.002)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country- fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.048 0.057 0.099 0.149 0.408
No. of observations 139,641 139,641 91,960 91,960 89,445 91,670
Notes: See notes to Table 13.4.
Source: ESS (2002– 2015).
Table 13.5 Continued
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Table 13.6 Labor market performance differences between native- born youth and 
young Southern/ Eastern migrants
Young Southern European 
migrants vs. young 
native- born
Young Eastern European 
migrants vs. young 
native- born
Employment + +
Unemployment + +
Self- employment +** +
Temporary contract +* +
Hours of work (weekly) + +**
Overqualified + +***
Notes: The table displays post- estimation t- test results of linear combinations of origin interacted with 
youth dummies. A plus sign indicates that the respective migrant group has a higher value of the outcome 
variable compared to native- born. Asterisks indicate the significance level of the t- tests based on conventional 
notation. No asterisk means nonsignificance of the tested coefficients. Only recent migrants who arrived in 
the destination countries within the previous 10 years are included in the analysis.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: ESS (2002– 2015).
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younger than age 35 years. We display the predicted gender gaps among young 
people and by origin in selected labor market outcomes (see Figure 13.3)
In Table 13.5, the single coefficients of the origin dummies for Southern and 
Eastern Europe give the average effect for these groups without distinguishing the 
age group, whereas the interacted terms with the youth dummy give the effects 
for young individuals from these regions. Therefore, to obtain the overall effect 
of being young and being of a particular origin on the outcome variable, we need 
to add these coefficients together. Before assessing the overall effects, a quick 
glance at the estimated coefficients suggests that compared to older individuals, 
young individuals are less likely to be employed or self- employed, are more likely 
to be unemployed or have temporary job contracts, and are more likely to be 
overqualified for their occupations.
In order to determine whether the joint effect of being young and from a par-
ticular migratory origin on labor market outcome is statistically significant, we 
run post- estimation significance tests of linear combinations of the coefficients 
of the youth and respective origin dummies from Table 13.5. Table 13.6 
summarizes these post- estimation test results for young Southern and Eastern 
European migrants by taking native- born young people as the reference group.14
The results show that young Southern and Eastern Europeans are not sig-
nificantly more likely than young native peers to be employed or unemployed. 
However, young Southern Europeans are more likely than young native peers 
to be self- employed (which is not a general result for Southern migrants of all 
ages, as seen in Table 13.4). Finally, the results suggest that young migrants from 
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both Eastern and Southern Europe are more likely than young native peers to be 
overqualified for their occupations, where the gap compared to native peers is 
statistically significant for Eastern Europeans, in particular.
To further illustrate these results visually, Figure 13.2 shows the predicted 
probabilities of selected labor market indicators— such as unemployment, 
self- employment, contract type, and overqualification— across origins for two 
age bands (cut- off age is 35 years). The graphs in Figure 13.2 are based on the 
estimated probit models with the full set of controls, and each point in the figure 
gives the marginal effect of a particular age group on the predicted outcome for 
a given origin. The top left panel shows that unemployment is generally higher 
for all young groups of different origins except for Eastern Europe and that the 
overall predicted unemployment is highest among non- EU migrants. Regarding 
self- employment, young individuals of all origins have lower predicted self- 
employment compared to older individuals. Among young people, Southern 
Europeans have the highest level of self- employment. Similar to self- employment, 
young individuals of all origins are more likely than older individuals to have a 
temporary contract, but among the youth of different origins, there is quite a 
bit of heterogeneity in predicted outcomes. For example, young migrants from 
non- EU countries and Southern Europe have higher predicted values for having 
a temporary contract compared to young intra- EU migrants and native- born 
workers. Finally, younger individuals are generally more likely to be overqualified 
across all groups, except for non- EU migrants. However, as the post- estimation 
test from Table 13.4 suggested, the difference is significant mainly for Eastern 
Europeans.
Finally, we examine the gender gaps among individuals of different origins 
and aged 35 years or younger for selected labor market outcomes, such as em-
ployment, contract type, overqualification, and hours worked per week. We 
choose the labor market outcomes for which we observed significant (uncon-
ditional) gender differences, as reported previously (see Table 13.3). Figure 
13.3 is based on the estimation of predicted probabilities for these selected 
outcomes after including all control variables as before. We see that there is 
an important gender gap in favor of men in employment and hours worked 
per week and that this pattern holds for all migrant groups considered. As 
observed previously for other outcomes, there are also variations in the 
outcomes among the migrant origins. For example, young women of non- EU 
origins have the lowest employment and hours worked per week compared 
to young women of other origins and compared to young men in general. 
Concerning contract type, we observe that the previous gender- gap patterns 
are somewhat broken but that they still seem to exist. For example, young 
migrant men from Southern Europe have a higher probability of having a 
temporary job compared to their female counterparts of the same origin, 
whereas the predicted probability of being on a temporary job contract is al-
most the same for young native- born individuals and for Eastern European 
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male and female migrants. Regarding the gender gap in the overqualification 
outcome, it seems that there is again a slight gender pattern, although this 
time it is more in favor of women, whereby young men of most origins, in-
cluding native- born men (except for Southern Europe), are more likely than 
young women to be overqualified for the jobs they hold.
13.5. DISCUSSION
Overall, regarding the main groups of interest in the destination countries 
analyzed, the results from baseline estimations show clearly that migrants from 
Eastern Europe and non- EU countries (as well as from Southern Europe, to a 
lesser extent) display important differences in certain labor outcomes, such as 
employment, unemployment, and overqualification for the occupation held, 
even after taking into account differences in their socioeconomic characteris-
tics. This comes as a surprise given the strong educational and socioeconomic 
background of some migrants. At the same time, examining the fit of the models 
in different columns, we observe that the performance of the model estimation 
varies across outcomes of interest, whereby the fit of the models for employment, 
hours worked, and overqualification is better than for the rest.
The finding of a relatively worse labor market performance of migrants 
compared to native peers is not very new in the literature (Chiswick 1978; 
Adsera and Chiswick 2007; Jean et al. 2007; Akgüç and Ferrer 2015). Chiswick 
asserts that the earnings gap between native- born individuals and immigrants 
in the labor markets narrows the longer the migrant stays in the destination 
country and that this assimilation period can last for a relatively long time (10– 
15 years). The fact that we focus our analysis only on recent migrants could 
partially explain these nativity gaps because it might take a longer time for 
recent migrants to accumulate country- specific skills. Other reasons behind 
the persisting gaps between various populations in European destination labor 
markets could be related to factors not accounted for here, such as individual 
unobserved heterogeneity, language proficiency gaps, and so on. A further ex-
planation for labor market outcome gaps between native- born individuals and 
migrants could be related to differential labor market treatment in the form of 
discrimination.
Regarding the main results with youth interactions, we find that youth gen-
erally have worse outcomes in employment, unemployment, contract type, 
and education– occupation match compared to older cohorts but that these 
differences are not always significant. This is in line with the findings from the 
literature pointing to various transitional challenges faced by youth in general 
(Brzinsky- Fay 2007). Moreover, this differential performance varies by the or-
igin of the young individuals. Our results also suggest that Eastern and Southern 
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migrants are more likely than native- born people to be overqualified and that the 
overqualification of Eastern Europeans seems to be mainly found among young 
migrants. These findings, again, could be associated with the theses that there is 
imperfect international skills transferability across countries (Chiswick 2009) or 
that these young migrants need more time to fully assimilate and accumulate 
skills that are specific to the destination country so that they can catch up with 
the native- born individuals (Chiswick 1978). Moreover, we note that because the 
estimated models are based on pooled data from a number of relatively hetero-
geneous destination countries with different labor market institutions, welfare 
systems, and compositions of migrant populations, it is impossible to pin down 
the exact mechanism explaining why the migrant– native gaps persist in the labor 
markets.
Regarding the gender dimension in labor market integration among youth 
migrants, our findings highlight the fact that the gender gaps seem to generally 
exist among young individuals regarding certain labor outcomes such as employ-
ment and hours worked, although some differential patterns are also observed 
in contract type and occupational mismatch. Moreover, the predicted outcomes 
also vary by different migratory origins. In summary, various factors— such as 
different labor market institutions in terms of their flexibility for work– life bal-
ance, differences in childcare access, as well as different cultural attitudes toward 
labor market participation among various migrant groups— could be behind 
these gender gaps. A comprehensive understanding of the causal mechanisms 
behind these differences is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, we high-
light these gender differences among youth migrants by controlling for various 
sociodemographic and ethnic backgrounds and by exploiting the variation 
across countries and time.
13.6. CONCLUSIONS
Using a microeconometric framework, this chapter examined the labor market 
integration of recent migrant populations vis- à- vis native- born individuals, 
with a focus on youth in major European countries that have received impor-
tant inflows in recent decades. Although the quantitative analysis is carried out 
including all migratory origins, particular attention is paid to migrants from 
Southern and Eastern Europe, given that these two regions have been the largest 
source of young migrants within Europe especially during the past decade. In 
this vein, examining the recent migration flows from within Europe, Akgüç and 
Beblavý (2015) point to a shift from Southern Europe to Eastern Europe as an 
important region of origin. The stock figures suggest, however, that Southern 
European migrant stocks are still larger than those of Eastern Europeans 
across many destinations in Europe, such as France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom.
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This chapter focused on youth migrant integration and investigated outcomes 
following migration because— based on several theories outlined previously— 
(1) migration is an essential part of a strategic transition in an individual’s life 
and (2) youth is a particular group with possibly different migration behavior 
and human capital endowment compared to the rest of the population. With this 
aim in mind, the microeconometric analysis using individual- level data from the 
ESS across 15 European countries specifically examined how young migrants 
differ from older migrants and from native peers, and especially whether 
young migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe have different labor market 
outcomes compared to young migrants from the rest of Europe and from outside 
the EU. The chapter treated migrants as a heterogeneous group and distinguished 
ethnic origins via broader country clusters. The descriptive analysis highlighted 
that recent migrants (who arrived within the past 10 years) are, on average, much 
younger than the native- born population. The findings from the micro- level 
analysis suggest that migrants from Eastern and Southern Europe show impor-
tant differences compared to native- born people regarding certain outcomes, 
such as employment, unemployment, contract type, and overqualification, even 
after taking into account differences in socioeconomic characteristics such as 
education, gender, age, and country- fixed and year effects. Furthermore, young 
migrants from both Eastern and Southern Europe are more likely to be over-
qualified compared to young native- born workers. These findings imply that 
individual characteristics explain only part of the differential performance of 
migrants in the destination- country labor markets. Moreover, we also find im-
portant gender gaps in favor of men in employment and hours worked per week 
and that this pattern holds for all migrant groups considered (and very signifi-
cantly so for non- EU migrants).
There could be various reasons for the unexplained gaps between different 
young migrant groups and native peers, such as differential treatment of these 
groups in destination countries. Regarding the vulnerabilities faced by— especially 
female— migrants in the labor markets, there is also the issue of their selection 
into the labor force (and employment), which could lie behind the discrepancies 
compared to the performance of native- born workers. However, dealing with se-
lection issues, in general, is outside the scope of this chapter and has been left for 
future research. Last, we note that given the pooled nature of the cross- country 
data, we can expect different outcomes and findings if the analysis is carried out 
on a single country; nevertheless, these findings on differential outcomes for 
migrants in destination- country labor markets call for further research on the un-
derlying channels leading to native– migrant gaps. In this vein, panel data would 
prove very useful in controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity.
To tackle issues of persisting native– migrant gaps in labor market performance, 
policies could be geared toward further integration and nondiscriminatory treat-
ment of foreign- born residents in the destination labor markets. Employers 
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could adopt anonymous job applications to avoid discriminatory hiring based 
on ethnicity. On the education– occupation mismatch issue, better screening 
and more transparent evaluation schemes could be developed to compare and 
recognize the degrees, qualifications, and skills possessed by the migrants so 
that their skills and competences could be put to better use in destination coun-
tries. Similarly, mechanisms that facilitate international skill transferability and 
on- the- job training possibilities could be offered to (young) migrants so as to 
avoid skill mismatches in occupations. Regarding the persisting gender gap 
found among migrants, especially in outcomes such as employment and hours 
worked, policymakers could take a targeted approach, whereby they inform mi-
grant women about existing facilities, such as family- friendly work schedules 
and access to childcare, depending on the destination- country context and labor 
market flexibilities.
NOTES
1 We thank Silvana Weiss, Paweł Kaczmarczyk, and the editors of this volume— 
Jacqueline O’Reilly, Janine Leschke, Renate Ortlieb, Martin Seeleib- Kaiser, 
and Paola Villa— for valuable comments and feedback.
2 We are not able to analyze wages because the data we used contain no infor-
mation on this point.
3 Except for countries such as Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, which 
opened their labor markets immediately to migrants from the new member 
states.
4 See http:// ec.europa.eu/ social for more information regarding the year when 
free access to the receiving- country labor markets in the old member states 
was given to citizens of new member states.
5 We acknowledge the existence of further heterogeneities among migrants 
within country- of- origin clusters; however, this compromise is offset by the 
possibility of getting an overall effect for these broader groups of origin, which 
still have certain sociodemographic characteristics in common. We leave the 
more detailed analysis of the peculiarities of migration experiences by specific 
origins to future research.
6 In this construction, non- EU also includes Switzerland and Norway; how-
ever, given the relatively low emigration rates from these countries compared 
to the rest of the non- EU, the data are not significantly affected by this inclu-
sion. Moreover, the results are also not sensitive to including these two coun-
tries in the intra- EU cluster.
7 We also estimated models with indicators for underqualification and correct 
matches; the results are not reported here but are available from the authors 
upon request.
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8 There may be other ways to define overqualification that take into ac-
count migrant niches in certain occupations, where migrants might be 
overrepresented (see Kacmarczyk and Tyrowicz 2015).
9 We also ran the analysis dropping the first round of the survey (hence, years 
2002 and 2003) so as to account for the first year of the enlargement period, 
but the results remained substantially the same. Therefore, we decided to use 
all the survey rounds.
10 As a robustness check, we estimated the mismatch variables using a multi-
nomial logit specification; the results (available upon request) remain quali-
tatively unchanged compared to binary probit estimations.
11 Of course, there could also be network effects, in which the existing migrant 
networks in urban areas attract further migrants.
12 Note that we do not observe the same individuals over their exact life cycle 
in the ESS data set; rather, we observe different cohorts of representative 
individuals at various cycles in their lives.
13 We also ran models without native- born individuals and included controls 
for years since migration, but the results did not change substantially; thus, 
we present the findings with the full set of population groups.
14 We note that the comparison of young migrants to older native- born 
individuals would be a different exercise, which we also performed but have 
not reported here (available upon request). We also note that these results 
are based on pooled country estimations and hence might show different 
patterns if applied to and tested in separate country studies.
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APPENDIX
Table A13.1 European Social Survey (2002– 2015)
ESS Round
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total sample
Austria ✓ ✓ ✓ o o o ✓ 7,322
Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10,266
Denmark ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8,729
Finland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 11,314
France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10,209
Germany ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 16,294
Ireland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 12,435
Italy ✓ ✓ o o o ✓ ✓ 2,993
Luxembourg ✓ ✓ o o o o o 2,712
Netherlands ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10,678
Norway ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9,868
Spain ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10,823
Sweden ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10,200
Switzerland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9,890
United Kingdom ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 11,831
Total sample 23,827 23,742 20,901 19,228 18,498 19,774 19,594 145,564
Note: A checkmark indicates that the country was included in the survey round.
Source: ESS (2002– 2015; rounds 1– 7).
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EUROPE’S PROMISE FOR JOBS?
LaBor MarKET inTEGraTion oF YounG EuropEan union 
MiGranT ciTiZEns in GErManY anD THE uniTED KinGDoM
Thees F. Spreckelsen, Janine Leschke,  
and Martin Seeleib- Kaiser
14.1. INTRODUCTION
Migrant youth are faced with the double disadvantage of labor market entry and 
problems associated with assimilation and discrimination in the broad context 
of migrant life courses (Kogan et al. 2011, 75). In the words of Hooijer and Picot 
(2015, p. 5), “Migrants are by definition labour market entrants” (see also Kogan 
2006). Although there is some literature on barriers to labor market integration 
for recent immigrants in general (Kogan 2006; Andrews, Clark, and Whittaker 
2007; Clark and Lindley 2009; Demireva 2011; Altorjai 2013), little country- 
comparative evidence is available on the working conditions of recent young 
EU migrant workers. Also, to date, only a few studies have explicitly compared 
migrant citizens from different European Union (EU) countries of origin with 
regard to their labor market outcomes (Akgüç and Beblavý 2015; Höhne and 
Schulze Buschoff 2015; Recchi 2015) while simultaneously taking into account 
the different institutional contexts in the countries of destination.
Against this backdrop, this chapter focuses on the quantitative and quali-
tative labor market integration of recent young EU migrant citizens1 from 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE, EU8),2 Romania and Bulgaria (EU2), and 
Southern European countries (South- EU),3 who are living in Germany and the 
United Kingdom.4 To contextualize our analysis, results are also presented for 
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the old EU member states (EU- Rest)5 and for third- country nationals (TCNs). 
Quantitative labor market integration is captured by examining the levels of 
employment of each group compared to nationals. Qualitative labor market 
integration is captured by comparing income, forms of nonstandard employ-
ment, and particularly marginal, fixed- term, and (solo) self- employment, as 
well as skills/ qualification mismatch of each group against nationals. Germany 
and the United Kingdom were selected as destinations because these two coun-
tries not only have very different labor markets and welfare regimes but also 
are major destination countries for intra- EU migration (Galgóczi and Leschke 
2015). A comparison between the two countries is of special interest given that 
intra- EU migration— in contrast to the openness of the British labor market in 
the past— was one of the key issues in the debate leading up to the 2016 Brexit 
referendum in the United Kingdom, whereas major European politicians, such 
as the German chancellor Angela Merkel, are outspoken advocates of freedom 
of movement.
On the basis of the quantitative and qualitative labor market indicators 
outlined previously, this chapter addresses the following research questions: How 
well are recent young migrants integrated in the labor market relative to their 
peers in the respective destination countries? Does the degree of labor market 
integration reflect structural differences between the regions of origin (in par-
ticular, CEE and Southern European countries) and macroeconomic changes 
caused by the economic crisis after 2008? Is there evidence that quantitative and 
qualitative labor market integration of recent young EU migrants varies across 
welfare regimes?
The novelty of our research is its comparative perspective at the level of both 
country group of origin and destination countries. The analyses describe the sit-
uation in both Germany and the United Kingdom using— for the most part— 
proportions and means across the different migration groups. Furthermore, in 
line with the public debates reflecting on “migrants” as a holistic group, char-
acteristics such as skill levels are not controlled for, nor are young EU citizens’ 
undoubtedly various motives for migrating (Verwiebe, Wiesböck, and Teitzer 
2014) taken into account. Thus, this chapter investigates the aggregate differences 
between young nationals and the recent EU migrant population in Germany 
and the United Kingdom, with a focus on the precrisis and postcrisis periods, in 
order to provide an assessment of their situation.6
The following section briefly presents the economic and welfare- state context 
of the two receiving countries in order to formulate expectations with regard 
to the labor market integration of EU citizens. Section 14.3 presents the data, 
definitions, and measures. Section 14.4 contains the empirical results, focusing 
on forms of nonstandard employment, skills/ qualification mismatches, and in-
come. Finally, the discussion draws out commonalities and differences in rela-
tion to the region of origin and receiving countries.
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14.2. ECONOMIC AND WELFARE- STATE CONTEXTS
Young migrants face the same risks and challenges with regard to labor market 
integration as all young people, as well as those difficulties that are specific to 
migrants. Labor market “outsiderness”— inactivity, unemployment, low income, 
and low employment protection— is increasingly problematic for young people 
across Europe (Seeleib- Kaiser and Spreckelsen 2018), leading to a “new genera-
tion with higher exposure to systematic labor market risks” (Chung, Bekker, and 
Houwing 2012, 301). Youth vulnerability to labor market outsiderness is due in 
part to limited work experience, which impacts on the transition from educa-
tion to employment (Brzinsky- Fay 2007; Schmelzer 2008). Early career insecu-
rity is exacerbated by a prevalence of fixed- term contracts and “last- in, first- out” 
principles. In addition, the dualization literature (Emmenegger et al. 2012) has 
highlighted the risk of migrants becoming labor market outsiders who are 
exposed to (insecure) precarious employment and low wages (Standing 2009).
Access to the labor market by EU migrant citizens from EU8 countries has 
differed significantly between Germany and the United Kingdom. Whereas EU8 
migrant citizens had more or less immediate access to the UK labor market 
after the accession of the CEE countries in 2004, Germany applied strict transi-
tion rules until 2011 (Fihel et al. 2015). Prior to the 2008– 2009 economic crisis, 
and after 2012, the United Kingdom had strong economic pull factors for EU 
migrants— low unemployment, overall good economic performance, and a lib-
eral regulatory regime coupled with language advantages. By contrast, weak eco-
nomic growth and comparatively high unemployment rates made Germany less 
attractive up until the economic crisis. Nevertheless, long- term traditions of mi-
gration from CEE countries, including particular inflows for seasonal labor, the 
existence of migration networks, and geographic proximity, played important 
roles in attracting EU migrant workers to Germany (for details, see Kogan 2011). 
EU2 migrants were restricted from entering the German and the UK labor 
markets as employees for the maximum possible transition period of 7 years fol-
lowing the 2007 EU enlargement.
As a result of the asymmetric economic development within the EU after 
2008, the growing German economy became much more attractive for intra- 
EU labor migrants, whereas the crisis had a dampening effect on the UK labor 
market. Given rising unemployment and a shift in migration policies (transi-
tional measures for workers from Romania and Bulgaria and changes in benefit 
entitlements), the United Kingdom became comparatively less attractive during 
the crisis period (Tilly 2011). Hence, the labor market integration of migrants in 
Germany is likely to have improved over time, whereas an inverse trend might be 
visible in the United Kingdom. The impact of transition measures is expected to 
be visible in particular with regard to the share of (solo) self- employed migrant 
citizens in the economy because the freedom of establishment can be used to 
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“circumvent” employment restrictions (for more details on self- employment, see 
Ortlieb, Sheehan, and Masso, this volume).
Quantitative labor market integration of (young) EU migrant citizens might 
be easier in the United Kingdom than in Germany given the two countries’ dif-
ferent school- to- work transition regimes (Walther and Pohl 2005; Hadjivassiliou 
et al., this volume) and, in particular, the prevalence of general skills in the United 
Kingdom. Strongly institutionalized vocational education systems and a rela-
tively strong reliance on specific skills, as found in Germany (Hall and Soskice 
2001), can represent an entry barrier to migrant employment and might thus 
potentially also lead to more segmentation between nationals and migrants in 
qualitative labor market outcomes. Irrespective of institutional labor market and 
welfare- state differences (Esping- Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall 
2007), both Germany and the United Kingdom have highly segmented labor 
markets, as evidenced in the low- wage sectors. Similarly, both countries have in-
stitutionalized job categories at the outer fringes of the labor market: “minijobs” 
in Germany and “zero- hours contracts” in the United Kingdom. In addition, 
trade union density has been declining substantially during recent decades in 
both countries. The German labor market is also segmented with regard to job 
security, partly as a result of strict employment protection for insiders, which 
differs significantly from the relatively low overall level of employment protec-
tion in the United Kingdom (Organization for Economic Co- operation and 
Development (OECD) 2013).
Empirical research by Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010) suggests that 
country- of- origin effects can be more significant for labor market integration 
than the nature and characteristics of the destination labor market. There are 
several reasons for potential differences in labor market integration by country 
or region of origin. Wage differentials between country of origin and destina-
tion country and differences in reservation wages might be a result of much 
lower (exportable) unemployment benefits. As Bruzelius, Reinprecht, and 
Seeleib- Kaiser (2016) have shown, the exportable weekly unemployment ben-
efit of an ideal- typical unemployed Romanian worker moving to another EU 
member state is approximately €27/ $32, compared to the benefit of €228/ $267 
for an unemployed German worker. Low exportable benefits are likely to ex-
pose migrants from CEE countries and Southern Europe to precarious work. 
Compared to migrants from EU- Rest countries, they might thus also be more 
likely to take up jobs below their skill levels or that do not reflect their formal 
qualifications, leading to qualification and skill mismatches (McGuinness, 
Bergin, and Whelan, this volume). This problem will be even more pronounced 
for youth migrants, given that young people typically are less often eligible for 
unemployment benefits compared to adults because of insufficient contribution 
records (Leschke and Finn, this volume).
Overall, our expectation is to find a clear stratification of labor market in-
tegration by EU migrant citizens’ region of origin as a result of differences in 
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reservation wages and variations in the application of transition measures. We 
expect to find less labor market integration overall and more segmentation 
compared to nationals in Germany than in the United Kingdom. This would 
reflect the stronger reliance of the German labor market on specific compared 
to general skills and the recent precarization and dualization trends (Lehndorff 
2015), which indeed are also found in the United Kingdom (Leschke and Keune 
2008). We expect
a segmentation of labor market integration by region of origin in terms 
of employment (quantitative integration), income, and quality of 
jobs (qualitative integration), with potentially more segmentation in 
Germany;
higher rates of solo self- employment of EU8 and EU2 migrants in Germany 
and of EU2 migrants in the United Kingdom as a result of institutional 
and transition arrangements; and
improving quantitative and qualitative labor market integration of EU 
youth migrants over time in Germany, with an inverse trend in the 
United Kingdom because of economic developments.
14.3. DATA, DEFINITIONS, AND MEASURES
In our analysis, we define youth as young people aged 20– 34 years. As a conse-
quence of data restrictions, migrants are identified slightly differently between 
the United Kingdom and Germany.7 This chapter studies recent migrants, spe-
cifically those who arrived in the respective receiving country within the pre-
vious 5 years (Rienzo 2013). The region- of- origin effects regarding EU migrant 
citizens are best studied among those who have arrived recently because after 
5 years of residence, EU migrant citizens have the same social rights as nationals, 
irrespective of their economic activity or economic status. Moreover, more es-
tablished migrants might have already caught up with or assimilated with their 
national peers.
The analyses utilized the German Microcensus8 and the UK Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey (UK- LFS),9 both of which are the national inputs to the European 
Labour Force Survey (EU- LFS), rendering them relatively comparable in terms 
of sampling and indicators. However, the UK- LFS has been known to underesti-
mate migrant populations (Martí and Ródenas 2007; Longhi and Rokicka 2012). 
The same is likely to be true for the German Microcensus because the question-
naire is only available in German (with translation assistance into English for the 
interviewers).10 Because of the sampling design, both data sets largely exclude 
short- term migrants (e.g., seasonal workers) and cross- border or posted workers. 
Furthermore, the numbers for youth migrant workers are comparatively small, 
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particularly when broken down by region of origin. Consequently, the data were 
pooled across waves to increase estimation samples and reliability. The results are 
provided with confidence intervals reflecting often small case numbers.11
The chapter combines data for 2004– 2009 and 2010– 2014 for the United 
Kingdom and for 2005– 2008 and 2009– 2012 for Germany so as to assess 
differences between the precrisis and crisis periods. Proportions and means were 
estimated for national youth and EU migrant citizen youth using the standard 
weights from the Microcensus and the UK- LFS. These account for nonresponse 
and adjust for demographic factors, namely age, nationality, and gender.
Table 14.1 summarizes the dimensions of labor market integration and 
their corresponding indicators in the German and UK data. Comparable 
measures and international standard classifications were used. Thus, employ-
ment is operationalized according to the International Labour Organization 
convention.12
Table 14.1 Measuring dimensions of labor market integration
Germany United Kingdom
Quantitative integration
Employment, 
unemployment, 
inactivity
ILO ILO
Qualitative integration
Marginal employment Minijobs (earnings  
< €400/ approx. $470)
Gross hourly wages at 
or below the national 
minimum wage according 
to age groupa
Fixed- term employment Employees only Employees only
(Solo) self- employment Self- employed without employees Self- employed without 
employees
Skill/ qualification 
mismatch
Mean ISEIb score for skill 
level (low, medium, and 
high: ISCEDc)
Mean ISEI score by origin of 
education (school, work- 
related, and university)
Income Net hourly income (broad: 
including social benefits) 
adjusted for inflation (CPI)— only 
persons whose main source of 
income is employment
Net hourly income (pay)d 
adjusted for inflation (CPI)
aUK minimum wage limits differed over time: prior to 2010, the minimum wage increased at age 18 years 
and at age 22 years; subsequent to 2010, the age thresholds were 18 and 21 years, with a lower minimum for 
apprentices (GOV.UK 2016b).
bInternational Socio- Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI; Ganzeboom and Treiman 2003), 
calculated using syntax from the GESIS Institute (http:// 193.175.238.45/ missy- qa/ de/ materials/ MZ/ tools/ 
isei); for a critical account of the ISEI measure, see Schimpl- Neimanns (2004).
cThe International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) was created using routines available at GESIS 
(Lechert, Schroedter, and Lüttinger 2006).
dProportions estimated using a zero- inflated Poisson regression, adjusted for illness/ absence in reference 
week (United Kingdom only).
CPI, consumer price index; ILO, International Labour Organization.
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Marginal employment is the key dimension that was conceptualized differ-
ently in the two countries. Marginal employment in Germany is characterized by 
the prevalence and recent increase of so- called “minijobs.” Minijobs pay a max-
imum monthly wage of €450/ $525 (€400/ $470 until 2013) and are, in principle, 
exempt from social insurance contributions (Voss and Weinkopf 2012). These 
low- paying jobs are often topped up with in- work benefits (Bruckmeier et  al. 
2015)— similar to tax credits in the United Kingdom and United States. They 
are of particular relevance given the absence of a statutory minimum wage in 
Germany until 2015. In the United Kingdom, marginal employment was meas-
ured as employment at or below the national minimum wage. Temporary em-
ployment was operationalized as employees being on fixed- term contracts.
Self- employment can be very heterogeneous, taking place at both the high 
end and the low end of the labor market (Ortlieb and Weiss 2015), whereby self- 
employed workers without employees (solo self- employed) have worse labor 
market outcomes than do self- employed with employees. Self- employed workers 
in Germany, unlike the United Kingdom, are not obliged to contribute to social in-
surance. Hence, self- employed workers with comparatively low earnings are likely 
to have insufficient social insurance coverage (Schulze Buschoff and Protsch 2008).
Qualification mismatch and skill mismatch were assessed by comparing the av-
erage occupational status for a qualification (skill level) among natives against the 
corresponding status for the same qualification (skill level) among migrants (see 
Section 14.4.3.2 for an explanation of the distinction between the two types of mis-
match). Although this is a fairly standard way of comparing skills– occupation mis-
match, such a relative measure has the disadvantage that immigrants may be clustered 
in specific immigrant occupation niches (Joassart- Marcelli 2014), which could po-
tentially distort the results. In this regard, subjective measures on qualification mis-
match would be more appropriate, but they are not available in the context of the 
research presented here. Income was measured somewhat differently in Germany 
and the United Kingdom. In both countries, net hourly income is analyzed; how-
ever, in Germany this refers to income including social benefits and is only recorded 
for persons whose main source of income is employment. By contrast, income in 
the United Kingdom refers to pay from employment only, which in principle will 
exclude all benefits because even (Working or Child) Tax Credits are paid directly 
to claimants (GOV.UK 2016a). However, the respective survey question does not 
explicitly exclude other income. Income is adjusted for inflation using the respective 
country’s consumer price index (Destatis 2016; Office of National Statistics 2015b).
14.4. RESULTS
14.4.1. Demographic characteristics of Young 
European union Migrant citizens
In Germany and the United Kingdom, EU migrant citizens, especially those 
from EU8 and EU2 countries, increased as a share of all recent migrants from 
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pre- to postcrisis (for details, see Leschke et al. 2016). Notably, and despite the 
economic crisis, we observe no relative increase for Southern European migrant 
citizens in the United Kingdom compared to the precrisis period. A relative in-
crease can be observed for this group for the entire period in Germany, as well as 
a steep absolute increase since the crisis (Destatis 2012).
Recent EU migrant citizens in Germany and the United Kingdom are predom-
inantly young, aged 20– 34 years (Table 14.2). In Germany, gender proportions 
differ considerably across migrant groups, with relatively more female CEE 
youth and fewer female EU- South and EU- Rest youth. Gender proportions 
seem similar among youth migrant groups in the United Kingdom, except for 
fewer females among EU- South youth. Postcrisis, more young migrant citizens 
are students in Germany (13%– 30%) than in the United Kingdom (9%– 23%).
14.4.2. Quantitative Labor Market 
integration: Economic activity
Figure 14.1 records the employment, unemployment, and inactivity levels of 
young EU migrant citizens. Overall, they are well integrated compared to TCNs, 
and several groups have improved their status over time. In the United Kingdom, 
CEE migrants have higher employment rates compared to their native peers, 
whereas in Germany they have lower employment rates, which, however, have 
increased from pre- to postcrisis. This result is consistent with a labor demand 
argument, given the comparatively robust economic growth in Germany, the 
gradual opening up of the labor market in particular for qualified CEE migrants, 
and the end of transition measures for CEE nationals in 2011. The different 
proportions of youth in the respective employment statuses reflect the different 
shares of students among the migrant groups (e.g., larger proportions of students 
correspond to higher proportions of inactive youth because the inactive status is 
defined as including students; see Table 14.2).
14.4.3. Qualitative Labor Market 
integration: prevalence of nonstandard Employment
Despite finding (relatively) positive quantitative employment integration levels, 
particularly in the postcrisis period, the results presented here demonstrate sig-
nificant shortcomings in the quality of employment. Quality of employment is 
gauged by the prevalence of nonstandard employment, skills– occupation and 
qualification– occupation mismatch, and wages. Forms of nonstandard employ-
ment are reported separately; however, they tend to overlap and often correlate 
with low wages (Leschke 2015; on youth labor market outsiderness, see Seeleib- 
Kaiser and Spreckelsen 2018).
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Table 14.2 Demographics of recent migrants to Germany and the United Kingdom, precrisis and postcrisis periods
Destination Region of origin
Youth, % (aged  
20– 34 years)
Females, %  
(of youth migrants)
Students, %  
(of youth migrants)
Precrisis Postcrisis Precrisis Postcrisis Precrisis Postcrisis
Germany CEE (EU8) 72.5 65.0 67.4 58.4 18.1 12.8
Bulgaria/ Romania (EU2) 52.4 52.9 66.0 50.2 36.1 19.0
EU- South 66.9 63.5 46.3 43.0 24.2 29.8
EU- Rest 67.0 58.2 48.5 45.4 24.2 26.5
Third country (TCN) 68.7 71.4 53.7 54.7 25.2 28.7
United Kingdom CEE (EU8) 70.0 60.7 46.2 51.3 12.4 8.6
Bulgaria/ Romania (EU2) 68.7 67.1 50.1 51.1 17.7 14.9
EU- South 63.3 61.6 53.4 44.0 17.7 14.3
EU- Rest 53.3 53.2 50.4 55.8 15.9 14.3
Third country (TCN) 55.9 57.4 49.4 50.3 24.0 23.1
CEE, Central and Eastern Europe; TCN, third- country nationals.
Sources: Pooled German Microcensus (2005– 2012) and pooled UK- LFS Survey (2004– 2014).
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14.4.3.1. Nonstandard Employment
In both countries, the results (Figure 14.2) show higher fixed- term employment 
levels among all migrant groups compared to their native peers, with larger 
differences in Germany, partially reflecting the weaker overall employment pro-
tection in the United Kingdom (OECD 2013). The higher level of fixed- term 
Figure 14.1 Employment status of recent youth migrants compared to nationals (Germany/ 
United Kingdom, precrisis/ postcrisis periods). Weighted estimates adjusted for sampling 
design.
Source: Pooled German Microcensus (2005– 2012) and pooled UK- LFS (2004– 2014).
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contracts very likely reflects the labor market entrant status of recent migrants, 
irrespective of the host country. German nationals (postcrisis) have the longest 
fixed- term contracts and cite “being in education or training” as the main 
reason, whereas CEE nationals frequently mention probation periods (Leschke 
et al. 2016, Table 4a). CEE and EU- South nationals state “not finding a perma-
nent job” as the main reason for involuntary fixed- term employment— more than 
other migrant groups and especially more than Germans (Leschke et al. 2016, 
Table 4a). Notably, one cannot discern consistent substantial changes in tempo-
rary employment from pre- to postcrisis.
The proportions of solo self- employment (self- employed without an employee; 
Figure 14.3) attest strongly to the labor market impact of the post- enlargement 
transition regimes (Fihel et al. 2015). Restrictions on the freedom of movement 
of labor applied to EU8 and EU2 migrants in Germany and to EU2 migrants 
in the United Kingdom. Consequently, EU migrant citizens from these coun-
tries were able to use the freedom of establishment to gain access to the labor 
market on the basis of self- employment (with some sectoral restrictions in place 
for Germany, including construction and commercial cleaning), which led to 
higher shares of solo self- employed EU8 and EU2 youth in Germany and to sig-
nificantly higher solo self- employment among EU2 youth migrant citizens in 
the United Kingdom. These proportions declined slightly in Germany for EU8 
nationals in the postcrisis period when transition measures were phased out.
Figure 14.2 Temporary employment of recent youth migrants compared to nationals (Germany/ 
United Kingdom, precrisis/ postcrisis periods). Weighted estimates adjusted for sampling 
design.
Source: Pooled German Microcensus (2005– 2012) and pooled UK- LFS (2004– 2014).
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In addition to solo self- employment, it seems pertinent to analyze marginal 
employment. In Germany, youth from EU8, EU2, and Southern European coun-
tries have higher shares in minijobs compared to natives. Nationals from the 
EU- Rest countries have the lowest and TCNs the highest shares in this form of 
employment (Figure 14.4).13
Although the United Kingdom has a lower earnings limit for national insur-
ance contributions, somewhat similar to German minijobs, employment at the 
national minimum wage constitutes the main form of marginal employment 
(more than 5% of all jobs).14 Youth from CEE are more likely to earn a minimum 
or below- minimum hourly wage compared to their United Kingdom peers. This 
also holds for EU2 but not for EU- South or EU- Rest youth. If anything, the 
latter have a lower share working at the minimum wage. Mirroring the German 
findings, a larger proportion of TCNs compared to nationals earn a minimum 
hourly wage in the United Kingdom (Figure 14.5).
14.4.3.2. Skill Mismatch and Qualification Mismatch
Several studies highlight a skills– occupation mismatch, particularly among 
CEE migrant workers in EU15 countries (European Integration Consortium 
2009; Bettin 2012; Engels et  al. 2012). This mismatch refers to situations in 
which the occupation a person works in requires a different skill level from 
what the person has at the present time. The “requirement” should be viewed in 
relative terms, referring, for example, to the average skill level in an occupation. 
Figure 14.3 Solo self- employment (i.e., self- employed without employees) of recent youth 
migrants compared to nationals (Germany/ United Kingdom, precrisis/ postcrisis periods). 
Weighted estimates adjusted for sampling design.
Source: Pooled German Microcensus (2005– 2012) and pooled UK- LFS (2004– 2014).
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Similarly, a qualification– occupation mismatch refers to the difference between 
the formal qualification a person holds and the qualification level of the person’s 
occupation.
The measures of both skill and qualification mismatches are relative here, 
using the mean occupational status of the native youths in a skills/ qualification 
category as a reference point (their status level is indicated by the horizontal line 
in each panel of Figures 14.6 and 14.7). Pooled data are presented here combining 
Figure 14.4 Share of minijobs among employed recent youth migrants compared to nationals 
(Germany, postcrisis period). * Maximuum pay <€450/ $525, no social insurance contributions.
Source: Pooled German Microcensus (2009– 2012).
Figure 14.5 Hourly pay at/ below the minimum wage for recent youth migrants compared to 
nationals (United Kingdom, postcrisis period). Estimates based on hourly pay ≤ minimum 
wage threshold.
Source: Pooled UK- LFS (2010– 2014).
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the pre- and postcrisis periods because of the low case numbers resulting from 
the division of the migrants into three groups according to their skill levels. The 
following results should be viewed with caution, given the differences between 
the indicators used (see Table 14.1), namely skills (Germany) and qualifications 
(United Kingdom). Therefore, the following sections refer correspondingly to 
skill mismatch and qualification mismatch in order to highlight the limited com-
parability of the measures.
Recent youth migrants from EU8 and EU2 work consistently in lower status 
jobs compared to their German peers (Figure 14.6). In the United Kingdom 
(Figure 14.7), the same holds for EU8 youth migrants (on the low rate of return 
to education for Polish migrants in the United Kingdom, see Kacmarczyk and 
Tyrowicz 2015) but not for their Bulgarian and Romanian peers. Consistently, 
young recent migrants from the Rest- EU find higher status jobs in the same 
skills bracket as their native peers in both Germany and the United Kingdom.
EU- South migrants with tertiary education seem to achieve on average higher 
status jobs compared to their native peers in Germany. Those with medium- or 
low- skilled backgrounds fare consistently worse than their native peers. For the 
United Kingdom, in contrast, EU- South nationals with tertiary education have 
comparatively poor occupational outcomes. The same holds true, although with 
smaller gaps, for those with work- related qualifications.
In Germany, migrant workers with medium skill levels (secondary and post- 
secondary nontertiary education) might have particular problems applying their 
skills (Engels et al. 2012), which again might follow from the importance of spe-
cific rather than general skills in the German economy.
Figure 14.6 Levels of skill mismatch in Germany for recent youth migrants compared to 
nationals. *Mean ISEI- 08 by educational background (**ISCED).
Source: Pooled German Microcensus (2005– 2012).
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14.4.3.3. Income Differentials
Migrant– native income differentials have long been studied (Andrews et  al. 
2007) in their own right. The focus here is instead on the comparison between 
youth migrant groups: Figure 14.8 presents the average hourly income levels of 
the different groups as a percentage of those of their German/ UK peers.
Using the broad Microcensus income measure including social benefits (see 
Table 14.1), but restricting it to those people who state that their main income 
derives from work, Germany appears to be comparatively equal in terms of in-
come, with slightly lower net income among EU2 migrants and considerably 
higher income among EU- South and EU- Rest youth (+11% and +31%, respec-
tively). By contrast, EU8 migrants and, to a lesser extent, EU- South migrants 
and TCNs report lower income compared to their national peers in the United 
Kingdom. The experience of lower wages does not apply to migrants from the 
EU- Rest; both in the United Kingdom and in Germany, these EU migrant citi-
zens do better than their native peers.
14.5. DISCUSSION
14.5.1. Quantitative and Qualitative Labor Market 
integration
European Union migrant citizens have generally high employment rates, espe-
cially in the United Kingdom. However, EU migrant citizens from CEE countries 
are more often in precarious employment compared to Southern European and 
particularly EU- Rest migrants. The latter’s qualitative labor market integration 
is close to or better than that of nationals. Both countries show by far the worst 
Figure 14.7 Levels of qualification mismatch in the United Kingdom for recent youth migrants 
compared to nationals. *Mean ISEI- 08. Weighted estimates adjusted for sampling design.
Source: Pooled UK- LFS (2004– 2014).
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outcomes for TCNs on quantitative labor market integration (low employment 
rates and high inactivity).
These better results for EU migrant citizens might be due to their privileged 
status compared to that of TCNs, based on the principle of nondiscrimination in 
relation to nationals. Given free labor mobility, their migration channels differ 
substantially from those of TCNs, who often come as asylum seekers or under 
family reunification regulations.
The United Kingdom seems to achieve better quantitative labor market integra-
tion of EU migrant citizens (particularly from CEE countries) compared to Germany. 
This might be explained by the UK economy’s orientation toward general rather than 
specific skills, which facilitates the integration of youth migrants. Furthermore, the 
improvements in EU migrants’ quantitative labor market integration that are visible 
in Germany during our second observation period are consistent with a labor de-
mand argument, for unemployment significantly declined during this period.
In terms of qualitative labor market integration, the over- representation of 
migrant workers in nonstandard employment in Germany is not surprising. 
Given the high degree of dualization of the German labor market, flexibility 
needs are achieved at the margins— for example, through higher levels of fixed- 
term employment, solo self- employment (particularly for CEE migrant citizens 
during the transition period), and minijobs.
Figure 14.8 Wage– income differentials for recent youth migrants compared to nationals in 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Estimates: Logarithm of net income adjusted for inflation 
(GER: Destatis, 2016; UK: CPI base 2005, Source: Office for National Statistics 2015).
Source: Net hourly income from German Microcensus (2005– 2012); net hourly income from 
pooled UK- LFS (2004– 2014).
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The findings on wage income and skill and qualification mismatches— in 
addition to reflecting issues such as linguistic barriers, transferability of skills, 
and potential migrant niche effects generated by migrant networks— point to 
an interesting segmentation of EU migrants according to region of origin. For 
the United Kingdom, which arguably provides a more clear- cut wage measure 
than the German data, our analysis points to lower wages for young recent CEE 
migrants compared to their national peers, higher wages for EU- Rest migrants, 
and no significant wage differences between nationals and EU- South migrants. 
EU8 migrants show pronounced skill (Germany) and qualification (United 
Kingdom) mismatches in their occupations; the results for EU- South migrants 
are more mixed; and EU- Rest migrants, particularly in Germany, seem to per-
form better than nationals on this indicator.
These intra- EU differences in qualitative labor market outcomes might partly 
be explained by destination- country wage differentials and by differences in 
reservation wages because of much lower (exportable) unemployment benefits 
(Bruzelius et  al. 2016). These potentially render migrant citizens from CEE 
countries and, to some degree, EU- South migrants more willing than EU- 
Rest migrants to work under precarious conditions, for low wages, and below 
their skill/ qualification levels. The results for EU2 and EU- South migrants 
differ between Germany and the United Kingdom, potentially pointing to mi-
grant network effects and the role of general versus specific skills. Crucially, the 
segmentation of labor market integration outcome seems to reflect structural 
differences by regions of origin.
The analysis shows that contextual factors, such as transition arrangements, 
had a clear impact on migration movements, for the share of EU migrant citizens, 
especially those from CEE countries, increased in both destination countries. In 
addition, their levels of solo self- employment indicate a response to the previous 
transition arrangements even though this calls for further analysis taking selec-
tivity into account. The analysis did not identify large relative increases of EU- 
South migrants, which were quite salient in UK media reporting in the run- up to 
the Brexit referendum. By contrast, we were able to identify an increasing trend 
for this group in Germany.
14.5.2. Limitations
The analysis has a number of limitations. First, the pooling of data makes 
it difficult to identify the effects of the transition periods. The limited panel 
possibilities of the UK- LFS data mean the labor market outcomes of re-
cent youth migrant workers are only examined in two time periods. Thus, 
improved labor market integration due to better language skills, acquaint-
ance with working culture norms, and better networks is not accounted for 
(see Prokic- Breuer and McManus’s (2016) notion of “apparent qualification 
mismatch”).
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Sampling biases mean that the data capture “better integrated” recent 
migrants, who might not fully represent migrants as such. In both countries, the 
data mainly capture residents, thus under- representing seasonal workers, posted 
workers, or more recent migrants (see Section 13.3 on methods).
Comparability issues arise from the use of partially harmonized data (e.g., mi-
grant definition, marginal employment, and skill and qualification mismatch with 
one’s occupation). Most of these reflect data constraints, but also country- specific 
labor market arrangements (e.g., minijobs). Despite these limitations, the findings 
are rather consistent across measures and with our theoretical expectations.
14.6. CONCLUSIONS
Despite institutional differences between labor markets and welfare regimes, as 
well as the different transition regimes, we identified significant similarities in 
the labor market integration of young EU migrant citizens across Germany and 
the United Kingdom.
Young EU citizens who recently migrated are well integrated in the respec-
tive labor markets (particularly in the United Kingdom), as measured by overall 
employment rates. However, EU youth migrants’ qualitative labor market in-
tegration as measured here by income, marginal, fixed- term, and (solo) self- 
employment, as well as skills/ qualification mismatch, is segmented by their 
region of origin: EU8 and EU2 citizens often work in precarious and nonstandard 
employment, youth from Southern Europe take a middle position, and youth 
from the remaining EU countries do as well or better than their native peers on 
several indicators. Notably, this segmentation can be observed for these migrant 
groups without a detailed analysis of demographic characteristics.
A number of broad questions for future research derive from the previously 
discussed findings. Crucially for labor market and social policy research, does 
the availability and exportability of unemployment benefits influence the segmen-
tation of labor market integration outcomes by region of origin? For example, do 
these result in observable differences in EU migrant citizens’ reservation wages 
and support options, which in turn affect their labor market positions in the 
countries of destination?
Finally, and more generally, the question arises as to whether, at the micro 
level, EU cross- border labor mobility simply replicates the existing stratification 
of young people across Europe or whether migration gives young EU citizens an 
opportunity to improve their relative labor market position compared to their 
position in the country of origin and their initial position in the country of desti-
nation. The corresponding question on the macro EU- wide level is whether, and 
in what way, young EU citizens’ migration can contribute to an economically and 
socially ever closer European Union.
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NOTES
1 Throughout the chapter, we use the term EU migrant citizen because our 
analysis focuses on those EU citizens who have migrated from one member 
state to another. Working EU migrant citizens have the same rights as 
nationals and can be differentiated from the category of EU mobile workers 
(e.g., posted or cross- border workers), for whom different regulations apply; 
see Bruzelius and Seeleib- Kaiser (2017).
2 The EU8 countries acceded the union in May 2004 and are composed of the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia.
3 Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; Malta and Cyprus.
4 Throughout the text, reference is made to the United Kingdom, in line with 
the main data source, the UK- LFS.
5 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Sweden (and, for Germany only, the European Free Trade Association coun-
tries), Germany (UK analysis only), and the United Kingdom (German 
analysis only).
6 We particularly thank Silvana Weiss, Franziska Meinck, and Jonas Felbo- 
Kolding for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. The chapter 
also received two reviews from María González Menéndez and Paweł 
Kaczmarczyk, which were motivating and insightful. Previous versions of 
the chapter received comments in January 2016 and January 2017 at the 
STYLE meetings. We further thank Noor Abdul Malik and Magnus Paulsen 
Hansen for their help with preparing the manuscript and Niamh Warde for 
her excellent language editing. Finally, we thank Renate Ortlieb for her guid-
ance, support, and patience as section editor and Jackie O’Reilly for getting 
us all there in the end.
7 For the United Kingdom, migrants are defined as having a different country 
of birth than the United Kingdom, no UK citizenship, and UK residency for 
between 1 and 5 years. For Germany, migrants are defined as having non- 
German citizenship and having migrated to Germany within the previous 
5 years.
8 The Microcensus is a representative sample containing demographic and 
labor market information from 1% of all households in Germany. All per-
sons who have right of residence in Germany, whether living in private or 
collective households, or at their main or secondary residence, are sampled 
and are obliged to participate (Research Data Center of the Federal Statistical 
Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder).
9 The LFS is the largest social survey in the United Kingdom. All adult members 
from a rotating sample of 41,000 private households are interviewed in five 
consecutive quarters. The sample size makes it the best data set available for 
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analyzing the labor market situation of recent migrants (Office for National 
Statistics 2015a).
10 In the German case, there is an obligation to participate, and nonparticipation 
is penalized. The UK- LFS makes efforts to conduct face- to- face interviews 
with the help of interpreters if no household member speaks English.
11 Analysis of the German data was carried out by Janine Leschke (FDZ 
Forschungsprojekt:  2014– 2631), and that of the UK data and figures was 
performed by Thees F. Spreckelsen.
12 According to the EU- LFS definition, persons working at least 1 hour in the 
reference week are counted as employed and are asked questions relating to 
their employment status. The analyses, unless otherwise stated, thus include 
students and those in vocational training.
13 Only information for 2009– 2012 has been used. Because the earlier measure 
is incomparable, these data also capture short- term employment (often sea-
sonal) and “one- Euro- jobs”— an employment integration measure under the 
subsidiary welfare scheme.
14 See Office for National Statistics workforce statistics at http:// webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 20160105160709/ http:// www.ons.gov.uk/ ons/ 
about- ons/ business- transparency/ freedom- of- information/ what- can- i- 
request/ previous- foi- requests/ labour- market/ workforce- statistics/ index.
html.
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15
HOW DO LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES HELP 
YOUNG EASTERN EUROPEANS FIND WORK?
Renate Ortlieb and Silvana Weiss
15.1. INTRODUCTION
Mainstream economists view the geographic mobility of workers as a prereq-
uisite for well- functioning labor markets.1 Relatedly, policy measures aimed at 
increasing the mobility of young people, such as the Youth on the Move flagship 
initiative launched by the European Commission in 2010, are said to be effective 
means to combat youth unemployment (European Commission 2010; O’Reilly 
et al. 2015). Against the background of the high relevance of youth mobility, as 
endorsed by both academics and policymakers, and given the high numbers of 
young migrants from Eastern Europe working in Western Europe (Kahanec and 
Fabo 2013; Akgüç and Beblavý, this volume), the following question arises: How 
did these young migrants find work in a foreign country? This question is impor-
tant because the existing literature suggests that migrants from Eastern Europe 
struggle to find jobs with good working conditions in Western Europe (Favell 
2008; Galgóczi and Leschke 2012; Spreckelsen, Leschke, and Seeleib- Kaiser, this 
volume). Thus, in order to be able to develop theoretical models explaining these 
difficulties and to design policy measures aimed at improving the labor market 
opportunities of young migrants from Eastern Europe, detailed knowledge about 
their routes into employment is crucial.
In the migration literature, entering a foreign labor market is typically 
conceived as a process in which several actors are involved. Apart from the 
migrants themselves, employers are key actors in that they may fill vacant job 
positions with migrants (Moriarty et  al. 2012; Ortlieb and Sieben 2013; Scott 
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2013; Cangiano and Walsh 2014; Ortlieb, Sieben, and Sichtmann 2014). In addi-
tion, migrants often draw on informal networks of friends and relatives to find a 
job and to (temporarily) settle abroad (Agunias 2009; Lindquist, Xiang, and Yeoh 
2012). Finally, an important role may be played by labor market intermediaries 
(LMIs) such as public employment services, online job portals, and temporary 
work agencies. Previous research shows that LMIs act as significant facilitators 
of globalized labor markets (Freeman 2002; Coe, Johns, and Ward 2007; Elrick 
and Lewandowska 2008). Nonetheless, despite the increasing numbers of 
LMIs worldwide within the past few years (Bonet, Cappelli, and Hamori 2013; 
CIETT 2016) and the growing body of LMI research in Europe (Andersson and 
Wadensjö 2004; Findlay and McCollum 2013; Friberg and Eldring 2013; Sporton 
2013), the role of these actors in trans- European job search and recruiting is not 
yet fully understood.
This chapter addresses this knowledge gap. We concentrate on young 
EU8 citizens— that is, people younger than age 35 years from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. We examine the 
role of LMIs for young EU8 migrants entering the Austrian labor market, thereby 
taking the perspectives of young EU8 migrants, Austrian employers, and LMIs 
into account. Austria is particularly suitable for studying East– West youth mi-
gration in Europe because it is a receiving country with geographical proximity 
and historically strong ties to Eastern Europe, it has a comparatively good overall 
labor market situation, and it hosts a large number of EU8 migrants (Benton and 
Petrovic 2013). At the same time, we posit that our findings offer insights into 
underlying labor market processes that prevail in other countries as well.
In order to capture specific features of the role of LMIs, we focus on three in-
dustrial sectors: high- tech/ information technology (IT), hospitality, and 24- hour 
domestic care. Our choice was determined both by the high number of EU8 
migrants and by the strong labor demand that characterize these three sectors, 
enabling good observation of entry processes. Furthermore, this selection allows 
us to account for different skill levels, gender compositions, and types of employ-
ment relations. To theorize on differences between the three sectors, we apply a 
framework proposed by Benner (2003). According to this framework, LMIs ful-
fill three specific functions for both employers and workers: They reduce trans-
action costs, build social networks, and help manage risks. We suppose that these 
functions are of different importance in the three sectors. Thus, the role of LMIs 
for young EU8 migrants entering the Austrian labor market will vary across the 
three chosen sectors.
Our research relies on 60 semistructured interviews with young EU8 
migrants, employers, LMIs, and labor market experts. We find that young EU8 
migrants across the three sectors use a broad range of entry ports, including dif-
ferent types of LMIs. They mainly use informal networks and online platforms 
providing information on job vacancies, working conditions, and general 
country characteristics. In addition, in the 24- hour domestic care sector, young 
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EU8 migrants contact agencies that match caregivers with private households 
and assist with various kinds of paperwork. We also find that, especially in the 
high- tech/ IT and 24- hour domestic care sectors, LMIs reduce transaction costs 
and risks for both employers and workers. LMIs play a more important role in 
job search and recruiting processes in these sectors than in the hospitality sector, 
in which the transaction costs and risks attached to employment relations are 
comparatively low.
Overall, our research shows that LMIs are important facilitators of youth 
transitions from Eastern Europe to the West. LMIs can help reduce youth un-
employment in Eastern Europe by providing informational, matchmaking, and 
administrative services to both employers and jobseekers. Our research findings 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the labor market entry paths of young 
migrants and the many- faceted role of LMIs in these processes. Taking account 
of the perspectives of both employers and young migrants, and focusing on sec-
toral specificities, we go beyond the existing literature on youth migration in 
Europe.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 15.2, we summarize the litera-
ture on LMIs, focusing on different types of LMIs and their services. In Sections 
15.3 and 15.4, we elucidate our theoretical framework and describe our methods, 
including the research context of Austria. In Sections 15.4– 15.6, we present 
findings regarding the salience of different LMI types and services in the three 
sectors and then turn, in Section 15.7, to specific functions of LMIs in the three 
sectors. In the concluding Section 15.8, we suggest avenues for future research.
15.2. TYPES AND SERVICES OF LABOR MARKET 
INTERMEDIARIES
Labor market intermediaries serve to mediate the relationship between 
employers and workers. The controversy associated with LMIs has centered on 
whether or not they exploit vulnerable workers and whether or not they facili-
tate job matching. On the one hand, the types of LMIs that receive heightened 
media attention related to exploitative practices are, in general, a marginal part 
of this market. On the other hand, the range of legal LMIs is considerably varied. 
They include traditional public employment services, online job portals, tem-
porary work agencies, and highly specialized executive search firms, as well as 
non- governmental organizations (NGOs) and social enterprises concerned with 
the labor market integration of vulnerable people.
To enable a systematic view of these different kinds of institutions, 
scholars have proposed several frameworks that categorize LMIs in terms 
of diverse criteria. Table 15.1 presents prototypes of LMIs, drawing on 
the categorizations by Benner (2003), Agunias (2009), Autor (2009), and 
Bonet et  al. (2013). We categorize different types of LMIs based on their 
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Table 15.1 Types of labor market intermediaries
Type of LMI
Organizational structure and funding Services offered to employers and jobseekers
Private sector Public sector Information provider Matchmaker Administrator
Public employment service (e.g., Austrian/ AMS, 
European/ EURES)
X X X
Temporary work agencies (e.g., Adecco, ISS, 
Manpower)
X X X
Recruitment agencies, executive search firms  
(e.g., Kienbaum, Hill, Boyden)
X X
Online job portals (e.g., monster.com, karriere.at, 
ams.at, ec.europa.eu/ eures)
X X X X
Social media (e.g., LinkedIn, Facebook) X X
Educational institutions (e.g., universities, 
vocational schools)
X X X
AMS, Austrian Public Employment Service; EURES, European Employment Services; LMI, labor market intermediary.
Sources: Authors’ compilation based on Benner (2003), Agunias (2009), Autor (2009), and Bonet et al. (2013).
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organizational structure and funding as either private- sector or public- sector 
intermediaries. Thereby, private- sector LMIs typically are paid by employers, 
whereas their services are cost- free to jobseekers.2 Depending on the services 
LMIs offer to employers and jobseekers, we further distinguish between infor-
mation providers, matchmakers, and administrators. Information providers 
either sell or offer cost- free information about vacancies, job profiles, and can-
didate profiles. Matchmaking services include job and candidate diagnosis, 
assignment of qualified candidates to jobs, and monitoring of a probation pe-
riod. Administrative services refer to the full spectrum of human resource 
management, such as payroll, training, and career planning. Administrator 
LMIs such as temporary work agencies often act as an employer who hires out 
personnel to client firms.
Previous research on the role of LMIs for labor market outcomes of (young) 
migrants has produced mixed results. There is evidence that migrants recruited 
by LMIs obtain better employment contracts compared to migrants using in-
formal social networks; for example, they are more likely to obtain higher wages 
(Bonet et al. 2013; Findlay and McCollum 2013). However, LMIs have also been 
found to increase the risk of devaluation of foreign professional skills (Samaluk 
2016). Moreover, their recruiting and selection procedures are not always free 
of discriminating biases against migrants (Bonet et  al. 2013). Also, in some 
cases, LMIs have been associated with fraud and exploitation of migrant workers 
(Agunias 2009; van den Broek, Harvey, and Groutsis 2016).
A considerable body of research revolves around temporary work agencies. 
This type of LMI can have a negative impact on the labor market outcomes of its 
employees, especially the highly vulnerable group of (young) migrants (McDowell, 
Batnitzky, and Dyer 2008; Autor and Houseman 2010; Sporton 2013). At the same 
time, for persons with otherwise limited employment prospects, temporary work 
agencies can act as stepping stones into employment (Andersson and Wadensjö 
2004; Arrowsmith 2006; Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 2007; Voss et al. 2013).
However, it is unclear whether these findings can be applied to the context of 
East– West youth migration in Europe. In addition, although previous research 
suggests that the role of LMIs differs between sectors (see Section 15.3), there is 
currently no systematic comparative evidence with regard to youth labor migra-
tion. In the following, we explore the role of LMIs in shaping East– West youth 
migration in Europe in greater detail.
15.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FUNCTIONS OF LABOR 
MARKET INTERMEDIARIES ACROSS INDUSTRIAL SECTORS
Prior research based on either single- sector (Benner 2003; Fitzgerald 2007; 
Findley and McCollum 2013; Thörnquist 2013) or multisector studies (Friberg 
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and Eldring 2013; Sporton 2013; Cangiano and Walsh 2014; van den Broek et al. 
2016) indicates that the role of LMIs varies across sectors. However, there is as 
yet no coherent theoretical framework explaining these differences. A promising 
approach has been suggested by Benner, who theorizes on the relationship be-
tween LMI activities and regional development. Based on a case study on Silicon 
Valley, the author argues that distinctive functions of LMIs can help firms adapt 
to changing labor markets, which in turn is crucial for doing business in an en-
vironment driven by knowledge work and rapid innovation. This reasoning can 
be applied to explaining the role of LMIs in shaping East– West youth migration 
in Europe.
According to Benner (2003), LMIs fulfill three functions in the labor market. 
First, LMIs reduce transaction costs for both employers and workers. Because 
LMIs specialize in certain fields, they possess information and access to other 
resources that help both employers and workers minimize search costs as well as 
costs related to contracting and monitoring. Second, LMIs function as network 
builders for both employers and workers. By connecting various individuals and 
institutions with one another, LMIs can replace informal networks, facilitating 
person– job matching processes as well as key business activities such as innova-
tion. Third, LMIs help employers and workers manage risks, such as firms’ risks re-
lated to volatile demand in product markets and workers’ risks related to job loss. 
Although these three functions of LMIs may be observed throughout the entire 
labor market, we maintain that their importance varies across sectors, depending 
on the transaction costs and the need to build networks and manage risks.
15.4. METHODS
15.4.1. research context: Eu8 Migrants Working 
in austria
Austria belongs to the group of EU15 countries that restricted labor movement 
for EU8 citizens following the enlargement of the European Union in May 2004. 
Austria and Germany were the only countries that maintained their restrictions 
until the end of the period of transitional arrangements in April 2011. After the 
restrictions had been fully removed in May 2011, a growing number of EU8 cit-
izens entered the Austrian labor market. However, it is important to note that 
EU8 citizens had the opportunity also before May 2011 to (legally) work in 
Austria, with or without the assistance of LMIs. Work permits were issued for 
sectors suffering from labor shortages, and self- employed migrants were allowed 
to offer their services if they fulfilled certain occupational requirements.
Figure 15.1 presents the number of EU8 migrants working in Austria between 
2007 and 2015, differentiated by age. In accordance with the available data, EU8 
migrants are defined for this figure based on their citizenship. The graph includes 
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both EU8 citizens who migrated themselves and second- generation migrants. 
However, the vast majority of these people, and especially those who trigger var-
iation within the curves, are first- generation migrants— that is, EU8 citizens who 
migrated themselves.
According to Figure 15.1, a total of 206,294 EU8 migrants worked in Austria 
in 2015 as either salaried employees or self- employed, which is more than 5% of 
the Austrian labor force and almost three times as many EU8 migrant workers 
as in 2007 (68,965 persons). People younger than age 35 years account for 36% 
of the EU8 migrants (73,650 persons). Men outnumber women, with the major 
differences emerging for the group of adults aged older than 35 years at the be-
ginning of the period of data availability in 2007 and for the group of adults aged 
between 25 and 34 years after May 2011— when the restrictions for labor move-
ment had been lifted. Although the available data do not allow for conclusive 
interpretation of these gaps, we suggest that they reflect gender segregation of 
the labor market in association with both increasing business trends in women- 
dominated sectors and political efforts to legalize the work of migrants in such 
sectors.
15.4.2. Key characteristics of the selected sectors
We selected three sectors to gain deeper insight into the role of LMIs by juxtaposing 
the specific types and functions of LMIs in these different sectors, namely high- 
tech/ IT, hospitality, and 24- hour domestic care. The selection is based on the 
following three criteria: (1) Both the number of young EU8 migrants working 
in these sectors and the labor demand should be considerably high; (2) the skill 
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Figure 15.1 Number of EU8 migrants working in Austria, 2007– 2015 (employees and 
self- employed).
Source: Austrian Labor Market Service Monitoring of Occupational Careers 
(Erwerbskarrieremonitoring, AMS 2016, personal communication); authors’ calculations.
 
450 TransiTions across EuropE
450
level should vary across these sectors; and (3)  the gender composition should 
vary across these sectors.3 The three sectors are briefly described next.
The high- tech/ IT sector is characterized by a long- lasting labor shortage, 
prompting employers to recruit employees from abroad. The skill level is gener-
ally high, and the majority of employees are men. In comparison with the hos-
pitality and the 24- hour domestic care sectors, firms in the high- tech/ IT sector 
are larger, they more often operate in international markets and with business 
alliances, and their personnel management is more professional.
The hospitality sector is characterized by a high share of young migrants 
among employees, a fairly high labor demand, high labor fluctuation, low or me-
dium skill level, and a balanced gender composition.
The 24- hour domestic care sector is characterized by a very high share of 
migrants among caregivers. The required skill level is low, and the vast majority 
of caregivers are women.4 A particularity of this sector is that caregivers usually 
work as self- employed on the basis of service contracts with private households. 
For the sake of simplicity, in the following we refer to private households as 
“employers,” given that the relationships between private households and 
caregivers resemble those between employers and employees. Caregivers usually 
live in the same household as their clients for a period of 2 weeks, followed by 
a break of 2 weeks. During the absence of one caregiver, a colleague takes over. 
These caregiver tandems usually remain the same over a longer period of time, 
often up until the client moves into a care home or dies. Legislation related to this 
sector is complex as a result of the self- employment status of caregivers.
15.4.3. Data
The data we use in this chapter originate from a larger research project comparing 
East– West and North– North youth migration in Europe (Hyggen et al. 2016). 
Our empirical material comprises data from 60 semistructured interviews 
conducted with young EU8 migrants, representatives of employers and LMIs, 
and labor market experts. We conducted the interviews between September 
2014 and August 2015. Each interview lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. Table 
15.2 presents the number of interviews we conducted with the different types of 
interviewees in the three selected employment sectors.
Of the interviewed EU8 migrants, the majority were from Hungary or 
Slovakia. Fifteen were women and seven were men. Their average age was 
28.8 years (ranging from 18 to 36 years), with an average age at the time of migra-
tion of 25.4 years. The period of time they had been working in Austria ranged 
from a few months to 14 years (median, 2 years). The employers were of varying 
sizes, ranging from one- person “companies” in the case of private households 
and small companies typical of the hospitality sector to large companies with 
a few thousand employees, especially in the high- tech/ IT sector. LMIs were 
private- sector agencies, public- sector institutions, and NGOs of varying sizes.
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15.5. WHAT TYPES OF LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES 
DO EU8 MIGRANTS AND AUSTRIAN EMPLOYERS USE?
In our sample, private- sector LMIs appear to be more relevant for connecting 
employers with jobseekers compared to public- sector LMIs. In the high- tech/ 
IT sector, the EU8 migrants mainly used cost- free online job portals. In addi-
tion, they found jobs via direct search on the websites of potential employers 
in Austria. None of the young interviewees working in this sector had been in 
contact with an agency. Many employers in the high- tech/ IT sector have long- 
standing business relationships with different kinds of for- profit agencies. For 
instance, they use executive search firms to fill top management positions, re-
cruitment agencies to find employees with specific skills, and temporary work 
agencies for large- scale projects.5
Although employers from all the sectors stated that they use the informal 
networks of their (migrant) employees to recruit personnel from abroad, some 
employers in the high- tech/ IT sector strategically use the informal recruit-
ment channel by providing financial bonuses to employees who recommend 
job candidates. The employers’ representatives stated that this strategy is highly 
effective because employees who recommend a job candidate not only are fa-
miliar with the candidate but also informally instruct and supervise their new 
co- worker. In addition, some of the employers in our sample recruit personnel 
from their subsidiaries in EU8 countries. Others collaborate with public- sector 
or private- sector universities in EU8 countries.
In the hospitality sector, EU8 migrants stated that in addition to public- 
sector or commercial online job portals, unsolicited applications via phone 
calls or personal visits to restaurants and hotels are effective ways to find a 
job in Austria. Some employers use public- sector online job portals also for 
validating the professional skills and the foreign certificates of job candidates. 
Some of them found employees via the public employment service or social 
media. One employer in our sample collaborated with a vocational school 
Table 15.2 Sample characteristics: Type of interviewees and industrial sectors
Sector
Interviewees High- tech/ IT Hospitality Care General Total
Young migrants 5 9 8 22
Employers 5 5 5 15
LMIs 5 2 6 2 15
Labor market experts 1 1 1 5 8
Total 16 17 20 7 60
IT, information technology; LMIs, labor market intermediaries.
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in Hungary, from which this employer directly recruited graduates. In gen-
eral, employers in the hospitality sector only very seldom use recruitment 
agencies. Exceptions include the filling of high- level positions such as chef de 
rang. The majority do not use LMIs at all; rather, they recruit personnel via 
informal networks, or they select candidates from the pool of unsolicited job 
applications.
In the 24- hour domestic care sector, for- profit agencies are by far the most 
prevalent LMIs. A particularity of this sector is that agencies receive fees from 
both private households and caregivers. According to one of the intermediaries 
interviewed, an estimated one- third of caregivers from EU8 countries use 
agencies. However, our interviewees indicated that EU8 migrants prefer finding 
a family through their own networks in order to save money. The caregivers 
interviewed also stated that they switched between different agencies and some-
times searched for a family without an agency. Likewise, private households use 
either informal networks or for- profit agencies because they lack the competence 
and the time to find an appropriate caregiver. Often, they need a caregiver on 
short notice— for instance, after a family member has suffered a stroke.
Overall, the interviewed young EU8 migrants from all three sectors use LMIs 
whenever they are searching for information and cannot draw on their informal 
networks of friends and family. According to them, some jobseekers neither in-
tentionally contacted an LMI to find a job in Austria nor did they notice that 
they were interacting with a recruitment agency and not with an employer. 
Because LMIs often place job offers in their own name and do the first screening 
of job candidates, it is not always clear to applicants that they would factually be 
working for another employer. Neither is it always clear to them that the job is 
located in a foreign country. For instance, one woman from Hungary working 
in the hospitality sector reported that she had searched for a job in her home 
country. It was only during the job interview that she learned that her future 
workplace would be in Austria. The agency doing the job interview also managed 
her travel to Austria and all registration formalities. Although this procedure 
enabled the woman to find employment, she expressed personal fears associated 
with this journey into the unknown.
15.6. WHAT KINDS OF SERVICES OFFERED BY LABOR 
MARKET INTERMEDIARIES DO EU8 MIGRANTS AND 
AUSTRIAN EMPLOYERS USE?
According to our interview data, of the variety of services made available, 
jobseekers and employers from all three sectors most often use the information 
services of LMIs. In contrast, matchmaking and administrative services are less 
salient. EU8 migrants search for information not only regarding job vacancies 
 
Labor Market intermediaries 453
   453
but also regarding working conditions and general host- country characteristics. 
Employers are especially interested in information on the skills and work expe-
rience of job candidates. They use online job portals to obtain information on 
their counterparts and simultaneously to provide information about themselves. 
A special informational service offered by an agency in the 24- hour domestic 
care sector was the provision of data related to the criminal records of caregivers 
from Slovakia.
Compared with information services, matchmaking services are far less often 
used. Matchmaking services are especially relevant in the high- tech/ IT and the 
24- hour domestic care sectors. In the hospitality sector, employers only sporadi-
cally use matchmaking services by LMIs to fill high- skill positions. Recruitment 
agencies and matching algorithms implemented in online job portals usually pre-
select job applications and provide a short list of the best qualified job candidates 
to employers. In some cases, recruitment agencies additionally monitor a pro-
bation period of job candidates. If it turns out that a proposed candidate is less 
qualified for the position than expected, the agency suggests another candidate.
In our sample, administrative services offered by LMIs were less prevalent than 
informational or matchmaking services. However, in the 24- hour domestic care 
sector, they are highly relevant. Although the agencies in the 24- hour care sector 
do not act as the employers of the caregivers, they offer further services before 
and after matchmaking. For example, they assist caregivers with paperwork, for 
instance, regarding the obligatory registration as self- employed at the Austrian 
Economic Chamber and in the social insurance system. Often, they organize the 
caregivers’ travel between their home towns and their places of work in Austria. 
Some of them additionally offer training, for instance, in caring or in the German 
language. A particularly important service, as stated by caregivers, is the assign-
ment to a new household at short notice if a client moves into a care home or 
dies. Private households also avail of the paperwork assistance provided by LMIs, 
for example, in relation to applications for state subsidies. In addition, they use 
a replacement service in the event that a caregiver becomes unavailable. These 
“full- service” arrangements are unique for the 24- hour domestic care sector. In 
the high- tech/ IT sector, if employers use the administrative services of agencies, 
these typically include payroll, performance monitoring, and replacement of 
hired workers in the event of longer absences or other kinds of failure. In the 
hospitality sector, employers almost never use the administrative services offered 
by LMIs.
Beyond existing categorizations of LMI services into informational, match-
making, and administrative services, in our interviews we identified a further 
kind of service, namely the provision of access to job candidates from abroad 
(without preselection of candidates, matchmaking, or provision of further in-
formation). Specifically, employers in the high- tech/ IT and the hospitality 
sectors use special activities of universities and other educational institutions in 
EU8 countries to find qualified personnel. Examples include universities in EU8 
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countries hosting student job fairs at which Austrian employers can present 
themselves and universities or other educational institutions in EU8 countries 
organizing student competitions for internships in Austrian firms. Although 
such access services are typically related to high- skill positions, our interview 
data indicate that employers from all three sectors use access services when they 
face an extreme scarcity of qualified job candidates in Austria. In addition, LMIs 
enable access to job candidates from EU8 countries through close collaboration 
with LMIs in these countries. For instance, some agencies operating in the 24- 
hour domestic care sector draw on a “chain of LMIs” consisting of several agents 
in Slovakia, some of whom had previously worked as caregivers in Austria. 
These LMI chains help bridge language barriers and geographic distance.
15.7. WHAT FUNCTIONS DO LABOR MARKET 
INTERMEDIARIES FULFILL?
15.7.1. Transaction cost reduction
In our sample, the eminent importance of LMIs as reducers of transaction costs 
becomes clearly visible across all three sectors. The fact that employers and 
jobseekers act in a transnational context complicates the search for and the val-
idation of information. Thus, the costs associated with establishing contracts 
are higher than those in local or national contexts. Different languages or state 
regulations related to required professional certificates, for instance, further in-
crease transaction costs.
In all three sectors, LMIs in the form of online job portals effectively lower 
information costs for both employers and jobseekers. Depending on the sector, 
further types of LMIs are used to lower different kinds of transaction costs. In 
the high- tech/ IT sector, even firms with a professional personnel management 
department face high transaction costs in certain situations, leading them to 
use various kinds of agencies. In the hospitality sector, personnel management 
is usually less professionalized because of the smaller firm sizes. However, 
given that these firms receive many unsolicited job applications and screening 
of job candidates is comparatively easy, transaction costs are lower. Thus, with 
the exception of a few high- level positions, there is little need for employers 
in the hospitality sector to use other LMIs than online job portals. In the 24- 
hour domestic care sector, private households usually lack the competence 
and time to search for an appropriate caregiver. Moreover, as lay employers, 
they can be challenged by comparatively complex legislation. Thus, transac-
tion costs are relatively high. Specialized agencies reduce these transaction 
costs for the employers, and they also reduce the search costs of the caregivers. 
Given that Austrian agencies often collaborate with other institutions located 
in an EU8 country, EU8 citizens can easily obtain information closer to where 
they live and in their first language. Finally, for both private households and 
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caregivers, agencies reduce contracting costs by assisting with the required 
paperwork.
15.7.2. risk Management
Partly interrelated with their function as reducers of transaction costs, LMIs also 
reduce the risks attached to recruitment and job search, particularly if they act 
as matchmakers or administrators. This function is especially relevant in the 
24- hour domestic care sector, in which LMIs reliably replace caregivers or pri-
vate households when a relationship terminates. For caregivers, agencies reduce 
the general risks associated with job search because the assignment of a new 
client usually takes less than 2 weeks. In addition, for both private households 
and caregivers, agencies reduce the risk of unintended illegal activities due to 
nonfamiliarity with social protection or trade legislation. Furthermore, some 
agencies in this sector reduce risks by securing acceptable working conditions 
(including fair pay) by acting as a contact point for caregivers who otherwise 
would be at the private households’ mercy.
Unlike in the 24- hour domestic care sector, the risk management func-
tion plays a minor role only in the high- tech/ IT and the hospitality sectors. 
Specifically, interviewees in the hospitality sector stressed that the risk of inap-
propriate matching of job candidates with positions is very low. Because newly 
hired employees only need little training and because fluctuation in this sector is 
generally high, employees and employers can be comparatively easily replaced. 
In the high- tech/ IT sector, in cases in which recruitment agencies monitor a pro-
bation period of job candidates and replace failing candidates, they manage the 
risks associated with candidate misfit.
15.7.3. network Building
The network- building function of LMIs is less pronounced in our sample than the 
functions as reducers of transaction costs and risks. Although LMIs replace in-
formal networks of both jobseekers and employers with regard to their function as 
information providers, they contribute less to the development of new networks. 
Rare examples of the network- building function include online job portals and 
social media, creating communities that especially help the interviewed young 
EU8 migrants to obtain further information. Although such communities exist in 
all industries, agencies in the 24- hour domestic care sector additionally connect 
their clients with other businesspeople, such as drivers who manage caregivers’ 
travel between their home towns and their places of work in Austria.
15.8. CONCLUSIONS
Our research provides in- depth insight regarding the entry ports of young 
EU8 migrants into the Austrian labor market and regarding the role of LMIs in 
 
 
 
456 TransiTions across EuropE
456
different sectors. The findings indicate that young EU8 migrants across sectors 
preferably use informal networks or cost- free informational services provided by 
online job portals. In addition, in the high- tech/ IT sector, young EU8 migrants 
search for information on company websites; in the hospitality sector, they 
spontaneously call or visit potential employers of their own accord; and in the 
24- hour domestic care sector, they pay agencies to establish relationships with 
private households. These search strategies are often complemented with recruit-
ment activities by employers using LMIs to gain access to job candidates in EU8 
countries.
LMIs facilitate entry into the Austrian labor market especially in the high- 
tech/ IT and the 24- hour domestic care sectors, in which they are important 
substitutes for informal networks. In these two sectors, LMIs— also in the form 
of agencies— play an important role in that they reduce transaction costs and 
risks for both young EU8 migrants and Austrian employers. In contrast, in the 
hospitality sector, agencies are far less important, which can be explained by the 
lower transaction costs and risks attached to employment relations in this sector.
Although this chapter offers a more nuanced understanding of EU8 migrants’ 
routes into employment in Austria, the quality of this employment remains an 
open question. Relatedly, the impact of the different entry ports on job quality 
cannot be fully assessed. In other words, although our findings indicate that 
LMIs are important facilitators of youth transitions from Eastern Europe to the 
West, the question of the consequences of these transitions for the labor market 
outcomes of young people from Eastern Europe remains open. LMIs may either 
secure good working conditions or hamper them by exploiting the weak power 
position of young EU8 migrants in the Austrian labor market.
Another limitation of our research is sample and response bias. Specifically, 
it was difficult to approach agencies operating in the 24- hour care sector, which 
reflects the complex circumstances in which these LMIs work. Those agencies 
that granted an interview were apparently not among the “black sheep” exploiting 
migrant caregivers that were mentioned by some interview partners. Moreover, 
the overall positive description of recruiting processes and working conditions, as 
perceived by interviewees across all sectors and interview types, should be carefully 
interpreted because social desirability may have contributed to these depictions.
In view of these limitations, further research on the role of LMIs in shaping 
East– West youth migration in Europe is needed, in particular regarding the im-
pact of different entry ports on labor market outcomes. In addition, although we 
have argued that Austria is a particularly apt case for studying East– West mi-
gration, future research focusing on other receiving countries is required. Given 
that our research findings indicate that the importance of entry ports and the 
importance of LMIs vary across sectors, future research should take account of 
these differences.
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NOTES
1 We thank Christer Hyggen and Hans- Christian Sandlie for productive and 
stimulating collaboration in our research on this topic. Jan Brzozowski pro-
vided helpful comments on a previous version of the chapter. We are also 
grateful to Sabrina Franczik and Isabella Bauer for their assistance in data col-
lection, as well as to Janine Leschke, Jacqueline O’Reilly, and Martin Seeleib- 
Kaiser for their guidance in preparing the text.
2 We exclude membership- based LMIs— which are the third type identified by 
Autor (2009)— from our analysis because neither the activities of guilds nor 
the collective action of unions are relevant to our research question.
3 A  theoretical rationale for selecting the three sectors is provided by labor 
market segmentation theory (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards 1973; Piore 
1986). According to this theory, labor markets consist of a primary seg-
ment characterized by stable employment relations, higher wages, and better 
opportunities for training and career development; and a secondary segment 
characterized by higher turnover rates, low wages, and poor opportunities for 
training and career development. We maintain that these differences between 
labor market segments are associated with differences in the role of LMIs. 
Whereas the high- tech/ IT sector is a prototypical example for the primary 
segment, the hospitality and the 24- hour domestic care sectors are examples 
for the secondary segment. Thereby, the 24- hour domestic care sector differs 
from the hospitality sector in that legislation is much more complex in the 
former sector. Given that previous research highlights the impact of legisla-
tion on migration (Garapich 2008; Lindquist et al. 2012; Cangiano and Walsh 
2014), we posit that the role of LMIs also varies between the hospitality sector 
and the 24- hour domestic care sector.
4 Depending on the needs of the client, specific training of caregivers is 
required— for instance, in palliative care. However, the typical caregivers in 
our study are people who only look after the client and do some housework, 
without providing any medical treatment or special care.
5 Although temporary work agencies often are associated with low- skill work 
in the secondary labor market segment, they also operate in high- skill areas 
such as engineering and IT design.
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WHAT ARE THE EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS 
FOR YOUNG ESTONIAN AND SLOVAK RETURN 
MIGRANTS?
Jaan Masso, Lucia Mýtna Kureková, Maryna Tverdostup,  
and Zuzana Žilincˇíková
16.1. INTRODUCTION
Free mobility is an important aspect of European integration that was widely 
realized for those Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that joined 
the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007. Many young and highly educated 
people from these countries have since sought employment in Western Europe 
(Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010). The key findings about East– West migra-
tion refer to the selection of emigrants on the basis of age and level of educa-
tion, to emigrants’ employment in low- skilled and low- paid jobs, and to their 
relatively weak upward occupational mobility (Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich 
2009; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010; Voitchovsky 2014). The quality of the 
employment of CEE migrants in the West is significantly worse than that of 
young migrants originating from Western countries (Akgüç and Beblavý, this 
volume; Spreckelsen, Leschke, and Seeleib- Kaiser, this volume). At the same 
time, CEE migrants in the West have very high employment levels (Kahanec and 
Zimmermann 2010; Kahanec and Kureková 2013), which even during the eco-
nomic crisis exceeded the employment levels of nationals in some host countries 
(Kahanec and Kureková 2016). To date, researchers have mainly focused on un-
derstanding the impact of East– West mobility on the receiving countries (Barrett 
and Duffy 2008; Clark and Drinkwater 2008; House of Lords 2008; Pollard, 
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Latorre, and Sriskandarajah 2008) and on evaluating the effects of the outflows 
for the sending countries (Rutkowski 2007; Galgóczi, Leschke, and Watt 2009; 
Pryymachenko and Fregert 2011; Organization for Economic Co- operation and 
Development (OECD) 2012; Zaiceva 2014).
With the onset of the 2008– 2009 economic crisis, many observers anticipated 
that the CEE migrants would return home. The economic literature mostly 
refers to return migration as a positive phenomenon for the home country, with 
returnees being viewed as agents of modernization and development, given that 
they bring home economic and social capital acquired abroad (King 1978). The 
existing evidence suggests that return patterns in the EU since the crisis have 
been diverse across both host and home countries (Galgóczi, Leschke, and Watt 
2012). This chapter seeks to enhance our knowledge about return migration 
patterns in two small CEE economies— Estonia and Slovakia.1 Although some 
comparative studies have recently analyzed return migration to CEE countries 
(Barcevičius et al. 2012; Lang et al. 2012; Coniglio and Brzozowski 2016), Estonia 
and Slovakia, in particular, are rarely selected as case studies, and knowledge 
about return migration in these countries is patchy. We chose these two coun-
tries because of their similar post- accession emigration rates, the variation in 
the severity of the 2008– 2009 economic crisis and in respective labor market 
conditions, and the differences in their institutional models in terms of welfare- 
state spending changes (Bohle and Greskovits 2012).
We focus our analysis on young emigrants (15– 34  years old) who have 
returned home to Estonia or Slovakia, calling them “returnees” here. Thus, we 
define a returnee as a person who emigrated from the home country, worked 
abroad for a period, and subsequently returned home. A “current emigrant,” by 
contrast, is a person who emigrated from the home country and has remained 
abroad. A “stayer” is a person who never left the home country (within our ob-
servation period) to work abroad. More exact definitions are provided in Section 
16.3. We rely on the Estonian and Slovak Labor Force Surveys (LFS) as our 
source of data. Although the two data sets involve to some extent different types 
of variables, they enable us to compare the two countries in a structured way. The 
LFS is a natural choice of data for the comparative analysis of return migration 
in Europe (concerning earlier studies, see Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2016) be-
cause within both the Estonian and the Slovak data, the variable of workplace 
location— home country or abroad— can be used to identify returnees.
The chapter conducts the analysis in two areas. First, we investigate what 
might lie behind the decision of some emigrants to return home (selection of 
returnees), and we seek to identify specific characteristics of returnees relative 
to those who remained at home (stayers) and those who remained abroad (cur-
rent emigrants). Second, the chapter provides an analysis of the labor market 
status of young returnees after they have re- entered the domestic labor market. 
In summary, our research is centered on two questions: (1) Who are returnees 
compared to both stayers and current emigrants— among both young people 
prospects for Estonian and slovak return Migrants 463
   463
and older adults? and (2)  How successful are returnees in the home- country 
labor markets in terms of observed labor market status— that is, how often are 
they employed, unemployed, or inactive?
The value of our contribution lies in the comparative design of the study, 
which enables us to test the relative importance of some institutional and mac-
roeconomic factors vis- à- vis micro- level characteristics such as education, 
gender, and labor market status. On the micro level, we pay particular attention 
to understanding the impact of being occupationally mismatched while abroad 
on the selection of returnees and on their short- term labor market outcomes. 
We also measure the effect of macroeconomic factors— gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita and unemployment rate— on the returnees’ labor market 
performance.
Our findings suggest that among young returnees, level of education has no 
effect on the decision to return in either of the country- specific samples. At the 
same time, level of occupation has a significant effect on the selection of young 
returnees, but only in the Estonian sample. In fact, an education– occupation 
mismatch significantly affects the decision to return among young and highly 
educated Estonian emigrants. By contrast, no mismatch effect is found for young 
Slovak returnees. The analysis of post- return labor market status reveals that 
both Estonian and Slovak returnees are more likely to face short- term unem-
ployment (after re- entering the domestic labor market) compared to either cur-
rent emigrants or stayers. This result could be attributed to a higher reservation 
wage and longer job search periods, both of which returnees can probably af-
ford due to savings accumulated while abroad and possibly also the opportunity 
to transfer unemployment benefits from the host country to the home country 
(Hazans 2008; Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2016). These advantages appear to 
create conditions that enable returnees to find jobs that match their qualification 
levels and preferences (e.g., wage and type of work). We also find that Estonian 
returnees have a lower risk of unemployment compared to Slovak returnees. 
We attribute this difference to better labor market conditions and a broader re-
sponse of the Estonian social security system to the crisis, both of which facilitate 
smoother reintegration of returnees in Estonia.
16.2. LITERATURE REVIEW: MACRO- AND MICRO- LEVEL 
DETERMINANTS OF RETURN MIGRATION
On a theoretical level, it has been established that economic actors self- select 
into migration (Borjas 1987)  and that emigrants differ from stayers in terms 
of both observable (e.g., age, family status, and labor market status) and unob-
servable (e.g., attitudes and risk aversion) characteristics. The type of selection 
and how it compares to stayers or to citizens of the host country depends on 
the home- and host- country characteristics. Similar factors affect the selection 
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of returnees. This is most widely analyzed with respect to selection according 
to skill and ability, as anchored in the theoretical framework of the Roy model 
(Roy 1951). This model predicts that where migration flows are negatively 
selected on the basis of skills (i.e., those who emigrate have lower than average 
skills), return migrants are the best of this negative selection. On the other 
hand, where the original migrants were positively selected (i.e., those who emi-
grate have higher than average skills), the return migrants are “the worst of the 
best” (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996). The aspect of selectivity is important because 
it signals the characteristics of returnees relative to stayers and is likely to affect 
returnee behavior in the home labor market, not least via their competitiveness 
with stayers.
However, the Roy model of selection into return migration overlooks the issue 
of occupational mismatch, whereas CEE migrants are often mismatched in the 
host countries, working in jobs below their qualifications (Akgüç and Beblavý, 
this volume; Spreckelsen et al., this volume). For example, Voitchovsky (2014) 
argues that the severity of the occupational downgrading of CEE migrants and 
the related wage penalty stand out relative to those of other migrant groups in 
Ireland (and the United Kingdom), including third- country nationals. The mis-
match is strongest for workers with higher secondary and tertiary education 
(Drinkwater et al. 2009; Turner 2010). There is some evidence supporting a link 
between mismatch and return decisions. For instance, overeducation of migrants 
has been identified as a key variable associated with the intention to return for 
Estonian migrants working in Finland (Pungas et  al. 2012). Similarly, Currie 
(2007) found that Polish returnees commonly framed their decision to return to 
Poland within a context of frustration with limited labor market progress in the 
United Kingdom.
Scholars theorize different reasons for return migration. It may follow, for 
example, from an initial plan regarding the country of residence over the life 
cycle, where the return home is already envisaged at the moment of emigra-
tion. In an analysis of determinants of return among Moroccan emigrants, for 
instance, De Haas, Fokkema, and Fassi Fihri (2015) showed that the decision 
to return can be driven by economic success in the host country. However, the 
return may also result from mistakes in the initial migration decision; that is, 
it follows from an unsuccessful migration experience (failed migration) (Rooth 
and Saarela 2007). The individual and collective success of the return process 
may vary depending on the individual characteristics of the migrant and his or 
her household, networks, and community, as well as country- level features in the 
home and host states (Kveder 2013). Furthermore, precautionary savings may be 
related to the return decision (Dustmann 1997; McCormick and Wahba 2001). 
Along these lines, Dumont and Spielvogel (2008, 178)  define the key reasons 
for return migration as a failure to integrate in the host country, changes in the 
economic situation in the home country (macroeconomic environment), per-
sonal preference for the home country, the achievement of a savings objective, 
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or improved employment opportunities at home following experience gained 
abroad.
The variety of factors that can contribute to the success of a return (individual- 
level characteristics, networks, country- level factors, motive for return, mi-
gration experience, and timing of return) is reflected in the mixed empirical 
findings on the characteristics of returnees and especially on their post- return 
labor market trajectories and performance across different CEE countries and 
over time (Iara 2006; Hazans 2008; Martin and Radu 2012; Pungas et al. 2012; 
Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2016). Coniglio and Brzozowski (2016) document 
that skill mismatch in the host country is significantly associated with post- 
return nonconformance of skills and employment, which ultimately reduces the 
likelihood of successful reintegration.
The majority of studies found that returnees to CEE countries are positively 
selected in terms of education (Hazans and Philips 2010; Martin and Radu 
2012; Smoliner, Förschner, and Nova 2012; Masso, Eamets, and Mõtsmees 2014; 
Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2016). This positive selection into return migra-
tion is reflected in the significant wage premiums of CEE returnees (Iara 2006; 
Ambrosini et al. 2011; Martin and Radu 2012). However, evidence found by De 
Coulon and Piracha (2005) indicates that Albanian emigrants are negatively 
selected on skills, relative to stayers, which to a large extent explains the relatively 
worse performance of Albanian returnees on the home labor market. Another 
strand of literature has documented that returnees have a higher probability 
of falling into unemployment or inactivity (Smoliner et al. 2012; Coniglio and 
Brzozowski 2016). However, Piracha and Vadean (2010) found that the associ-
ation between return migration to Albania and unemployment vanishes after a 
1- year period of reintegration.
In addition to individual- level factors, institutional and macroeconomic 
aspects also play a role. Friberg et al. (2014) found that the performance of 
immigrants to a great extent depends on their structural position in the host 
labor market, which is largely determined by the institutional configuration 
of the host- country labor market. Other evidence by Findlay and McCollum 
(2013) highlights the significance of recruitment and employment regimes 
in the context of rural agricultural migrant labor. Napierała and Fiałkowska 
(2013) emphasize the importance of host- country employment agencies in 
preventing skill– occupation mismatch and, hence, in reducing return migra-
tion driven by overqualification. The macroeconomic environment is framed 
by changing external conditions, such as the Great Recession of 2008– 2009, 
which significantly affected several host and home countries. White (2014), 
analyzing the return migration of young Polish migrants from the United 
Kingdom and Ireland following the crisis, questions the strength of a causal 
effect of the crisis on their decision to return. She argues that migrants prefer 
to stay in the host country because of the persistence of significant wage 
differentials compared to Poland. The existing evidence suggests that patterns 
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of return in response to the economic crisis have been diverse across both 
host and home countries (Galgóczi et al. 2012).
To date, systematic work exploring the impact of welfare policies on patterns 
of return is absent. As stated previously, some studies view returning emigrants 
as being selected on the basis of a lack of economic success in the host country; 
return migration would thus correct for the failure of the initial migration. Being 
unemployed in the host country, therefore, significantly increases the probability 
of returning to the homeland (Pungas et al. 2012; Bijwaard, Schluter, and Wahba 
2014). This might not be quite the case in the context of intra- EU mobility be-
cause migrants with a sufficient employment record become eligible for social in-
surance and other types of welfare benefits in the host country (Kureková 2013). 
Moreover, under EU legislation, unemployment benefits can be transferred to 
the country of origin.2 However, if access to welfare is employment based, it 
continues to exclude the least successful migrants. The few existing studies have 
noted that choosing to stay or to return home can be influenced by where (at 
home or in the host country) the emigrant has access to social security benefits 
(for a discussion regarding Poland during the economic crisis, see Anacka and 
Fihel 2012) and that the decision of returnees to register as unemployed can de-
pend on the country of previous employment (Kahanec and Kureková 2016). 
Other findings indicate that unemployment benefits enable emigrants to survive 
a period of unemployment abroad (White 2014) and that public programs might 
be important for the successful integration of poorly prepared return migrants 
(Cassarino 2004).
The contextual factors of the home and host countries go beyond economic and 
institutional variables. Some studies argue that return decisions are influenced 
mainly by the home countries rather than the host countries (Martin and Radu 
2012) or that private and social motives play a key role (Barcevičius et al. 2012; 
Lang et al. 2012). Furthermore, cultural factors might be behind a return due to 
failed migration, such as an inability to integrate in the host country because of 
prejudices and stereotypes encountered abroad (Cerase 1974), whereas changed 
cultural and social patterns in the country of origin may also pose challenges 
to successful reintegration on return (Dumon 1986). Cross- border social net-
work theory emphasizes that cross- border networks of social and economic 
relationships secure and sustain return migration (Cassarino 2004). For in-
stance, having lost networks of social relationships may be the factor that causes 
returnees to fail to pursue their interests in the home country. Networks provide 
access to resources influencing performance on return, whereas return migration 
may help establish and maintain networks spanning several societies (Cassarino 
2004). As an example of the importance of social factors for successful reinte-
gration, Barrett and Mosca (2013) highlight the high degrees of loneliness and 
social isolation among elderly Irish returnees who had spent long periods abroad 
compared to those who had stayed at home. However, Kureková and Žilinčíková 
(2018), using web- survey data for Slovak returnees, find that returning for family 
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reasons adds to the success of reintegration. Given this existing body of evidence, 
understanding the consequences for returning youth emigrants to Estonia and 
Slovakia can provide a novel and pertinent lens for examining some of the effects 
of youth migration during the recent crisis period.
16.3. DATA
The EU Labor Force Survey (EU- LFS) is a random representative household 
survey collected on a quarterly basis. The data set is restricted to individuals 
who are at least 15 years old, and we added an upper limit of 64 years for our 
study. The EU- LFS employs a rotational panel design, whereby every individual 
is interviewed for five consecutive quarters of the survey and subsequently leaves 
the sample. We use this panel structure of the data set to identify those who 
have work experience abroad. Within both the Estonian and the Slovak data, 
the variable of workplace location— home country or abroad— is used to iden-
tify returnees. The variable of country of residence a year previously, used by 
other return migration studies (Zaiceva and Zimmerman 2016), does not pro-
vide a sufficient sample size in the case of Estonian and Slovak data. A disad-
vantage of our approach is that we cannot use the data set to observe longer 
integration patterns and can only comparatively assess labor market outcomes 
for one quarter (the last quarter of the survey). However, we are able to go be-
yond the descriptive approach prevalent in most other studies that use EU- LFS 
data (Martin and Radu 2012; Smoliner et al. 2012).
For the analysis of the Slovak data, we keep only individuals who were 
interviewed in at least two out of the five available quarters in the sample. We de-
fine returnee as a person who worked at least one quarter abroad but returned to 
Slovakia in the last observed quarter. A current emigrant is an individual who is 
working abroad in the last observed quarter. In the Estonian LFS data, the labor 
market history of individuals is available for the past 2 years. Therefore, we de-
fine Estonian returnees as those who have worked abroad for at least one quarter 
during the past 2 years and are back in Estonia in the last quarter. This longer 
time span for observing emigrants and returnees yields a much larger sample of 
returnees in Estonia than in Slovakia.
A general disadvantage of the EU- LFS is the fact that it only captures emigra-
tion and return migration of short- term emigrants and returnees. A condition 
of participation in the survey is that an individual is considered a member of a 
surveyed household; therefore, the survey does not cover emigration of econom-
ically independent units (e.g., young people who emigrated and live abroad and 
are considered economically independent by the household members). However, 
individuals engaging in temporary or seasonal work abroad (or commuters) are 
considered household members, even if they work abroad for more than a year, 
and are therefore included in the survey (Bahna 2013). An important implication 
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of this survey design is that the EU- LFS more precisely captures emigrants who 
live with a broader family and engage in circular or temporary mobility and at 
the same time is likely to underestimate the mobility of young people who have 
not established a family and are more footloose. We interpret our results in the 
light of these limitations.
16.4. KEY FACTS ABOUT ESTONIA AND SLOVAKIA
Estonia and Slovakia are understudied countries in the return migration literature. 
We selected these cases because they experienced similar post- accession emigra-
tion rates (Kureková 2011) but showed differences in the severity of the 2008– 
2009 economic crisis, as well as varying today in their labor market conditions 
and in their institutional models in terms of changes in welfare spending. The 
key comparative data for the two countries are presented in Table 16.1.
Slovakia and Estonia have had very different experiences of the economic 
crisis. They entered the crisis with different levels of youth unemployment, 
converging by 2010 on very high rates— from which Estonia recovered more 
quickly than Slovakia, however. Estonian youth unemployment rates skyrocketed 
from approximately 10% in 2007 to 34% in 2010 and then declined to approxi-
mately 19% in 2013. In contrast, the youth unemployment rate in Slovakia was 
nearly double that of Estonia at the onset of the crisis: It was 19% in 2008 and 
increased to 34% by 2012, remaining at this level in 2013.
Estonia experienced significant declines in GDP in 2008 and 2009 of 5.4% 
and 14.7%, respectively. Subsequently, economic growth returned, contributing 
to a decline in the general unemployment rate from 16.7% in 2010 to 8.6% in 
2013. Although Slovakia experienced only a mild GDP decline in 2009 (−4.9%), 
its success in fighting unemployment has been limited. From this perspective, we 
might expect that the integration of return migrants to the Estonian labor market 
would be smoother than that of Slovak returnees.
Moreover, social protection spending has increased considerably in Estonia. 
Whereas in the mid- 2000s, Estonia had a lower level of social protection 
spending than that of Slovakia (12.4% vs. 15.9%, respectively, in 2005), the levels 
converged at the peak of the crisis in 2009, with social protection spending 
amounting to 18.8% versus 18.2% of GDP in Estonia and Slovakia, respectively. 
This change indicates that Estonia invested significantly in assisting its citizens 
with weathering the misfortunes of the economic crisis. This increased invest-
ment in welfare may have assisted return migrants, but it also discouraged fur-
ther outmigration from Estonia (Kureková 2013). Which country was more 
successful in integrating returnees is an important question. Based on these ag-
gregate indicators, we might expect that returnees to Estonia on average perform 
better at reintegrating into the labor market because of higher levels of labor 
market flexibility (Eamets et  al. 2015), contributing to higher outflows from 
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Table 16.1 Key economic indicators: Estonia and Slovakia
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Unemployment rate
EU25 8.8 8.5 8.8 9.1 9.2 9.1 8.2 7.2 7.1 9.1 9.7 9.7 10.5 10.9
EE 14.6 13.0 11.2 10.3 10.1 8.0 5.9 4.6 5.5 13.5 16.7 12.3 10.0 8.6
SK 18.9 19.5 18.8 17.7 18.4 16.4 13.5 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 13.7 14.0 14.2
Youth unemployment rate (age 15– 24 years)
EU25 17.3 16.9 17.4 18.4 18.8 18.7 17.3 15.5 15.7 20.1 21.0 21.2 22.8 23.2
EE 23.9 22.2 17.9 20.9 23.9 15.1 12.1 10.1 12.0 27.4 32.9 22.4 20.9 18.7
SK 37.3 39.6 38.1 33.8 33.4 30.4 27.0 20.6 19.3 27.6 33.9 33.7 34.0 33.7
GDP growth
EU27 3.9 2.0 1.3 1.5 2.6 2.2 3.4 3.2 0.4 - 4.5 2.0 1.7 −0.4 0.1
EE 9.7 6.3 6.6 7.8 6.3 8.9 10.1 7.5 - 4.2 - 14.1 2.6 9.6 3.9 0.8
SK 1.4 3.5 4.6 4.8 5.1 6.7 8.3 10.5 5.8 - 4.9 4.4 3.0 1.8 0.9
Social protection expenditures (% GDP)
EU25 25.6 25.7 26.0 26.5 26.3 26.4 26.0 25.5 26.2 28.9 28.7 28.4 28.8 — 
EE 13.8 13.0 12.7 12.6 13.0 12.5 12.0 12.0 14.7 18.8 17.6 15.6 15.0 14.8
SK 19.1 18.7 18.8 18.0 16.9 16.2 16.0 15.7 15.7 18.5 18.3 17.9 18.1 18.4
Strictness of employment protection— individual and collective dismissals: regular contracts
EE — — — — — — — — 2.33 2.33 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.07
SK — — — — — — — — 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.16 2.26
Strictness of employment protection— temporary contracts
EE — — — — — — — — 2.29 2.29 2.29 2.29 2.29 3.04
SK — — — — — — — — 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.42 2.29 2.42
EE, Estonia; SK, Slovakia.
Sources: OECD (employment protection) and Eurostat (all other data series).
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unemployment and better labor market conditions. In fact, Estonian returnees 
show lower unemployment rates than has been the case for returnees to Slovakia.
For the analysis of return migration, we work with a pooled sample of EU- LFS 
data from 2008 to 2013. The overall Slovak sample consists of 96,821 individuals, 
of whom 3,211 are current emigrants and 329 are returnees. The total Estonian 
sample includes 159,028 respondents, of whom 3,002 are current emigrants 
and 3,570 are returnees. Of the returnees, 62% of the Slovaks and 65% of the 
Estonians are young (aged 15– 34 years).
The rate of return migration increased over time in both countries, but the 
growth has been especially significant in Estonia (Tables 16.2 and 16.3). By 
2013, the rate of return had exceeded the rate of outmigration, resulting in pos-
itive net intra- EU mobility in Estonia. The rate of return to Slovakia has been 
more modest. Between 2008 and 2013, on average every tenth person who 
worked abroad returned, but the rate of return varies significantly over the years 
analyzed, reaching close to 20% in 2009 and 2012 but only approximately 7% 
in all other years.3 The share of current emigrants out of Slovakia relative to 
Table 16.2 Estonia: Numbers of emigrants, returnees, and stayers (full sample)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Stayers 17,763 15,526 15,634 16,660 18,556 18,346 152,456
Returnees 275 413 491 608 778 785 3,570
Emigrants 332 307 365 390 507 492 3,002
Total 18,370 16,246 16,490 17,658 19,841 19,623 159,028
Share of returnees 1.50 2.54 2.98 3.44 3.92 4.00 2.24
Share of emigrants 1.81 1.89 2.21 2.21 2.56 2.51 1.89
Returnees per emigrants 82.8 134.5 134.5 155.9 153.5 159.6 118.9
Source: EE- LFS; authors’ calculations.
Table 16.3 Slovakia: Numbers of migrants, returnees, and stayers (full sample)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Stayers 14,618 14,402 13,563 14,172 13,550 22,976 93,281
Returnees 69 83 30 30 68 49 329
Emigrants 695 484 437 440 357 798 3,211
Total 15,382 14,969 14,030 14,642 13,975 23,823 96,821
Share of returnees 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3
Share of emigrants 4.5 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.6 3.4 3.3
Returnees per 
emigrants
9.9 17.1 6.9 6.8 19.0 6.1 10.2
Source: SK- LFS; authors’ calculations.
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returnees to Slovakia exceeds the share of current emigrants out of Estonia rela-
tive to returnees to Estonia, especially in the crisis years 2008 and 2009.
The EU- LFS does not include information about the main migrant destina-
tion countries for Estonia. Other studies document that Finland was, and re-
mains, the most important destination country for temporary labor mobility 
among young Estonians (aged 15– 35  years); the United Kingdom, Austria, 
Norway, Sweden, and Russia are also popular destinations. The key migration 
destinations for Slovaks are the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Italy, Austria, and Germany (Masso et al. 2016).
Tables 16.4 and 16.5 present descriptive statistical evidence for key demo-
graphic features of returnees, current emigrants, and stayers and for different age 
brackets. Estonian return migrants are substantially different from both current 
emigrants and stayers (see Table 16.4). Return migrants are on average younger 
than those who stay in Estonia; returnees are also more often male, compared to 
the relevant age group of stayers. Among young returnees, the share of married 
individuals is 39%, which is higher relative to that of stayers (31%) but lower 
relative to that of their peers who are still working abroad (49%). In terms of ed-
ucation, young returnees are more educated (e.g., the share of those with a lower 
level education is 32%, compared to 41% among stayers of the corresponding age 
group) and predominantly hold a secondary- level education (54%). The exami-
nation of labor market status revealed that approximately 72% of young returnees 
were employed while abroad; however, after returning, the share of those em-
ployed dropped to 52%, along with an increase in the share of unemployed from 
12% a year previously to 26% in the current year.4 However, despite the better 
educational attainments of returnees, they are still more likely to be unemployed 
than are stayers. Among returnees who found work, their occupational profile 
was lower compared to that recorded in their last quarter abroad. Consequently, 
young returnees with high education levels more frequently reported themselves 
to be overeducated in the last quarter working abroad compared to those who 
had stayed in Estonia (16% relative to 10% among stayers).
For Slovakia (see Table 16.5), we find that returnees significantly differ both 
from stayers (nonmigrants) and from Slovak emigrants currently working 
abroad with regard to the main demographic and labor market characteristics. 
Similar to current emigrants, returnees are more likely to be males. Returnees are 
younger, more frequently overeducated for the jobs they performed abroad, and 
more skilled than both current emigrants and stayers. Most young returnees have 
a secondary education (90%); however, approximately two- thirds of returnees 
were unemployed in the last quarter of the survey, which exceeds the share of 
unemployed among stayers and especially among Slovak emigrants abroad.
However, returnees are also much less likely to be inactive compared to stayers 
in the relevant age categories. Returnees are less likely than stayers to be self- 
employed, which might be related to their better performance in the labor market 
(e.g., no need to enter bogus self- entrepreneurship; see Ortlieb, Sheehan, and 
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Table 16.4 Estonia: Descriptive statistics based on EE- LFS
Returnees Stayers Current emigrants
15– 35 
years
Youth 15– 24 
years
Youth 25– 35 
years
>35 
years
15– 35  
years
Youth 15– 24 
years
Youth 25– 35 
years
>35 
years
15– 35 
years
Youth 15– 24 
years
Youth 25– 35 
years
>35 
years
Sociodemographic characteristics
Average age, 
years
41 45 39
Gender 
(male = 1)
71.8 68.8 78.2 61.2 50.5 52.5 53.5 44.5 87.2 79.9 89.9 85.7
Nationality 
(Estonian = 1)
80 82.3 78.4 66.4 78.2 81.4 73.7 73 79.1 85.8 76.1 77.8
Citizenship 
(Estonian = 1)
92.3 95.4 90.3 79.7 91.5 94 87.9 84.3 94 97.2 92.6 88.2
Marital status 
(married = 1)
39 16.7 56.7 77.5 30.8 10.3 63.7 75.4 48.9 20.1 59.8 81.1
Education
Higher 13.9 5.2 21.5 18.9 14.2 5.2 28.5 21.9 11.1 4.7 13.5 8.2
Secondary 53.9 60.5 50.4 59.1 44.7 44.6 49.5 50.5 57.8 66.8 54.4 68.3
Lower 32.2 34.3 28.2 22 41.1 50.3 22 27.6 31.1 28.4 32.2 23.5
Employment
Employed 51.9 38.2 60.4 59.5 49.1 23.1 76.2 58.1 100 100 100 100
Unemployed 25.8 26.9 25.2 15.6 8.8 8.6 9 5 — — — — 
Inactive 22.3 35 14.4 24.9 42.1 68.3 14.9 36.9 — — — — 
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Employment 1 year previously
Employed 72 58.2 79.3 77 61.8 35.7 78.5 60.1 79.9 62.2 85.3 78.5
Unemployed 12 11.6 11.2 6.8 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 6.9 13.5 4.9 7.2
Inactive 16 30.2 8.5 16.2 34.9 60.9 18.3 36.6 13.2 24.3 9.8 14.3
ISCO (last quarter abroad for returnees)
High 7.7 6.2 8.8 11.3 37.9 22.5 42.8 39.2 8.7 5 10.1 13.1
Medium 7.2 9.9 5.1 8.1 23.1 32.4 20.1 20.2 9.8 16 7.5 7.3
Low 85.1 83.9 86.1 80.5 38 44.8 35.8 40.2 81.2 79 82.4 79.5
Overeducation (last quarter abroad for returnees)
Among medium 
educated
11.1 12.9 9.6 7.8 8.2 11.2 7 11 11.2 13.5 10.1 8.9
Among highly 
educated
16.1 36.4 13.2 3.7 10.2 13.8 9.8 10.6 32.6 60 29 18.9
Self- employed 
(last quarter 
abroad for 
returnees)
2.8 4.5 1.5 2.9 6.2 2.6 7.4 9 1.5 0.9 1.7 3.7
No. of 
observations
1,042 280 701 1,563 29,770 15,189 14,581 106,009 794 219 575 1,424
Notes: The level of occupation corresponds to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) code: low (9), medium (4– 8), and high (0– 3). Overeducation was measured as a combination 
of education and occupational level. Overeducation among the medium educated was defined as the combination of medium education (ISCED 3 or 4) and low occupational level (ISCO 9); overeducation 
among the highly educated was defined by high education (ISCED 5 or 6) and a low or middle level of occupation (ISCO > 3).
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Table 16.5 Slovakia: Descriptive statistics based on SK- LFS
Returnees Stayers Current emigrants
15– 34  
years
Youth 15– 24 
years
Youth  
25– 34 years
>35  
years
15– 34 
years
Youth 15– 24 
years
Youth  
25– 34 years
>35  
years
15– 34  
years
Youth  
15– 24 years
Youth  
25– 34 years
>35  
years
Sociodemographic characteristics
Average age, years n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gender (male = 1) 63.7 50.6 72.4 73.6 51.1 50.9 51.2 46.9 67.6 62.7 69.7 70.5
Nationality 
(Slovak = 1)
85.3 85.2 85.4 83.2 90.2 90.4 89.9 89.1 88.2 90.7 87.1 87.9
Citizenship 
(Slovak = 1)
99.5 100 99.2 99.2 99.9 100 99.7 99.8 99.7 100 99.6 99.7
Marital status 
(married = 1)
13.7 0 22.8 70.4 22.1 2.9 42 75.7 21 3.6 28.4 74.3
Education
Higher 7.4 3.7 9.8 2.4 15 5.8 24.6 13.7 10.9 4.3 13.8 5
Secondary 89.7 91.4 88.6 91.2 57.9 46.9 69.4 75.3 86.1 90 84.4 91.1
Lower 2.9 4.9 1.6 6.4 27 47.4 6 11.1 3 5.7 1.8 3.9
Employment
Employed 33.3 28.4 36.6 32.8 42.8 17.5 68.9 62.3 98 99.1 97.5 98.7
Unemployed 59.3 60.5 58.5 53.6 12 10.6 13.4 9.8 0.1 0 0.2 0
Inactive 7.4 11.1 4.9 13.6 45.3 71.9 17.7 27.9 1.9 0.9 2.3 1.3
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Employment 1 year previously
Employed 70.6 61.7 76.4 85.6 39.2 13.6 65.8 63.3 84.9 73.2 89.8 94.2
Student 10.8 23.5 2.4 0.0 40.1 74.2 4.8 0.0 4.8 12.7 1.5 0.0
Unemployed 17.2 14.8 18.7 10.4 11.4 9.1 13.8 10.5 8.8 13.9 6.6 4.7
Inactive 1.5 0 2.4 4.0 9.2 3.1 15.6 26.2 1.6 0.2 2.1 1.2
No. of 
observations
204 81 123 125 34,582 17,595 16,987 58,698 1,473 440 1,033 1,738
Labor market characteristics
Occupation/ ISCO (last quarter abroad for returnees), N = 56,789
High 11 6.2 14.2 8.8 36.6 22.6 40.4 36.2 15 9.1 17.6 7.9
Medium 62.2 66.7 59.2 72 56.1 66.2 53.4 54.3 66 67.1 65.6 79.5
Low 26.9 27.2 26.7 19.2 7.3 11.1 6.2 9.5 19 23.7 16.9 12.7
Overeducation (last quarter abroad for returnees)
Among medium 
educated
25.9 24.7 26.7 14.4 5.7 8.1 5 7 16.8 20.3 15.2 11.1
Among highly 
educated
3 1.2 4.2 0.8 3.3 1.8 3.8 1.8 4.2 2.1 5.1 1.7
Self- employed 6.0 2.5 8.3 13.6 12.7 8.6 13.8 15.3 19.2 14.8 21.0 35.7
No. of 
observations
201 81 120 125 15,248 3,261 11,987 38,031 1,451 438 1,013 1,733
Notes: Overeducation was measured as a combination of education and occupational level. Overeducation among the medium educated was defined as the combination of medium education (ISCED 3 or 
4) and low occupational level (ISCO 9); overeducation among the highly educated was defined by high education (ISCED 5 or 6) and a low or middle level of occupation (ISCO > 3).
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Masso, this volume). But this may also be associated with the lower frequency of 
opportunity entrepreneurship (Bosma et al. 2012) among return migrants. These 
findings contrast with some other previous findings (McCormick and Wahba 
2001; Piracha and Vadean 2010); however, the EU- LFS might not be the appro-
priate data source for studying the degree of self- employment among returnees 
because they may require more time after their return home to become engaged 
in entrepreneurship.5 In the empirical analysis that follows, we examine whether 
these differences are statistically salient and to what degree these compositional 
effects impact on the labor market performance of returnees relative to stayers 
and current emigrants.
16.5. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SELECTIVITY  
AND LABOR MARKET STATUS
16.5.1. Models
The econometric analysis has two foci. First, a set of logistic regressions is used 
to investigate how the characteristics of returnees differ from those of both 
stayers and current emigrants. Second, the labor market status of returnees is 
investigated in comparison to the rest of the respondents— stayers and current 
emigrants. A multinomial logistic regression is fitted for the variable indicating 
labor market status in the last observed quarter:  employed, unemployed, or 
inactive. All models are estimated for the full sample (M1– M3), as well as for 
the youth sample only (M4– M6). Results are shown in Tables 16.6 and 16.7 for 
Estonia and in Tables 16.8 and 16.9 for Slovakia.
The models include two broad types of variables: individual- level variables and 
macroeconomic variables. In particular, the models include sociodemographic 
variables: gender; marital status (single or married); age; nationality (Estonian/ 
Slovak or non- Estonian/ non- Slovak); and education— low (International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 1– 2), medium (ISCED 3– 4), and 
high (ISCED 5– 6). The models addressing the selectivity of returnees further em-
ploy variables related to the economic activity of respondents: self- employment 
(a dummy variable), labor market status a year previously (employed [ref.], stu-
dent, unemployed, or inactive), skill level of job after return, and overqualification 
while abroad. We distinguish between two types of overqualification: overquali-
fied among medium- educated and overqualified among highly educated workers.
Macro- level characteristics include measures of GDP per capita and unem-
ployment rate in the home country. Based on the findings of secondary literature, 
host- country conditions appear more important than home- country conditions 
for the return and reintegration of emigrants. We are not able to use these 
macro- level variables in the host countries (or their differences in the host and 
home countries) because of the lack of information on the migrants’ destination 
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Table 16.6 Estonia: Selectivity analysis
Returnee– stayer Returnee– emigrant
All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years) All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Male 0.003* 0.003** 0.004** 0.008** 0.008** 0.01*** – 0.294*** – 0.293*** – 0.299*** – 0.314*** – 0.314*** – 0.308***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
Married – 0.001 – 0.001 – 0.001 – 0.003 – 0.003 – 0.003 – 0.025 – 0.028 – 0.026 – 0.009 – 0.011 – 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Age 15– 24 years 0.017*** 0.02*** 0.022*** – 0.022 – 0.027 – 0.029
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Age 25– 34 years 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.015*** – 0.115*** – 0.119*** – 0.12***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Age 35– 44 years 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.014*** – 0.075** – 0.079** – 0.081**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age 45– 54 years 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.008*** – 0.104*** – 0.108*** – 0.109***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Other non- Estonian 
nationality
– 0.001 – 0.001 – 0.001 –0.008*** – 0.008** – 0.009** 0.013 0.011 0.015 – 0.038 – 0.036 – 0.029
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Secondary education 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.005 0.007* 0.03 0.028 0.035 0.036 0.046 0.059*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Higher education 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.156*** 0.012 0.022 0.04
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.06) (0.06) (0.061)
(continued)
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Returnee– stayer Returnee– emigrant
All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years) All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Overeducated among 
medium educated
– 0.018*** – 0.019*** – 0.022*** – 0.059*** – 0.06*** – 0.07*** – 0.196*** – 0.199*** – 0.193*** – 0.564*** – 0.556*** – 0.554***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.192) (0.193) (0.190)
Overeducated among 
highly educated
– 0.004 – 0.004 – 0.005 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.022*** – 0.051 – 0.052 – 0.057 0.15** 0.155** 0.145*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.076) (0.075) (0.077)
Medium- level 
occupation
– 0.01*** – 0.01*** – 0.013*** – 0.019*** – 0.02*** – 0.024*** – 0.347*** – 0.343*** – 0.339*** – 0.511*** – 0.503*** – 0.5***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
High- level occupation 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.016*** – 0.181*** – 0.177*** – 0.182*** – 0.321*** – 0.316*** – 0.317***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Self- employed – 0.015*** – 0.015*** – 0.017*** – 0.013* – 0.012* – 0.014 – 0.02 – 0.016 – 0.012 0.046 0.056 0.049
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.098) (0.095) (0.096)
Labor market status 
1 year ago— student
– 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.006 – 0.006 – 0.007 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.037
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.052) (0.05) (0.049)
Unemployed 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008 0.005 0.006 – 0.05* – 0.045 – 0.051* – 0.074* – 0.066 – 0.063
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.029) (0.03) (0.030) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Inactive – 0.008*** – 0.008*** – 0.01*** – 0.007* – 0.007* – 0.01** – 0.131*** – 0.129*** – 0.146*** – 0.051 – 0.048 – 0.077
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.05) (0.05)
GDP last quarter 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.011 0.053
(0.003) (0.007) (0.04) (0.061)
Unemployment rate 
last quarter
0.001*** 0.001*** – 0.004 – 0.008*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
Year dummies No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
No. of observations 48,664 48,664 41,373 13,305 13,305 11,223 2,389 2,389 2,336 938 938 915
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.085 0.071 0.0526 0.0703 0.0638 0.1335 0.1368 0.1393 0.155 0.162 0.1694
Notes: The level of occupation corresponds to the standard categorization of the ISCO code: low (9), medium (4– 8), and high (0– 3). Overeducation was measured as a combination of education and 
occupational level. Overeducation among the medium educated was defined as the combination of medium education (ISCED 3 or 4) and low occupational level (ISCO 9); overeducation among the 
highly educated was defined by high education (ISCED 5 or 6) and a low or middle level of occupation (ISCO > 3). The figures reported in the table are the marginal effects with standard errors in 
parentheses. The reference categories in the regressions are male, single, age 55– 65 years, Estonian nationality, primary education, overeducated among primary education, low- level education, and 
salaried employee.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Table 16.6 Continued
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Returnee– stayer Returnee– emigrant
All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years) All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Overeducated among 
medium educated
– 0.018*** – 0.019*** – 0.022*** – 0.059*** – 0.06*** – 0.07*** – 0.196*** – 0.199*** – 0.193*** – 0.564*** – 0.556*** – 0.554***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.192) (0.193) (0.190)
Overeducated among 
highly educated
– 0.004 – 0.004 – 0.005 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.022*** – 0.051 – 0.052 – 0.057 0.15** 0.155** 0.145*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.076) (0.075) (0.077)
Medium- level 
occupation
– 0.01*** – 0.01*** – 0.013*** – 0.019*** – 0.02*** – 0.024*** – 0.347*** – 0.343*** – 0.339*** – 0.511*** – 0.503*** – 0.5***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
High- level occupation 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.016*** – 0.181*** – 0.177*** – 0.182*** – 0.321*** – 0.316*** – 0.317***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Self- employed – 0.015*** – 0.015*** – 0.017*** – 0.013* – 0.012* – 0.014 – 0.02 – 0.016 – 0.012 0.046 0.056 0.049
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.098) (0.095) (0.096)
Labor market status 
1 year ago— student
– 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.006 – 0.006 – 0.007 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.037
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.052) (0.05) (0.049)
Unemployed 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008 0.005 0.006 – 0.05* – 0.045 – 0.051* – 0.074* – 0.066 – 0.063
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.029) (0.03) (0.030) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Inactive – 0.008*** – 0.008*** – 0.01*** – 0.007* – 0.007* – 0.01** – 0.131*** – 0.129*** – 0.146*** – 0.051 – 0.048 – 0.077
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.05) (0.05)
GDP last quarter 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.011 0.053
(0.003) (0.007) (0.04) (0.061)
Unemployment rate 
last quarter
0.001*** 0.001*** – 0.004 – 0.008*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
Year dummies No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
No. of observations 48,664 48,664 41,373 13,305 13,305 11,223 2,389 2,389 2,336 938 938 915
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.085 0.071 0.0526 0.0703 0.0638 0.1335 0.1368 0.1393 0.155 0.162 0.1694
Notes: The level of occupation corresponds to the standard categorization of the ISCO code: low (9), medium (4– 8), and high (0– 3). Overeducation was measured as a combination of education and 
occupational level. Overeducation among the medium educated was defined as the combination of medium education (ISCED 3 or 4) and low occupational level (ISCO 9); overeducation among the 
highly educated was defined by high education (ISCED 5 or 6) and a low or middle level of occupation (ISCO > 3). The figures reported in the table are the marginal effects with standard errors in 
parentheses. The reference categories in the regressions are male, single, age 55– 65 years, Estonian nationality, primary education, overeducated among primary education, low- level education, and 
salaried employee.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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Table 16.7 Estonia: Labor market status analysis
All sample Young sample (15– 34 years)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive
Returnee 0.062*** – 0.06*** 0.051*** – 0.066*** 0.057*** – 0.064*** 0.093*** – 0.21*** 0.082*** – 0.219*** 0.091*** – 0.215***
(– 0.004) (– 0.011) (– 0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.021)
Male 0.019*** – 0.086*** 0.018*** – 0.086*** 0.021*** – 0.084*** 0.021*** – 0.182*** 0.02*** – 0.183*** 0.024*** – 0.174***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Married – 0.019*** – 0.065*** – 0.019*** – 0.065*** – 0.018*** – 0.061*** – 0.011*** – 0.286*** – 0.011*** – 0.286*** – 0.011*** – 0.274***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Age 15– 24 years 0.041*** 0.005*** 0.043*** 0.006* 0.048*** 0.007*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age 25– 34 years 0.063*** – 0.283*** 0.065*** – 0.282*** 0.072*** – 0.274***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age 35– 44 years 0.058*** – 0.371*** 0.059*** – 0.369*** 0.061*** – 0.366***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age 45– 54 years 0.057*** – 0.357*** 0.059*** – 0.355*** 0.064*** – 0.354***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Other non- 
Estonian 
nationality
0.041*** – 0.013*** 0.042*** – 0.012*** 0.045*** – 0.019*** 0.051*** – 0.081*** 0.052*** – 0.079*** 0.056*** – 0.09***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Secondary 
education
0.005*** – 0.141*** – 0.002 – 0.145*** – 0.001 – 0.156*** 0.013*** – 0.207*** 0.008*** – 0.21*** 0.011*** – 0.224***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
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Higher 
education
– 0.027*** – 0.226*** – 0.033*** – 0.23*** – 0.035*** – 0.237*** – 0.019*** – 0.361*** – 0.025*** – 0.367*** – 0.029*** – 0.359***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
GDP per capita – 0.019* 0.016 – 0.029 0.003
(0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.029)
Unemployment 
rate
0.002*** 0.002* 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Year dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. of 
observations
143,017 143,017 143,017 143,017 111,069 111,069 51,559 51,559 51,559 51,559 39,609 39,609
Pseudo R2 0.0494 0.2562 0.0726 0.2568 0.0732 0.2543 0.0291 0.1766 0.0541 0.178 0.0529 0.1767
Note: See notes to Table 16.6.
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Table 16.8 Slovakia: Selectivity analysis
Returnee– stayer Returnee– emigrant
All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years) All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Male 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** – 0.001 – 0.001 0 – 0.001 – 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.012 – 0.014 – 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Married – 0.003*** – 0.004*** – 0.004*** – 0.009*** – 0.010*** – 0.010*** – 0.018 – 0.018 – 0.02 – 0.03 – 0.027 – 0.029
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Age 15– 24 years 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008 0.008 - 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Age 25– 34 years 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** – 0.001 – 0.004 – 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Age 35– 44 years 0.001 0.001 0.001 – 0.024 – 0.025 – 0.029
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
Age 45– 54 years 0 0 0 – 0.03 – 0.032 – 0.035
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Other non- Slovak 
nationality
– 0.003** – 0.003** – 0.003** – 0.005 – 0.005 – 0.005 – 0.022 – 0.021 – 0.022 – 0.03 – 0.034 – 0.032
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Secondary education 0.002 0.002 0.002 – 0.001 0 0 0.011 0.005 0.014 – 0.008 – 0.015 – 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.03) (0.031) (0.028) (0.061) (0.062) (0.059)
Higher education – 0.002 – 0.001 – 0.001 – 0.007 – 0.006 – 0.005 – 0.033 – 0.039 – 0.022 – 0.049 – 0.06 – 0.033
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Overeducated among 
medium educated
0.009 0.007 0.007 0.08 0.065 0.069 0.007 0.017 0.004 0.176 0.18 0.174
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.069) (0.057) (0.06) (0.044) (0.046) (0.043) (0.147) (0.141) (0.145)
Overeducated among 
highly educated
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.013 0 0.003 0.016 – 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.048) (0.05) (0.046) (0.057) (0.062) (0.053)
Medium- level occupation 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.012 0.013 – 0.022 – 0.011 – 0.023 0.075 0.079 0.075
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066)
High- level occupation – 0.004 – 0.005 – 0.005 0.001 – 0.001 – 0.001 – 0.025 – 0.012 – 0.03 0.048 0.054 0.04
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.05) (0.046) (0.049) (0.07) (0.067) (0.068)
Self- employed – 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.008* – 0.008* – 0.008* – 0.100*** – 0.099*** – 0.091*** – 0.125*** – 0.128*** – 0.118***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
LM status one year 
ago— student
0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.013* 0.013* 0.012* 0.097* 0.101** 0.103** 0.124** 0.130** 0.125**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (– 0.005) (0.039) (0.039) (0.04) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Unemployed 0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 0.008* 0.010* 0.010** 0.063** 0.068** 0.072*** 0.073* 0.078** 0.084**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.03) (0.03) (0.031)
Inactive 0 0 0 – 0.008* – 0.008** – 0.008** 0.165 0.180* 0.183* 0.101 0.139 0.144
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.085) (0.086) (0.089) (0.18) (0.191) (0.2)
GDP last quarter – 0.002 – 0.007 – 0.056* – 0.091*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.025) (0.041)
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Table 16.8 Slovakia: Selectivity analysis
Returnee– stayer Returnee– emigrant
All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years) All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Male 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** – 0.001 – 0.001 0 – 0.001 – 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.012 – 0.014 – 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Married – 0.003*** – 0.004*** – 0.004*** – 0.009*** – 0.010*** – 0.010*** – 0.018 – 0.018 – 0.02 – 0.03 – 0.027 – 0.029
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Age 15– 24 years 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008 0.008 - 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Age 25– 34 years 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** – 0.001 – 0.004 – 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Age 35– 44 years 0.001 0.001 0.001 – 0.024 – 0.025 – 0.029
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
Age 45– 54 years 0 0 0 – 0.03 – 0.032 – 0.035
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Other non- Slovak 
nationality
– 0.003** – 0.003** – 0.003** – 0.005 – 0.005 – 0.005 – 0.022 – 0.021 – 0.022 – 0.03 – 0.034 – 0.032
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Secondary education 0.002 0.002 0.002 – 0.001 0 0 0.011 0.005 0.014 – 0.008 – 0.015 – 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.03) (0.031) (0.028) (0.061) (0.062) (0.059)
Higher education – 0.002 – 0.001 – 0.001 – 0.007 – 0.006 – 0.005 – 0.033 – 0.039 – 0.022 – 0.049 – 0.06 – 0.033
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Overeducated among 
medium educated
0.009 0.007 0.007 0.08 0.065 0.069 0.007 0.017 0.004 0.176 0.18 0.174
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.069) (0.057) (0.06) (0.044) (0.046) (0.043) (0.147) (0.141) (0.145)
Overeducated among 
highly educated
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.013 0 0.003 0.016 – 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.048) (0.05) (0.046) (0.057) (0.062) (0.053)
Medium- level occupation 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.012 0.013 – 0.022 – 0.011 – 0.023 0.075 0.079 0.075
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066)
High- level occupation – 0.004 – 0.005 – 0.005 0.001 – 0.001 – 0.001 – 0.025 – 0.012 – 0.03 0.048 0.054 0.04
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.05) (0.046) (0.049) (0.07) (0.067) (0.068)
Self- employed – 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.002 – 0.008* – 0.008* – 0.008* – 0.100*** – 0.099*** – 0.091*** – 0.125*** – 0.128*** – 0.118***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
LM status one year 
ago— student
0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.013* 0.013* 0.012* 0.097* 0.101** 0.103** 0.124** 0.130** 0.125**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (– 0.005) (0.039) (0.039) (0.04) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Unemployed 0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 0.008* 0.010* 0.010** 0.063** 0.068** 0.072*** 0.073* 0.078** 0.084**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.03) (0.03) (0.031)
Inactive 0 0 0 – 0.008* – 0.008** – 0.008** 0.165 0.180* 0.183* 0.101 0.139 0.144
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.085) (0.086) (0.089) (0.18) (0.191) (0.2)
GDP last quarter – 0.002 – 0.007 – 0.056* – 0.091*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.025) (0.041)
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Returnee– stayer Returnee– emigrant
All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years) All sample Youth sample (15– 34 years)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Unemployment rate last 
quarter
– 0.001*** – 0.002*** – 0.008*** – 0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004)
Year dummies No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
No. of observations 53,604 53,604 53,602 15,449 15,449 15,447 3,510 3,510 3,508 1,652 1,652 1,650
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.116 0.116 0.089 0.111 0.106 0.064 0.092 0.073 0.053 0.089 0.06
Note: See notes to Table 16.6.
Table 16.8 Continued
   485
Table 16.9 Slovakia: Labor market status analysis
All sample Young sample (15– 34 years)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive
Returnee 0.415*** – 0.188*** 0.427*** – 0.191*** 0.432*** – 0.191*** 0.462*** – 0.293*** 0.476*** – 0.296*** 0.479*** – 0.296***
(0.027) (0.02) (0.027) (0.02) (0.027) (0.02) (0.036) (0.029) (0.035) (0.028) (0.035) (0.028)
Male 0.008*** – 0.138*** 0.008*** – 0.138*** 0.008*** – 0.138*** 0.022*** – 0.198*** 0.021*** – 0.198*** 0.021*** – 0.198***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Married – 0.040*** 0.005 – 0.038*** 0.006 – 0.038*** 0.006 – 0.015*** – 0.095*** – 0.012** – 0.094*** – 0.012** – 0.093***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Age 15– 24 0.020*** 0.054*** 0.022*** 0.055*** 0.022*** 0.055***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Age 25– 34 0.081*** – 0.363*** 0.083*** – 0.362*** 0.083*** – 0.362***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Age 35– 44 0.085*** – 0.462*** 0.085*** – 0.461*** 0.085*** – 0.461***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Age 45– 54 0.083*** – 0.449*** 0.083*** – 0.449*** 0.083*** – 0.449***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Other non- 
Slovak 
nationality
– 0.080*** 0.039*** – 0.079*** 0.039*** – 0.079*** 0.039*** – 0.121*** 0.126*** – 0.120*** 0.126*** – 0.120*** 0.126***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
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All sample Young sample (15– 34 years)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive
Secondary 
education
– 0.108*** – 0.278*** – 0.110*** – 0.277*** – 0.110*** – 0.277*** 0.034*** – 0.565*** 0.034*** – 0.565*** 0.034*** – 0.565***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Higher 
education
– 0.162*** – 0.312*** – 0.165*** – 0.312*** – 0.165*** – 0.312*** – 0.017*** – 0.619*** – 0.021*** – 0.622*** – 0.022*** – 0.622***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
GDP per capita 0.028*** – 0.012 0.003 – 0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004)
Unemployment 
rate
0.004** – 0.003 0.040** – 0.040*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.016)
Year dummies No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
No. of 
observations
96,820 96,820 96,818 36,259 36,259 36,257
Pseudo R2 0.254 0.2558 0.2559 0.2212 0.2252 0.2254
Note: See notes to Table 16.6.
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countries in the Estonian data. The variables GDP per capita and unemployment 
rate are measured at the national level in the home countries, and we use quar-
terly data for these. We also include year dummies to capture other aggregate- 
level dynamics. The models are organized in three modifications:  baseline 
models (individual- level variables only), models with year dummies, and models 
with macroeconomic variables. The models are identical for the two countries.
16.5.2. results: Estonia
16.5.2.1. Selectivity Analysis
The results of the selectivity analysis for the Estonian sample are presented in 
Table 16.6. Returnee– stayer and returnee– migrant selections are studied in 
both the young group (aged 15– 34 years) and the total sample. We first focus 
on the returnee– stayer selection framework. The estimates based on the total 
sample showed that the likelihood of being a returnee decreases with age; for 
example, the odds of being a returnee are highest for those aged 15– 24 years.6 
Because young returnees are of prime interest, we explicitly analyze their selec-
tion patterns. We found that young returnees are more likely to be male, relative 
to stayers (the same holds in the total sample). Returnees aged 15– 34 years are 
more likely to hold a secondary education qualification (models M4 and M6). 
However, higher education does not significantly affect the decision to return 
in the sample of young people, whereas in the total sample both secondary and 
higher education play a role in the selection of returnees. In terms of job- related 
characteristics, young returnees are less likely to occupy medium- level positions 
relative to low- level occupations, and they are more likely to have high- level 
occupations.7 This suggests a bimodal selection of returnees with respect to the 
skill level of occupation in returnee– stayer selection (i.e., we can observe positive 
selection from both low- and high- level occupations). Compared to stayers aged 
15– 34 years, returnees have less likelihood of being self- employed, more like-
lihood of being unemployed, and are less likely to be inactive 1 year before the 
interview. It is interesting to note that being overeducated shortly before return 
significantly disincentivized return among medium- educated youth. At the same 
time, among highly educated youth (but not in the total sample), a mismatch 
significantly increased the likelihood of return relative to current emigrants. In 
terms of macro- level variables, as expected, a higher home- country unemploy-
ment rate and GDP level are positively linked to the probability of being a re-
turnee in both the young and the total samples.
Second, we analyzed selection of returnees compared to current Estonian 
emigrants (see Table 16.6). Age affects selection for returning differently for 
emigrants than for stayers:  The likelihood of returning increases with age. 
Therefore, younger aged people are more likely to experience temporary labor 
migration, but once abroad they are more likely to return as they grow older. 
Analysis of the young sample revealed that returnees are likely to be female (the 
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same holds in the total sample). This result, coupled with the evidence on selec-
tion by gender in the returnee– stayer framework, implies that men are generally 
more likely to choose temporary employment abroad, but once in the foreign 
country, women are more likely to return. Regarding job- related characteristics, 
young returnees are less likely to occupy medium- and high- level positions in the 
last quarter abroad. Overeducation in the last quarter abroad significantly affects 
the decision to return in the young subsample of both medium- and highly edu-
cated returnees. At the same time, overeducation only appeared to significantly 
affect the decision to return among the medium educated in the total sample. 
Among other employment- related variables, unemployed status a year previ-
ously decreases the likelihood of being a returnee in the young sample solely in 
model M10. Self- employed, student, and inactive labor market status a year pre-
viously plays no significant role in the selection of returning youth. Naturally, a 
higher unemployment rate in the home country is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of returning; however, a statistically significant effect was found only 
in the young subsample.
16.5.2.2. The Effect of Migration Status on Labor Market Status 
(Multinomial Logistic Regression)
Table 16.7 reports the results of the multinomial logistic regression of labor 
market status (employed, unemployed, or inactive) in the last quarter of the in-
terview across the total sample and the youth subsample. In the baseline model of 
the young age group (M4), returnees were found to be 9.3 percentage points (pp) 
more likely to be unemployed and 21 pp less likely to be inactive. A similar pattern 
holds in the total sample, albeit of a smaller magnitude (6.2 pp and 6 pp, respec-
tively). Regarding the effect of other controls within the youth sample, women are 
less likely than men to be unemployed, whereas they are more likely to be inac-
tive. Married respondents are less likely to be either unemployed or inactive. Non- 
Estonians have a 5.1 pp greater likelihood of facing unemployment and are 8.1 pp 
less likely to be inactive. A higher education degree decreases the likelihood of un-
employment by 1.9 pp, whereas the probability of being inactive is negatively and 
substantially affected by both secondary and higher education. Macroeconomic 
indicators appeared to have no statistically significant association with the odds 
of being unemployed or inactive in the young group (M6). However, model M3, 
based on the total sample, revealed a significant positive effect of the unemploy-
ment rate on the probability of unemployment and inactivity, whereas the GDP 
level negatively affects the likelihood of unemployment in the total sample.
16.5.3. results: slovakia
16.5.3.1. Selectivity Analysis
The results for the Slovak sample are presented in Table 16.8 for the general 
sample and for the youth subsample. Comparing returnee– stayer selection in 
 
 
 
prospects for Estonian and slovak return Migrants 489
   489
the general sample, we find that being male, young (aged 15– 34 years), single 
(as opposed to married), and of Slovak nationality all increase the likelihood of 
being a returnee. Among young returnees, only being single increases the like-
lihood of return. Young returnees are also more likely to have been either a stu-
dent or unemployed a year before the interview in the host country, relative to 
being employed, but are less likely to be economically inactive. Young returnees 
are also more likely to work in medium- skilled positions and are less likely to be 
self- employed compared to stayers. We observe similar results for the general 
sample. Concerning the macroeconomic variables, essentially the same results 
were observed for both the general sample and the youth sample (M5 and M6). 
A  higher unemployment rate in the home country is associated with a lower 
probability of returning. Overall, although we find significant differences be-
tween returnees and stayers in both samples, they are substantively rather small. 
Importantly, we do not find any effect from overeducation, skill level of occu-
pation, or the level of education on the selection of returnees relative to stayers.
Comparing returnees to current emigrants, we find no significant 
differences between these groups in terms of demographic characteristics. We 
focus on interpreting the results for the youth subsample. The only significant 
results relate to the nature of employment and previous labor market status. 
Being self- employed is associated with approximately 13 pp lower probability 
of being a returnee. Being a student or unemployed a year previously are all 
associated with a higher probability of returning (approximately 13 pp and 8 
pp, respectively). Furthermore, higher GDP is negatively associated with the 
probability of being a returnee rather than a current emigrant, but we do not 
find a significant effect of unemployment rate in the youth subsample. Higher 
unemployment in the home country does, however, deter returns for the 
general sample.
16.5.3.2. The Effect of Migration Status on Labor Market Status 
(Multinomial Logistic Regression)
Table 16.9 shows the results of the multinomial logistic regression of labor 
market status (employed, unemployed, or inactive) in the last quarter of the in-
terview across the total sample (M1– M3) and the youth subsample (M4– M6). 
We again focus on the interpretation of the youth subsample. Results from the 
baseline model of the multinomial logistic regression of labor market status in 
the last quarter of the interview (M4 in Table 16.7) show the probability of being 
employed, unemployed, or inactive for the whole sample. Compared to stayers 
and migrants, young returnees are 46 pp more likely to be unemployed— a strik-
ingly stronger relationship compared to Estonia— and 30 pp less likely to be 
inactive, controlling for gender, age, marital status, education, and nationality. 
Women have a lower probability of being unemployed but a greater probability 
of being inactive compared to men. Being married decreases the chances of being 
 
490 TransiTions across EuropE
490
unemployed or inactive. Having a higher education decreases the likelihood of 
unemployment or inactivity, whereas having a secondary education increases 
the probability of unemployment. Non- Slovaks have a 12 pp lower probability of 
unemployment, but a 13 pp stronger likelihood of being inactive. These results 
also hold in the extended specifications of the model. The results for the total 
subsample are substantively the same on most accounts. Adding macroeconomic 
variables to the model (M3), we do not observe any effect from the level of GDP 
on unemployment or inactivity, but we still find a positive effect of rising un-
employment rates on unemployment. For the total sample, a higher GDP level 
and unemployment rate are associated with a higher probability of being unem-
ployed, but there is no such linkage with the probability of being inactive.
16.6. COMPARATIVE SYNTHESIS
The conclusions from the Estonian and Slovakian case studies contribute to pre-
vious empirical findings regarding the post- return labor market performance of 
return migrants, and they also reveal the main characteristics of the labor market in-
tegration of young returnees in two small economies in Central and Eastern Europe.
We find a multitude of differences in the return migration patterns, 
determinants of selection, and labor market integration of returnees. First, re-
turn migration is a more widespread phenomenon in Estonia than in Slovakia. 
In Estonia, net intra- EU migration is positive because more people have started 
to return than to leave. The Slovak balance continues to be negative. Poor labor 
market conditions could be the reason for continued outflows of migrants from 
Slovakia. Second, young returnees do not differ from young stayers or young 
emigrants in terms of their level of education in either of the two countries. 
However, Estonian returnees in the total sample are positively selected on the 
basis of education relative to stayers and migrants. The no- effect findings for 
youth seem to contradict other studies finding selectivity on the basis of edu-
cation (Hazans and Philips 2010; Martin and Radu 2012; see also the literature 
review in Section 16.2), but these studies did not specifically focus on youth.
Third, overeducation plays no role in the selectivity of returnees relative to 
migrants or stayers in Slovakia. This is in line with other research using web- 
survey data about returnees (Kureková and Žilinčíková 2018). Kureková and 
Žilinčíková show that returnees find positions equivalent to their qualifications 
after returning and that mismatch does not cause a failed return; in other words, 
there is no negative effect of a mismatch on Slovak returnees. The results are 
significant in Estonia, where overeducation among highly educated young re-
turn migrants has contributed to their return. This finding is in line with sev-
eral other studies, which argue that a mismatch abroad is a significant factor of 
return (Currie 2007; Pungas et al. 2012; Coniglio and Brzozowski 2016). This 
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suggests that young highly educated Estonians face difficulties when trying to 
find a job that corresponds to their qualifications abroad and that the decision 
to return is partly driven by a mismatch in their occupation and qualifications 
in the foreign labor market. It may also indicate that highly educated Estonian 
youth are relatively optimistic about their opportunities in their home country. 
In the total sample of highly educated Estonians, no statistically significant effect 
of overqualification on return probability was found.
The patterns observed regarding overeducation in Estonia could be explained 
in terms of young people gaining more from their good education in the home 
country compared to older people. Although generally the returns on higher ed-
ucation are high in the Estonian labor market, some labor market groups, such as 
ethnic minorities, benefit much less from higher education (Hazans 2003). The 
main destination countries have to be acknowledged in this context, too. Masso 
et al. (2016) showed that Finland was and remains the key destination country 
among Estonian emigrants.8 A highly suppressed income distribution in Finland 
coupled with the previous evidence on occupational downgrading of Estonian 
migrants (Masso et al. 2014) may result in lower earnings for highly educated 
Estonian migrants who fail to find a job that corresponds to their qualifications. 
At the same time, a lower occupation– qualification match for medium- educated 
young Estonians in Finland results in higher earnings compared to a better match 
if they were to remain in Estonia. In other words, they obtain higher earnings 
in Finland compared to Estonia despite their lower occupation– qualification 
match. The latter finding is supported by the negative effect of overeducation 
among the medium educated on selection of returnees.
Fourth, for the young Estonian returnees, labor market status a year previ-
ously does not affect their selectivity relative to migrants or stayers, whereas it 
is an important factor for the Slovak returnees. The crucial role of labor market 
conditions in Slovakia is also confirmed in the analysis of post- return short- 
term labor market outcomes. Although we find a higher risk of short- term un-
employment for young returnees in both countries, there are some important 
cross- country differences. The magnitude of the negative effect of returnee status 
on labor market performance is much stronger in Slovakia than in Estonia. 
Furthermore, the impact of macroeconomic variables in Estonia is less impor-
tant in predicting labor market outcomes for young and older returnees. The 
latter finding might be related to the rather different destination countries of the 
Estonian and Slovak migrants and possibly to the fact that the business cycles 
in the home and host countries for migrants are more closely correlated in the 
case of Estonia. The finding that being a returnee has a negative impact on short- 
term labor market outcomes is generally in line with the findings of other studies 
(Smoliner et  al. 2012; Coniglio and Brzozowski 2016). We can, however, also 
anticipate that most returnees integrate relatively smoothly within 6 months of 
return, as has been shown in other research, not least due to their high levels of 
education and foreign experience. For example, Tverdostup and Masso (2016) 
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identified a positive, statistically significant effect of temporary mobility on earn-
ings in the young cohort 3 years after returning (based on Estonian Population 
and Housing Census data linked to Tax Registry data on individual payroll taxes). 
This result is in line with our finding of a negative short- term impact on labor 
market performance and suggests that positive returns on foreign labor market 
experience for youth develop over time after returning home. Masso et al. (2016) 
found that employers and young returnees generally value foreign work experi-
ence positively, although, on the negative side, employers mention higher wage 
expectations among returnees and the risk of them going abroad again in the 
future. These authors also document that unemployment benefits appear to fa-
cilitate job matching after return, but likewise temporarily increase short- term 
unemployment as returnees use the time to find adequate jobs. Finally, Masso 
et al. found that foreign work experience significantly increases the attractiveness 
of job candidates.
The initial differences in the likelihood of unemployment between the Slovak 
and Estonian returnees are probably a function of the general performance of 
the labor market, which has been relatively poor in Slovakia. The labor market 
situation in the host countries has important implications for the ease of rein-
tegration of returnees. It might also explain the differences in the magnitude of 
returns, which have been more prominent in Estonia and comparatively weaker 
in Slovakia. Overall, the labor market situation in the home country affects 
return decisions and labor market performance. It appears that better labor 
market conditions and increased welfare support in response to the crisis have 
contributed to better immediate labor market outcomes for Estonian returnees. 
Other studies suggest that medium- term integration prospects for returnees are 
likely to be better relative to the situation immediately after return; that is, over 
time the prospects of reintegration into the home country labor market are likely 
to improve (Piracha and Vadean 2010; Masso et al. 2016).
16.7. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter furthers our understanding of the selectivity and labor market inte-
gration of return migrants in Estonia and Slovakia. The comparative approach is 
useful because it helps highlight that selectivity and integration prospects might 
vary significantly across EU countries. Our findings highlight the complex ways 
in which various factors intervene and interrelate in affecting different subgroups 
of returnees (e.g., young returnees) in different ways, including a mediating role 
of personal, gender, and family- related factors that we are unable to uncover in 
our analysis. The complexity is further revealed in the two- country comparison 
showing that across countries, different factors might play a role, depending on, 
for example, home country labor market conditions. In summary, our research 
seems to point to different underlying reasons for mobility and return in Estonia 
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and Slovakia, mediated by the role of labor market performance and welfare 
spending changes. This implies that no uniform conclusions or policy advice that 
is applicable across the EU are possible in the area of return migration and that 
specific country contexts should be carefully investigated and evaluated.
We have focused, in particular, on isolating the role of macroeconomic factors 
in affecting who returns and how they integrate. Although we have been unable to 
investigate the full range of possible factors, our findings suggest that the quality 
of the macroeconomic environment affects both the selectivity and the perfor-
mance of returnees. Better labor market conditions in Estonia and significantly 
enhanced social support in response to the crisis appear to have encouraged the 
return of older migrants and facilitated the reintegration of young migrants.
Although our study shows that in both countries, returnees initially enter un-
employment registers, evidence suggests that this is a temporary phenomenon 
facilitated by the possibility of transferring unemployment benefits from the 
country where they were earning to another EU country (typically the home 
country) for a period of 3 months. Other research rather consistently shows that 
the integration prospects of returnees improve soon thereafter and that they 
find work within 6 months. Employers value foreign work experience because 
it demonstrates a set of skills valued in the CEE labor markets. A further impor-
tant finding relates to the role of overeducation and mismatch in shaping return 
patterns. Especially in the case of Estonia, a mismatch abroad led to a greater pro-
pensity to return among highly educated young returnees, but it disincentivized 
the return of medium- educated migrants. This suggests that receiving countries 
are losing the most able CEE migrants because of a failure to offer quality em-
ployment and career prospects. Although this appears to be an advantage for the 
sending countries, it is unlikely that these highly educated returnees had enough 
opportunities to develop their human capital and that, therefore, their contribu-
tion to the home country is more limited.
The limitations of our chapter are threefold. First, we only examine how dif-
ferent labor market groups— returnees, stayers, and current emigrants— perform 
in terms of labor market status. Such an approach naturally has its limitations 
because return migration might also have an effect on wages (Hazans 2008), 
the tendency to be self- employed, or occupational mobility (Masso et al. 2014). 
Second, given the data structure, we are only able to analyze short- term labor 
market outcomes in the 3 months following the return. Although the results indi-
cate a worse labor market situation for returnees than for emigrants and stayers, 
other research consistently finds that in the longer term, returnees integrate well 
and their foreign work experience is valued in the domestic labor market after 
returning (Masso et al. 2016). Third, because of data limitations, we concentrate 
on economic factors only and are unable to consider several other factors, such 
as social networks and some of the specific characteristics of migration that argu-
ably play a role in successful reintegration (Barrett and Mosca 2013; Coniglio and 
Brzozowski 2016). Although most of the returnees had experienced short- term 
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migration, we were unable to reconstruct the exact length of the migration spell 
that was previously found to increase difficulties with integration upon return 
(Coniglio and Brzozowski 2016). We could also not employ a measure of the 
number of children in our analysis, which had been found to have a positive 
impact on integration into the home labor market (Coniglio and Brzozowski 
2016). Last, we were unable to control for the destination country of emigrants, 
which might have impacted on the selectivity of return and on integration into 
the home labor market, given the different employment opportunities in each 
host country.
One possible solution to some of these issues would be to have panel data 
following the whole migration process and return— capturing information for 
before migration (in the home country), while abroad (in the host country), 
and after return (once back in the home country). Such data, whether collected 
on a continuous basis or through a series of retrospective interview surveys, 
would capture the complete migration path and examine the selections more 
profoundly. It would allow us to analyze “true” returns on migration and re-
turning home in a consistent manner, controlling for migrants’ labor market 
performance in the home country before leaving. This kind of data could also 
be obtained by linking the national registers of home and host countries (e.g., 
Estonia and Finland). However, the downside of such an approach is that we are 
likely to learn only about a limited number of countries, which may induce some 
selectivity issues. Online data, such as reconstructing life histories from online 
curriculum vitae (CVs), provide another possible source for studying migration 
and returning home from the perspective of labor market integration (Kureková 
and Žilinčíková 2018).
Several policy lessons can be drawn from our analysis. First, given that young 
return migrants constitute a specific subgroup of the returnee population, they 
should be attracted to the host- country economy because they have significant 
potential based on high educational attainment accompanied by foreign market 
experience. Facilitating the acceleration of the labor market integration of young 
returnees will enable them to fully realize their potential and thus provide 
benefits for the home- country economy. There is scope for public institutions to 
provide better assistance upon return and to facilitate integration, especially in 
underperforming labor markets such as that of Slovakia. Precisely such practices 
of labor market intermediaries were also identified for EU8 migrants in Austria 
(Ortlieb and Weiss, this volume). For example, return migrants can become a 
target category for post- return assistance in labor offices, especially if they return 
to worse performing regions, as seems to be the case (Barcevičius et al. 2012).
Second, inequalities exist among returnees, and not all returnees are on an 
equal footing in terms of their abilities. In particular, returnees disadvantaged 
in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, or geographic location might be in more need 
of assistance from public authorities in their reintegration process. On the other 
hand, programs targeted at highly educated youth underperforming in the host 
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countries may help overcome the effects of a brain drain or brain waste. Yet, 
as demonstrated in the Slovak case, given that overeducation need not be as-
sociated with the return decision among the highly skilled, the challenge could 
also be how many opportunities the home- country labor market offers these 
individuals. The need for policy intervention seems to be somewhat less pressing 
in the Estonian case, in which overeducation was shown to be associated posi-
tively with returning home among the highly educated.
NOTES
1 Jaan Masso acknowledges financial support from the Estonian Research 
Agency, project No. IUT20- 49, “Structural Change as the Factor of 
Productivity Growth in the Case of Catching Up Economies.” The authors 
are grateful for comments made on earlier versions by Maura Sheehan, Jan 
Brzozowski, and the editors of this volume, while assuming full responsibility 
for the final content.
2 The mechanism of transfer of unemployment benefits allows an individual to 
carry over unemployment benefits from the EU country in which he or she 
was last working to another EU country, usually for a period of 3 months. 
There are two basic conditions under which a worker is entitled to transfer 
the benefits. First, the worker must be entitled to unemployment benefits in 
the country of last employment and, second, he or she must register as unem-
ployed with the labor office in another EU member state. The eligibility, dura-
tion, and maximum amount of benefits vary widely across EU countries. For 
example, the level of jobseeker’s allowance in the United Kingdom is relatively 
low— approximately £313 per month for a person aged older than 25 years, 
which is extremely difficult to live on. The relative value of such benefits may 
be higher in the home country, where living costs may be lower; hence, an 
unemployed person might choose to return home to receive this value of 
benefits in his or her country of origin.
3 Kureková and Žilinčíková (2018), analyzing online CV data, find that re-
turn migration to Slovakia is much more sizable. In their sample of young 
jobseekers, every fifth person had experience of migration. Their sample also 
significantly differs from the EU- LFS sample of returnees regarding key dem-
ographic characteristics, especially the education variable.
4 One may think of the higher unemployment rate among returnees as being 
related to the scarring effect if the best people do not emigrate. However, the 
qualitative evidence shows that returnees are rather attractive for employers 
but that they may have higher wage expectations, resulting in a longer job 
search period (Masso et al. 2014, 2016). The higher unemployment rate may 
also be due to savings accumulated abroad that enable returnees to afford a 
longer period for job search.
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5 We are grateful to Jan Brzozowski for drawing our attention to this possibility.
6 The higher share of return migrants among youth may be thought to be asso-
ciated with student mobility; however, in the current analysis, the definition 
of returnee is based exclusively on being abroad for work.
7 The results are probably due to the selection rather than, for example, to 
individuals previously employed in medium- level positions moving to high- 
level positions because of return migration, given that previous studies did 
not find any effect of return migration on occupational upgrading (Masso 
et al. 2014).
8 The evidence from the Estonian job search portal data set (CV Keskus) re-
vealed that among Estonian migrants aged 15– 35  years, the share of those 
moving to Finland increased from 17% in 2004 to 38% in 2012 (Masso 
et al. 2016).
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ORIGINS AND FUTURE OF THE CONCEPT 
OF NEETS IN THE EUROPEAN POLICY AGENDA
Massimiliano Mascherini
17.1. INTRODUCTION
Deeply concerned about the risk of a “lost generation” and seeking to better un-
derstand the complex nature of youth disadvantage, researchers and government 
officials began to adopt new ways of estimating the prevalence of labor market 
vulnerability among young people by using the concept of NEETs: young people 
not in employment, education, or training. Originating in studies carried out 
in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, the concept was adopted by the European 
Commission Employment Committee (EMCO), which agreed in 2010 on a def-
inition and the methodology for an indicator to measure and monitor trends in 
the NEET population of the European Union (EU) as part of the Horizon 2020 
strategy.
Once it had entered the European policy debate, the term NEET quickly 
became a powerful tool for attracting public attention to the multifaceted 
vulnerabilities of young people and for mobilizing researchers’ and policymakers’ 
efforts in addressing the problem of labor market participation by young people. 
The concept of NEETs has since been widely used in the European policy de-
bate: Reducing the number of NEETs is one of the objectives of the European 
Youth Guarantee and, more recently, prevalence of NEETs has been included as 
one of the indicators for strengthening the social dimension of the Economic 
and Monetary Union.
Despite the rapid success of the NEET concept, it is often criticized for its 
grouping of a highly heterogeneous set of young people under one single term. 
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Although the term NEET captures all young people who are in a status of not 
accumulating human capital through formal channels— namely the labor market 
or education— this is actually a very diverse population with very different char-
acteristics and needs. The heterogeneity of the NEET population has important 
consequences for policy responses. Although governments and social partners 
are rightly setting targets to reduce the overall NEET rate, it is argued here that 
greater attention should be given to disaggregating the heterogeneous NEET cat-
egory. Policy interventions sensitive to the needs and barriers faced by particular 
groups of young people will be more effective than a blanket policy imposed on 
a heterogeneous group.
This chapter discusses the origin and the future of the NEETs indicator in 
the European policy framework and proposes a distinction between seven dif-
ferent types within the NEET categorization with a view to better informed 
targeted policies. First, we examine the origins of the concept of NEETs and how 
it entered into the European policy debate. This is followed by a critical evalua-
tion of the value added by the concept and of its limitations for policymaking. 
We then examine the main characteristics of the NEET population in Europe 
and the risk factors associated with becoming NEET. Finally, a disaggregation of 
the NEET indicator is proposed and applied to data from the European Union 
Labour Force Survey (EU- LFS), followed by a discussion of policy implications.
17.2. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE NEET INDICATOR
The need for an additional indicator able to capture young people who are not in 
employment, education, or training first emerged in the United Kingdom in the 
late 1980s as an alternative way of categorizing young people aged 16– 17 years. 
This came about as a result of changes in the UK benefit regime: Specifically, the 
1986 Social Security Act and its 1988 implementation withdrew entitlement to 
Income Support/ Supplementary Benefit from young people aged 16– 17 years in 
return for a “youth training guarantee” (Williamson 2010).
As a result of this change and the consequent emergence of this new group, 
researchers and government officials started to adopt new ways of estimating 
the prevalence of labor market vulnerability among young people. Williamson 
(1985) was the first to highlight the emerging crisis of young adulthood. 
Subsequently, a study of young people in South Glamorgan in Wales (funded by 
the South Glamorgan Training and Enterprise Council) was the first to produce 
quantitative estimates of the number of young people aged 16– 17  years who 
were not in education, training, or employment (Istance, Rees, and Williamson 
1994). Using more qualitative material, this study also illustrated how some of 
these young people had arrived at this status, how they were getting by, and 
what they expected for their futures. Here, Istance and colleagues (1994) used 
the term Status 0/ Status Zer0 (later changed to “Status A”) to refer to a group of 
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people aged 16– 17 years who were not covered by any of the main categories 
of labor market status (employment, education, or training). The term Status 0/ 
Status Zer0 was merely a technical term derived from careers service records, 
where Status 1 referred to young people in post- 16 education, Status 2 to those 
in training, and Status 3 to those in employment. The study concluded with 
the shocking finding that 16%– 23% of the age group in question was in Status 
Zer0 in the United Kingdom during the 1980s. Without making any claim as to 
representativeness, Istance and colleagues acknowledged the heterogeneity of 
the group, depicting different routes into Status Zer0 and different experiences 
within it. The term Status Zer0 was by no means intended as a negative label; 
it was more about reflecting societal abandonment of this group. However, the 
term soon came to represent “a powerful metaphor” for the fact that Status 
Zer0 young people appeared to “count for nothing and were going nowhere” 
(Williamson 1997:82). The study captured the media’s imagination (Bunting 
1994; McRae 1994), and the term entered into the policy debate in the summer 
of 1994 as Status A (where A stood for abandoned, as in “the abandoned genera-
tion”). In this context, Liberal– Democrat MPs raised questions about the Status 
A  phenomenon in Parliament and convened a debate in the House of Lords 
(Williamson 2010).
Against this background, the term NEET was coined in March 1996 by a 
senior Home Office civil servant who had detected resistance on the part of 
policymakers working with the original and often controversial terms of Status 
Zer0 and Status A.  Embracing the concept previously introduced by Istance 
et  al. (1994), the term NEET replaced the other labels and was then formally 
introduced at the political level in the United Kingdom in 1999 with the publica-
tion of the government’s Bridging the Gap report from the Social Exclusion Unit 
of the New Labour government (SEU 1999).
The term NEET rapidly gained importance outside the United Kingdom, too. 
By the beginning of the new millennium, similar definitions had been adopted in 
almost all EU member states; similar concepts referring to disengaged youth were 
also emerging in popular discourse in Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and— most recently— China (Mizanur Rahman 2006; Liang 2009; Eurofound 
2012; Pacheco and Dye 2013). Some of these new concepts went beyond the orig-
inal meaning of NEET, also attaching a negative stigma to these newly identifiable 
categories of youth. For example, hikikomori in Japan means “withdrawal” and is 
used to refer to young Japanese NEETs, usually young men, who live with their 
parents, spend their time alone in their rooms, are without friends, and engage 
only in activities on the Internet or in watching movies (Jones 2006; Wang 2015). 
In Spain, the term generación ni- ni became popular before the crisis as a means 
to identify young people who did not want to grow up by studying or going to 
work (Navarrete Moreno 2011); similar terms with negative connotations were 
also used in Italy (bamboccioni) and Germany (Nesthocker)— usually for young 
men who appeared unwilling to leave home and “grow up.” Thus, although it had 
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originated in the United Kingdom, the concept of NEETs was gradually being 
recognized in a number of other economically advanced countries.
17.2.1. neets at the european level
As the term became more popular across Europe, “NEETs” came to refer to 
young people aged 15– 24 or 15– 29  years who were not in employment, edu-
cation, or training, and it was measured and mapped using national labor force 
surveys. Nevertheless, this seemingly simple definition masks considerable di-
versity between countries with regard to the characteristics of the young people 
classified as NEET. In the UK context, NEETs were frequently associated with 
problematic labor market transitions. In other countries— with well- functioning 
transmission paths into education and employment— NEETs were not present 
and youth transitions were not problematized in the same manner (Wallace and 
Bendit 2009; Filandri, Nazio, and O’Reilly, this volume).
The totality of those classified as NEETs can also include a diversity of 
experiences ranging from unemployed graduates taking their time to find 
work to unqualified early school- leavers and those taking on family caring 
responsibilities. Some of this diversity has been captured in a number of studies 
from the Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development and the 
European Commission (Walther and Pohl 2005; Carcillo et al. 2015). A study 
by Eurofound (2012) provided the first comparative analysis of the extent of the 
NEET phenomenon in Europe, examining the economic and societal costs of not 
integrating youth into the labor market.
At the European policymaking level, EMCO and its Indicators Group 
(European Commission, DG EMPL) agreed on a definition and a methodology 
for a standardized indicator to measure and compare the NEET population 
in Europe as part of its monitoring of the Europe 2020 strategy in April 2010 
(European Commission 2011a, 2011b). The definition of NEETs implemented 
by Eurostat refers to young people aged 15– 24 years who are unemployed or in-
active according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition1 and 
who are not in any form of education or training.
The Eurostat definition of NEET is constructed as follows: The numerator of 
the indicator refers to persons who are not employed (i.e., unemployed or in-
active) and/ or have not received any education or training during the 4 weeks 
preceding the survey; the denominator consists of the total population of the 
same age and gender. The NEET indicator is calculated using cross- sectional 
data from the EU- LFS, observing established rules for statistical quality and reli-
ability (European Commission 2010b, 2011a).
The main NEET indicator produced by Eurostat covers various age groups. 
For analytical purposes, and given a conceptualization of youth as an age group 
that varies substantially across different countries (Wallace and Bendit 2009), the 
indicator is then disaggregated by gender and is available for different age groups 
(15– 17/ 15– 19/ 15– 24/ 15– 29/ 15– 34/ 18– 24/ 20– 24/ 20– 34/ 25– 29 years).
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Breakdowns by labor market status (unemployed and inactive) and edu-
cation level (at most lower secondary attainment/ at least upper secondary at-
tainment) are also available on the Eurostat website (European Commission 
2011a).
The NEET indicator is constructed each year using the EU- LFS according to 
the following equation:
NEET
Number of young peoplenot inemployment education or tr
Rate =
, , aining
Total populationof young people
The NEET indicator thus measures the share of young people who are not in 
employment, education, or training among the total youth population. This 
is not the same as the youth unemployment rate, which measures the share 
of young people who are unemployed among the population of young people 
who are economically active (i.e., employed or searching for work, and ex-
cluding students). For this reason, although the youth unemployment rate is 
generally higher than the NEET rate, in absolute terms, the overall number 
of NEETs is generally higher than the overall number of young unemployed 
people (Figure 17.1). For example, although in 2015 the youth unemployment 
and NEET rates in Europe were 20.3% and 12%, respectively, the population 
of unemployed youth accounted for 4,640,000 individuals, whereas the popu-
lation of NEETs was 6,604,000 individuals.
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Figure 17.1 Unemployment compared to NEET.
Source: Eurofound (2012).
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17.2.2. neets in the european policy agenda
Once a standardized definition had been agreed and operationalized at the 
EU level, the term NEET became increasingly central to the European policy 
agenda: NEETs were explicitly targeted for the first time in the Europe 2020 flag-
ship initiative Youth on the Move (European Commission 2010a). The initiative 
states its mission as “unleashing all young people’s potential,” and emphasizes the 
importance of reducing the “astonishingly” high number of NEETs in Europe 
by providing pathways back into education or training and by enabling contact 
with the labor market. Most important, and going beyond youth unemployment, 
the initiative places special emphasis on ensuring the labor market integration of 
young people with disabilities or health problems.
Building on Youth on the Move, NEETs consequently became central to the 
new set of integrated guidelines for economic and employment policies. In 2011, 
the Youth Opportunities Initiative drew attention to the increasing share of 
young people not in employment, education, or training (European Commission 
2011a), proposing a combination of concrete actions by member states and 
the EU to tackle the issue (Hadjivassiliou et  al., this volume; Petmesidou and 
González Menéndez, this volume).
By 2012, several documents drawn up as part of the employment package 
Towards a Job- rich Recovery (European Commission 2012)  emphasized the 
importance of tackling the NEET crisis and suggested making greater use 
of the European Social Fund for the next program period (2014– 2020). One 
proposal was to make the sustainable integration of NEETs into the labor 
market (through youth guarantees and other measures) one of the investment 
priorities for the new program period. NEETs were identified as the most 
problematic group in terms of labor market trends and challenges (European 
Commission 2012).
Against this background, NEETs are at the heart of the Youth Guarantee, 
which aims to reduce NEET rates by ensuring that all young people aged 15– 
24  years not in employment, education, or training receive a good- quality 
offer of employment, continued education, or an apprenticeship or trainee-
ship within 4 months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education. 
Following a long debate starting in 2005, the Youth Guarantee was proposed 
by the European Commission in December 2012 and endorsed by the Council 
of the European Union on April 23, 2013 (Council of the European Union 
2013). To make the practical implementation of the Youth Guarantee a reality, 
the European Commission published the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI), 
supported by €6 billion of funding, which targeted young NEETs (European 
Commission 2013a, 2013b).
Furthermore, NEETs are now regularly referred to in the documents of the 
European Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council, and 
the topic of NEETs has been a priority for recent European Council presidencies. 
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In the first half of 2013, the Irish Council presidency focused extensively on 
youth unemployment; in fact, it was during this period that the establishment 
of the Youth Guarantee was recommended. Subsequent presidencies frequently 
referred to the situation of NEETs (Council of the European Union 2013, 2014, 
2015). Similarly, the European Parliament also took on board the NEET concept, 
as in a recent briefing on the youth employment situation in Greece (European 
Parliament 2015), but also in more generic publications examining the social 
situation in the EU (European Parliament 2014). When the pre- financing of 
the YEI was discussed in 2015, the NEET indicator played an important role in 
policy formulations.
17.3. VALUE ADDED AND LIMITATIONS OF NEET AS  
A CONCEPT FOR POLICYMAKING
As with every new concept entering the policy debate, the NEET concept has 
often struggled to be understood in terms of what exactly it is and what it was 
designed to do. NEET and youth unemployment are related concepts, but there 
are important differences between the two. NEET goes beyond unemployment 
in that it captures all young people who, for various reasons, are unemployed 
or inactive and are not accumulating human capital through formal channels 
(Eurofound 2012, 2016).
Although the NEET indicator is easily defined and captures a very gen-
eral and heterogeneous population of all young people who— regardless of 
their education level and sociodemographic characteristics— are not in em-
ployment, education, or training, the term is sometimes used as a shortcut to 
identify solely the most vulnerable and the population most at risk of being 
socially excluded. The misuse of the NEET acronym can probably be traced 
back to the origins of the concept in the United Kingdom: Being NEET was 
more closely associated with early school- leaving and other severe patterns 
of vulnerability that lead to a higher risk of social exclusion and a lack of 
employment.
However, today this correspondence between risk of social exclusion and 
NEET status is far from being univocal. By enlarging the age category to the 
15- to 24- year- old age group (or even to 15- to 29- year- olds), NEET captures all 
young people who are not currently participating in the labor market or in educa-
tion. This includes vulnerable groups and those with accumulated disadvantages 
(including lower education levels, immigration background, health issues, young 
mothers, or young people with a difficult family background). But it also includes 
more privileged youth who voluntarily become NEET— while waiting for a par-
ticular opportunity or while attempting to pursue alternative careers (see Filandri 
et al., this volume; Zuccotti and O’Reilly, this volume). The heterogeneity of this 
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group means that the concept of NEET, when applied to the older youth cohort, 
no longer provides the same shortcut to identify the most vulnerable youth. In 
addition, there is a negative association in the media and public discourse in 
which NEET implies that young people do not want to work or study (Serracant 
2013); this has been particularly true in some of the public discourse preceding 
the financial crisis.
The concept of NEET has been adopted in very different ways by governments 
and international organizations (Elder 2015). NEET is often associated with is-
sues of joblessness, discouragement, or marginalization of youth, but it cannot be 
equated only with one of these areas; rather, it lies at the intersection of the three 
issues. The Eurofound (2012) study strongly related NEET to a lack of human 
capital accumulation through formal channels, whereas Elder (2015) concludes 
that the best interpretation of the term goes beyond a “productivist” approach 
and that the best fit is offered by marginalization/ exclusion/ disaffection. 
Williamson, who coined the concept under the name Status Zer0 (subsequently 
changed to NEET), rejects the use of the term “disaffection” to characterize 
NEETs, arguing for language that is less judgmental; hence his advocacy of “dis-
engagement” or “exclusion,” which in turn allow for re- engagement and inclu-
sion (Williamson 2010).
Despite the relative novelty of the NEET concept, it has had a strong 
catalyzing effect in attracting and mobilizing policymakers and public opinion. 
As well as having entered the youth policies lexicon, the concept of NEET is 
now highly popular among European media. Given the country’s high share of 
NEETs, Italian media, for example, have defined Italy as the nation of NEETs 
(Corriere della Sera 2015; L’Espresso 2015). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, 
the BBC has repeatedly called for greater attention to be paid to the situa-
tion of NEETs (BBC 2012, 2014), while the Spanish newspaper El País has 
described the apathy and passiveness of NEETs and their general situation (El 
País 2014, 2015). The NEET concept has the capability to increase the under-
standing of the various vulnerabilities of young people by placing particular 
groups such as the low educated, early school dropouts, young mothers, or 
young people with disabilities at the center of policy debates. These groups 
would otherwise simply be classified as inactive, usually with very limited 
attention being dedicated to them from a policy perspective (see Berloffa, 
Matteazzi, and Villa, this volume). Making the reduction of the NEET rate 
a policy target, as the Youth Guarantee does, means preparing policies to re-
integrate young people into education and the labor market that go beyond 
the issue of unemployment and the needs of the conventionally unemployed. 
Although there is no doubt that policy focused on reducing NEET rates is im-
portant, recognition of the heterogeneity of this group requires tailored policy 
interventions (Furlong 2007; Eurofound 2012).
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17.4. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NEETS IN EUROPE
Despite its limitations, the standardized indicator proposed by EMCO and 
operationalized by Eurostat in 2010 makes it possible to estimate the number of 
young people who are disengaged from the labor market and from education in 
Europe and to perform cross- country comparisons on the basis of the usual so-
cioeconomic variables (Eurofound 2012, 2016).
According to the latest Eurostat data, the share of young people aged 15– 
29  years in Europe who were not in employment, education, or training was 
14.8% in 2015. In absolute numbers, this corresponds to approximately 13 mil-
lion young people belonging to the NEET group. As shown in Figure 17.2, the 
prevalence of NEETs varies substantially across member states. The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Luxembourg, and Denmark record the lowest NEET rates (approx-
imately 7%). Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy record the highest 
rates (greater than 20%), which implies that at least one out of five young people 
in these countries is not in employment, education, or training. In absolute 
terms, the NEET population is highest in Italy, with more than 2 million young 
people belonging to this group.
Before the economic crisis of 2008– 2009, NEET rates were decreasing across 
Europe: The lowest level of NEETs was recorded for all age categories in 2008. 
However, with the beginning of the economic crisis, this improvement ended 
abruptly, and NEET rates increased markedly. European NEET rates were at 
Figure 17.2 NEET rates across Europe (young people aged 15– 29 years).
Source: Eurostat (EU- LFS).
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their highest in 2013, when 15.9% of young people aged 15– 29 years were NEET, 
compared to 13% in 2008. NEET rates have now started to decrease slowly, 
falling to below 15% in 2015 for those aged 15– 29 years.
In terms of socioeconomic characteristics, analysis of the EU- LFS reveals 
considerable heterogeneity across member states. At the European level, there 
are more female than male NEETs. In the age category 15– 29 years, the female 
NEET rate was 16.7% at the European level in 2015, compared to 13% for males. 
This gap of 3.7% constitutes a considerable reduction compared to the 6% re-
corded in the precrisis period. Although considerable gender variability is found 
at the member- state level, only in Luxembourg, Cyprus, Croatia, and Finland 
is the share of young males higher than that of young women among NEETs. 
Conversely, the gender NEET gap is larger in the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Malta, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, where the great majority of NEETs in 
this age category are young women.
In terms of education, at the European level, 39% of young NEETs (aged 15– 
29 years) have a lower education level, 47% have an upper secondary level of ed-
ucation, and 14% have tertiary education. Substantial heterogeneity is observed 
across member states with regard to educational attainment. In countries such 
as Spain, Malta, and Germany, more than 50% of NEETs have a low education 
level. Conversely, in Poland, Greece, and Croatia, more than 60% of NEETs hold 
an upper secondary diploma. Finally, in Cyprus, more than 30% of NEETs have 
completed tertiary education. Furthermore, the disaggregation of upper educa-
tion levels between general courses and vocational education and training (VET) 
reveals that the group of NEETs with a VET- oriented upper education level is 
larger than those with more general qualifications.
17.5. RISK FACTORS FOR BECOMING NEET: DISADVANTAGE 
AND DISAFFECTION
As reviewed in the Eurofound (2012) study, there is reasonable agreement in the 
literature about the range of social, economic, and personal factors that increase 
the chances that an individual might become NEET, and it is generally perceived 
that the NEET status arises from a complex interplay of institutional, structural, 
and individual factors (Hodkinson 1996; Hodkinson and Sparkes 1997; Bynner 
2005; Eurofound 2012).
Focusing on the vulnerable groups (i.e., involuntary NEETs), the literature 
suggests that there are two principal risk factors relating to NEET:  disadvan-
tage and disaffection. Whereas educational disadvantage is associated with so-
cial factors such as the family, school, and personal characteristics, disaffection 
concerns the attitudes young people have toward education and schooling spe-
cifically, as expressed by truancy or behavior that leads to expulsion from school. 
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There also seems to be a clear correlation between both educational disadvan-
tage and disaffection prior to age 16 years and later disengagement (SEU 1999). 
Both educational disadvantage and disaffection are linked to a number of back-
ground factors, such as family disadvantage and poverty; having an unemployed 
parent(s); living in an area with high unemployment; membership in an ethnic 
minority group; or having a chronic illness, disability, and/ or special education 
needs (Coles et  al. 2002; see also Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa, this volume; 
Zuccotti and O’Reilly, this volume).
Although it should be emphasized that it is often not easy to differentiate be-
tween those factors that cause or lead to NEET status and those factors that are 
simply correlated with being NEET (Farrington and Welsh 2003, 2007), existing 
research places great emphasis on family background and individual character-
istics as determinants of the NEET status (Stoneman and Thiel 2010). At the 
individual level, characteristics that are over- represented among the NEET pop-
ulation are low academic attainment (Dolton et al. 1999; Meadows 2001; Coles 
et al. 2002); teenage pregnancy and lone parenthood (Morash and Rucker 1989; 
Cusworth et al. 2009); special education needs and learning difficulties (Cassen 
and Kingdon 2007; Social Exclusion Task Force 2008); health problems and 
mental illness (Meadows 2001); involvement in criminal activities; and low mo-
tivation and aspiration, including lack of confidence, sense of fatalism, and low 
self- esteem (Strelitz and Darton 2003). Moreover, motivation is often identified 
as one of the key factors among the nonvulnerable who may be in a “voluntary 
NEET status”— that is, those who are more likely to come from a privileged back-
ground and remain briefly outside the labor market and education in order to 
sample jobs and educational courses (Furlong et al. 2003; Pemberton 2008).
In order to perform a pan- European investigation of the NEET phenomenon 
in this chapter, the Eurostat definition of NEET is implemented in the European 
Values Study survey (EVS), focusing on young people aged 15– 29 years. The EVS 
is a large- scale, cross- national, and longitudinal survey research program on 
basic human values, which provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, 
attitudes, values, and opinions of citizens for 47 European countries and regions. 
It is an important source of data for investigating how Europeans think about life, 
family, work, religion, politics, and society, and specific attention is dedicated to 
individual socioeconomic and family- related variables. On this basis, we explore 
the characteristics of NEETs in Europe by making use of the set of key character-
istics identified in the literature, which includes, especially, the investigation of 
individual and family background characteristics. In particular, in our analysis, 
we use the 2008 wave (the most recent) of the EVS by considering data from all 
27 EU member states, with an overall sample of more than 40,000 observations 
that are representative for the EU population. NEETs are identified in the EVS 
as those young people aged 15– 29  years who declared not being in paid em-
ployment because of being unemployed, disabled, young carers, housewives, or 
not otherwise employed for undeclared reasons. This operationalization of the 
514 Challenging Futures For Youth
514
definition of NEET is equivalent to that implemented by Eurostat using the EU- 
LFS, and the computed rates are comparable. Data refer to 2008, so they capture 
the scenario only at the beginning of the crisis.
The characteristics of the NEETs in Europe have been investigated using a 
logit model that accounts for a broad set of individuals’ sociodemographic and 
family- related variables while also controlling for countries’ heterogeneity. We 
investigated a large set of individual characteristics:  gender, age, immigration 
background, perceived health status, education level, religiosity, and living with 
parents. Furthermore, at the family level, we considered household income, ed-
ucation level of parents, unemployment history of parents, and the area where 
the household is located. The analysis is performed at the European and also at 
the cluster level, which are identified on the basis of the extent of the NEET phe-
nomenon observed at country level and the mediating role of different welfare- 
state models (Marshall 1950; Hadjivassiliou et al., this volume). In this respect, 
the established categorization of member states in five clusters is adopted 
here: employment- centered (AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, and NL), universalistic (DK, 
FI, and SE), liberal (IE and UK), subprotective (CY, ES, GR, IT, MT, and PT), and 
post- socialist (BG, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SI, and SK). The results of our 
analysis show a high level of consistency with the general literature and reveal 
some heterogeneity among the risk factors observed in the different geograph-
ical clusters. In particular, the findings indicate that the probability of ending 
up NEET is influenced by the following factors and characteristics (Table 17.1):
 • Regarding gender, young women are more likely than men to be NEET. 
The interpretation of the odds ratio shows that because of family 
responsibilities, young European women are 62% more likely than men 
to be NEET. Interestingly, this effect is stronger in the subprotective and 
post- socialist clusters than in the universalistic, liberal, or employment- 
centered clusters.
 • As indicated in the literature, those perceiving their health status as bad 
or very bad and who are suffering from some kind of disability are 38% 
more likely to be NEET compared to those with a good health status. 
This effect is stronger in the liberal and universalistic clusters than in the 
rest of Europe.
 • Young people with an immigration background are 68% more likely to 
become NEET compared to nationals. This effect is strongest in the lib-
eral cluster, whereas it is not significant in the universalistic or in the 
subprotective cluster.
 • Young people living in a partnership are 67% more likely to be NEET 
compared to those living alone or with parents. This effect is mainly 
driven by young women with family responsibilities. It is strongest in 
the liberal, subprotective, and post- socialist clusters, whereas it is not 
significant elsewhere.
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Table 17.1 Logistic regression results
Variable European Union Cluster 1: AT, BE, 
DE, FR, LU, NL
Cluster 2:  
DK, FI, SE
Cluster 3:  
IE, UK
Cluster 4: CY, ES, 
EL, IT, MT, PT
Cluster 5: BG, CZ, 
EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, 
RO, SI, SK
Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Gender (male) 0.381*** 0.034 0.615*** 0.116 0.399*** 0.137 0.111*** 0.069 0.393*** 0.080 0.289*** 0.040
Age (years) 1.066*** 0.015 1.118*** 0.037 0.993 0.062 0.997 0.099 1.053* 0.033 1.073*** 0.024
Health (not good) 1.388*** 0.159 1.938*** 0.475 2.580** 0.995 3.175* 2.105 2.149*** 0.624 0.930 0.160
Immigration 
background
1.689*** 0.261 1.969** 0.529 1.621 0.993 8.965*** 6.431 1.287 0.390 2.803*** 0.970
Living with parents 
(ref.)
(dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Living alone 0.804 0.114 0.703 0.204 0.754 0.436 2.185 1.882 0.755 0.220 0.723 0.187
Living with partner 1.673*** 0.183 1.057 0.268 1.402 0.711 4.248* 3.634 1.621* 0.405 2.051*** 0.317
Experienced divorce 1.265** 0.142 1.338 0.283 1.677 0.572 1.353 0.877 1.499 0.479 1.044 0.188
Education 
level: primary (ref.)
(dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Education 
level: secondary
0.448*** 0.048 0.452*** 0.105 0.514 0.247 0.151*** 0.098 0.754 0.186 0.375*** 0.061
Education 
level: tertiary
0.320*** 0.048 0.148*** 0.055 0.490 0.307 0.183** 0.135 0.568* 0.191 0.321*** 0.072
Income 0.443*** 0.042 0.356*** 0.084 3.395 2.751 0.112*** 0.079 0.683 0.165 0.391*** 0.063
Income squared 1.051*** 0.013 1.094** 0.043 0.603** 0.153 1.332*** 0.123 0.997 0.042 1.056*** 0.018
(continued)
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Variable European Union Cluster 1: AT, BE, 
DE, FR, LU, NL
Cluster 2:  
DK, FI, SE
Cluster 3:  
IE, UK
Cluster 4: CY, ES, 
EL, IT, MT, PT
Cluster 5: BG, CZ, 
EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, 
RO, SI, SK
Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Highest education 
parents:  
primary (ref.)
(dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Highest education 
parents: secondary
0.656*** 0.071 0.626** 0.146 1.007 0.445 0.104** 0.099 0.618** 0.151 0.646*** 0.107
Highest education 
parents:  
tertiary
0.524*** 0.079 0.531** 0.158 1.338 0.640 0.323 0.257 0.353** 0.156 0.527** 0.131
Unemployment 
history (father)
1.199 0.223 0.832 0.357 0.428 0.462 1.912 1.582 2.504* 1.238 1.113 0.301
Country dummies Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted
No. of observations 4,470 1,259 344 156 779 1,933
Pseudo R2 0.168 0.194 0.169 0.42 0.135 0.198
Table 17.1 Continued
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 • Education is the main driver affecting the probability of being 
NEET:  Young people with lower level education are two times more 
likely to be NEET compared to those with secondary education, and 
they are more than three times more likely to be NEET compared to 
those with tertiary education. The effect of education is strongest in the 
liberal cluster, whereas it is very limited in the subprotective cluster.
 • Capturing both the heterogeneity of the NEET population and its com-
position (both vulnerable and nonvulnerable youth), the marginal effect 
of income emerges as a U- shaped curve. The probability of being NEET 
is higher for those with a lower income, then decreases for the middle- 
level income, and increases again for higher incomes. Again, the effect 
of income is strongest in the liberal cluster, whereas it is more limited in 
the subprotective and universalistic clusters.
In addition to these individual characteristics, the following intergenerational 
influences and family backgrounds play a significant role in increasing the prob-
ability of being NEET:
 • Having parents who experienced unemployment is not significant at the 
EU level, whereas it is only marginally significant in the subprotective 
cluster.
 • Those with parents with a low level of education are up to 50% more 
likely to be NEET compared to young people with parents with a sec-
ondary level of education, and they are up to twice as likely to be NEET 
compared to those with parents with a tertiary level of education. This 
effect is strongest in the liberal cluster, whereas it is not significant in the 
universalistic cluster.
 • Young people who experienced the divorce of their parents are almost 
30% more likely to be NEET compared to those who did not.
Despite some heterogeneity at the cluster level, the results of the investigation 
indicate that NEET status can be described as both an outcome and a defining 
characteristic of disadvantaged youth, who are at much greater risk of social 
exclusion. Education is the most important variable, and it has the strongest 
effect in influencing the probability of being NEET: This is true at both the in-
dividual level and the family level and in all clusters considered. Moreover, suf-
fering some kind of disadvantage, such as a disability or having an immigration 
background, strongly increases the probability of being NEET, and this effect 
is strongest in the liberal cluster (Zuccotti and O’Reilly in this volume suggest 
that these effects also vary by ethnic group and appear to diminish somewhat 
for second- generation migrants). The importance of family background is con-
firmed as increasing the risk of becoming NEET. In particular, young people 
with a difficult family background, such as those with divorced parents or with 
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parents who have experienced unemployment, are more likely to be NEET (as in 
the subprotective cluster) (see Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa, this volume). The 
heterogeneity of the NEET population, as a mix of vulnerable and nonvulnerable 
situations, is, however, confirmed by the effect of income, which is common to 
all clusters but the universalistic.
17.6. POLICIES TO TACKLE THE HETEROGENEITY OF NEETS
Understanding the composition of the NEET population is essential for policy 
design and for implementing reintegration measures. Armed with information 
about the size and the characteristics of each subgroup of the NEET population, 
member states can also better understand how to prioritize their actions and 
know which tools are most needed in order to reintegrate young people into the 
labor market or education.
Several alternative theoretical categorizations of NEETs have already 
been proposed in the literature. Williamson (1997) suggested disaggregating 
NEETs into three groups:  “essentially confused,” “temporarily side- tracked,” 
and “deeply alienated.” According to Williamson, whereas members of the 
first group are willing and ready to re- engage as long as the right support 
and encouragement are provided, those in the second group need some un-
derstanding and patience while they deal with what they consider to be more 
important matters in their lives right now. Williamson considers the third 
group to be at the highest risk of disengagement and disaffection. This group 
may include those who have discovered “alternative ways of living” within 
the informal and illegal economies and those whose lives revolve around the 
consumption of alcohol and illegal drugs. Although it would be possible to re- 
engage the “temporarily side- tracked” and the “essentially confused” into the 
labor market or education, it could be very difficult to persuade the “deeply 
alienated” to return.
An alternative categorization has been developed by Eurofound (2012, 
2016) and Mascherini (2017), who identified five categories within the NEET 
population with varying degrees of vulnerability and needs: the conventionally 
unemployed, the unavailable, the disengaged, opportunity seekers, and volun-
tary NEETs. The “conventionally unemployed” were expected to be the largest 
group within the NEET population, which could be further divided into short- 
and long- term unemployed. The “unavailable” include young people who are un-
available because of family responsibilities or because of illness or disability. The 
“disengaged” include all young people who are not seeking a job or following any 
education or training and who do not have other obligations that stop them from 
doing so. This category includes discouraged workers and young people who 
are pursuing dangerous and asocial lifestyles. The “opportunity seekers” include 
young people who are seeking work or training but are holding out for the right 
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opportunity. The “voluntary NEETs” are constructively engaged in other activi-
ties, such as art, music, or self- directed learning.
Although the previous categorizations are quite rich, their implemen-
tation is rather difficult because of data constraints that do not allow their 
operationalization through the EU- LFS, the survey officially used to compute 
the NEET rate. The EU- LFS has the undoubted advantage of having the largest 
sample base of any European survey, but it offers a restricted number of variables. 
This makes it difficult to capture the sociodemographic qualities and behaviors 
that are essential to a better understanding of the characteristics of NEETs, the 
reasons for their status, and their vulnerabilities. The limited range of variables 
also makes it impossible to use the previously described categorizations of vul-
nerable and nonvulnerable NEETs because the variables that would capture these 
characteristics are missing.
Building on findings from previous research and using the EU- LFS, a new 
categorization is proposed here. This categorization revolves around seven 
descriptions created using the available five variables that make it possible to un-
derstand why those in each particular group responded during the survey that 
they were not searching for employment and were not able to start work within 
the next 2 weeks.2 Similarly, duration of unemployment has been used to disag-
gregate the short- and long- term unemployed.
The seven subcategories that emerged from this exercise are as follows:
Re- entrants: This category captures those young people who will soon re- 
enter employment, education, or training and will soon begin or re-
sume accumulation of human capital through formal channels. They 
are people who have already been hired or have enrolled in education 
or training and will soon start this activity.3
Short- term unemployed:  This category is composed of all young people 
who are unemployed, seeking work, and available to start within 2 
weeks and who have been unemployed for less than 1 year.4
Long- term unemployed: This category is composed of all young people who 
are unemployed, seeking work, and available to start within 2 weeks 
and who have been unemployed for more than 1 year. People in this 
category are at high risk of disengagement and social exclusion.5
Unavailable because of illness or disability: This category includes all young 
people who are not seeking employment or are not available to start a 
job within 2 weeks because of illness or disability. This group includes 
those who need more social support because the nature of their illness 
or disability means they cannot carry out paid work.6
Unavailable because of family responsibilities:  This group includes those 
who are not seeking work or who are not available to start a new job 
because they are caring for children or incapacitated adults or have 
other less specific family responsibilities. Young people in this group 
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are a mix of the vulnerable and nonvulnerable; some are not able to 
participate in the labor market because they cannot afford to pay for 
care for their child or adult family member, whereas others volun-
tarily withdraw from the labor market or education to take up family 
responsibilities.7
Discouraged workers: This group encompasses all young people who have 
stopped searching for work because they believe that there are no job 
opportunities for them. They are mostly vulnerable young people at 
high risk of social exclusion who are very likely to experience poor em-
ployment outcomes over the course of their working lives and are at 
high risk of lifelong disengagement.8
Other inactive:  This group contains all NEETs whose reasons for being 
NEET do not fall into any of the previous six categories. This group 
is a statistical residual category made up of those who did not specify 
any reason for their NEET status. It is likely to be an extremely heter-
ogeneous mix that includes people at all extremes of the spectrum of 
vulnerability: the most vulnerable, the difficult to reach, those at risk of 
being deeply alienated, the most privileged, and those who are holding 
out for a specific opportunity or who are following alternative paths.9
The proposed categorization allows investigation of the composition of the 
NEET population by identifying seven major groups, four of which are labor- 
market driven (re- entrants, short- term unemployed, long- term unemployed, and 
discouraged workers), whereas three are inactivity driven (unavailable because 
of illness or disability, unavailable because of family responsibilities, and other 
inactive). Although the categorization is not exhaustive, it can be implemented 
every year through the EU- LFS, providing a useful tool for measuring the extent 
of NEET populations and the broad types of policy initiative among the various 
EU member states, showing not only the heterogeneity of the NEET population 
but also the heterogeneity of the member states, where NEET status differs in 
terms of not only rate but also composition.
17.6.1. Differentiating the composition of the neet 
population and appropriate policy responses
Focusing on young people aged 15– 29 years, we implemented the categorization 
outlined previously on data from the 2013 EU- LFS.10 Figure 17.3 thus shows that 
in 2013, the largest category of NEETs was the short- term unemployed (25.5%), 
followed by the long- term unemployed (23.1%). The group of those unavailable 
because of family responsibilities is also large (20.3%). Discouraged workers 
account for 5.8% of the total, whereas 7% are young people with an illness or 
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disability. Finally, 11.7% are young people who are inactive without having in-
dicated the reason, and 6.4% are re- entrants. Looking at the total population of 
young people in Europe in 2013, 4% of those aged 15– 29 years were short- term 
unemployed, whereas 3.6% were long- term unemployed and approximately 3.1% 
were outside the labor market and education because of family responsibilities.
According to the proposed decomposition, we can say in broad terms that at 
the European level, the share of young people who are NEET for labor- market 
driven reasons amounts to 60.8% of the total, which corresponds to the sum 
of re- entrants, short- and long- term unemployed, and discouraged workers. Of 
these, half are at risk of long- term disengagement (being both long- term un-
employed and discouraged workers) and will require more ad hoc reactivation 
measures in order to be reintegrated into the labor market.
The need for targeted measures becomes even more evident when the dis-
tribution of the composition of the NEET population is examined by gender. 
The gender composition of the various categories reveals that whereas young 
men dominated the categories of labor market- driven NEETs, more than 92% 
of NEETs attributing this status to family responsibilities are women (Figure 
17.4). Although it is unfortunately not possible to determine how many in this 
category are voluntarily in this situation, the clear gender imbalance in the 
category suggests room for maneuver for policy interventions, including the 
promotion of support to young women through childcare and other social care 
for family members so as to foster their reintegration into the labor market or 
education.
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Figure 17.3 Composition of the NEET population aged 15– 29 years at the EU level, percentage 
shares, 2013.
Source: Eurostat (EU- LFS 2013).
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17.6.2. heterogeneity of neets in a 
heterogeneous europe
The unemployed are the largest group of NEETs in most countries, although 
there are some significant differences with regard to the proportions in long- or 
short- term unemployment (Figure 17.5).
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Figure 17.4 Gender composition of the NEET population aged 15– 29 years, 2013.
Source: Eurostat (EU- LFS 2013)
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Figure 17.5 Composition of the NEET population at member- state level in 2013.
Source: Eurostat (EU- LFS 2013).
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The short- term unemployed are the largest category among NEETs in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This group ranges from 39% in Luxembourg 
to 28% in Belgium and Finland. All of these countries are also characterized 
by a NEET rate below the EU average, indicating that young people manage to 
enter the labor market more rapidly (see Berloffa et al., this volume; Flek, Hála, 
and Mysíková, this volume). It is interesting to highlight that in almost all these 
countries, the share of those who are NEET because of illness or disability is 
higher than the EU average and that the proportion of discouraged workers is 
also (marginally) higher than average.
Conversely, in Ireland and in some Mediterranean and Central European 
countries, such as Croatia, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain, the largest 
group of NEETs is composed of the long- term unemployed. Some of this is a 
result of the economic crisis, but it also indicates deeper structural problems in 
youth transitions from school to work. The size of this cohort ranges from 48% 
in Greece to 26% in Italy, and in all these member states it is well above the EU 
average. In both Italy and Croatia, the percentage of young people who are dis-
couraged workers is also well above the EU average.
The gender composition of the NEET group is strongly polarized, and in 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Italy, the percentage of NEETs with family 
responsibilities is well above the EU average. This suggests that in most of these 
countries, being NEET not only appears to be driven by structural barriers in 
accessing the labor market but also may be largely attributable to additional 
disadvantages and family responsibilities (Gökşen et al. 2016).
The NEET rate in Eastern European countries varies across countries— from 
12% in the Czech Republic to 25% in Bulgaria. The largest proportion of the 
NEET population in Eastern member states is attributable to those with family 
responsibilities— a category composed almost entirely of women. Although the 
gender dimension and family responsibilities are common drivers, member 
states differ as to how labor market factors affect the composition of the NEET 
population. In the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, the share of 
those closer to the labor market— re- entrants and the short- term unemployed— 
is higher than the EU average. Conversely, the share of long- term unemployed 
and discouraged workers is well above the EU average in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Romania, and Slovakia.
Considerable efforts have been made by EU member states to reintegrate 
some groups of NEETs through the use of the Youth Guarantee, especially the 
short- term unemployed and re- entrants. In many cases, member states have in-
cluded provisions that address young people who are NEET because of illness 
or disability. Despite these efforts, few measures currently focus on long- term 
youth unemployment and especially on young mothers and those young people 
who cannot participate in the labor market because of family responsibilities 
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(Eurofound 2015). A more general observation is that some member states have 
tended to target job- ready young people with Youth Guarantee interventions 
rather than those who are furthest from the labor market (Eurofound 2016).
17.7. CONCLUSIONS
The concept of NEET and the NEET indicator have attempted to go beyond tra-
ditional indicators for youth labor market participation so as to provide a better 
understanding of youth vulnerability on the labor market. Although from a sta-
tistical standpoint it is very easy to capture the NEET population, NEETs are 
by definition a heterogeneous category combining groups with very different 
experiences, characteristics, and needs, which include both vulnerable and 
nonvulnerable young people. Addressing the heterogeneity of the NEET pop-
ulation is of key importance in order to make successful and optimal use of the 
NEET indicator for policymaking.
Although the overall NEET indicator does not allow us to understand the 
characteristics of this diverse population, this chapter disentangles the hetero-
geneity of the NEET population by proposing a disaggregation of the main in-
dicator in seven types, each of which identifies a particular subgroup of young 
people with its own needs. If applied to the EU- LFS, the categorization could be 
used every year to monitor trends in the composition of the NEET population 
and the effectiveness of specific targeted policy interventions.
On the one hand, policy is rightly aimed at reducing overall NEET rates be-
cause these are clear indicators of the difficulties young people find in making 
the transition to work. On the other hand, addressing the heterogeneity of the 
NEET population has important consequences for appropriate policy responses 
for different groups of young people.
In particular, when used carefully and disaggregated in the manner outlined 
in this chapter, the NEET indicator can illustrate the particular needs of spe-
cific young people, such as young mothers and those with disabilities. This is 
preferred to a more traditional categorization implied by the label “inactive.” In 
order to effectively reintegrate NEETs, the different needs and characteristics of 
the various subgroups have to be taken into account because there will be no 
one- size- fits- all policy solution. Only a tailored approach for different subgroups 
has the potential to effectively and successfully reintegrate NEETs into the labor 
market and education.
The key groups who are still overlooked are those in the gray areas of 
education, training, and employment. Those who are in temporary or in-
secure forms of work and those who are underemployed, for example, are 
frequently in vulnerable and marginalized positions. Similarly, there are 
young people in education and training who can be regarded as reluc-
tant conscripts: They have been “forced” to engage under threat of benefit 
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withdrawal or have been discouraged from entering the labor market by a 
perceived lack of opportunities. In this context, although new concepts will 
be difficult to operationalize, future analysis to map the landscape of youth 
opportunities needs to pick up both objective and subjective dimensions of 
vulnerability that characterize modern youth transitions so as to understand 
how effective policy implementation can address these different dimensions 
of disadvantage.
NOTES
1 The ILO definition of unemployment covers all people who are without 
work or were not in paid employment during the previous 4 weeks, who 
have actively sought work during the previous 4 weeks, and who are 
available to start work within the next fortnight (International Labour 
Organization 1982).
2 (1)  Seeking employment during the previous 4 weeks (SEEKWORK); 
(2) reasons for not looking for a job (SEEKREAS); (3) availability to start job 
within 2 weeks (AVAIBLE); (4) reasons for not being available to start a job 
(AVAIREAS); and (5) duration of unemployment (SEEKDUR).
3 (SEEKWORK  =  1– 2) or (SEEKWORK  =  3 and SEEKREAS  =  1,5); or 
(SEEKWORK = 4 and AVAIBLE = 2 and AVAIREAS = 1).
4 (SEEKWORK = 4 and AVAIBLE = 1 and SEEKDUR = 0– 4).
5 (SEEKWORK = 4 and AVAIBLE = 1 and SEEKDUR = 6– 8).
6 (SEEKWORK  =  3 and SEEKREAS  =  2) and (SEEKWORK  =  4 and 
AVAIBLE = 2 and AVAIREAS = 5).
7 (SEEKWORK  =  3 and SEEKREAS  =  3,4) and (SEEKWORK  =  4 and 
AVAIBLE = 2 and AVAIREAS = 4).
8 (SEEKWORK = 4 and SEEKREAS = 7).
9 (SEEKWORK  =  3 and SEEKREAS  =  6,8,– 1) and (SEEKWORK  =  4 and 
AVAIBLE = 2 and AVAIREAS = – 1,6,2).
10 The most recent available data at the time of writing.
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YOUTH OVEREDUCATION IN EUROPE
is there sCoPe For a CoMMon PoliCY aPProaCh?
Seamus McGuinness, Adele Bergin, and Adele Whelan
18.1. INTRODUCTION
Overeducation describes the situation in which individuals are employed in 
jobs for which the level of education required to either get or do the jobs in 
question is below the level of schooling held by the workers. Overeducation 
has become an increasingly important issue for discussion both within na-
tional governments and at the European and Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) levels, and policymakers have become 
ever more concerned about the apparent inability of large shares of new labor 
market entrants to acquire jobs that are commensurate with their levels of edu-
cation. Overeducation is costly at an individual level, with mismatched workers 
typically earning 15% less than their well- matched counterparts with similar 
levels of education. Furthermore, overeducation tends to reduce levels of job sat-
isfaction and increase rates of job mobility (for a review of the evidence, see 
Quintini 2011). At the firm level, although there is some evidence that overed-
ucated workers raise productivity levels somewhat,1 higher rates of job mobility 
imply that overeducation can impose additional hiring costs on firms. At the 
macroeconomic level, total output will be lower as a consequence of a significant 
proportion of the workforce operating below their full potential productivity, 
while public finances are adversely affected as a consequence of lower income tax 
receipts and suboptimal investments in educational provision. Given the various 
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impacts of overeducation, it is extremely important to assess the evolution of 
its rates over time (both within and between countries) so as to develop our 
understanding of the phenomenon and ascertain the extent to which policies 
combating overeducation can be coordinated at a European level or whether 
country- specific responses are likely to be more appropriate.
Currently, almost all of the research on labor market mismatch, meas-
ured in terms of either overeducation or overskilling, has relied on country- 
specific, cross- sectional, or panel data sets. To date, the research has focused 
on identifying the individual- or firm- level determinants of mismatch and/ 
or the impact of mismatch on individual outcomes such as income or job 
satisfaction. Although such insights are crucial to understanding mismatch, 
it is only by studying the phenomenon at a more aggregate level that we can 
come to an understanding of the macroeconomic, demographic, and institu-
tional forces that drive it. In this study, we use the European Union Labour 
Force Survey (EU- LFS) to construct quarterly time series of both youth and 
adult overeducation rates between 1997 and 2012 for 29 European countries. 
This chapter has a number of objectives, including (1) providing a descrip-
tive assessment of trends in overeducation in European countries over time, 
(2) assessing the extent to which the rate of overeducation among youth and 
adult cohorts moves together within countries, (3) measuring the degree of 
interdependence and convergence in the evolution of overeducation between 
countries over time, and (4)  identifying some of the underlying drivers of 
youth overeducation.
From a policy perspective, the extent to which overeducation could be suit-
able for a common policy approach, at either a European or a national level, will 
largely depend on the similarities in the evolution of overeducation over time 
both between and within countries. In this chapter, we adopt advanced econo-
metric techniques that can confirm if two time series are driven by a common 
underlying economic relationship, as opposed to merely trending together in a 
spurious, noncausal manner. If overeducation has evolved in different directions 
at different rates across countries, this will provide a strong indication that it is 
driven by a range of factors that will vary in terms of both their magnitude and 
their significance across countries. Conversely, if movements in overeducation 
are confirmed through econometric testing to be driven by the same underlying 
causal factors over time, this would be supportive of a centralized policy ap-
proach aimed at targeting the common underlying causal influences driving both 
series. We consider a range of potential drivers relating to labor market demand, 
labor market supply, the structure of education systems, and macroeconomic 
factors. The potential for a future common policy approach to overeducation, at 
either a national or a pan- European level, is consequently assessed on the basis 
of this analysis.
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18.1.1. existing evidence on international variations 
in overeducation
Although the general literature on overeducation has expanded rapidly, partic-
ularly during the past two decades (for reviews, see McGuinness 2006; Quintini 
2011; McGuinness et al., 2018), there has been little assessment of overeducation 
from an aggregate country- level perspective; nevertheless, some exceptions do 
exist. Pouliakas (2013), also using data from the EU- LFS and analyzing the av-
erage rate of overeducation between 2001 and 2011, demonstrates the existence 
of considerable variation in overeducation rates across European countries. 
Pouliakas further concludes that although the average level of overeducation 
among EU25 member states exhibited a relatively stable time series between 2001 
and 2009, there was substantial credentialism present in the labor market, with 
the growth in overeducation being largely subdued by higher occupational entry 
requirements.2 Despite the relatively constant trend, the Pouliakas study does in-
dicate that during the financial crisis, the average rate of overeducation in Europe 
increased during the years 2008 and 2009, implying that levels of overeducation 
may vary with the business cycle. In support of this view, Mavromaras and 
McGuinness (2012) argue that there are grounds to expect the rate of mismatch 
to vary with macroeconomic conditions, on the basis that fluctuations in the 
economy will change the composition in the demand for labor and, consequently, 
how workers are utilized within firms. Ex ante, we might reasonably expect rates 
of overeducation to rise during times of recession and to fall during periods of 
economic growth. However, it is also reasonable to suppose that business- cycle 
impacts will be more heavily felt among newly qualified younger workers and that 
variations in the overall rate of overeducation are likely to be less affected by var-
iations in aggregate output. These hypotheses will be further explored in Sections 
18.3 and 18.5.
With respect to the potential drivers of overeducation at the macroec-
onomic level, there is limited research primarily because of the paucity of 
cross- country data sets. A  number of possible effects could potentially ex-
plain the existence and persistence of overeducation at a national level. 
Overeducation could arise when the supply of educated labor outstrips de-
mand, primarily as a result of the tendency of governments in developed 
economies to continually seek to raise the proportion of individuals with 
third- level qualifications. Alternatively, it may be that the quantity of educated 
labor does not exceed supply but that there are imbalances in composition; in 
other words, individuals are being educated in areas in which there is little de-
mand, leading to people from certain fields of study being particularly prone 
to overeducation.3 Furthermore, labor demand and supply might be perfectly 
synchronized yet overeducation might still arise because of frictions deriving 
from asymmetric information, institutional factors that prevent labor market 
clearance, or variations in individual preferences related to either job mobility 
or work– life balance.
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Applying a multilevel model to a cross- country graduate cohort database, 
Verhaest and van der Velden (2012) derive a number of variables from the 
individual- level data to explain cross- country differences in the incidence of 
overeducation. Explanatory variables in the Verhaest and van der Velden study 
include measures for the composition of higher education supply in terms of 
vocational versus academic orientation and field of study, proxies for educa-
tional quality,4 measures of the output and unemployment gaps,5 indicators of 
employment protection legislation within each country, and the level of educa-
tion oversupply. In their study, Verhaest and van der Velden calculate the share 
of graduates in the population older than age 25 years and gross expenditure on 
research and development (R&D). Graduate oversupply is then taken as the dif-
ference in the standardized values of these two variables. Verhaest and van der 
Velden find that cross- country differences in overeducation are related to their 
measures, which, they argue, capture variations in quality and orientation (gen-
eral vs. specific) of the education system, business- cycle effects, and the relative 
oversupply of highly skilled labor.
Davia, McGuinness, and O’Connell (2017) attempt a similar exercise using EU- 
SILC data. Similar to Verhaest and van der Velden (2012), Davia et al. find evi-
dence to support the notion that overeducation is more prevalent in regions where 
the level of educated labor supply exceeds demand and where university enrolment 
levels are highest.6 These authors also report that the overeducation rate is posi-
tively related to the share of migrants in the labor market and is lower for females 
in regions with strong employment protection. Thus, although some concerns may 
be raised regarding the quality of some of the indicator variables derived in studies 
relying on cross- sectional international data, the studies by Verhaest and van der 
Velden and Davia et al. demonstrate the potential importance of aggregate- level 
variables in explaining overeducation, with both studies pointing toward educa-
tion oversupply as an important driving force. Recently, McGuinness and Pouliakas 
(2017), using cross- country European data, have attempted to assess the relative 
importance of the various explanations for overeducation in terms of the propor-
tion of the overeducation pay penalty that can be attributed to them. McGuinness 
and Pouliakas argue that there is merit to the view that overeducation is related 
to differences in the human capital of overeducated and matched workers; how-
ever, differences in job conditions and skill requirements were also important. 
Furthermore, McGuinness and Pouliakas suggest that the quality of information 
that workers acquire before accepting a job is also an important component in 
explaining the impact of overeducation among European graduates.
18.2. DATA AND METHODS
To our knowledge, there are no reliable time- series data on overeducation 
that would allow a systematic cross- country comparison across time, and the 
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data- development aspect is a key contribution of the current study. The data used 
in this study are the quarterly anonymized country- level files of the EU- LFS for 
the period up to the fourth quarter of 2012. Because there is no subjective ques-
tion within the EU- LFS related to the level of schooling necessary to get, or un-
dertake, a person’s current job, overeducation is measured objectively. There are 
essentially three standard methods of measuring overeducation. The subjective 
measure is based on individual responses comparing attained education levels 
with perceived job- entry requirements; the occupational- dictionary approach 
compares individual- level education with the required level of schooling detailed 
for specific occupations in the documentation accompanying occupational clas-
sification systems; finally, the objective approach compares individual levels of 
schooling with either the mean or the mode level of schooling of the respective 
occupation. The goal of this chapter is to examine overeducation over time across 
a large number of EU countries. In this regard, the EU- LFS is one of the only data 
sets that enables this type of analysis; however, using this data set means that the 
only measure of overeducation we can exploit is the objective approach. Existing 
studies indicate that although the correlation between the various definitional 
approaches tends not to be particularly high, they generate very similar results 
with respect to both the incidence and the impacts of overeducation (for review, 
see McGuinness 2006).
For each country, in each quarter, overeducation is defined as the propor-
tion of employees in employment whose International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED) level of schooling lies one level or more above the occu-
pational mode. The occupational modal level of education is the most common 
qualification possessed by workers in each two- digit International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) occupation group. Overeducation is calcu-
lated within two- digit occupational codes and using five ISCED categories of <2, 
3, 4, 5B, and 5A + 6. Thus, if the modal level of schooling in a particular two- digit 
occupation were measured at ISCED- 3, then all individuals educated to ISCED 
levels 4 and above would be deemed to be overeducated in our approach. We cal-
culate the overall rate of overeducation in each country for each quarter, and we 
also calculate the rates for individuals aged 15– 24 and 25– 64 years. Given that 
we are dealing with a large number of countries, for the purposes of our anal-
ysis we group these into three categories on the basis of an initial inspection of 
patterns in the data. Moreover, the selected groupings are likely to have common 
linkages in terms of geographical proximity, levels of economic development, 
and access to the single market. The first category is composed of the countries 
that acceded to the EU from 2004— which include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia— and are referred to as the “Eastern” states. The second category refers 
to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain— the traditional “Periphery” of the 
EU. The third group (“Central”) is made up of the remaining countries located 
in Central and Northern Europe and includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
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Finland, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom.7 Generally, we found that the average rate of overeducation 
is lowest in the Eastern European countries, highest in the Periphery, and some-
where in between in the Central European countries (see descriptive evidence in 
Section 18.3).
In terms of the empirical approach, we are interested in determining the ex-
tent to which youth and adult overeducation move together within countries and 
also the degree to which long- term relationships in the rates of overeducation 
exist between countries. We classify these long- term equilibrium relationships as 
“completed convergence” on the grounds that, if detected, they indicate that cer-
tain series are sufficiently correlated that overeducation is likely to be driven by a 
common set of macroeconomic and/ or institutional factors. We might expect a 
link between youth and general overeducation within countries on the grounds 
that they are likely to be driven by a common set of macroeconomic variables 
related to, for instance, the nature of labor market demand, labor supply, or 
wage- setting institutions. The overall overeducation rate is closely related to 
a stock measure that will react more slowly to major changes in determining 
factors. However, the youth overeducation rate is more of a flow measure that 
may react with more volatility to changes in labor market conditions. This raises 
uncertainties related to the extent to which the two series will be highly synced 
even if they do share common determinants. Regarding intercountry completed 
convergence, there are grounds to believe that convergence could prevail within 
an EU context. This could happen, for example, when cross- country differences 
in key labor market variables such as unemployment and, possibly, overeducation 
are reduced by the free movement of workers. Conversely, completed conver-
gence (a tendency for the overeducation rates across countries to equalize over 
time) may be limited for Eastern European countries or between countries where 
language or other noneconomic barriers prevent equalizing labor flows.
In this chapter, we are dealing with time- series data, which should not 
be approached using a traditional regression methodology. Historically, 
econometricians have tended to assume that most time- series data are 
“nonstationary” and, crucially, this had no impact on their empirical analysis. 
Time- series data tend to increase or decrease over time and, therefore, do not 
have a constant “stationary” mean and variance. Running regressions on data 
of this nature (nonstationary) can give rise to misleading results and essen-
tially lead to erroneous conclusions about the existence of a relationship be-
tween variables where one may not in fact exist; this is commonly known as 
the spurious regression problem. Spurious regressions occur when two variables 
are statistically related to each other but no causal relationship exists, meaning 
they are related purely by coincidence or they are both influenced by another 
external variable. For example, in examining ice cream sales, we may find that 
sales are highest when the rate of drowning is highest. To imply that ice cream 
sales cause drowning or vice versa is an example of a spurious relationship. In 
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fact, a contemporaneous increase in these two variables could be caused by a 
heat wave. Consequently, when we test for common underlying trends between 
the overeducation series, we take account of the spurious regression problem. In 
order to overcome such issues, we adopt a cointegration estimation approach. 
Two nonstationary variables are said to be cointegrated when they move together 
in a similar manner over time— for example, variables such as household income 
and expenditure— and, in this case, the regression results are meaningful.
We begin by establishing whether each respective series is stationary or 
nonstationary by applying standard Phillips– Perron unit root tests (Phillips 
1987; Phillips and Perron 1988).8 The Phillips– Perron test is written formally for 
a time series yt in Eq. (18.1), where t is a time trend. The null hypothesis of the 
Phillips– Perron test is that there is a unit root or that the series is nonstationary; 
that is, β1 0= :
 y t yt t t= + + +−β γ β ε0 1 1
 (18.1)
If we establish that two overeducation time series are nonstationary, then we 
adopt the Phillips– Ouliaris test for a cointegrating relationship. If both series 
are stationary, we perform ordinary least squares (OLS) on the basis that spu-
rious regressions are no longer an issue. Finally, if one series is stationary and 
the other nonstationary, we do not undertake any further tests for an underlying 
relationship.
The Phillips– Ouliaris test is a residual- based test for cointegration involving a 
two- step estimation approach. In the first stage, Eq. (18.2) is estimated:
 X y uit it t= + +α β1
 (18.2)
β  is a cointegrating vector if u X Yt it i it= − −α β , and the second stage of the pro-
cedure tests whether the regression residuals from Eq. (18.2) are stationary using 
the Phillips– Perron test.
In addition to testing for long- term relationships in overeducation rates 
both within and between countries, we also examine the extent to which 
overeducation rates in Europe have been converging or diverging over time by 
estimating a Barro regression (Eq. 18.3; Barro 1997). This investigates the rela-
tionship between a country’s initial level of overeducation and how the rate has 
evolved over time. In instances in which completed convergence has not been 
achieved (where overeducation rates across countries have not equalized over 
time), overeducation rates may converge as workers from saturated graduate 
labor markets relocate to areas with greater levels of job opportunity and lower 
levels of overeducation (see Akgüç and Beblavý, this volume). For example, the 
lack of convergence could arise from some countries remaining outside of the 
monetary union. Under these circumstances, the consequence of labor market 
inflows would be to raise overeducation levels in areas of oversupply. At the same 
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time, labor market outflows, in the form of outmigration, would tend to reduce 
overeducation rates in highly saturated labor markets.
The application of the Barro model involves examining the relationship be-
tween the growth rate of overeducation and the initial level of overeducation 
using a regression model. If a country with a lower initial level of overeducation 
tended to have a higher growth in overeducation over time, then the estimate of 
the coefficient of interest— β1 in Eq. (18.3)— would be negative and significant. 
This implies that this country’s overeducation rate would converge to the average 
prevailing in other countries. Therefore, disparities in rates across countries over 
time would tend to dissipate. In contrast, a positive coefficient would point to-
ward divergence in overeducation rates across countries. In addition to the Barro 
regression, we also check for convergence by plotting the cross- country variance 
in overeducation rates for specific groups of countries:
 
ln lnOv t Ov
t
Ov
( ) − ( )
= + ( ) +0 00 1β β ε (18.3)
Finally, we examine the determinants of youth overeducation for countries with 
a stationary series. Twenty- one of the 28 youth overeducation series were found 
to be stationary in nature, suggesting that the application of standard OLS is 
appropriate.9 For the stationary series, we estimate the following model for all 
countries initially and then for our three country groupings:
 y y Xit it j ijt i it= + + + +−β β β α ε0 1 1
 (18.4)
where yit is the dependent variable observed for country i in time t, yit −1 is the 
lagged dependent variable, Xijt  represents a number of j independent variables 
with β j the associated coefficients, αi is the unobserved time- invariant country 
effect that allows us to control for institutional factors (fixed effect), and εit  is the 
error term. Using this fixed- effect approach allows us to model the determinants 
of youth overeducation, but we cannot exclude the possibility that some variables 
may be endogenous and, in further analysis, we plan to build on this approach 
using panel data in a dynamic framework.10
18.3. DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
The average levels of overeducation, based on quarterly data for the period 2001– 
2011, are reported in the first column of Table 18.1. Our sample is restricted 
to employees in full- time employment and so will largely exclude the student 
population but include paid apprenticeships and traineeships. The estimated 
rate of overeducation varies from 8% in the Czech and Slovak Republics to 30% 
or greater in Ireland, Cyprus, and Spain. In general, we observe the estimated 
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incidence of overeducation to be lowest in the Eastern countries (e.g., the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic) and highest in the Peripheral coun-
tries (e.g., Spain and Ireland), with the Central countries lying somewhere in 
the middle. There are, however, some exceptions to this general pattern; for 
instance, overeducation rates were relatively high in Lithuania and Estonia, 
whereas overeducation in Portugal was well below the level observed in other 
Table 18.1 Overeducation rates: Comparison of estimates from EU- LFS data averaged 
over 2001– 2011 and estimates based on PIAAC data for 2014
(1) (2)
Country Estimates based on EU- LFS  
(2001– 2011 average)
Estimates based on 
PIAAC (2014)
Austria 0.19 0.23
Belgium 0.26 0.24
Bulgaria 0.11
Cyprus 0.31 0.31
Czech Republic 0.08 0.12
Germany 0.18 0.22
Denmark 0.18 0.31
Estonia 0.24 0.26
Spain 0.30 0.34
Finland 0.14 0.17
France 0.17 0.17
Greece 0.28
Hungary 0.13
Ireland 0.33 0.33
Italy 0.24 0.24
Lithuania 0.25
Luxembourg 0.17
Latvia 0.19
Netherlands 0.22 0.22
Poland 0.11 0.11
Portugal 0.18
Romania 0.10
Sweden 0.14 0.19
Slovenia 0.09
Slovak Republic 0.08 0.10
United Kingdom 0.21 0.20
Sources: Column (1), authors’ calculations based on EU- LFS data; column (2), Flisi et al. (2014).
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Peripheral countries. The second column of Table 18.1 provides a comparison 
with a number of estimates for 2014 generated by Flisi et  al. (2014), who ap-
plied a comparable approach to the OECD Programme for the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) data. In general, our overeducation 
estimates match closely with those from the PIAAC- based study, with the ex-
ception of the estimate for Denmark, where a relatively large discrepancy exists.
We plot the country rates for total overeducation and for the 15- to 24- year- 
old and 25- to 64- year- old age groups for each country in Figure 18.1.11 The 
length of the time series varies depending on data availability. There is a high 
Figure 18.1 Quarterly overeducation rates (restricted to full- time employees) for each country 
plotted for the time periods available from Q1/ 1998 to Q4/ 2010.
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Figure 18.1 Continued
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Figure 18.1 Continued
degree of cross- country variation in terms of the level of overeducation, the gen-
eral direction of the trend over time, and the relationship between youth and 
adult overeducation within countries.
For slightly less than half of the countries, overeducation appears to be 
trending upward over time. However, although the rate of increase seems quite 
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slight, a much steeper slope is observed for most countries in the Peripheral 
group (Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Italy) and also in Poland. Furthermore, 
overeducation appears not to have risen in any observable way in 12 coun-
tries, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, and 
Luxembourg, whereas it has fallen over time in Cyprus, Croatia, Lithuania, and 
Latvia.
With respect to youth overeducation, the pattern appears much more volatile 
relative to adult overeducation. Youth overeducation lies below the average in the 
vast majority of countries; however, it has been consistently above the average 
in the Peripheral group and in Belgium, Cyprus, France, and Poland. It may be 
the case that the consistently high levels of youth overeducation in countries in 
the Peripheral group are also contributing to the observed trend increase in total 
overeducation over time. For example, this may happen as a consequence of 
higher proportions of consecutive generations of young people failing to achieve 
an appropriate labor market match. The main characteristics of the country- level 
overeducation series are summarized in Table 18.2.
18.4. HAVE OVEREDUCATION RATES CONVERGED OR ARE 
THEY CONTINUING TO CONVERGE?
To investigate the existence of a long- term relationship between overeducation 
rates across countries, we adopt the Phillips– Ouliaris approach (described in 
Section 18.2) and perform pairwise analysis of overeducation rates. Cointegration 
tests should reveal whether overeducation rates move together over a longer time 
period. A finding of a common trend in the rates across countries may signify 
that an international policy approach to overeducation is appropriate. Even if 
there is no finding of cointegration across countries, overeducation may still re-
spond to the same underlying processes, which we explore in Section 18.5.
For each country, the tests for stationarity are performed either with or 
without a time trend. The decision to include a time trend or not depends on the 
evolution of the overall overeducation rate over time in each country. The null 
hypothesis (that the series is nonstationary) is the presence of a unit root. We 
conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for any series 
where the test statistic is below the critical value at the 10% level of significance. 
These countries are then included in the cointegration analysis to ascertain if 
the overeducation rates move together over time in an equilibrium manner. 
We perform pairwise OLS on the other countries where we conclude that the 
overeducation rate is stationary and include a time trend depending on the na-
ture of the stationarity. For example, a series is trend stationary if the underlying 
series is stationary after removing the time trend.
The finding of nonstationarity means that the overeducation rate has a 
nonconstant mean and/ or variance, suggesting that the phenomenon is some-
what unstable over time. Conversely, a finding of stationarity implies relative 
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Table 18.2 Key characteristics of country- level overeducation series based 
on estimates from EU- LFS data, 2001– 2011
Country Youth > adult Youth < adult Positive 
trend
Negative 
trend
No trend
Austria X X
Belgium X X
Bulgaria X X
Cyprus X X
Czech Republic X X
Germany X X
Denmark X X
Estonia X X
Spain X X
Finland X X
France X X
Greece X X
Croatia X X
Hungary X X
Ireland X X
Iceland X X
Italy X X
Lithuania X X
Luxembourg X X
Latvia X X
Netherlands X X
Norway X X
Poland X X
Portugal X X
Romania X X
Sweden X X
Slovenia X X
Slovak Republic X X
United Kingdom X X
Youth overeducation in europe 545
   54
stability, suggesting that overeducation rates are generally stable in the sense that 
they are constant over time or increase/ decrease at a constant rate with no vol-
atility. Table 18.3 shows that for the majority of countries, overeducation is sta-
tionary, meaning the average rates are stable over time. The null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity could not be rejected for Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic, Norway, the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Spain, 
Table 18.3 Country- level Phillips– Perron stationarity tests
Country Phillips– Perron test statistic Trend
Austria – 4.066*** No
Belgium – 4.302*** No
Bulgaria – 5.161*** No
Cyprus – 3.098 Yes
Czech Republic – 3.468* Yes
Germany – 2.824* No
Denmark – 4.842*** No
Estonia – 4.937*** No
Spain – 3.032 Yes
Finland – 4.189*** Yes
France – 2.836* No
Greece – 1.962 No
Hungary – 2.063 Yes
Ireland – 2.594 No
Iceland – 3.899*** No
Italy – 2.177 Yes
Lithuania – 5.368*** Yes
Luxembourg – 2.985** No
Latvia – 3.485* Yes
Netherlands – 2.704* No
Norway – 2.573 Yes
Poland – 2.006 Yes
Portugal – 5.670*** Yes
Romania – 2.367 Yes
Sweden – 5.548*** Yes
Slovenia – 3.749** Yes
Slovak Republic – 3.078 Yes
United Kingdom – 2.272 Yes
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: EU- LFS.
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indicating that these series are nonstationary and therefore should be included 
in the pairwise cointegration analysis. In the sense that the tests suggest that the 
development of overeducation is somewhat unpredictable, it appears more likely 
to be erratic in most countries in the Peripheral group, which could reflect their 
greater exposure to macroeconomic shocks.
Table 18.4 shows the test results from the cointegration analysis. Although 
the patterns are not clear- cut, the table provides some evidence of cointegrating 
relationships within the Peripheral group, indicating completed convergence. 
For example, Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Spain are all bilaterally cointegrated at 
varying levels of statistical significance. This implies that overeducation in these 
countries responds in a similar manner to external shocks; in other words, there 
is some evidence of a long- term relationship in overeducation rates between 
these countries. This arguably suggests that they should be subject to a partic-
ular policy response. Outside of this, the table indicates no clear pattern, with 
some evidence of cointegration between countries in the Central, Eastern, and 
Peripheral groups.12 The pairwise OLS results, presented in Table 18.5, reveal 
similar patterns. These findings of long- term relationships between several of the 
Central group countries and also between the Central and Eastern groups indi-
cate that there are similarities in the general evolution of overeducation across 
certain countries, and they may justify a common policy approach for these 
countries. However, in a minority of countries, overeducation series were found 
not to be heavily correlated with those of other European countries; examples are 
Austria, Portugal, and Sweden, which exhibit little or no commonality in their 
overeducation series. This finding suggests that a common policy approach may 
not be appropriate for these countries.
In summary, the completed convergence evidence suggests that overeducation 
in Europe is likely to respond to a coordinated policy approach. However, 
overeducation in the Peripheral group appears to behave somewhat differently 
from the rest of Europe, suggesting that a separate policy response is likely to be 
required for this block of countries.
Although there is some evidence of completed convergence within and between 
the Central group countries and some Eastern group countries, it is still possible 
that the countries in our study are converging to a common overeducation rate. 
Ongoing convergence is feasible given that many countries were found to be sta-
tionary with a common trend, suggesting that they continue to rise or fall over 
time, whereas others were found to follow no discernible pattern or trend.
Next, we test for the presence of ongoing convergence over the period first 
quarter Q1/ 2003 to Q1/ 2010. This time period was chosen so as to maximize 
the number of countries that could be included in the model; nevertheless, the 
results remained unchanged when the model was tested on a longer time series 
including fewer countries.
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Table 18.4 Phillips– Ouliaris cointegration statistics testing the existence of a long- term relationship (null hypothesis of no cointegration 
between paired countries against alternative hypothesis of stable cointegration relationship), 2001– 2011
Country Hungary Poland Romania Slovak 
Republic
Norway United 
Kingdom
Greece Italy Ireland Spain
Cyprus – 3.242 – 3.208 – 3.292 – 3.026 – 3.921* – 3.585 – 3.189 – 3.346 – 3.171 – 3.613
Hungary – 3.122 – 2.635 – 2.401 – 4.326** – 3.674* – 2.779 – 4.951*** – 2.221 – 5.050***
Poland – 2.642 – 2.846 – 2.313 – 3.111 – 3.142 – 3.451 – 2.167 – 3.674*
Romania – 3.161 – 2.861 – 2.594 – 3.190 – 2.978 – 3.037 – 3.660*
Slovak Republic – 4.108** – 3.793* – 5.204*** – 4.674*** – 4.683*** – 4.463**
Norway – 3.280 – 2.160 – 4.651*** – 2.810 – 5.659***
United Kingdom – 2.824 – 3.108 – 2.558 – 3.387
Greece – 4.348** – 3.814* – 3.912*
Italy – 1.976 – 6.471***
Ireland – 3.903*
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: EU- LFS.
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Ongoing convergence would imply that overeducation increased at a faster 
rate between 2003 and 2010 in countries that had a lower initial overeducation 
rate in 2003. This is equivalent to a negative and significant β1 coefficient in the 
Barro regression from Eq. (18.3). Conversely, a positive and significant coeffi-
cient would be indicative of divergence. The coefficients from the Barro models 
are presented in Table 18.6 and indicate that ongoing convergence was a fea-
ture of the time period. The results suggest that there is a tendency for countries 
to converge toward a common overeducation rate over time for all measures of 
overeducation.
It may be the case that the degree of ongoing convergence varies among groups 
of countries with common structural, geographical, and historical features. It is 
not possible to estimate Barro regressions separately for our three groups be-
cause the sample size is too small. In order to overcome this difficulty, we as-
sess the rate of ongoing convergence by plotting the variance of overeducation 
rates across countries, on the grounds that ongoing convergence would be con-
sistent with a falling variance over time. Plotting the variance across all countries 
confirms the results from Table 18.6 that ongoing convergence did occur over the 
time period (Figures 18.2– 18.4). However, the aggregate picture appears to con-
ceal substantial variation because it is apparent that ongoing convergence was 
more modest in the Central group relative to the Eastern and Peripheral groups 
(Figures 18.5– 18.7).
18.5. DETERMINANTS OF YOUTH OVEREDUCATION
We now bring the analysis full circle by using the EU- LFS data to calculate a 
number of additional variables that can potentially explain movements in youth 
overeducation within countries. Specifically, for each country for each quarter, 
we compute variables measuring the labor force shares of migrants, the em-
ployment shares of workers who are part- time and workers who are temporary, 
the shares of workers employed in various sectors (administration, sales, and 
Table 18.6 Barro regression results: Time period 
Q1/ 2003– Q1/ 2012 for 26 countries
Overeducation shares Coefficients
Total overeducation – 0.033***(0.009)
Female overeducation – 0.036**(0.011)
Male overeducation – 0.032***(0.008)
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
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Figure 18.2 Variance in total overeducation across countries from Q1/ 2003 to Q1/ 2012 (26 
countries).
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Figure 18.3 Variance in adult overeducation across countries from Q1/ 2003 to Q1/ 2012 (26 
countries).
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Figure 18.4 Variance in youth overeducation across countries from Q1/ 2003 to Q1/ 2012 (26 
countries).
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manufacturing), the unemployment rate, and the participation rate. We also 
compute a number of variables related to relative educational supply, specifically 
(1)  the ratio of workers employed in professional occupations to graduates in 
employment and (2) the ratio of workers employed in professional occupations 
to workers in low- skilled occupations. Whereas the first variable is designed as a 
straightforward measure of graduate oversupply, the second is intended to pick up 
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Figure 18.5 Variance in total overeducation across Central group countries from Q1/ 2003 to Q1/ 
2012 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom).
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Figure 18.6 Variance in total overeducation across Eastern group countries from Q1/ 2003 to 
Q1/ 2012 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia).
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the effects of skill- biased technological change, which is generally associated with 
a shift in relative demand away from high- skilled and toward low- skilled labor 
and in many countries with a general hollowing out of mid- skilled occupations. 
In addition to the variables calculated from the individual labor force surveys, 
we also derive some indicators from external data sources, and where necessary, 
annual data are interpolated to quarterly data series. Information on gross do-
mestic product (GDP) per capita and R&D spending was sourced from Eurostat 
and the OECD.13 Information on the number of students enrolled in tertiary and 
vocational programs was sourced from the OECD and standardized by age co-
hort using the EU- LFS data.14
A number of patterns are present in the results shown in Table 18.7. In 
the model that combines the data across all countries, the results suggest that 
overeducation declines with an increase in part- time employment, labor force 
participation, and manufacturing employment. Conversely, overeducation was 
found to rise with increases in the share of temporary workers and in employ-
ment in the sales and hotel sectors. The results are difficult to interpret because, 
on the one hand, the finding with respect to part- time workers suggests that 
overeducation tends to be lower in more flexible labor markets, whereas on the 
other hand, the finding related to temporary workers suggests the opposite. The 
estimates suggest that the higher the overall participation rate and GDP per 
capita, the lower the youth overeducation rate. To the extent that a rise in the 
participation rate is generally accompanied by increases in wage rates and gen-
eral labor demand, the results suggest that youth overeducation will tend to 
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Figure 18.7 Variance in total overeducation across Peripheral group countries from Q1/ 2003 to 
Q1/ 2012 (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).
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Table 18.7 Determinants of youth overeducation for countries with stationary series 
(fixed- effects model)
Dependent variable: Youth 
overeducation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable All  
countries
Central  
group
Eastern  
group
Peripheral 
group
Lagged youth overeducation 0.45*** 0.35*** 0.17*** 0.35***
(0.030) (0.041) (0.063) (0.101)
% Migrants in labor force – 0.03 0.09 – 0.11** – 0.26
(0.042) (0.077) (0.056) (0.455)
% Temporary workers 0.13** – 0.02 0.20 0.46*
(0.060) (0.091) (0.152) (0.269)
Overall unemployment rate 0.01 0.18 – 0.07 0.06
(0.052) (0.144) (0.078) (0.249)
% Part- time workers – 0.33*** – 0.38*** 0.04 – 0.78**
(0.070) (0.091) (0.176) (0.352)
% Employed in public 
administration
– 0.14 0.52 – 0.40 0.62
(0.244) (0.365) (0.376) (1.023)
% Employed in sales and 
hotels
0.44*** 0.69*** – 0.03 – 0.66
(0.149) (0.237) (0.227) (0.648)
Overall participation rate – 0.21*** – 0.22 – 0.02 0.79
(0.078) (0.134) (0.118) (0.511)
Ratio of employed in 
occupations 2, 3 to grads in 
employment
– 0.02 – 0.01 – 0.07*** – 0.00
(0.011) (0.021) (0.019) (0.055)
Ratio of workers in high (2, 
3) to low (7, 8, 9) ISCO
0.03** 0.02 0.03 0.06
(0.010) (0.012) (0.032) (0.086)
Share of manufacturing – 0.20* – 0.31** – 0.26 0.16
(0.107) (0.150) (0.167) (0.694)
Ratio of tertiary students 
to population (aged 
20– 24 years)
0.06*** 0.05** – 0.15** 3.41**
(0.022) (0.028) (0.072) (1.327)
Ratio of vocational students 
to population (aged 
15– 19 years)
– 0.04** – 0.04* 0.03 – 2.35**
(0.016) (0.021) (0.048) (1.121)
Ln GDP per capita – 0.04*** – 0.09** – 0.06*** 0.03
(0.016) (0.036) (0.021) (0.086)
R&D expenditure 0.02*** 0.02*** – 0.01 – 0.02
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.030)
Constant 0.57*** 0.99*** 0.80*** – 0.55
(0.140) (0.354) (0.173) (0.664)
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decline as general labor market conditions tighten. In the context of the model, 
the participation rate and GDP per capita tend to capture changing labor market 
demand more effectively compared to the unemployment rate. The measure 
relating to skill- biased technological change is positive, suggesting that youth 
overeducation is increasing as a consequence of declining relative demand for 
unskilled labor. This suggests that as the labor market restructures, jobs that 
were traditionally occupied by poorly educated workers are now being occu-
pied by workers with higher levels of schooling. The results suggest that higher 
R&D spending has a positive effect on the youth overeducation rate. At first 
glance, this result seems counterintuitive because one would expect countries 
with higher R&D spending to have more high- skilled jobs so that, all else being 
equal, this would have a negative impact on overeducation. However, it could be 
the case that this does not apply to the youth cohort given that a certain level of 
experience may be required for such jobs. Finally, the aggregate model provides 
consistent support for the view that overeducation will be higher in countries 
with comprehensive- based education systems and lower in countries providing 
viable vocational alternatives.
When the model is estimated separately for country groupings, we find that 
many of the results hold, although some variations exist. For example, within the 
Eastern group, the relative balance between vocational and comprehensive- based 
education appears less important, whereas overeducation was found to decrease 
along with an increase in the availability of graduate- level jobs and in migrants in 
the labor force. Within the Central and Peripheral groups, the share of part- time 
employment was found to have a strong negative effect, but no significant effect 
was found for the Eastern group. The positive temporary worker effect observed 
within the aggregate model was only evident for the Peripheral group.
Dependent variable: Youth 
overeducation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable All  
countries
Central  
group
Eastern  
group
Peripheral 
group
No. of observations 903 491 284 128
R2 0.32 0.31 0.24 0.76
No. of countries 21 11 7 3
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Ln = Natural Log.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Table 18.7 Continued
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18.6. CONCLUSIONS
Overeducation is known to be costly to workers, and it also has negative 
implications for firms and the wider macroeconomy. To date, the vast body 
of research in the area has focused on examining the incidence and impacts 
of overeducation within countries. This chapter represents one of the few ex-
isting attempts to examine patterns of overeducation within countries, while 
the adoption of a time- series approach enables the identification of common 
trends across Europe. The evidence suggests that although overeducation rates 
in Europe are converging upward over time, the general pattern of overeducation 
is linked across many countries, suggesting that the phenomenon responds in 
a similar way to external shocks and, consequently, is likely to react in similar 
ways to appropriate policy interventions. However, the research indicates that 
overeducation within the Peripheral group is evolving somewhat differently 
compared to the rest of Europe, suggesting that a separate policy response is 
likely to be appropriate.
Although the overall model results are complex for the determinants of 
youth overeducation, a number of impacts are consistently present for all or 
most country groupings. Specifically, youth overeducation is highly driven by 
the composition of education provision and will tend to be lower in countries 
with more developed vocational pathways. Furthermore, youth overeducation 
tends to be heavily related to the level of aggregate labor demand, proxied in the 
model by variations in the participation rate and GDP per capita. Finally, youth 
overeducation tends to be lower the higher the employment share of part- time 
workers, suggesting that the phenomenon may be partly driven by labor market 
flexibility.
So what form are appropriate policy interventions likely to take? Although 
much remains unknown with respect to the drivers of overeducation, a number 
of recent studies have identified some key factors that influence overeducation 
across countries. The research by Verhaest and van der Velden (2012) and 
by Davia et al. (2017) suggests that overeducation is, at least to some degree, 
related to an excess supply of university graduates, implying that education 
policy should take closer account of the demand for graduate labor before 
agreeing to further increases in the number of university places. However, re-
sponsible education expansion is likely to be only part of the policy response, 
given that the study by McGuinness and Pouliakas (2017) identified a number 
of policy areas likely to be effective in tackling the problem of overeducation. 
Overeducation is partly related to inferior human capital, suggesting that 
policies aimed at improving the job readiness of students will help alleviate the 
problem (McGuinness and Pouliakas 2017; McGuinness, Whelan, and Bergin 
2016). For example, increasing the practical aspects of degree programs, irre-
spective of the field of study, was found to reduce the incidence of initial mis-
match for graduates (McGuinness et al. 2016). Job conditions are also part of 
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the problem, with the research suggesting that policies targeted at improving 
job quality and flexibility will also make a positive contribution (McGuinness 
and Pouliakas 2017). Finally, the quality of information that individuals ac-
quire about a potential job before deciding to accept the post is also important, 
as is the method of job search that is undertaken (McGuinness and Pouliakas 
2017; McGuinness et al. 2016), leading to the conclusion that policy initiatives 
that facilitate a smoother and more informed route into the labor market 
should also be pursued. For example, higher education work placements with 
the potential to develop into permanent posts and the provision of higher 
education job- placement assistance were found to have substantial impacts 
in reducing the incidence of graduate mismatch (McGuinness et  al. 2016). 
Therefore, there are many initiatives that have the potential to lessen the im-
pact of overeducation, and the research presented here suggests that many of 
these can be facilitated and coordinated at a central European level.
NOTES
1 Although their earnings are penalized relative to matched workers with 
similar levels of schooling, overeducated workers enjoy a wage premium 
relative to workers with lower levels of education doing the same job 
(McGuinness 2006).
2 Pouliakas (2013) measured overeducation subjectively by comparing indi-
vidual levels of education with the modal level of education in the chosen 
occupation. The study demonstrates that overeducation in the EU25 would 
have increased much more rapidly between 2001 and 2009 had occupational 
entry requirements remained at their 2001 levels.
3 There is ample evidence in the literature of a higher prevalence of 
overeducation among graduates from fields such as Arts and Social Sciences.
4 Derived from factor analyses carried out on subjective variables.
5 Deviations of the observed rate from the natural rate.
6 Measured by the ratio between the share of workers with ISCED- 5 educational 
attainment and the share of workers in professional- directive occupations— 
that is, ISCO groups I  and II, which consist of legislators; senior officials 
and managers; corporate managers; managers of small enterprises; physical, 
mathematical, and engineering science professionals; life science and health 
professionals; teaching professionals; and other professionals.
7 The descriptive analysis and the tests for long- term relationships also include 
Cyprus, Croatia, and Germany. These countries are excluded from later anal-
ysis because of missing or incomplete data.
8 The augmented Dickey– Fuller (ADF) test is the most commonly used test 
for this purpose, but it can behave poorly, especially in the presence of se-
rial correlation. Dickey and Fuller correct for serial correlation by including 
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lagged difference terms in the regression; however, the size and power of the 
ADF test are sensitive to the number of these terms. The nonparametric test 
developed by Phillips (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988) allows for both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term.
9 For the remaining seven countries, where overeducation was found to be 
more volatile, OLS can only be applied after each series is differenced a suffi-
cient number of times to induce stationarity.
10 Our dependent variable runs from 0 to 1, and a standard panel regression 
may generate predicted values that lie outside the 0 to 1 interval. However, 
the incidence of overeducation typically lies in the range of 10%– 30%. This 
implies that there is no clustering around the extreme values of 0 or 1 and 
suggests that the use of a fractional outcome variable is not highly problem-
atic in this instance.
11 The 15- to 24- year- old age group was chosen on the basis that it allowed us to 
observe overeducation among young people across all levels of educational 
attainment.
12 The results for the Slovak Republic are somewhat implausible and should be 
treated with caution because a visual inspection of the data suggests that the 
series is stationary, contrary to the test statistic result.
13 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D from the OECD was used.
14 Some existing research has indicated that overeducation tends to be lower 
in countries with more developed vocational pathways (Mavromaras and 
McGuinness 2012).
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DO SCARRING EFFECTS VARY BY ETHNICITY 
AND GENDER?
Carolina V. Zuccotti and Jacqueline O’Reilly
19.1. INTRODUCTION
There is a substantive literature showing that the poor labor market integration 
of young people can have long- term negative impacts on their adult lives— for 
example, by increasing the probability of subsequent periods of unemployment 
or by affecting their income (for the United Kingdom, see Gregg 2001; for the 
Netherlands, see Luijkx and Wolbers 2009; for Germany, see Schmillen and Möller 
2012; Schmillen and Umkehrer 2013; for the United States, see Mroz and Savage 
2006). We also know that migrants and their children perform differently in the 
labor market compared to majoritarian populations. In particular, those coming 
from developing countries are often disadvantaged in terms of access to jobs, as 
shown both in cross- national (Heath and Cheung 2007) and in country- specific 
studies (Carmichael and Woods 2000; Silberman and Fournier 2008; Heath and Li 
2010; Kogan 2011; Zuccotti 2015a). However, research that focuses on dynamics into 
and out of employment, or on the impact of early labor market outcomes on later 
employment or occupational outcomes for different ethnic groups, is less common 
(some exceptions are Kalter and Kogan 2006; Demireva and Kesler 2011; Mooi- Reci 
and Ganzeboom 2015). In particular, surprisingly little is known about how early 
job insecurity affects different ethnic groups in the labor market over time.
In this chapter, we address this gap in the literature by examining the 
impact of the early labor market status of young individuals in the United 
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Kingdom (in 2001)  on their employment probabilities and occupational 
status 10  years later (in 2011), focusing on how this varies across ethnic 
groups and by gender. In particular, we are interested in whether an early ex-
perience of being NEET (not in employment, education, or training) affects 
later labor market outcomes. Our analysis is based on the Office for National 
Statistics Longitudinal Study (ONS- LS), a data set linking census records for 
a 1% sample of the population of England and Wales across five successive 
censuses (1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011). We study individuals who are 
aged between 16 and 29 years in 2001 and follow them up in 2011, when they 
are between 26 and 39 years old. The focus is on second- generation minority 
groups born in the United Kingdom; we also include individuals who arrived 
in the United Kingdom at a young age.
Understanding how early labor market experiences affect later outcomes 
for different ethnic groups (and genders within them) is of crucial importance 
(see Berloffa et  al., this volume), especially in countries where the number of 
ethnic minorities is considerable and increasing. On the one hand, this knowl-
edge enables a better understanding of integration processes over time; on the 
other hand, it can contribute to the development of more targeted policies, 
given the dramatic rise in youth unemployment since the 2008 crisis (Bell and 
Blanchflower 2010; Eurofound 2014; O’Reilly et al. 2015). The United Kingdom 
represents a valuable opportunity for a case study for this purpose, given its long- 
standing ethnic minority population, which includes a large and diverse number 
of second- generation minorities. The groups studied here— Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, and Caribbean (compared with White British)— are also very 
varied in terms of levels of educational and economic resources, cultural values 
and religion, and degrees of spatial segregation (Modood et  al. 1997; Phillips 
1998; Platt 2007; Longhi, Nicoletti, and Platt 2013; Catney and Sabater 2015; 
Crawford and Greaves 2015; Catney 2016). These differences allow us to explore 
a range of expectations as to why “scars” related to poor early labor market inte-
gration might differ across groups.
We find that the transmission of disadvantage occurs differently across ethnic 
groups and genders:  Some groups/ genders perform better (and others worse) 
in terms of overcoming an initial disadvantaged situation. In particular, Asian 
men appear to be in a better relative position compared to White British men— 
a finding that challenges preconceptions about ethnic minorities always per-
forming poorly in the British labor market.
In the next section, we present previous studies on scarring effects and ethnic 
inequalities, identifying the main mechanisms and discussing why these might 
vary across ethnic groups and genders. After outlining the data and methods 
used, we perform the analyses separately for employment and occupational 
outcomes. Finally, we conclude and discuss our findings.
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19.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY
19.2.1. the long- term effects of youth nonemployment
Experiencing periods of unemployment or inactivity while young has been shown 
to have both short- and long- term negative effects for labor market outcomes. 
In the United Kingdom, several studies have addressed this issue (Kirchner Sala 
et al. 2015). Using the National Child Development Study (NCDS; a UK data set 
following a cohort born in 1958), Gregg (2001) examines the extent to which 
nonemployment1 (i.e., unemployment or another inactive situation, excluding 
students) experienced between the ages of 16 and 23  years (measured when 
individuals were 23 years old in 1981) has an effect on later work experiences 
(when individuals are aged between 28 and 33 years). He shows that conditional 
on background characteristics such as education, family socioeconomic status, 
and neighborhood unemployment, men who experience an extra 3  months of 
being nonemployed before age 23 years face an extra 1.3 months out of employ-
ment between the ages of 28 and 33 years, whereas for women the effect is approx-
imately half as strong. Kalwij (2004), who follows individuals who turned 18 years 
between 1982 and 1998 and were registered as unemployed at least once during 
this period, presents evidence pointing in the same direction. He demonstrates 
that the longer the previous spell of unemployment, the lower the probability of 
finding a job later. Specifically, 2 years in unemployment decreases the probability 
of becoming employed by 31%. Similarly, analyzing the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), Crawford et  al. (2010) show that individuals who were NEET 
at 18 or 19 years old have an almost 20% greater chance of being unemployed 
10 years later, compared to individuals who were either studying or working at the 
same age. More recently, Dorsett and Lucchino (2014), using the BHPS to study 
transitions up to age 24 years, show that the longer one remains in employment, 
the lower the chance of becoming unemployed, whereas the longer an individual 
remains unemployed or inactive, the less likely he or she is to find employment.
Some authors have examined scarring effects in terms of wage outcomes. For 
example, using the NCDS, Gregg and Tominey (2005) find that given equal char-
acteristics (including education), 13 months of unemployment between ages 16 
and 23 years (vs. being always employed) reduces income by 20% at ages 23 and 
33 years and by 13% at age 43 years. They also find that even when individuals do 
not experience unemployment after the age of 23 years, a wage scar of between 
9% and 11% remains. Crawford et al. (2010) demonstrate that individuals who 
were NEET at ages 18 or 19 years had significantly lower wages when aged 28 
or 29 years compared to individuals who were either working or studying at the 
same age; this held even when they shared similar characteristics, such as com-
parable education and parental background.
Scarring effects may vary in their intensity depending on the highest level 
of education achieved or the qualifications of individuals. Kalwij (2004), for 
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example, shows that highly skilled men have greater chances of exiting and weaker 
chances of re- entering unemployment compared to low- skilled men. Burgess 
et al. (2003), analyzing data from the UK Labour Force Survey (UK- LFS), show 
that although the effect of early career unemployment is to reduce later employ-
ment chances for those with lower or no educational qualifications, the opposite 
occurs among those with higher educational qualifications. Schmelzer (2011), 
examining occupational outcomes, arrives at a similar finding. He shows that 
individuals with higher levels of education do not suffer as a result of early career 
unemployment; in fact, their stronger resources allow them to stay longer in this 
situation while waiting for better job offers (see Filandri, Nazio, and O’Reilly, 
this volume). Individuals with lower education levels, by contrast, are penalized 
in terms of their future occupations— an outcome that is generally attributed to 
gaps in their human capital accumulation. It is also possible that these periods 
outside of employment or education send negative signals to employers.
In summary, a wealth of research on early labor market experiences reveals 
how crucial these are for later life outcomes. These experiences vary by educa-
tional attainment, with the lowest qualified being the most negatively affected 
later in life. Clearly, such findings are very significant, given the heightened 
rates of youth unemployment being seen across Europe— both preceding and 
exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis (O’Reilly et al. 2015).
19.2.2. ethnicity and labor market outcomes in the 
united Kingdom
Western European countries have a long history of immigration, often connected 
to processes of economic reconstruction. In the United Kingdom, there has been 
a long- term pattern of Irish migration; however, immigration intensified in the 
postwar period with the arrival of the first waves of Caribbean migrants in the 
late 1940s, who were subsequently followed by Indians and Pakistanis and— 
later— by Chinese, Bangladeshis, and Africans. Today, more than 10% of the 
population in the United Kingdom self- defines as non- White, and this includes 
both first- generation migrants and their second- generation children.
In general, studies are in agreement that although problems such as unem-
ployment (Heath and Cheung 2007) and low income (Longhi et  al. 2013) are 
still faced by several ethnic groups in Western European countries, especially 
the visible non- White groups, the children of immigrants are in a better sit-
uation compared to their parents in terms both of education (Brinbaum and 
Cebolla- Boado 2007; van de Werfhorst and van Tubergen 2007)  and of labor 
market outcomes (Heath and Cheung 2007; Alba and Foner 2015). In the United 
Kingdom, efforts have been made to develop policies and laws to help these 
groups integrate (Cheung and Heath 2007), and these initiatives have probably 
encouraged the processes of social mobility we observe today (Platt 2007). For 
example, whereas first generations are more often concentrated in low- qualified 
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jobs (Zuccotti 2015b), their children have similar (Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and 
Caribbeans) or even higher (Indian) rates of participation in professional and 
managerial occupations compared to White British. Regarding access to jobs, 
unemployment has historically been one of the main problems concerning ethnic 
minorities’ labor market integration. However, trends show an improvement in 
employment levels for all groups in the adult population. For example, the un-
employment level for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis declined from 25% in 1991 
to approximately 10% in 2011; Indians had practically the same unemployment 
level as the White British (approximately 6%) in 2011; and the unemployment 
level of Caribbean men, although still relatively high (16%), has improved since 
1991 (Nazroo and Kapadia 2013). Of course, there are also gender differences 
in this respect, with Pakistani and Bangladeshi women still being characterized 
by high unemployment and inactivity levels (House of Commons Women and 
Equalities Committee 2016). Moreover, although studies have shown that some 
of the differences in employment levels across groups are connected to educa-
tion (Cheung and Heath 2007), social origins, and neighborhood deprivation 
(Zuccotti 2015b), discrimination continues to be a key problem faced by ethnic 
minorities (Heath and Cheung 2006).
19.2.3. a longitudinal view on ethnicity and labor 
market outcomes
The studies on ethnic inequalities presented so far are either restricted to certain 
time points or, if applied to several years, do not really discuss changes within 
individuals or individual- level changes in labor market performance over time. 
A recent work by Demireva and Kesler (2011) sheds some light on this matter. 
Using data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (1992– 2008), Demireva 
and Kesler study transitions into and out of employment for different migrant 
and native groups. In accordance with previous studies, they corroborate the 
idea that higher education plays a positive role in these transitions. In terms of 
ethnicity, they show that men born in the New Commonwealth (which includes 
the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) are more likely than the White 
British to remain in or to move into unemployment/ inactivity between two con-
secutive quarters of a year. Among second- generation immigrants, the authors 
note that men are more likely to remain in unemployment compared to equiv-
alent White British; women are also more likely to move from unemployment 
to inactivity compared to their White British counterparts. However, group 
differences within second generations are not further developed— a limitation of 
this work that we address in the current study.
Related studies have been carried out in other European countries (see Reyneri 
and Fullin 2011 and other articles in the same journal issue) and in comparison 
with North America (Alba and Foner 2015), with results varying according to 
institutional factors and labor market characteristics. An analysis of 10 (pooled) 
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Western European countries found that non- EU15 immigrants generally have 
higher probabilities of remaining in unemployment between two years (Reyneri 
and Fullin 2011). More recently, a study in the Netherlands (Mooi- Reci and 
Ganzeboom 2015)— a country that, like the United Kingdom, has a relatively 
long history of immigration— has examined the concept of scars and how these 
might vary according to the migrant status of individuals. Using the Dutch Labor 
Supply Panel (covering data between 1980 and 2000), the authors examine in-
come as an outcome and explore how previous unemployment experiences affect 
re- employment income for native Dutch and foreign- born individuals. They find 
that individuals born outside of the Netherlands receive lower re- employment in-
come compared to Dutch counterparts with similar unemployment experiences.
Often, ethnic minorities and foreign- born individuals are more exposed 
to unemployment/ inactivity compared to their majoritarian host- country 
counterparts. Most important, these events seem to have particularly pro-
nounced scarring effects in later life for these groups, including weaker employ-
ment chances and lower re- employment income. This chapter focuses on how the 
early labor market experiences of young people in different second- generation 
minority groups affect their later outcomes. Although, according to the literature 
discussed previously, more severe scarring might be expected among second- 
generation ethnic minorities, the recent improvements in terms of employment 
and occupation might actually point in the opposite direction.
19.2.4. highlighting mechanisms: human capital 
decay versus stigma
When searching for explanations as to why an early experience of inactivity 
or unemployment might affect later labor market outcomes, the literature has 
highlighted two in particular:  human capital decay and stigma (Omori 1997; 
Schmelzer 2011). These explanations focus mainly on employers’ recruitment 
practices. Human capital decay suggests that in periods of nonemployment, 
individuals lose vital work experience, which in turn might reduce their future 
employability and earnings. Stigma- related explanations, on the other hand, 
suggest that employers judge future employees’ capabilities based on their un-
observed trajectory of employment and nonemployment. In other words, they 
infer workers’ qualities based on their past employment status. In this context, 
previous unemployment spells have a negative stigma (e.g., when one assumes 
that individuals are unemployed because they are lazy), which might then af-
fect later employment probabilities and income prospects. However, as suggested 
by Mooi- Reci and Ganzeboom (2015), stigma might also be related to how 
employers infer characteristics of individuals based on their ethnic origins. For 
example, if employers believe that an ethnic minority group has certain neg-
ative characteristics in terms of employability— such as an educational degree 
obtained abroad, language deficiencies, or their concentration in deprived 
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neighborhoods— a period of unemployment or inactivity might exacerbate 
these negative preconceptions and stereotypes, affecting future employment 
probabilities, type of occupation, or income. These authors’ empirical analysis 
regarding the Netherlands presents evidence in this direction.
To what extent can we see stigma mechanisms connected to ethnicity 
occurring in the United Kingdom? First, there is evidence of discrimination 
in the labor market (Heath and Cheung 2006; Wood et al. 2009). In particular, 
experimental studies have demonstrated that employers usually prefer White 
British compared to other ethnic groups, especially Asians and Blacks. Although 
the reasons behind this preference are still to be explored, we could argue that a 
period of unemployment or inactivity might affect some ethnic minority groups 
in particular negative ways and independently of whether they were born in the 
United Kingdom or abroad. For example, Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations 
have historically worked in relatively lower qualified jobs and have been spatially 
concentrated in the most deprived areas (Phillips 1998; Robinson and Valeny 
2005). This negative signal in terms of where employers view these populations 
in the social structure (which could affect their views on these groups’ produc-
tivity, for instance) might contribute to how they perceive their nonemployment 
experiences and thus help create a particularly profound scar for them.
However, for other groups, we might observe other processes taking place. We 
argued that scars are lighter (or not present) among highly educated individuals, 
partly because employers do not view a period of unemployment for highly ed-
ucated individuals particularly negatively (Schmelzer 2011), assuming them to 
be searching for an appropriately qualified job. In terms of ethnic differences and 
how employers perceive groups, this might benefit Indians, in particular. This 
group has very high rates of university achievement, which could be observed 
as a positive signal for employers in terms of group characteristics. A period of 
unemployment or inactivity might therefore be more “legitimate” for Indians 
than for other groups, which would be observed in a lower scarring effect of un-
employment/ inactivity on this group.
Mooi- Reci and Ganzeboom (2015) also suggest that employers’ perceptions 
might vary by gender. They argue that immigrant women from poorer countries 
are more likely to be perceived as more nurturing and obedient, which might 
weaken the stigma of joblessness. In the United Kingdom, this might apply to 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, who are also embedded in cultural contexts 
in which women are expected to stay at home (Peach 2005).
The group context or group characteristics, and how employers observe 
these, are therefore an argument for expecting variation in scars across ethnic 
groups. In line with this reasoning, Omori (1997) found that individuals who 
experienced unemployment in periods when unemployment was high were less 
penalized in terms of future employability compared to individuals who had 
been unemployed when unemployment levels were low. The context perceived 
by employers or, in our case, the perceived group context may therefore matter.
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Until now, we have discussed employers; however, groups’ perspectives, cul-
ture, and networks might also affect outcomes. For example, although it is true 
that Bangladeshi men are usually concentrated in poor areas and have low social 
backgrounds, there is evidence that second- generation Bangladeshis are doing 
quite well in the labor market: Not only do they not seem to experience ethnic 
penalties in employment (Zuccotti 2015b) but also they overperform compared 
to the White British in terms of the occupations they obtain. This finding might 
be connected to specific characteristics of Bangladeshis that make them more re-
silient to adverse situations. Hence, we might argue that they manage to better 
overcome a situation of early unemployment or inactivity. Similarly, with regard 
to the arguments concerning gender, given the strong role models in some Asian 
ethnic groups and the family and community pressures on women to remain out 
of the labor market (Dale et al. 2002a, 2002b; Kabeer 2002), we could argue that 
it might actually be particularly difficult for women to become employed if they 
have had early experiences of unemployment or inactivity. In summary, these 
arguments suggest that the role of (increased or decreased) stigma might not be 
the only explanation behind differences in the effect of early labor market statuses 
across groups.
19.3. DATA AND METHODS
19.3.1. the office for national statistics 
longitudinal study
Our analysis is based on the ONS- LS,2 a unique data set collected by the Office 
for National Statistics in the United Kingdom that links census information for 
a 1% sample of the population of England and Wales, following individuals in 
1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011. The original sample was selected from the 
1971 Census, incorporating data on individuals born on one of four selected 
dates. The sample was updated at each successive census by taking individuals 
with the same four dates of birth in each year and linking them to the existing 
data (Hattersley and Creeser 1995). Life- event information has been added to the 
ONS- LS since the 1971 Census. New members enter the study through birth and 
immigration, and existing members leave through death and emigration. Some 
individuals might also exit the study (e.g., someone who goes to live abroad for a 
period) and then re- enter at a later census point; however, individuals are never 
“removed” from the data set, nor do they actively “leave” it.
Slightly more than 500,000 individuals can be found at each census point; 
however, information for people in the 1% sample who participated in more than 
one census point is more limited. For example, there is information on approx-
imately 400,000 people at two census points, on average, whereas information 
is available on approximately 200,000 people for all five census points. In total, 
approximately 1,000,000 records are available for the entire period (1971– 2011).
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One of the most interesting aspects of this data set— in addition to its large 
sample size— is that both household and aggregated census data for small ge-
ographical areas can be attached to each individual and for each census point. 
This provides a reasonable idea of the “family contexts” and “neighborhoods” in 
which individuals live at different moments of their lives.
19.3.2. sample
Our focus is on young individuals aged between 16 and 29 years in 2001, whom 
we follow through 2011, when they are between 26 and 39 years old. Different 
definitions have been given as to what it means to be young or to belong to the 
“youth population.” The Office for National Statistics in the United Kingdom, 
for example, usually considers an age range of 16– 24 years. We decided to use 
a slightly wider age range for two main reasons. First, we wanted to capture the 
increasingly lengthy and blurred trajectories into adulthood (Aassve, Iacovou, 
and Mencarini 2006); second, we could thus cover a larger sample of ethnic 
minorities. We performed robustness checks excluding individuals aged 25– 
29 years and found that the results remained robust to the findings shown here.
We constructed our sample in a way that permits more than one measure-
ment per individual. Where individuals had more than one measurement for 
“family context” and “origin neighborhood” (obtained when they were between 
0 and 15 years old, in 1981– 1991), we counted these as two units of analysis. For 
example, we counted an individual twice if he or she was 21 years old in 2001 
and had household and neighborhood information in both 1991 (when he or 
she was 11 years old) and 1981 (when he or she was 1 year old). This structure 
follows a model used previously by Platt (2007) and is common in works using 
panel- like data. In order to account for double measurement, we control for “or-
igin year” (1981/ 1991) and we use clustered standard errors in the regression 
models. We have also estimated a model in which one origin year per individual 
is randomly chosen and the results remain the same. The total sample consists of 
77,180 cases, out of which 73% are “unique” individuals.
19.3.3. Variables and methods
We study two outcome variables in 2011: employment status and occupational 
status. These are examined in relation to labor market status in 2001. We ob-
serve individuals with different statuses in 2001— NEET (i.e., “unemployed and 
inactive,” including individuals doing housework, with long- term illness or disa-
bility, and other inactive), employed, and students— and ascertain their employ-
ment and occupational trajectories in 2011. The focus is on the potential negative 
effect that being out of employment and out of education might have on later 
labor market outcomes and how this varies by ethnicity and gender (for a dis-
cussion on the concept of NEET, see Mascherini, this volume). Employment in 
2011 is a dummy variable that determines whether the person was employed or 
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not in 2011 (the reference category is unemployed/ inactive, excluding students). 
Occupational status, on the other hand, is measured using the National Statistics 
Socio- economic Classification (NS- SEC) (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). The 
NS- SEC includes seven categories ranging from higher managerial/ professional 
occupations to routine occupations. We study the probability of having a Class 
1 or Class 2 occupation (vs. any other): Class 1 consists of higher managerial, 
administrative, and professional occupations, whereas Class 2 consists of lower 
managerial, administrative, and professional occupations. The occupations 
within these two classes are often regulated by so- called service relations, where 
“the employee renders service to the employer in return for compensation, which 
can be both immediate rewards (for example, salary) and long- term or prospec-
tive benefits (for example, assurances of security and career opportunities)” 
(Office for National Statistics 2010, 3). Note that occupational status refers to the 
current or most recent job.
We examine these trajectories across five ethnic groups: White British, Indian, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Caribbean. In this study, White British are those who 
identify themselves as White English/ Welsh/ Scottish/ Northern Irish/ British3 
and have both parents (or one parent, in the case of individuals raised in single- 
parent households) born in the United Kingdom. Ethnic minorities, on the other 
hand, are those who identify themselves as belonging to one of the main ethnic 
groups and have one (single- parent households) or two parents born abroad.4 
The parental country of birth is measured when individuals were between 0 and 
15 years old in 1981– 1991.
In studies of scarring effects, efforts are usually made to measure the ac-
tual scar in the best possible way. Often, we do not know all the variables that 
might affect an outcome. If such variables are present but we do not con-
trol for them, then we might be over(under)estimating the size of the scar. 
For example, if individuals of a certain group have characteristics that make 
them more likely to be unemployed, this will affect both the 2001 and the 
2011 outcomes and will make the relationship between the two unemploy-
ment variables at the respective time points stronger than it is in reality. In 
order to reduce unobserved heterogeneity, we control for a wide range of key 
predictors of labor market status, including family arrangements and educa-
tion in 2011 and the socioeconomic characteristics of the households in which 
individuals lived when they were between 0 and 15 years old. Household- level 
variables (found in the 1981 and 1991 census files) include number of cars, 
housing tenure, level of overcrowding in the home, and parental occupation 
(taking the highest status between the father and the mother). In addition, we 
also control for current- neighborhood deprivation and origin- neighborhood 
deprivation (when individuals were between 0 and 15 years old), both meas-
ured with the Carstairs Index (Norman, Boyle, and Rees 2005; Norman and 
Boyle 2014).5 This measure is a summary of four dimensions: percentage male 
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unemployment, percentage overcrowded households, percentage no car/ van 
ownership, and percentage low social class.
The inclusion of variables that denote neighborhood characteristics— current 
and, most important, past— has been a commonly used tool by some authors 
(e.g., Gregg 2001) to control for the self- selection of individuals into their initial 
condition (in our case, labor market status in 2001) and hence reduce the impact 
of unobserved heterogeneity. In terms of our study, neighborhood deprivation 
when individuals are young is likely to affect labor market status in 2001 but 
less so labor market status in 2011, except through neighborhood deprivation in 
2011 (which we control for). Most important, this variable has the advantage that 
young individuals probably did not choose the neighborhood where they lived 
when they were young (rather, their parents did).
Our model has, nevertheless, some limitations. First, we are not able to use 
(as Gregg (2001) does) more detailed neighborhood unemployment levels or 
types of jobs available in the area, which would be a better indicator of labor 
market conditions and availability of jobs. The ONS has restrictions regarding 
the use of neighborhood variables, and neighborhood deprivation is easy to ac-
cess and is a commonly used variable among ONS- LS users. Note, however, that 
because we include students in our initial labor market statuses, neighborhood 
deprivation is probably a better variable than, for example, neighborhood unem-
ployment alone, given that it includes indicators such as social class and socio-
economic resources of households, which might impact on decisions regarding 
school attendance. Second, we do not use an instrumental variable approach, as 
Gregg does:  In other words, origin- neighborhood characteristics is not an in-
strument in our model (as it is in Gregg’s study) but, rather, a control variable. 
The program we use to analyze our data (Stata 14) has limitations in terms of the 
commands for instrumental variables, and some tests led us to prefer a classic 
regression model.6 Finally, a third limitation (that would also be present even 
with an instrumental variable approach) is that there might be unmeasured pa-
rental or group characteristics (e.g., parental aspirations or group preferences 
for certain areas) that affect individuals’ outcomes as well as their selection of 
neighborhoods. If present, these unmeasured characteristics will weaken the 
origin- neighborhood deprivation’s potential ability to randomize the allocation 
of individuals into areas and, hence, into initial statuses. In summary, we are 
aware that we cannot fully randomize the selection of individuals into their in-
itial statuses in 2001, which means that we cannot be certain that the relation-
ship between initial status and employment in 2011 is casual. The observed scar 
might therefore include some unmeasured characteristics of individuals, their 
parents, or the ethnic groups to which they belong.
Our multivariate analyses are based on average marginal effects derived from 
logistic regressions. In addition to the previously mentioned variables, other 
controls include age in 2001, country of birth, and number of census points in 
which the individual participated.
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19.4. ANALYSIS
19.4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 19.1 shows the percentage of individuals employed in 2011 and the per-
centage of individuals who declare a high occupational status (either presently or 
in the most recent job), distinguished by their labor market status in 2001, ethnic 
group, and gender.
For most groups, and as expected, having been employed or in education in 
2001 leads to a greater likelihood of being employed in 2011 and to a greater 
likelihood of having a higher occupational status— compared to individuals who 
were unemployed or inactive (i.e., NEET) in 2001. In particular, those who were 
students in 2001 have high proportions in both employment and professional/ 
managerial occupations in 2011, probably attributable to having a university de-
gree. However, the extent to which education and employment in 2001 act as 
“protectors” in the labor market or, conversely, the extent to which unemploy-
ment and inactivity make people more “vulnerable” or generate “scars” varies 
greatly across ethnic groups and genders.
Having been NEET in 2001 (compared to having been employed) is not 
particularly detrimental for the labor market prospects of ethnic minorities 
compared to the White British. Only Caribbean women seem to follow this 
pattern as regards their employment probabilities (note that among those who 
were employed in 2001, White British and Caribbean women have similar em-
ployment probabilities in 2011, whereas this is 9% lower for Caribbeans among 
those who were NEET). In contrast, it is White British men who seem to ex-
perience deeper scars regarding employment, especially compared to Asian 
groups (Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi). We observe that among those who 
were employed in 2001, employment probabilities in 2011 are similar across all 
groups, but having been NEET has a more detrimental effect on the likelihood of 
White British men being in employment in 2011. Approximately 59% of White 
British men who were NEET in 2001 are employed in 2011; for Indians, in par-
ticular, but also for Pakistani and Bangladeshi men, the percentage of employed 
is higher.
Table 19.1 also shows that although, in general, ethnic minority groups do 
not suffer very strongly from previous periods of unemployment or inactivity, 
sometimes having been employed in 2001 is not as protective for them as it is for 
the White British. For example, Caribbean men are similar to White British in 
terms of their employment probabilities among those who were NEET in 2001; 
however, they do not benefit from having been employed in 2001 to the same 
degree as White British men (they have approximately 10 percentage points less 
probability of being employed in 2011). A  similar finding is observed among 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi men and women when studying occupational status. 
We observe that although differences with respect to White British are relatively 
small among those who were NEET in 2001, of those who were employed in 
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2001, White British have higher probabilities of attaining a professional/ mana-
gerial position by 2011.
Finally, other well- known patterns that emerge from Table 19.1 are the 
overperformance of Indians in terms of access to high- status occupations and 
the low employment probabilities of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women (see 
House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee 2016). In this respect, 
Table 19.1 Employed individuals and individuals with (current or most recent) 
professional/ managerial status in 2011, by labor market status in 2001, ethnic group, 
and gender (%)
Employed Professional/ managerial status
NEET S E Total NEET S E Total
Men
White British 58.9 92.0 93.6 89.8 22.8 59.1 42.8 44.4
Indian 77.6 91.8 91.0 90.1 37.7 69.8 55.2 60.2
Pakistani 64.8 86.0 91.2 84.1 21.6 45.8 32.9 37.0
Bangladeshi 64.5 100.0 87.5 87.7 25.0 61.0 35.9 41.8
Caribbean 58.3 76.2 84.9 78.3 40.0 47.2 47.6 46.2
Women
White British 50.2 89.2 85.6 80.0 19.3 62.7 44.5 44.5
Indian 50.9 87.1 82.4 80.3 28.7 74.6 55.5 60.7
Pakistani 29.9 61.6 67.5 52.2 18.4 56.4 38.2 38.4
Bangladeshi 33.7 64.2 68.1 53.5 18.0 53.6 34.8 34.9
Caribbean 41.0 74.6 84.8 74.4 30.3 60.0 51.2 50.2
Totals: Men
White British 3,471 6,878 24,791 35,140 2,768 6,674 24,354 33,796
Indian 85 413 434 932 77 397 422 896
Pakistani 88 222 181 491 74 212 173 459
Bangladeshi 31 60 80 171 40 59 78 177
Caribbean 24 42 86 152 25 36 82 143
Totals: Women
White British 6,875 8,158 23,315 38,348 5,704 7,970 22,988 36,662
Indian 110 357 403 870 87 343 389 819
Pakistani 224 198 203 625 152 172 191 515
Bangladeshi 89 67 72 228 61 56 69 186
Caribbean 39 59 125 223 33 55 121 209
Notes: Labor market status in 2001: NEET, unemployed or inactive; S, student; E, employed. 
Population: Individuals between 16 and 29 years old in 2001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
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note that although there is no clear evidence of a stronger employment scarring 
effect for these women (the difference in employment probabilities with respect 
to White British is approximately 18– 20  percentage points among both those 
who were employed and those who were NEET in 2001), we do observe a par-
ticularly strong scar connected to having been a student in 2001: The ethnic gap 
in terms of employment chances grows to 30 percentage points for this category.
These results, however, need to be studied after we have controlled for a se-
ries of factors that might also affect the outcomes. In fact, there is great varia-
tion across ethnic groups in terms of educational achievements, socioeconomic 
backgrounds, and family arrangements, as shown in Table 19.2.
Table 19.2 Social origins and individual- level characteristics, by ethnic group
British Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Caribbean Total
Social origins
Parental social class
No earners/ no code 5.6 4.9 18.8 29.3 14.5 5.9
Manual (V + VI + VII) 33.4 47.0 56.7 51.7 33.7 34.1
Routine nonmanual (III) 15.1 11.3 3.6 3.2 26.8 14.8
Petite bourgeoisie (IV) 11.8 15.8 12.5 11.3 3.3 11.9
Professional/ managerial 
(I + II)
34.1 20.9 8.5 4.4 21.7 33.2
Cars
No cars 18.7 22.5 39.5 69.0 46.7 19.5
1 car 53.4 57.0 51.8 28.3 45.9 53.3
2 cars 27.9 20.5 8.7 2.7 7.4 27.2
Tenure
Owner 70.4 86.9 86.8 41.9 46.9 70.8
Social rent 22.8 7.7 7.4 42.9 46.4 22.5
Private rent 6.7 5.4 5.8 15.3 6.6 6.7
Persons per room
>1.5 persons 0.7 8.8 22.5 36.2 6.1 1.4
1.5 persons 0.5 3.7 6.5 8.9 5.4 0.8
>1 and <1.5 persons 6.1 20.3 31.2 28.8 13.8 6.9
1 person 16.3 23.8 18.7 12.3 25.5 16.6
≥0.75 and <1 person 29.9 22.0 12.9 9.4 21.7 29.3
<0.75 person 46.5 21.4 8.2 4.4 27.6 45.0
Carstairs quintiles
Q1 (less deprivation) 22.0 7.2 2.1 2.5 2.8 21.2
Q2 21.7 7.7 3.7 3.4 5.1 20.9
(continued)
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British Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Caribbean Total
Q3 20.8 11.8 5.8 5.9 7.1 20.2
Q4 19.7 21.5 16.8 8.9 22.4 19.6
Q5 (more deprivation) 15.8 51.7 71.6 79.3 62.5 18.0
Individual characteristics
Age (2001)
Mean age 22.6 22.1 21.9 21.8 23.0 22.6
Education (2011)
None and other 10.7 4.9 12.6 12.3 4.8 10.6
Level 1 14.2 9.2 18.5 22.2 14.0 14.1
Level 2 18.8 11.7 16.3 17.0 17.6 18.5
Level 3 18.2 11.5 12.6 12.3 17.1 17.9
Level 4+ 38.2 62.7 40.0 36.2 46.4 38.8
Family type (2011)
Single, no children 25.8 37.0 22.1 20.0 45.9 26.1
Couple, no children 22.3 18.3 8.2 8.4 12.0 21.9
Single with children 8.6 8.2 14.6 18.7 22.2 8.8
Couple with children 43.2 36.4 55.1 53.0 19.9 43.2
Country of birth
UK- born 99.0 93.4 81.1 45.6 97.7 98.3
N 74,796 1,830 1,147 406 392 78,571
Note: Population: Individuals between 16 and 29 years old in 2001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
Table 19.2 Continued
There are two clear and interesting findings from Table 19.2. On the one 
hand, ethnic minorities tend, in general, to have lower or more deprived so-
cial origins. For example, they are more likely to have been raised in areas with 
high neighborhood deprivation and to have parents with lower occupational 
status. This is particularly evident for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations. 
These factors might impact negatively not only on their labor market outcomes 
but also on the transitions they make in the labor market. On the other hand, 
ethnic minorities also tend to be more educated, revealing their upward edu-
cational mobility (given their low parental social backgrounds). For instance, 
the high percentage of Indians who reach university level (level 4+) is striking. 
Bearing in mind the positive role that education plays in the labor market, in-
cluding making good- quality transitions, a higher education level among ethnic 
minorities might actually help counterbalance their poorer social origins. Recent 
research (Zuccotti 2015a; Zuccotti, Ganzeboom, and Guveli 2017)  shows the 
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importance of considering both education and social origins (see also Berloffa, 
Matteazzi, and Villa, this volume) in the estimation of ethnic inequalities in the 
labor market. Variation is also observed in terms of family type, with Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi populations having particularly large shares of households 
composed of a couple with children. This might be an explanation as to why we 
see such low employment levels among women from these groups.
The next section examines all these factors together using multivariate logistic 
regression models. In addition to the socioeconomic, educational, and family 
variables observed in Table 19.2, we also control for the year in which the origin 
variables were measured (1981 or 1991) and for the number of census points 
in which the individuals participated. Finally, note that although the majority 
of ethnic minorities were born in the United Kingdom, we also consider the 
country of birth in our analyses (with a dummy as to whether they were born in 
the United Kingdom or not). Bangladeshis, in particular, have the highest pro-
portion of foreign- born young individuals (see Table 19.2)— a factor that might 
have a negative impact on labor market transitions.
19.4.2. Multivariate models
This section examines whether the trends found in Table 19.1 still hold after 
we control for individual and social- origin characteristics, including current 
and past residential neighborhood deprivation levels. First, we show the av-
erage effect of labor market status in 2001 and of ethnic group on labor market 
outcomes in 2011 (employment and occupational status) before (Model a) and 
after (Model b) controlling for key individual, social- origin, and neighborhood 
variables (see Tables 19.3 and 19.4). The results are presented separately for men 
and women; the coefficients represent average marginal effects derived from 
logistic regressions (models with all controls are shown in Table A19.1 in the 
Appendix).
Next, we introduce interactions between labor market status in 2001 and 
ethnicity in order to study whether scarring varies in relation to an individual’s 
ethnic group. Models with interactions are used to answer the main question in 
this chapter: What is the effect of having been unemployed or inactive (NEET), 
compared to having been employed or in education, in 2001 on the probability of 
being employed/ having a high occupational status in 2011— for different ethnic 
minority groups and for White British? In particular, to what extent is being 
out of education and out of the labor market particularly detrimental (or not) 
for some ethnic groups? Because we work with logistic regression models, we 
calculated predicted values for the groups from the interaction models (keeping 
all control variables at their mean; see Table A19.2 in the Appendix) and created 
graphs.7 Predicted values and graphs serve not only to observe the magnitude 
of the effects but also to explore at which levels of the dependent variable they 
occur for an individual with “average” characteristics. Assuming that the variable 
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“labor market status in 2001” has a certain “order” in the categories, we explore 
“slopes” for different ethnic groups: how steep they are and whether they touch 
or not.
19.4.2.1. Employment scarring
Overall, our findings indicate that having been NEET in 2001, compared to 
having been employed, reduces by more than 30 percentage points the proba-
bility of being employed in 2011— for both men and women (Model a). After we 
control for social- origin and individual characteristics, as well as for current and 
past levels of deprivation of the neighborhood of residence (Model b), the effect 
Table 19.3 Probability of being employed in 2011, by labor market status in 2001 and 
ethnic group; AME (clustered standard errors)
Men Women
Model a Model b Model a Model b
Labor market status in 2001 (ref. Employed)
NEET (unemployed  
or inactive)
– 0.338*** – 0.175*** – 0.357*** – 0.173***
(0.0103) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0073)
Student – 0.005 – 0.041*** 0.056*** – 0.012*
(0.0045) (0.0063) (0.0052) (0.0071)
Ethnic group (ref. White British)
Indian 0.003 0.004 – 0.028 – 0.061***
(0.0120) (0.0109) (0.0176) (0.0185)
Pakistani – 0.020 0.007 – 0.211*** – 0.160***
(0.0164) (0.0130) (0.0250) (0.0223)
Bangladeshi 0.002 0.042*** – 0.180*** – 0.100***
(0.0243) (0.0159) (0.0393) (0.0325)
Caribbean – 0.067* – 0.023 – 0.064* – 0.073**
(0.0347) (0.0246) (0.0343) (0.0324)
N 36,886 36,886 40,294 40,294
Basic controls X X X X
Individual, social origin, and 
neighborhood controls
X X
Notes: Basic controls: Age, country of birth, origin year, and number of census points. Individual, social 
origin, and neighborhood controls: Education, family type, parental social class, number of cars, tenure, level 
of overcrowding, and neighborhood deprivation (past and current). Population: Individuals between 16 and 
29 years old in 2001.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
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declines, but it is still quite substantive (approximately 17%). Poor labor market 
integration at a young age creates scarring for both men and women.
Table 19.3 shows that although the effect of having been in education in 2001 
on the probability of being employed in 2011 is similarly positive to the effect of 
having been employed in 2001 (for women it is actually more positive), the edu-
cation effect becomes negative after we control for key variables. In other words, 
after we control for the fact that individuals with more socioeconomic resources 
are usually more likely to continue in higher/ university education, and for the 
fact that higher education levels lead to better employment chances, a situation 
Table 19.4 Probability of having a (current or most recent) professional/ managerial 
occupation in 2011, by labor market status in 2001 and ethnic group; AME (clustered 
standard errors)
Men Women
Model a Model b Model a Model b
Labor market status in 2001 (ref. Employed)
NEET (unemployed or inactive) – 0.172*** – 0.098*** – 0.240*** – 0.105***
(0.0105) (0.0117) (0.0072) (0.0088)
Student 0.276*** 0.037*** 0.278*** 0.036***
(0.0085) (0.0092) (0.0081) (0.0087)
Ethnic group (ref. White British)
Indian 0.105*** 0.082*** 0.105*** 0.063***
(0.0208) (0.0183) (0.0209) (0.0187)
Pakistani – 0.113*** – 0.021 – 0.041 0.010
(0.0270) (0.0273) (0.0265) (0.0238)
Bangladeshi – 0.025 0.075* – 0.040 0.057
(0.0446) (0.0433) (0.0429) (0.0387)
Caribbean 0.017 0.038 0.037 0.041
(0.0510) (0.0451) (0.0409) (0.0358)
N 35,453 35,453 38,391 38,391
Basic controls X X X X
Individual, social origin, and 
neighborhood controls
X X
Notes: Basic controls: Age, country of birth, origin year, and number of census points. Individual, social 
origin, and neighborhood controls: Education, family type, parental social class, number of cars, tenure, level 
of overcrowding, and neighborhood deprivation (past and current). Population: Individuals between 16 and 
29 years old in 2001.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
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of employment (vs. any other) in 2001 seems to have more positive long- term 
effects than studying. Although this does not mean that individuals should invest 
less in education, it does suggest that early experiences of employment— perhaps 
simultaneously with an educational activity— can have positive long- term effects 
in terms of accessing work in the UK labor market. As previously argued, this 
might be connected to the extra skills acquired due to longer lasting work expe-
rience but also to sending a positive “signal” to employers.
In terms of average group differences, we observe that men from ethnic 
minority backgrounds (especially Bangladeshis) have similar or even higher 
probabilities of being in work in 2011 compared to White British. This 
finding is similar to previous results obtained for a slightly older age group 
(aged 20– 45  years; Zuccotti 2015b). For women, on the contrary, all ethnic 
minority groups have lower employment probabilities compared to White 
British women. Differences that emerge from our analysis range from 6 per-
centage points lower for Indian women to 16  percentage points lower for 
Pakistani women.
We identified several statistically significant interactions. For men, having 
been NEET in 2001 (vs. having been employed) is not as detrimental for Indian 
and Bangladeshi men as it is for White British men. This denotes lower scar-
ring effects for the ethnic minorities. A  similar relative advantage is observed 
for Indian and Pakistani men when comparing NEET with students in 2001. 
Among women, the results suggest that Pakistani and Caribbean women have 
deeper scars connected to having been NEET than is the case for White British 
women. These findings are better understood by looking at Figures 19.1 and 19.2, 
which show the predicted values of employment in 2011 for Indian, Pakistani, 
and Bangladeshi men (vs. White British men) and for Pakistani and Caribbean 
women (vs. White British women) for each labor market status in 2001 (keeping 
all control variables at their mean).
In visual terms, the weaker detrimental effect of having been NEET, versus 
having been employed or a student, for Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi 
men is expressed in the flatter slopes for these three ethnic groups. In par-
ticular, for Indians and Bangladeshis, there is a much higher probability of 
employment among those who were NEET in 2001: This difference is approxi-
mately 9 percentage points for Indians and approximately 12 percentage points 
for Bangladeshis. Note that Bangladeshis are also greatly advantaged among 
those who were students in 2001. Conversely, these groups have more sim-
ilar employment probabilities among those who were employed in 2001 (only 
Indians seem to present a negative and relatively small gap with respect to 
White British).
The graph for women (see Figure 19.2), in contrast, shows a steeper slope for 
Pakistanis and Caribbeans than for White British, denoting a deeper scar for the 
ethnic minority. Looking at the predicted values, we observe, for example, that 
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the employment probabilities among those who were employed in 2001 are ap-
proximately 74% for Pakistanis and 88% for White British (a 14% gap), whereas 
among those who were NEET in 2001, the values are 47% and 70%, respectively 
(a gap that grows to 23%).
Overall, the results on employment scarring show that ethnic minority men 
are not particularly penalized; On the contrary, being NEET in 2001 has a similar 
or reduced scarring effect on later employment probabilities compared to White 
British. Among women, the results suggest higher scarring effects on employ-
ment for Pakistani and Caribbean women.
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Figure 19.1 Predicted values of male employment in 2011 (90% confidence interval).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
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19.4.2.2. Scarring of occupational status
As with the results for employment, the results for occupational status show that 
having been NEET leads to lower probabilities (approximately 10  percentage 
points less; Model b) of attaining a high occupational status, even after control-
ling for key variables. However, having been a student in 2001 is actually better 
than having been employed as regards future occupational status. Although 
much of this effect is explained by the education of individuals (introduced in 
Model b), probably driven by individuals acquiring a university degree, there 
is still a small residual effect. This might suggest that having been to university 
provides additional skills on top of the degree itself and/ or access to a wider and 
better qualified network. Following previous findings (Cheung and Heath 2007; 
Zuccotti 2015b), Table 19.4 also shows that given equality in their labor market 
situations in 2001 and their individual and socioeconomic background charac-
teristics (Model b), ethnic minorities do as well as or even better, on average, 
than White British in terms of occupational attainment. In particular, this is the 
case for Indian and Bangladeshi men.
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Figure 19.2 Predicted values of female employment in 2011 (90% confidence interval).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
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Regarding interactions, the results show that for Bangladeshi men, having 
been a student in 2001 (vs. having been employed) exerts a more positive ef-
fect on occupational status than is the case for White British. This can be 
clearly observed in Figure 19.3, which shows that Bangladeshi men have higher 
probabilities of achieving a professional/ managerial position compared to White 
British and that this is particularly strong among those who were students in 
2001:  These have a 70% probability of attaining a higher occupational status 
(compared to approximately 50% for equivalent White British).
Among women, the results are neither substantive nor statistically significant. 
In fact, the findings show that the general tendency is for the labor market status 
in 2001 to have a similar effect across ethnic groups. This can also be interpreted 
in terms of ethnic gaps remaining similar across statuses in 2001.
In summary, the results of the occupational analysis show that for all groups, 
having been NEET in 2001 leads, in general, to lower probabilities of attaining 
a professional/ managerial position. However, unemployment/ inactivity scars 
do not vary by ethnicity, nor are ethnic minorities particularly disadvantaged 
if they were NEET in 2001 compared to White British. On the contrary, some 
groups (Bangladeshi men) are particularly well positioned with respect to White 
British: In particular, they have higher probabilities of achieving a professional/ 
managerial position if they were a student in 2001.
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White British Ethnic minority 
Figure 19.3 Predicted values of male access to (current or most recent) professional/ 
managerial occupation in 2011.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
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19.5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has sought to bridge a gap between two research agendas that have 
only marginally interacted: ethnic inequalities and labor market scarring effects 
for young people. A  further dimension we have included here— and that is 
even less evident in previous research— is the systematic comparison of gender 
differences between different ethnic groups. The use of the ONS- LS enabled us 
to follow young individuals over time and to have a sufficiently large number 
of ethnic minority groups, accompanied with rich and detailed information on 
their socioeconomic backgrounds, including neighborhood deprivation infor-
mation attached to individuals.
Our results support previous research indicating the effects of early 
experiences on subsequent labor market outcomes. On average, we found that 
those who were not in employment, education, or training in 2001 had an ap-
proximately 17 percentage points less chance of being employed in 2011 and an 
approximately 10 percentage points less chance of being in a professional/ mana-
gerial position compared to those who were employed in 2001; these results were 
found after controlling for comparable levels of education, social background, 
and neighborhood deprivation. We also found that whereas having been em-
ployed in 2001 leads to the highest employment probabilities in 2011, having 
been a student in 2011 leads to the greatest likelihood of attaining a professional/ 
managerial position. This is an interesting finding that might indicate different 
mechanisms playing a role: Although a previous employment experience seems 
to be crucial for improving future employability, it is participation in the educa-
tion system (and the additional benefits it may have in addition to the university 
degree) that makes the greatest difference in terms of acquiring a good- quality 
job (see Filandri et al., this volume).
Moving to the core question of the chapter, we found that scarring connected 
to a previous experience of unemployment or inactivity indeed varies across 
ethnic groups, and it also depends on the gender of individuals. In particular, 
examining employment probabilities in 2011, the NEET scar is weaker among 
Indian and Bangladeshi men by more than half compared to White British men. 
For women, by contrast, scarring appears to be stronger among Pakistani and 
Caribbean women than among White British women. The nonemployment of 
Asian women is an issue of current political concern in the United Kingdom 
(House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee 2016).
Occupational attainment is not affected by ethnic differences for those with a 
period of being NEET in 2001. However, Bangladeshis have a particularly high 
probability of attaining a high occupational status if they were students in 2001, 
even after controlling for their own educational attainment. Interestingly, we also 
observe these results for Indian and Bangladeshi students when studying access 
to employment.
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Overall, our results for men contradict previous findings for the United 
Kingdom (Demireva and Kesler 2011)  and for other European countries 
(Reyneri and Fullin 2011; Mooi- Reci and Ganzeboom 2015). The penalties as-
sociated with coming from an ethnic minority background do not accrue with 
being unemployed or inactive, as the stigma argument predicted. On the con-
trary, some male groups actually showed the opposite trajectory. In the case of 
Indians, it could be argued that their high educational attainment at the group 
level might compensate for any experience of unemployment or inactivity in 
the eyes of employers recruiting them. This might be one of the reasons why 
we observe relatively higher employment probabilities among Indians who 
were NEET in 2001. Previous findings (Zuccotti and Platt 2017)  also show 
that Indian men benefit in terms of labor market outcomes from being raised 
in areas with a higher share of coethnics, which might point to networking 
mechanisms as potential additional causes. The findings are more puzzling for 
Pakistani and, especially, for Bangladeshi men because these groups have his-
torically been located in the lower sector of the social structure, and we would 
expect this to send a negative signal to employers. Further research to untangle 
this puzzle, as well as to explain the advantage found for Indians, might focus 
on unmeasured characteristics of these groups, including parental aspirations, 
motivational factors, the role of networks at the neighborhood and the uni-
versity level (especially for Indians and Bangladeshis), the exploitation of re-
sources such as internships, and the type of university degrees chosen. Note 
that these factors might be potential explanations for the scar, but they may 
also belong to the mechanisms of self- selection into initial conditions, given 
the limits of our model.
Regarding women, youth unemployment or inactivity leads to lower em-
ployment probabilities later in life for Pakistanis and Caribbeans compared to 
equivalent White British. Group stigmatization might be an explanation for the 
Caribbeans’ disadvantage; this might also be connected with their overrepresen-
tation as single mothers. The result for Pakistanis might be connected to the role 
in this group of women, who are often occupied with caring activities, and the 
low value attached to paid work for them (Peach 2005). Evidence suggesting that 
these cultural values might actually influence labor market transitions is the fact 
that having been raised in a neighborhood with a higher share of coethnics neg-
atively impacts on Asian women’s employment probabilities as adults (Zuccotti 
and Platt 2017). White British women, on the other hand, often combine caring 
with part- time work (O’Reilly and Fagan 1998; Dale et  al. 2002a, 2002b). 
Interestingly, we do not find particularly strong scarring effects for Bangladeshi 
women (despite the fact that, independently of their origin status in 2001, they 
have lower employment probabilities compared to White British women). 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women therefore seem to be following different tran-
sition trajectories— a finding that deserves further examination.
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Finally, in addition to showing that scars vary by ethnicity, this chapter 
challenges the idea that ethnic minorities are always disadvantaged in terms of 
access to jobs. The fact that some ethnic minority groups— especially second- 
generation men— are less penalized by a previous unemployment/ inactivity ex-
perience compared to some of their White British counterparts is in part good 
news in terms of integration processes. Although much of recent UK policy has 
focused on limiting new immigration, this has gone hand in hand with efforts 
to promote integration (Cheung and Heath 2007), as well as new legislation to 
prevent discrimination and to promote “social cohesion” at the local level (Heath 
and Yu 2005; Rattansi 2011; Cantle 2012; Meer and Modood 2013). Our results 
are likely to be in part connected to these measures, although the extent to which 
they imply a decrease in ethnic discrimination in the labor market requires fur-
ther exploration.
Significant concerns remain regarding employment probabilities for ethnic 
minority women and young White British men, who are increasingly “left be-
hind” (Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development 2012). The 
findings raise questions regarding the groups that policymakers should target. 
Often, being an ethnic minority is equated with being disadvantaged, but our 
results show that this is not universally the case in the United Kingdom. Among 
men, scarring connected to having experienced a period of unemployment or 
inactivity is particularly high for White British. Our evidence is also supported 
by previous findings showing that– – given equality of education and social 
background– – employment probabilities increased for all ethnic minorities be-
tween 2001 and 2011 but declined for White British individuals (Zuccotti 2015b). 
Among women, however, we do observe a clear “ethnic minority disadvantage” 
in the labor market. Here, the mechanisms behind these disadvantages deserve 
greater attention: Although discrimination might be part of the story, and here 
policymaking should definitely have a role, cultural values (especially among 
Asians) and possibly fewer employment opportunities in their communities 
might also contribute to the explanation. Policy to address these multiple and 
complex outcomes clearly needs to be sensitive to the differential effects and 
outcomes of gender and ethnicity on young people’s employment transitions.8
NOTES
1 In this section, we use nonemployment to identify individuals who are either 
unemployed or engaged in any other activity that does not involve working or 
studying. Some studies include students in their comparisons (hence identify 
NEET populations), whereas others do not.
2 Some cell counts, percentages, and totals shown in the tables created with 
ONS- LS data have been modified in order to comply with publication rules 
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established by the Office for National Statistics. These modifications, how-
ever, do not affect the main findings derived from the regression models. The 
permission of the Office for National Statistics to use the Longitudinal Study 
is gratefully acknowledged, as is the help provided by staff at the Centre for 
Longitudinal Study Information and User Support (CeLSIUS). CeLSIUS is 
supported by the ESRC Census of Population Programme (Award ref. ES/ 
K000365/ 1). The authors alone are responsible for the interpretation of the 
data. This work contains statistical data from ONS, which is Crown Copyright. 
The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorse-
ment of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statis-
tical data. This work uses research data sets, which may not exactly reproduce 
National Statistics aggregates.
3 Ethnicity is measured by a question on self- identification (measured in 2011; 
when missing, self- identification in 2001 is used). In 2011, the question is 
formulated as follows: “What is your ethnic group?” The options are White 
(English/ Welsh/ Scottish/ Northern Irish/ British; Irish; Gypsy or Irish traveler; 
other White), Mixed/ multiple ethnic groups (White and Black Caribbean; 
White and Black African; White and Asian; any other Mixed/ multiple 
ethnic background; open question), Asian/ Asian British (Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Chinese; any other Asian background; open question), Black/ 
African/ Caribbean/ Black British (African; Caribbean; any other Black/ 
African/ Caribbean background; open question), and Other ethnic group 
(Arab; any other ethnic group). Note that the “Gypsy or Irish traveler” and 
“Arab” categories were not specified separately in the 2001 census form.
4 Individuals of whom one parent is born abroad and the other in the United 
Kingdom are therefore excluded from the analysis. White British with 
foreign- born parents (or a foreign- born parent in the case of single- parent 
households) and ethnic minorities with UK- born parents (or a foreign- born 
parent in the case of single- parent households) are also excluded. African and 
Chinese were excluded due to the small number of cases.
5 Neighborhood deprivation is expressed in population- weighted quintiles and 
is obtained at the ward level. The ward is the key building block of UK ad-
ministrative geography and is used to elect local government councilors. Wards 
vary in terms of size and population, with the average population amounting 
to 4,000. In general, the smallest and most populous wards are in metropol-
itan areas, where the majority of ethnic minorities are found. The permission 
of Dr. Paul Norman, School of Geography, University of Leeds, to use the 2011 
Carstairs Index of Deprivation he created is gratefully acknowledged. Please see 
Norman and Boyle (2014) for use of the Carstairs Index in conjunction with the 
ONS- LS.
6 “Ivprobit,” which is the command we should use given that our outcomes are di-
chotomous, does not allow factorial endogenous variables (i.e., status in 2001), 
but only continuous variables. We have, nevertheless, run a model (without 
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interactions) in which a recoded version of status in 2001— being NEET (vs. 
being in employment or in education)— is used as an endogenous dummy var-
iable, and neighborhood deprivation when individuals were 0– 15 years old is 
used as an instrument. The results are similar to those presented here. Another 
option would be to use the command “ivregress” and ignore the fact that our 
dependent variable is dichotomous. We have tried this model as well, but the 
outcomes are difficult to interpret (predictions are out of range, i.e., they exceed 
1, and have very large standard errors). All results are available on request.
7 To identify relevant interactions (shown in Figures  19.1– 19.3), we plotted all 
interactions in graphs and also created “contrasts,” which show the size of the 
interaction effect and whether or not it is statistically significant. In the study of 
employment in 2011, we have identified contrasts that are statistically significant 
at p < .10 for Indian and Bangladeshi men, for whom the effect of being employed 
in 2001 versus being NEET is different compared to White British men. We have 
also found, in the analysis of occupations in 2011, that the effect of being a student 
versus being NEET is different for Bangladeshi men (p < .10) compared to White 
British men. Finally, we have identified relevant interactions when the observed 
effects were quite substantive (but the contrasts were statistically significant at 
larger p values). In the analysis of employment, the effect of being employed in 
2001 versus being NEET is different for Pakistani men and women (p < .14) and 
for Caribbean women (p < .30) compared to White British men and women.
8 An earlier version of this chapter was published in the journal Human 
Relations.
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APPENDIX
Table A19.1 Probability of being employed and probability of having a (current or most recent) professional/ managerial occupation in 2011; AME 
(clustered standard errors)— full models
Employment Professional/ managerial
Men Women Men Women
Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b
Status in 2001 (ref. Employed)
NEET (unemployed or 
inactive)
– 0.338*** – 0.175*** – 0.357*** – 0.173*** – 0.172*** – 0.098*** – 0.240*** – 0.105***
(0.0103) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0105) (0.0117) (0.0072) (0.0088)
Student – 0.005 – 0.041*** 0.056*** – 0.012* 0.276*** 0.037*** 0.278*** 0.036***
(0.0045) (0.0063) (0.0052) (0.0071) (0.0085) (0.0092) (0.0081) (0.0087)
Ethnic group (ref. White British)
Indian 0.003 0.004 – 0.028 – 0.061*** 0.105*** 0.082*** 0.105*** 0.063***
(0.0120) (0.0109) (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0208) (0.0183) (0.0209) (0.0187)
Pakistani – 0.020 0.007 – 0.211*** – 0.160*** – 0.113*** – 0.021 – 0.041 0.010
(0.0164) (0.0130) (0.0250) (0.0223) (0.0270) (0.0273) (0.0265) (0.0238)
Bangladeshi 0.002 0.042*** – 0.180*** – 0.100*** – 0.025 0.075* – 0.040 0.057
(0.0243) (0.0159) (0.0393) (0.0325) (0.0446) (0.0433) (0.0429) (0.0387)
Caribbean – 0.067* – 0.023 – 0.064* – 0.073** 0.017 0.038 0.037 0.041
(0.0347) (0.0246) (0.0343) (0.0324) (0.0510) (0.0451) (0.0409) (0.0358)
(continued)
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Employment Professional/ managerial
Men Women Men Women
Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b
Family type (ref. Single, no children)
Couple, no children 0.092*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.035***
(0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0087)
Single with children – 0.010 – 0.084*** 0.022 – 0.094***
(0.0123) (0.0079) (0.0199) (0.0107)
Couple with children 0.076*** – 0.079*** 0.047*** – 0.056***
(0.0044) (0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0078)
Education (ref. Level 1)
No education – 0.149*** – 0.289*** – 0.046*** – 0.041*
(0.0117) (0.0228) (0.0152) (0.0250)
Other – 0.043*** – 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.044*
(0.0095) (0.0207) (0.0137) (0.0234)
Level 2 – 0.014 – 0.015 0.142*** 0.088***
(0.0091) (0.0203) (0.0135) (0.0231)
Level 3 0.022** 0.049** 0.191*** 0.154***
(0.0089) (0.0204) (0.0137) (0.0233)
Level 4+ 0.044*** 0.085*** 0.525*** 0.497***
(0.0085) (0.0202) (0.0130) (0.0230)
Tenure (ref. Owner)
Social rent – 0.019*** – 0.024*** – 0.040*** – 0.039***
(0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0076) (0.0071)
Private rent – 0.005 – 0.014* – 0.008 – 0.012
(0.0060) (0.0080) (0.0104) (0.0100)
Number of cars (ref. None)
1 car 0.012*** 0.009 0.008 0.016**
(0.0043) (0.0053) (0.0077) (0.0071)
2+ cars 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.020** 0.038***
(0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0094) (0.0088)
Persons per room (ref. 1 person per room)
>1.5 persons 0.001 – 0.026* – 0.030 – 0.008
(0.0111) (0.0153) (0.0235) (0.0212)
1.5 persons 0.006 – 0.016 0.029 – 0.055*
(0.0157) (0.0181) (0.0300) (0.0283)
>1 and <1.5 persons – 0.006 – 0.004 – 0.015 – 0.007
(0.0064) (0.0074) (0.0117) (0.0106)
≥0.75 and <1 person 0.010** 0.003 0.004 – 0.001
(0.0043) (0.0054) (0.0073) (0.0069)
<0.75 person 0.009** 0.001 0.025*** 0.012*
(0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0073) (0.0069)
Table A19.1 Continued
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Employment Professional/ managerial
Men Women Men Women
Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b
Family type (ref. Single, no children)
Couple, no children 0.092*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.035***
(0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0087)
Single with children – 0.010 – 0.084*** 0.022 – 0.094***
(0.0123) (0.0079) (0.0199) (0.0107)
Couple with children 0.076*** – 0.079*** 0.047*** – 0.056***
(0.0044) (0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0078)
Education (ref. Level 1)
No education – 0.149*** – 0.289*** – 0.046*** – 0.041*
(0.0117) (0.0228) (0.0152) (0.0250)
Other – 0.043*** – 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.044*
(0.0095) (0.0207) (0.0137) (0.0234)
Level 2 – 0.014 – 0.015 0.142*** 0.088***
(0.0091) (0.0203) (0.0135) (0.0231)
Level 3 0.022** 0.049** 0.191*** 0.154***
(0.0089) (0.0204) (0.0137) (0.0233)
Level 4+ 0.044*** 0.085*** 0.525*** 0.497***
(0.0085) (0.0202) (0.0130) (0.0230)
Tenure (ref. Owner)
Social rent – 0.019*** – 0.024*** – 0.040*** – 0.039***
(0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0076) (0.0071)
Private rent – 0.005 – 0.014* – 0.008 – 0.012
(0.0060) (0.0080) (0.0104) (0.0100)
Number of cars (ref. None)
1 car 0.012*** 0.009 0.008 0.016**
(0.0043) (0.0053) (0.0077) (0.0071)
2+ cars 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.020** 0.038***
(0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0094) (0.0088)
Persons per room (ref. 1 person per room)
>1.5 persons 0.001 – 0.026* – 0.030 – 0.008
(0.0111) (0.0153) (0.0235) (0.0212)
1.5 persons 0.006 – 0.016 0.029 – 0.055*
(0.0157) (0.0181) (0.0300) (0.0283)
>1 and <1.5 persons – 0.006 – 0.004 – 0.015 – 0.007
(0.0064) (0.0074) (0.0117) (0.0106)
≥0.75 and <1 person 0.010** 0.003 0.004 – 0.001
(0.0043) (0.0054) (0.0073) (0.0069)
<0.75 person 0.009** 0.001 0.025*** 0.012*
(0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0073) (0.0069)
(continued)
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Employment Professional/ managerial
Men Women Men Women
Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b
Parental social class (ref. Manual [V + VI + VII])
No earners/ no code – 0.015** – 0.026*** 0.043*** 0.013
(0.0064) (0.0076) (0.0126) (0.0114)
Routine nonmanual (III) 0.003 – 0.004 0.048*** 0.026***
(0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0076) (0.0072)
Petite bourgeoisie (IV) 0.003 – 0.001 – 0.007 – 0.006
(0.0053) (0.0067) (0.0088) (0.0083)
Professional/ managerial 
(I + II)
0.005 – 0.009 0.085*** 0.053***
(0.0045) (0.0057) (0.0073) (0.0069)
Carstairs quintile in origin (ref. Q1: Least deprived)
Q2 – 0.004 0.005 – 0.009 0.002
(0.0051) (0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0070)
Q3 – 0.002 0.003 – 0.003 – 0.001
(0.0052) (0.0067) (0.0079) (0.0074)
Q4 – 0.008 0.012* – 0.023*** 0.003
(0.0054) (0.0069) (0.0084) (0.0079)
Q5 – 0.010* 0.010 – 0.017* – 0.002
(0.0059) (0.0075) (0.0096) (0.0091)
Carstairs quintile in 2011 (ref. Q1: Least deprived)
Q2 – 0.003 0.013* – 0.016* – 0.007
(0.0058) (0.0074) (0.0088) (0.0083)
Q3 – 0.015*** 0.022*** – 0.034*** – 0.027***
(0.0058) (0.0072) (0.0089) (0.0084)
Q4 – 0.021*** 0.018** – 0.047*** – 0.020**
(0.0059) (0.0075) (0.0093) (0.0087)
Q5 – 0.031*** 0.005 – 0.042*** – 0.022**
(0.0065) (0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0100)
Age
Age in 2001 0.001* – 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.005***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Origin year (ref. 1981)
1991 0.000 – 0.007*** 0.005** – 0.004* 0.010*** – 0.022*** 0.013*** – 0.019***
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0030)
Number of census points (ref. 3)
4 census points 0.017*** – 0.003 0.031*** 0.005 0.098*** 0.023*** 0.090*** 0.022***
(0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0091) (0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0080)
Country of birth
UK- born 0.008 0.026** – 0.020 – 0.017 – 0.010 0.035 – 0.011 0.015
(0.0135) (0.0118) (0.0179) (0.0170) (0.0251) (0.0228) (0.0237) (0.0207)
N 36,886 36,886 40,294 40,294 35,453 35,453 38,391 38,391
Notes: Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. Population: Individuals between 16 and 29 years old in 2001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
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Employment Professional/ managerial
Men Women Men Women
Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b Model a Model b
Parental social class (ref. Manual [V + VI + VII])
No earners/ no code – 0.015** – 0.026*** 0.043*** 0.013
(0.0064) (0.0076) (0.0126) (0.0114)
Routine nonmanual (III) 0.003 – 0.004 0.048*** 0.026***
(0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0076) (0.0072)
Petite bourgeoisie (IV) 0.003 – 0.001 – 0.007 – 0.006
(0.0053) (0.0067) (0.0088) (0.0083)
Professional/ managerial 
(I + II)
0.005 – 0.009 0.085*** 0.053***
(0.0045) (0.0057) (0.0073) (0.0069)
Carstairs quintile in origin (ref. Q1: Least deprived)
Q2 – 0.004 0.005 – 0.009 0.002
(0.0051) (0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0070)
Q3 – 0.002 0.003 – 0.003 – 0.001
(0.0052) (0.0067) (0.0079) (0.0074)
Q4 – 0.008 0.012* – 0.023*** 0.003
(0.0054) (0.0069) (0.0084) (0.0079)
Q5 – 0.010* 0.010 – 0.017* – 0.002
(0.0059) (0.0075) (0.0096) (0.0091)
Carstairs quintile in 2011 (ref. Q1: Least deprived)
Q2 – 0.003 0.013* – 0.016* – 0.007
(0.0058) (0.0074) (0.0088) (0.0083)
Q3 – 0.015*** 0.022*** – 0.034*** – 0.027***
(0.0058) (0.0072) (0.0089) (0.0084)
Q4 – 0.021*** 0.018** – 0.047*** – 0.020**
(0.0059) (0.0075) (0.0093) (0.0087)
Q5 – 0.031*** 0.005 – 0.042*** – 0.022**
(0.0065) (0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0100)
Age
Age in 2001 0.001* – 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.005***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Origin year (ref. 1981)
1991 0.000 – 0.007*** 0.005** – 0.004* 0.010*** – 0.022*** 0.013*** – 0.019***
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0030)
Number of census points (ref. 3)
4 census points 0.017*** – 0.003 0.031*** 0.005 0.098*** 0.023*** 0.090*** 0.022***
(0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0091) (0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0080)
Country of birth
UK- born 0.008 0.026** – 0.020 – 0.017 – 0.010 0.035 – 0.011 0.015
(0.0135) (0.0118) (0.0179) (0.0170) (0.0251) (0.0228) (0.0237) (0.0207)
N 36,886 36,886 40,294 40,294 35,453 35,453 38,391 38,391
Notes: Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. Population: Individuals between 16 and 29 years old in 2001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
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Table A19.2 Predicted values of employment and professional/ managerial occupation in 2011, by labor 
market status in 2001, ethnic group, and gender
Employment Professional/ managerial occupation
Men Women Men Women
Value SE Value SE Value SE Value SE
NEET
White British 0.79 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.30 0.01
Indian 0.88 0.03 0.59 0.07 0.39 0.08 0.33 0.07
Pakistani 0.85 0.04 0.47 0.05 0.33 0.09 0.28 0.06
Bangladeshi 0.91 0.04 0.59 0.07 0.33 0.12 0.44 0.11
Caribbean 0.85 0.07 0.53 0.12 0.45 0.17 0.33 0.10
Student
White British 0.92 0.00 0.87 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.48 0.01
Indian 0.93 0.01 0.82 0.03 0.63 0.03 0.59 0.04
Pakistani 0.91 0.02 0.64 0.04 0.43 0.05 0.55 0.05
Bangladeshi 0.98 0.01 0.71 0.06 0.72 0.08 0.56 0.08
Caribbean 0.90 0.04 0.73 0.07 0.46 0.11 0.55 0.10
Employed
White British 0.95 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.44 0.01
Indian 0.93 0.01 0.81 0.03 0.50 0.03 0.51 0.04
Pakistani 0.96 0.01 0.74 0.04 0.40 0.06 0.42 0.05
Bangladeshi 0.95 0.02 0.79 0.06 0.43 0.08 0.47 0.08
Caribbean 0.92 0.03 0.85 0.04 0.49 0.08 0.49 0.06
Notes: Variables set to their mean: Age, country of birth, origin year, number of census points, parental social class, number of cars, tenure, 
level of overcrowding, neighborhood deprivation (past and current), education, and family type. Population: Individuals between 16 and 
29 years old in 2001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ONS- LS.
597
   597
20
DO BUSINESS START- UPS CREATE  
HIGH- QUALITY JOBS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE?
Renate Ortlieb, Maura Sheehan, and Jaan Masso
20.1. INTRODUCTION
Since the onset of the recent economic crisis, there has been a renewed interest 
among policymakers across Europe in measures to stimulate self- employment 
and entrepreneurship as an alternative to unemployment (e.g., within the 
Europe 2020 strategy; European Commission 2010, 2013). However, funda-
mental questions about policies promoting self- employment, especially among 
young people, remain unanswered. For instance, do such policies create new 
jobs or just promote new forms of precarious, poor- quality employment? (For 
an overview of policies targeted at youth transitions in general across Europe, 
see Petmesidou and González Menéndez, this volume.) Despite considerable in-
terest among policymakers, there is little evidence regarding the quality of jobs 
that young people create for either themselves or for further employees. Indeed, 
Shane’s (2008) detailed analysis of entrepreneurship in the United States criti-
cally concluded, “Start- ups don’t generate as many jobs as most people think, and 
the jobs that they create aren’t as good as the jobs in existing companies” (p. 161). 
Focusing on EU27 countries, this chapter addresses the question as to whether 
business start- ups create high- quality jobs for young people.1
New economic business models have recently seen a flourishing of self- 
employment for young people, as exemplified by the growth of companies such 
as Deliveroo and Uber operating in the “sharing” economy (Cushing 2013; 
Eichhorst et  al. 2016). Young people working for these companies frequently 
have a self- employment status as own- account workers rather than a traditional 
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employment relationship with the organization. So- called “gig” workers are typ-
ically contracted through virtual “human cloud” platforms such as Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, TaskRabbit, and Upwork. The European Commission (2016a) 
is generally quite positive in its outlook for these new business models and the 
associated employment opportunities. However, the rise of “gig” workers is also 
receiving increased media and policy attention, with workers demanding better 
pay deals and questions being raised about the extent to which these young people 
really are self- employed or not (BBC 2016; Valenduc and Vendramin 2016). As 
an emerging form of employment, it is not always clear to what extent these new 
self- employed workers are protected by domestic labor law (De Stefano 2016), 
given that they do not have employment contracts but, rather, service contracts 
on the basis of so- called clickwrap agreements— that is, the workers agree to the 
terms of a service contract by clicking an “OK” button on the company website.
Encouraging self- employment for young people requires an understanding of 
what the long- term implications of this work are in terms of job quality. The aim 
of this chapter is to examine the job quality of self- employed women and men 
younger than age 35 years and the related job- creation potential. The analysis 
uses an explorative approach based on current conceptualizations of job quality 
and secondary data sources such as the European Union Labour Force Survey, 
the European Working Conditions Survey, and the European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions, as well as semistructured interviews with 
self- employed young people in selected countries and industries. After mapping 
youth self- employment in EU27 countries, the chapter presents findings con-
cerning the job quality of young self- employed and the job- creation potential 
of youth self- employment. The analysis takes gender- related differences into 
account, given that the existing literature indicates that job quality differs sub-
stantially between women and men (Smith et al. 2008; Mühlau 2011; Beblo and 
Ortlieb 2012).
20.2. DEFINING SELF- EMPLOYMENT
In this chapter, we define self- employment in accordance with the definition 
used by the European Union Labour Force Survey. That is, with the term “self- 
employment,” we refer to a form of employment engaged in by people who 
work in their own business, farm, or professional practice and who receive 
some form of economic return for their labor. Thereby, in our analysis we con-
sider both self- employed with employees working for them and self- employed 
without employees. Alternative terms commonly used in the literature include 
“employers” and “owner– managers” for self- employed with employees and “sole 
traders,” “solo self- employed,” “own- account workers,” and “freelancers” for self- 
employed without employees. With the term “salaried employees,” we refer to 
people employed by organizations.
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Defining self- employment is a challenging endeavor because the em-
pirical boundary between self- employment and salaried employment is 
blurred (Jorens 2008; Muehlberger and Pasqua 2009; Eichhorst et  al. 2013; 
Oostveen et al. 2013). According to definitions typically used by social secu-
rity institutions and state authorities, people are categorized as self- employed 
if they fulfill the following criteria: Self- employed individuals autonomously 
choose the content, time, and place of their work without being bound by the 
instructions of other persons— such as formal supervisors within a hierarchi-
cally structured company— and they take responsibility for business risks on 
their own (for an overview of legal definitions in selected European countries, 
see Sheehan and McNamara 2015).
However, within the past few decades, “false” or “bogus” forms of 
self- employment have been emerging as a consequence of an increase in 
outsourcing activities by firms (Jorens 2008; Flecker and Hermann 2011). 
Bogus self- employed people formally deliver their services as an inde-
pendent firm based on a service contract or a general commercial contract, 
but factually, they depend on another organization to the same degree as sal-
aried employees depend on their employers. Typically, these people work as 
sole traders without employees working for them, they have only one client, 
they are not able to hire staff if necessary, and/ or they are not able to make 
the most important decisions about how to organize their work and run the 
business (Ostveen et  al. 2013). This form of self- employment is related to 
employers circumventing social insurance contributions and other issues 
subject to labor law, such as employment protection, working- time limits, 
maternity/ paternity and sick pay, or paid holidays (Román, Congregado, and 
Millán 2011). In addition, bogus self- employment has been related in the 
past to circumventing access restrictions to the labor market for migrants 
from European Union (EU) accession countries (Thörnquist 2013). Thus, 
although bogus self- employment sometimes may remain the only viable op-
tion for youth to find paid work, it is often associated with a quite significant 
lack of employment protection and social welfare entitlements (Eichhorst 
et al. 2013). As a consequence, in those countries and occupations in which 
such institutions exist, bogus self- employed people are at a disadvantage 
in this regard compared to salaried employees. Moreover, the (bogus) self- 
employed cannot avail of benefits negotiated from the collective bargaining 
agreements commonly found in Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, for 
example.
Both the difficulties related to the empirical distinction between self- 
employed, bogus self- employed, and salaried employees and the differences be-
tween these three forms of employment with respect to dependencies and risks 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the empirical findings presented in 
this chapter. We shed more light on bogus self- employment in Section 20.8 on 
job- creation potential.
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20.3. JOB QUALITY: CONCEPTS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
For policymakers, unions, and many employers alike, the quality of jobs is 
a highly important issue. For example, one of the declared aims of the Lisbon 
Strategy launched by the European Council in 2000 reads, “More and better 
jobs for Europe” (European Council 2000). For unions and other workers’ 
associations, job quality can be viewed as the overarching aim of different kinds 
of activities. This aim is also reflected in the International Labour Organization’s 
(2015) Decent Work Agenda, which emphasizes fair labor income, security in the 
workplace, and workers’ voice, among other issues. Only recently, management 
scholars, too, have called for a reinvigoration of research on quality of working 
life, which also should have a policy impact (Grote and Guest 2017).
A number of studies seek to map job quality in Europe using survey data 
(Gallie 2003; Smith et al. 2008; Olsen, Kalleberg, and Nesheim 2010; Green and 
Mostafa 2012; Oinas et al. 2012; Green et al. 2013; Holman 2013). According to 
these studies, job quality tends to be better in Nordic and Continental European 
countries than in Southern Europe and especially in Eastern Europe. However, 
although some studies establish nuanced pictures of job quality in Europe, 
very few consider the job quality of young people (Russell, Leschke, and Smith 
2015), and none explicitly examine the consequences for young self- employed.
Within the job- quality literature, various conceptualizations of job quality 
have been proposed. Although scholars do not have a common understanding 
of what “good jobs” or “bad jobs” mean, we can identify workers’ well- being as a 
comprehensive aim. As Muñoz de Bustillo et al. (2011) state in their extensive re-
view, “At a very high level of generality, we can more or less agree that job quality 
refers to the characteristics of work and employment that affect the well- being of 
the worker” (p. 460).
The question as to what concrete job characteristics constitute job quality 
has not yet been conclusively answered. However, review articles indicate that 
there is agreement on the shortcomings of subjective concepts focusing on 
factors such as job satisfaction and feelings of well- being (Leschke, Watt, and 
Finn 2008; Muñoz de Bustillo et al. 2011; Hauff and Kirchner 2014). Although 
subjective concepts might suit research purposes related to work motivation or 
general life satisfaction, they fall short with regard to identifying the sources 
of these attitudes and their long- term consequences for the well- being of both 
workers and their families. In contrast, objective concepts of job quality directly 
focus on “the features of jobs that meet workers’ needs from work” (Green and 
Mostafa 2012, 10), which can be summarized under the umbrella concept of 
workers’ well- being. Examples of objective measures include pay, working time, 
autonomy, health and safety, skills and career development, and participation in 
decision- making. Objective concepts have a subjective component, too, because 
they center on the perspective of the working individuals. Correspondingly, re-
search typically relies on self- reported data. Overall, however, objective concepts 
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rely on measures related to the universal needs of (all) workers rather than on 
subjective feelings.
In our analysis of the job quality of self- employed youth in Europe, we focus 
on both objective and subjective job characteristics. These indicators include the 
following: pay, working hours, work intensity, feeling of social belonging, health 
and safety, learning and development, perceived job security, and subjective sat-
isfaction with pay and working hours.
20.4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
With the aim of understanding and comparing the job quality of self- 
employed youth in Europe, we draw on a range of complementary method-
ological approaches. The analysis of secondary data relies on three cross- EU 
individual- level representative surveys. First, the European Union Labour 
Force Survey (EU- LFS)— run by the national statistical authorities— is the 
standard household- based survey of labor market information, such as rates 
of unemployment and inactivity, in the EU. In the analysis, we used data for 
EU27 countries from 2002 until 2014. In recent years, the number of an-
nual observations has ranged from approximately 20,000 to 600,000. Second, 
the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) run by Eurofound is the 
source of information for working conditions and the quality of work in the 
EU. We used the most recent available data (year 2010) for 27 countries, with 
the number of observations per country being in the range of 1,000 to 4,000. 
Third, the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU- SILC) is the source for comparative statistics on income distribution 
and social inclusion in the EU, with a focus on income. In the analysis, we 
used three waves from 2004, 2008, and 2012 for 31 countries (for details, see 
Masso et al. 2015, 61).
The quantitative data are supplemented by case study data originating from 
semistructured interviews with 72 young self- employed under 35 years of age 
and by additional company information gathered from websites and personal 
visits. Applying purposeful sampling, we conducted the case studies in six 
selected countries:  Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. We selected these countries because they represent very different 
business environments in terms of institutional, economic, and cultural contexts. 
Specifically, these countries cover different types of Hall and Soskice’s (2001) 
Varieties of Capitalism typology and of Pohl and Walther’s (2007) categorization 
of school- to- work transition regimes.
Germany reflects many elements of coordinated market capitalism and has an 
employment- centered transition regime, Ireland and the United Kingdom both 
have liberal market economies and liberal transition regimes, Spain has some de-
gree of market coordination and a subprotective transition regime, and Estonia 
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and Poland both have liberal market economies and post- socialist transition 
regimes. We sought to take account of different regimes in our sample because 
we expected that these frameworks would help provide a theoretical explanation 
for patterns of youth self- employment in the six study countries and possibly 
across the EU. In addition, hypothesizing that national unemployment rates and 
youth self- employment rates reflect more general labor market and institutional 
conditions, we selected the countries in such a way that the sample covers dif-
ferent labor market contexts.
The six countries differ in terms of youth unemployment rates (ranging 
from 7.2% in Germany to 48.3% in Spain in 2014; Eurostat 2016) and youth 
self- employment rates (ranging from 4.3% in Germany to 11.1% in Poland 
in 2014; authors’ calculations based on EU- LFS data; see also Section 20.5). 
Regarding social protection systems, in all six countries the self- employed 
have access to health care and pension insurance. Differences between the 
countries relate to the degree of compulsion, the cost of social insurance, and 
the related benefits (for details on selected European countries, see Schulze 
Buschoff and Protsch 2008). For instance, in Germany, health care and pen-
sion insurance are compulsory, with contributions depending on the amount 
of tax paid. In contrast, all self- employed in the United Kingdom receive 
health care benefits without paying contributions. In Spain, the self- employed 
can voluntarily contribute to a special system that also provides cash benefits 
in the event of sickness (for further details, see European Commission 2014). 
The fact that the sample does not include a country with a very high rate of 
self- employment— for example, Greece or Italy— is recognized as a limitation 
of this study.
In the six countries, we focus on two selected industrial sectors so as to reduce 
complexity. We selected the cultural and creative industry (CCI) and the infor-
mation/ communication technologies sector (ICT) because they provide com-
paratively good opportunities for youth, especially, to start a business. Moreover, 
the ICT industry represents 4.8% of the European economy, where investments 
in ICT account for half of the productivity growth in Europe (European 
Commission 2016b), whereas the CCI industry is perceived as one of Europe’s 
most dynamic sectors, providing approximately 5 million jobs across the EU27 
(European Commission 2010). In addition, the importance of these two sectors 
within the European economy is expected to increase in the future so that they 
could become a significant source of future self- employment opportunities for 
young people (for details, see McNamara et al. 2016).
The value of this case study research is to provide insights into perceptions 
of job quality and into the job- creation potential associated with youth self- 
employment that go beyond those available from an interpretation of more 
quantitative aggregate data. In this sense, our research design incorporates both 
a macro, comparative dimension and a more specific, micro perspective to eval-
uate the issue of job quality for the young self- employed in Europe.
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20.5. YOUTH SELF- EMPLOYMENT RATES ACROSS EUROPE
The extent and significance of youth self- employment in Europe are indicated 
by the figure of more than 5.6 million EU27 citizens younger than age 35 years 
who were self- employed in 2014 (according to EU- LFS data). Within the group 
of working people aged 25– 34  years, more than every tenth person was self- 
employed. The self- employment rate— that is, the share of self- employed among 
all employed— within this group of older youth is more than twice as high as the 
rate for younger youth aged 15– 24 years, but it is decidedly lower than that for 
adults aged 35– 65 years (older youth, 10.1%; younger youth, 4.2%; older adults, 
17.0%). During the past decade, the self- employment rate has been fairly stable. 
The overall rate across EU27 countries has oscillated within the range of 14.2% to 
14.7%, with a peak in 2004 and a decreasing trend during the past 5 years.
Self- employment rates in EU27 countries are presented in Figure 20.1, which 
compares youth younger than age 35 years and older adults in the years 2002 and 
2014. The graph shows that youth self- employment rates vary significantly across 
the EU. For example, in 2014, the rates for youth younger than age 35 years were 
highest in Greece and Italy (18.3% and 17.8%, respectively), whereas they were 
lowest in Denmark and Germany (3.6% and 4.3%, respectively). Regarding age 
groups, Figure 20.1 indicates that the largest gaps in self- employment rates be-
tween youth younger than age 35  years and older adults exist in Ireland and 
Austria. By contrast, the self- employment rates of youth younger than age 
35 years and older adults are similar in Italy and Slovakia.
Percent
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Figure 20.1 Self- employment rates of youth (aged 15– 34 years) and older adults (aged 35– 
65 years) across EU27 countries: 2002 and 2014.
Source: EU- LFS.
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A comparison of the years 2002 and 2014— spanning a period that may 
entail effects of the recent economic and financial crisis but is still long 
enough to shed light on longer term trends— indicates that self- employment 
rates decreased especially in those countries that were characterized by 
comparatively high self- employment rates in 2002 and poor general eco-
nomic environments. Examples include Portugal, Poland, and Romania. 
Interestingly, countries such as Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia, where self- 
employment rates increased, faced similarly difficult economic conditions. 
But because self- employment rates in these countries were comparatively low 
in 2002, they apparently subsequently caught up with the other EU countries. 
Western European countries with increased self- employment rates include 
France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In these countries, self- 
employment rates possibly increased because of both improved governmental 
support for entrepreneurship and increased outsourcing activities— resulting 
in bogus self- employment.
A further interesting finding is that in some countries, youth self- 
employment rates changed differently over time from those for older adults, 
whereas in most countries the rates for youth and older adults changed in a 
similar way— that is, between 2002 and 2014, the rates for both age groups 
increased, decreased, or they remained at the same level. Specifically, in 
Spain and Italy, youth self- employment rates increased, whereas rates for 
older adults decreased. Similarly, in Cyprus and Greece, rates for older adults 
considerably decreased, whereas those for the young remained nearly stable. 
Because these four countries are among those EU countries with the highest 
youth unemployment rates, the patterns suggest that a high number of young 
people may have tried to escape from unemployment by working as self- 
employed, although they might have preferred salaried employment had it 
been available.2
Although we are not able to identify a clear pattern of differences across 
countries according to Hall and Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of Capitalism typology, 
we interpret these findings as reflecting country specificities, such as the youth 
unemployment rate, the size of the informal sector, the relative importance 
of sectors typical of self- employment (e.g., agriculture), institutions related to 
starting a business and social welfare, as well as the skills and mindsets of young 
people (Packard, Koettl, and Montenegro 2012; Eichhorst et al. 2013; Mascherini 
and Bisello 2015; Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development/ 
European Union 2015). Likewise, differences between age groups may be traced 
back to different labor market opportunities, economic structures, and mindsets. 
Furthermore, although young people and adults of one country act within the 
same institutional environment, these institutions may affect young people dif-
ferently compared to adults.
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20.6. WHO ARE THE SELF- EMPLOYED AND WHAT KIND 
OF BUSINESSES DO THEY RUN?
Confirming previous research findings on the sociodemographic character-
istics of the self- employed (Dawson, Henley, and Latreille 2009; Barnir and 
McLaughlin 2011; Poschke 2013; Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos 2014; Simoes, 
Crespo, and Moreira 2015), our analyses based on EU- LFS data show that the 
probability of being self- employed increases with age. In addition, this proba-
bility is higher for men than for women, for nationals than for non- nationals, 
for less educated people (below secondary education) than for the better ed-
ucated, and for those whose parents are self- employed (for details, see Masso 
et al. 2015, 20– 21). Self- employment does not appear to be very attractive to the 
rising number of “overeducated” young people across the EU (for a comprehen-
sive analysis of youth overeducation across the EU, see McGuinness, Bergin, and 
Whelan, this volume).
Regarding industrial sectors, according to EWCS data for 2010, young self- 
employed under 35  years of age tend to cluster in the wholesale, retail, food, 
and accommodation sectors (22.6%); other services (21.8%); and agriculture 
(20.5%). Figure 20.2 displays their distribution across sectors compared to all 
self- employed and all young working people under 35 years of age. In addition, 
it presents the distribution of young self- employed women under 35 years of age.
Figure 20.2 shows a very similar pattern for young self- employed aged 
under 35 years and for all self- employed, with approximately 3% of the young 
working less in the agricultural sector and 3% more providing other services. 
These trends might result from a cohort effect, shaped by the general decline of 
100
Percent
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
All self-
employed
All young
(18–34)
Young self-
employed
(18–34)
Young self-
employed
women (18–34)
Other services
Health
Education
Public administration and defense
Financial services
Transport
Wholesale, retail, food, accomodation
Construction
Manufacturing
Agriculture
Figure 20.2 Sectors of all self- employed (aged 18– 65 years), all young working people (aged 
18– 34 years), young self- employed (aged 18– 34 years), and young self- employed women (aged 
18– 34 years) in EU27 countries: 2010.
Source: EWCS.
 
606 Challenging Futures For Youth
60
the agricultural sector and the emergence of the service sector during the past 
few decades. Nevertheless, agriculture is still an important sector for young self- 
employed, particularly in comparison to young salaried employees. Furthermore, 
Figure 20.2 indicates typical gender segregation within the group of young self- 
employed under 35 years, with young women strongly over- represented in the 
health sector and in other services.
Altogether, these findings support previous evidence, according to which 
young people tend to focus on sectors with low entry barriers and low cap-
ital requirements (Parker 2009). At the same time, because these sectors are 
characterized by high shares of low- skill jobs and poorly paid work, they are 
often associated with lower job quality (see Grotti, Russell, and O’Reilly, this 
volume).
20.7. JOB QUALITY OF YOUNG SELF- EMPLOYED
Using EWCS data for the EU27 countries (the wording of the items is provided 
in the Appendix to this chapter), this section concentrates on selected job char-
acteristics, as outlined in Section 20.3 on concepts of job quality (for an over-
view of youth transitions and job quality in general, see Filandri, Nazio, and 
O’Reilly, this volume). Figure 20.3 depicts the median net earnings and average 
working hours, as well as ratings concerning further working conditions, of all 
self- employed, all young working people under 35 years, young self- employed 
people under 35 years, and young self- employed women.
Figure 20.3 shows that the young self- employed under 35  years receive a 
median income of €1,158, which is higher than the income of young salaried 
Figure 20.3 Working conditions of all self- employed (aged 18– 65 years), all young working 
people (aged 18– 34 years), young self- employed (aged 18– 34 years), and young self- employed 
women (aged 18– 34 years) in EU27 countries: 2010.
Source: EWCS.
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employees but lower than the income of older adult self- employed. Within the 
group of the young self- employed under 35 years, women— with a median in-
come of €1,000— receive less than men.3 Interestingly, among the young self- 
employed under 35 years, and thereof among women in particular, the share of 
those who believe they are well paid for their work is larger than in the groups of 
older adult self- employed and young salaried employees under 35 years.
Regarding working hours, young self- employed under 35  years work 40.8 
hours per week, on average, which is more than 4 hours above the mean for 
all young working people (36.5 hours) and 2.6 hours less than the mean for all 
self- employed (43.4 hours). Young self- employed women, on average, work 38.6 
hours per week. However, the median working hours of young self- employed 
women and men equal those of all young working people and all employees, 
amounting to 40 hours per week. According to Figure 20.3, young self- employed 
under 35  years— and, in particular, young self- employed women— perceive a 
good fit between their job duties and their social commitments. Although the 
share of those perceiving a good fit is smaller than that of the young salaried 
employees, this finding indicates satisfactory working- time arrangements, also 
in comparison with older adult self- employed.
Likewise, young self- employed aged under 35— and, especially, young self- 
employed women— report comparatively low work intensity. According to figure 
20.3, the ratings of this job feature correspond with those of the following three 
items, where young self- employed perceive themselves as having better working 
conditions than their salaried employed peers, but (slightly) worse conditions 
than older adult self- employed: “Feeling at home in the organization worked for,” 
“Being able to do job at age 60,” and “Expect not to lose job in next 6 months.” 
The finding that young self- employed at least partly perceive these job features 
more negatively than older adult self- employed can be traced back to effects re-
lated to age and experience. For example, it is less likely that a 30- year- old person 
would envision doing her/ his job at the age of 60, as compared to a 50- year- old 
person, simply because the time horizon for the 30- year- old is much longer.
Besides satisfaction with pay, the young self- employed evaluated two further 
job characteristics more positively than the other groups, namely “Job involves 
learning new things” and “Job offers good prospects for career advancement.” 
Figure 20.3 additionally shows that young self- employed women rate learning 
opportunities more positively than their male peers, but career prospects more 
negatively. These gender differences might be associated with the different in-
dustrial sectors women and men work in, as described in section 6 above. 
Notwithstanding these differences, this finding is particularly notable because 
good learning and development opportunities are especially crucial for young 
people, both in their current situation and for their future.
However, although young self- employed perceive comparatively good 
learning opportunities, they also view themselves as lacking skills. According 
to EWCS data, compared to all self- employed and all young working people, 
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young self- employed under 35 years more often report that their present skills 
do not correspond well with their job duties (for details, see Masso et al. 2015, 
30– 31). In particular, the share of those who perceive themselves as lacking 
skills is largest among young self- employed women. The share of young self- 
employed under 35 years reporting that they need further training is particularly 
large in Austria (58.2%), Estonia (41.1%), and Denmark (37.5%). Although this 
finding points, on the one hand, to the potentially problematic situation of high 
demands faced by young self- employed, it can be viewed, on the other hand, as 
a positive indicator of the fact that these people work not just in low- skill jobs.
In summary, compared to other groups of working people, young self- 
employed generally report good job quality. However, the overall good ratings 
should not hide the fact that a large share of young self- employed indicated that 
they do not believe they are well paid for their work and that their job does not 
offer good career prospects. Moreover, even if they express less job insecurity 
than peers working as salaried employees, the consequences of losing their jobs 
are more severe because in many countries they are not entitled to unemploy-
ment benefits (for details, see Schulze Buschoff and Protsch 2008).
20.8. JOB- CREATION POTENTIAL
This section takes a closer look at the job- creation potential for both the young 
self- employed and additional people working for them. Indicators of the job- 
creation potential of self- employment relate to the following three questions: Do 
young people leave unemployment by becoming self- employed? Are young self- 
employed to be classified as bogus self- employed? and Do young self- employed 
have further employees working for them?
20.8.1. Do young people leave unemployment 
by becoming self- employed?
Regarding this question, analyses of labor market status transition rates based on 
EU- LFS data reveal a mixed picture (for details, see Masso et al. 2015, 14– 17). 
Table 20.1 presents results for transitions between different labor market statuses 
in 2011 and 2012.
Table 20.1 shows that 1.4% of young unemployed under 25  years in 2011 
and 2.8% of older youth aged 25– 34 years in 2011 became self- employed in the 
following year— that is, in 2012. Of both youth age groups, approximately two- 
thirds remained unemployed in the following year; one- fourth became salaried 
employees; and 6.1% or 7.0%, respectively, moved into labor market inactivity 
(e.g., by entering further training). The small shares of those young unem-
ployed who moved from unemployment into self- employment indicate that 
opportunities for young people to escape unemployment by founding their own 
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business are limited. Even so, these numbers are slightly higher for older youth 
aged 25– 34 years compared to older adults aged 35 years or older.
Relatedly, the transition rates of young self- employed under 25  years sug-
gest that for many younger youth, self- employment is a temporary option only 
(for details, see Masso et al. 2015, 14– 17, 65– 67, 70– 73). Of the self- employed 
aged 15– 24 years in 2011, in the following year 6.1% were unemployed, 8.1% 
were working as salaried employees, and 7.7% were inactive in the labor market. 
Overall, transition rates out of self- employment decrease with increasing age. Of 
the older self- employed youth aged 25– 34 years in 2011, in the following year 
3.1% were unemployed, 4.7% were working as salaried employees, and 3.2% 
were labor market inactive. The shares for self- employed adults aged 35– 64 years 
amounted to 2% being unemployed in the following year, 2.2% becoming sala-
ried employees, and 3.3% being labor market inactive.
The finding that transition rates out of self- employment decrease by increasing 
age can be interpreted as partly resulting from a higher share of involuntary self- 
employment among youth. For some of those young self- employed who moved 
into salaried employment, running their own business may have functioned as 
a steppingstone to a less insecure job. On the other hand, young people may, 
Table 20.1 Labor market status transitions of young youth (aged 15– 24 years), older 
youth (aged 25– 34 years), and older adults (aged 35– 64 years) in EU27 countries, 
2011– 2012
Labor market  
status in 2011
Labor market status in 2012 (row %)
Age group Unemployed Self- employed
Salaried 
employed
Labor 
market 
inactive
15– 24 years Unemployed 67.9 1.4 23.8 7.0
Self- employed 6.1 78.1 8.1 7.7
Salaried employed 9.2 0.6 82.5 7.7
Labor market inactive 5.5 0.2 6.2 88.1
25– 34 years Unemployed 66.4 2.8 24.8 6.1
Self- employed 3.1 89.0 4.7 3.2
Salaried employed 6.1 0.8 90.4 2.7
Labor market inactive 10.2 1.3 13.4 75.1
35– 64 years Unemployed 72.4 2.0 16.9 8.7
Self- employed 2.0 92.5 2.2 3.3
Salaried employed 3.9 0.5 92.8 2.9
Labor market inactive 2.2 0.5 2.2 95.1
Notes: Authors’ calculations; no data for Germany, Ireland, or the United Kingdom.
Source: EU- LFS.
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on average, change jobs more often than older adults because they still have to 
determine what kind of work suits them. However, the high transition rates of 
young self- employed— especially of those younger than age 25 years— into un-
employment or labor market inactivity point to larger problems.
20.8.2. are young self- employed to be classified 
as bogus self- employed?
To analyze bogus self- employment, our second indicator of job- creation 
potential, we apply the criteria suggested by Oostveen et  al. (2013) and 
outlined previously. Data from the 2010 wave of the EWCS show that young 
self- employed under 35  years of age are likely to a similar degree as older 
adults to belong to the category of bogus self- employed (for details, see 
Masso et al. 2015, 22– 23). Among the young self- employed under 35 years 
without employees working for them, 13.4% indicate that they have only one 
client (all self- employed:  14.0%), 40.9% are not able to hire staff (all self- 
employed: 43.6%),4 and 9.7% do not make the most important decisions on 
how to run their business (all self- employed:  7.9%). Furthermore, 28.1% 
receive regular payments from their client(s) (all self- employed:  25.4%). 
We interpret regular payments as an indicator of bogus self- employment, 
too, because they are associated with dependencies typical of employer– 
employee relationships. These findings indicate that a large share of young 
self- employed people factually work in jobs resembling salaried employment 
rather than self- employment. In terms of job- creation potential, the question 
is whether these jobs would exist if the same work had to be done on the basis 
of an employment contract.
20.8.3. Do young self- employed have further 
employees working for them?
Our third indicator refers to the employment of further people. According to 
EU- SILC data for 2012, the majority of young self- employed run their business 
without employees working for them (for details, see Masso et al. 2015, 17– 20). 
Within the group of the younger self- employed under 25 years of age, only 11.2% 
have one or more employees working for them. For older youth aged 25– 34 years, 
this share increases to 21.8%, whereas 27.7% of the self- employed adults aged 
35– 64 years have at least one employee. Within all age groups, compared to men, 
fewer women have employees. The correlation of age with number of employees 
could be due to various reasons, such as longer life of the business associated 
with growth or different sectors. These findings appear to curb the hope that 
young self- employed serve as a source of further job creation.
Altogether, these findings provide a comprehensive insight into youth self- 
employment in Europe. However, although the statistical analyses showed that 
youth self- employment has many shapes (e.g., in terms of the size and the sector 
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of the business), they cannot identify what exactly is behind a statistical case. To 
obtain a better understanding of the concrete circumstances under which young 
self- employed people work, further investigation at the micro level of analysis is 
needed. In Section 20.9, we take such a micro perspective, focusing on selected 
cases of young self- employed people.
20.9. FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH YOUNG 
SELF- EMPLOYED PEOPLE
Building on the findings from a macro perspective on youth self- employment 
in Europe, we turn in this section to a micro perspective. Our case studies in 
the CCI and ICT sectors based on semistructured interviews and further com-
pany information offer deeper insight into job quality and job- creation poten-
tial. In the analysis of this qualitative material, certain patterns emerged in these 
regards— related to the business success of the start- up and subjective concerns 
of the founders regarding social protection. We identified four such patterns that 
we present next by describing one prototypical case standing for each pattern. 
We chose the four cases that are best suited to illustrating details related to the 
job quality and the job- creation potential of young self- employed people.
Originating from Germany, Estonia, and Ireland, the four selected cases are 
embedded in different institutional, economic, and cultural contexts (see the de-
scription in Section 20.4). However, because of the small sample size of 12 cases 
in each country, our findings are not intended to make generalizations about 
country differences. Rather, by presenting these 4 cases from three countries, 
we aim at a condensed illustration of the larger trends we have identified in the 
empirical material.
Here, we first describe the four cases. Then we juxtapose the cases in order 
to carve out the specific details related to job quality and job- creation potential. 
The cases are real, but the names are pseudonyms and several details have been 
omitted to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees. We indicate the number of 
cases in our empirical material that belong to the same category as the prototyp-
ical example.
The case of Hanna from Germany, exemplifying young self- employed people 
who work hard and receive considerable income but face challenges related 
to staff (14 cases in the empirical material)
Hanna provides post- production services related to photography and video 
clips. Holding a master’s degree in arts, she taught herself how to use graphics 
software. Her company is located in a large city, where Hanna can draw on a 
large pool of national and international clients. She migrated from another 
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European country and started working as a freelancer 5 years before the in-
terview. After a few months, she had earned the initial capital for a limited 
company. Hanna did not apply for financial assistance from the state because 
she had been generating revenue from the outset and because she lacked the 
German language skills she would have needed to complete application forms.
Hanna works between 50 and 80 hours per week, often including working 
in the evenings and on bank holidays, and sometimes working during the 
night, on weekends, and during holidays. She would prefer to work less hours 
and spend more time with her two children, but she is afraid of losing her 
clients if she works less. Although Hanna perceives the financial performance 
of her business to be below the industry average, her income amounts to 
€6,000 per month before tax.5 Her skills match the job requirements very well.
Asked about risks associated with her work as self- employed, Hanna 
indicates that at the time of founding her business she was unsure whether 
clients would like her work. Sickness is a risk, as her clients rely on her. 
Because the business depended on her, a challenging period was when she 
gave birth to her two children. Although she usually works even if she is sick, 
she perceives the risk that if something serious happened to her, the whole 
business would be affected. She tries to invest in real estate so as to have a 
pension when she is old.
Hanna has one full- time and one part- time employee, both aged younger 
than 35  years. Because she has many orders, Hanna can afford to employ 
more staff. However, she has difficulties in finding and retaining qualified 
employees. The major challenge is that job candidates expect to receive both 
training and a salary, but Hanna is too busy to devote much of her time to 
instructing new staff because she has to carry out the regular work herself. In 
addition, she has had bad experiences regarding employees who quit their job 
once they have received training from her. She wishes to find employees with 
appropriate skills or the willingness to earn only a little during the training 
stage and to stay with her company for a longer period of time.
The case of Bettina from Germany, exemplifying young self- employed 
people who are creative and perfectionists but in a precarious economic 
situation (21 cases in the empirical material)
Bettina is a sole trader in fashion design. After obtaining a master’s degree 
and working for several years abroad at a large, high- quality fashion company, 
she realized a long- cherished desire and founded her own label. Bettina has 
no employees but does have a few temporary interns. Although she learned 
a lot during her previous job, she thinks that it would have been better if 
she had entered self- employment immediately after her studies when she had 
more energy and better social networks. Setting up her own label initially 
 
Business start-ups 613
   613
went well, but then Bettina became pregnant and had to take a break for sev-
eral months. She is currently a single parent without financial support from 
the child’s father.
Bettina works approximately 40 hours per week. She never works on 
Sundays, but sometimes she works in the evening or at night, on Saturdays, 
on bank holidays, and during holidays. She perceives herself as having a 
good work– life balance, particularly when she compares the current working 
hours with those of her previous job as a salaried employee in a leadership 
position. The financial performance of the business is comparatively low. 
Bettina has difficulty assessing her monthly takings from the business and 
her total income. Roughly, monthly takings are less than €2,000, and Bettina 
earns less than €500 per month after tax. She receives financial assistance 
from the public employment service, supplemented by social benefits. An 
investor had been interested in her company, but Bettina decided to stay in-
dependent because she highly appreciates her autonomy regarding design, 
materials, and working style. Although her move from salaried employment 
to self- employment was associated with a considerable loss of income and 
social security, Bettina prefers her current situation over the previous one. 
She regularly contributes to a sickness insurance scheme and a pension 
scheme, which is covered by the social benefits she receives.
Bettina would like to hire staff in the future because she still has many 
ideas she would like to follow through on. However, it is unclear at what time 
the financial performance of her label will be good enough to pay salaries.
The case of Sofia from Estonia, exemplifying young self- employed people 
with a good business partner, a solid business, and a down- to- earth mindset 
(20 cases in the empirical material)
Sofia runs a company specializing in embroidery, sewing, and female fashion 
design. She jointly founded the company with another woman. The two 
women decided to start their own firm when one of them moved to another 
city and could not find a job matching her skills and the other had been made 
redundant and was thus also searching for a job in which she could utilize her 
professional skills in fashion design. The two women started with their own 
funds and took loans from their relatives. After a few months in business, they 
successfully applied for state funding to invest in machinery. The company 
operates on the local market; there is good demand, and the financial perfor-
mance is above industry average.
Sofia earns less than €500 per month.6 She works 40 hours per week, some-
times in the evenings and at night or on Saturdays, but never on Sundays, 
during holidays, or on bank holidays. Living with her husband and small 
children, she perceives her work– life balance as being good. Her skills set 
 
614 Challenging Futures For Youth
614
perfectly matches the job requirements. She does not see any risks related to 
social security. Rather, when she founded the company, she was concerned 
about her products and the size of her customer base. Later, she perceived 
difficulties associated with lack of managerial skills and lack of skilled staff.
Sofia’s company employs three full- time employees, all of whom are aged 
older than 50 years. Because the order situation is good, she could hire further 
employees. However, Sofia and her partner lack the time and money to stra-
tegically invest in the company’s growth. Sofia also sees a shortage of skilled 
job candidates, and in the past she had to deal with employees who had a poor 
work ethic, especially young employees.
The case of David from Ireland, exemplifying young self- employed people 
who are innovative, run a growing business, and postpone thinking about 
social insurance to the future (17 cases in the empirical material)
David runs a company that provides an Internet platform to connect 
customers with cleaning professionals. He holds a bachelor’s degree related to 
information technology (IT) and founded the company immediately after fin-
ishing his studies. He rejected a job offer by an IT company and preferred en-
tering self- employment, aiming at doing something he loved to do, working 
for himself, and developing his own idea. Although less than 1 year in opera-
tion, the business has already created revenue. However, the monthly takings 
are less than €1,000 before tax.7 The company has no employees, and David 
does not receive a salary from his company. Because he has a convincing busi-
ness plan, David receives financial assistance from several state programs.
David works between 60 and 70 hours per week; he works sometimes in 
the evenings but never at night, usually on Saturdays and during holidays, 
and sometimes on Sundays and bank holidays. He is single and lives alone. 
He perceives himself as having a good work– life balance and especially enjoys 
flexibility because he can work from anywhere. He can utilize his skills, and he 
appreciates the fact that through running his own business he can learn a lot.
David expressed no concerns about social protection regarding his job 
status as self- employed. He does not contribute to any insurance schemes. 
Given his young age, he plans to go 2 or 3 years without any social security and 
to look more, as he gets older, into pensions, health care, and other insurance. 
The major risk factors he saw when he started his own business included lack 
of finances and the risk of personal failure. David is less concerned about fi-
nancial losses, but he fears that if his business fails, people would question his 
ability. At the time of the interview, David sees the major risks as originating 
from upcoming competitors on the market and from having employees that 
have to be paid.
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David plans to employ staff in the future. He wants to hire 15 full- time 
employees within the next 3  years. He perceives no challenges related to 
hiring employees because he believes that many people want to work for a 
start- up, which— according to his experience— is seen as a “cool thing” to do.
20.9.1. Discussion of the interview findings
The micro perspective highlights several topics related to youth self- employment 
that were hidden in the macro perspective. Regarding job quality, the presented 
cases illustrate different patterns of working hours and income as well as under-
lying reasons. Whereas all four interviewees indicated that their job requires them 
to work long hours, Hanna does so because she is interested in retaining clients 
and has difficulty delegating work. David works long hours, too, but it seems that 
he does so more voluntarily than Hanna. Bettina and Sofia work less hours. The 
working times of the latter two women are restricted by their family responsibilities, 
whereby Sofia has the advantage that she can share working tasks with her busi-
ness partner. All interviewees emphasized that one of the major advantages of 
self- employment is flexibility of working time— despite the long working hours 
overall— and working place. Because the three women have children, they espe-
cially benefit from flexibility, but David also highly appreciates the flexibility.
Whereas Hanna and Sofia earn their living from work, Bettina and David 
depend on subsistence provided by the state. David appears to be in a less dif-
ficult situation compared to Bettina. David receives a large amount of financial 
assistance related to planned investments and business growth. Living without 
a family, for a certain period of time he can make ends meet even without a 
regular salary from his company. In contrast, Bettina belongs to the group of 
precarious workers. Working without pay may be more prevalent among young 
self- employed compared to older adults because young people may believe that 
they are still at a stage of learning and training within their vocational career. 
Even Hanna, who was able to make a living from the beginning and at the time 
of the interview was receiving a high salary, trained herself without getting paid. 
Later on, she accepted poorly paid orders because she needed them to build up 
her service portfolio, a customer base, and her reputation.
At the time of the interviews, Hanna’s income was more than 10 times as high 
as Sofia’s, reflecting different service/ product markets and national income levels. 
However, Sofia appears to be more satisfied with both her business and her co- 
workers compared to Hanna. The underlying reasons may include the different 
points of reference in terms of national contexts and the different experiences re-
lated to colleagues and employees: Sofia has worse alternative job opportunities 
in the Estonian fashion industry compared to Hanna in her market segment in 
Germany. At the same time, whereas Sofia perceived the financial performance 
of her company as above average, Hanna viewed her company’s performance as 
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below average. Furthermore, although both women reported that they were dis-
appointed by former employees and job candidates, Sofia eventually found three 
employees with whom she was satisfied. In addition, Sofia benefits from the pro-
fessional and social support of her business partner.
A further important topic related to job quality is professional skills and the 
degree to which skills sets match job requirements. Echoing our findings based 
on EWCS data, all the interviewees emphasized that they can utilize their skills 
and that they continue to learn while running their business. In particular, for 
Sofia, a major incentive for founding her own business was that she wanted to 
utilize her skills. Although for all working people the utilization of skills and fur-
ther learning opportunities are viewed as important, this particularly holds true 
for young people because they need to create a solid body of knowledge, skills, 
and abilities for their future career. Thereby, all interviewees expressed their 
strong desire to do at work those things at which they are best. They repeatedly 
described their work as something they really love to do. Especially for youth, 
this typical feature of self- employment will contribute to personal development.
On the other hand, the interviewees also perceived several risks related 
to self- employment. However, although in the interviews we explicitly asked 
about risks related to social protection, the interviewees actually mainly re-
ferred to business failure. In contrast, their long- term future and social in-
surance coverage only played a minor role. Apparently, business comes first, 
and the interviewees were much more concerned about potential competitors, 
lack of clients, or lack of money. Although the interviewees were well aware of 
the consequences of business failure, such as poverty or unemployment, they 
put far more emphasis on their business than on their private situation. This 
finding holds true for the whole sample of 72 interviews. Even if interviewees 
expressed their concerns about becoming sick without sickness pay or if they 
said it was unfair that social protection legislation differentiates between self- 
employed and salaried employed, their major concerns basically revolved 
around their businesses.
Of the four cases presented previously, David is illustrative of those young 
self- employed who believe they are too young to think about social insurance. 
Hanna and Bettina are aware that they must take care of social security, and 
they act accordingly. Sofia perceives that the question about social security risks 
was not relevant in the Estonian context. However, although in some European 
countries social security legislation provides self- employed with buffers against 
socioeconomic downfall, these people may be at disadvantage. For instance, 
young self- employed persons may have lower entitlements to social security over 
their entire life cycle if their earnings have been low and/ or if their contributions 
were discontinuous. Indeed, after a detailed analysis of social protection for de-
pendent self- employed across the EU, Eichhorst et al. (2013) concluded, “It is 
doubtful that most dependent self- employed workers sufficiently improve their 
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income over time and save enough to compensate for insufficient public pension 
entitlements” (p. 9). These authors express serious concerns for potentially high 
levels of risk of old- age poverty among self- employed EU citizens in the future.
Regarding the job- creation potential of youth self- employment, apparently all 
four interviewees created jobs that would not exist otherwise, as they invented 
new services or products. Thereby, the jobs of Bettina and David are not self- 
sustaining so far but, rather, financed by the public employment service and state 
programs, respectively. In contrast, both Hanna’s and Sofia’s work generate suf-
ficient income. In addition, Hanna and Sofia created jobs for further employees. 
However, they faced challenges related to personnel recruitment. In partic-
ular, they reported on negative experiences related to employees’ lack of skills 
and poor work ethic. Although these issues present challenges for all kinds of 
firms, they will affect young self- employed more than older adults because the 
young may more often lack professional skills in human resource management. 
Moreover, apparently there is a danger that young self- employed seek out people 
with skills and work ethics very similar to their own, leading to disappointment 
if they see that there are no “clones” of themselves on the labor market.
In summary, although our analyses based on the EWCS suggest that the 
job- creation potential of youth self- employment is moderate only, the case 
studies shed light on experiences of young self- employed and rationales be-
hind these findings. Furthermore, the four cases illustrate that the job quality 
of young self- employed is intertwined with job- creation potential because the 
interviewees were searching for employees who were willing to work under the 
same conditions as the interviewees themselves. However, because many job 
candidates refuse to accept these working conditions, the job- creation potential 
is only small, in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
It is important to note several limitations related to our case- study analysis. 
To reduce complexity, we concentrated on very few countries and relatively 
small labor market segments. In particular, because we selected the creative and 
ICT sectors, the finding that the young self- employed appreciate autonomy and 
the opportunity to realize their wishes may be more pronounced than in the 
transport/ logistics, retail, or food service industry. Thus, future case study re-
search should also take account of sectors such as these. Thereby, job quality re-
lated to bogus self- employment could be considered— a topic that did not arise 
in our study because none of the interviewees are categorized as bogus self- 
employed. In addition, our analyses are based on cross- sectional data. Although 
our sample comprised self- employed people at different stages, ranging from 
less than 1 year after founding their business to more than 4 years later, we were 
not able to trace them over time. Accordingly, future research applying a lon-
gitudinal design should cover longer time periods. Specifically, consideration 
of (formerly) self- employed at older ages and after business failure would be 
important.
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20.10. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter examined the job quality and the job- creation potential of self- 
employed people younger than age 35 years. The analysis on the basis of EWCS 
data revealed a somewhat mixed picture in terms of pay and hours worked. The 
young self- employed report comparatively low work intensity, indicating scope 
for a good work– life balance. On the other hand, this finding may also reflect 
under- employment. Importantly, young self- employed see good opportunities 
for learning and career development. Among the young self- employed, women 
tend to report better working conditions compared to men. Nevertheless, large 
shares of the total group of young self- employed do not believe they are well paid 
for their job and believe that their job offers limited career advancement. The 
case studies of young self- employed in the creative and ICT sectors additionally 
showed that despite the long working hours and sometimes very low income, self- 
employment has the advantage of providing young people with autonomy and an 
opportunity to utilize their skills. However, the interviews also highlighted that 
young self- employed see more risks related to their business than related to their 
private situation in terms of social protection. Because young self- employed 
have only limited social protection in many European countries (Eichhorst et al. 
2013; European Commission 2014), a lack of awareness of the associated risks 
or insufficient financial means for contributing to optional insurance schemes is 
worrying. Thus, policies that expand the social security of salaried employees to 
the self- employed are needed and should address various issues, such as health 
insurance, sickness and disability pay, maternity/ paternity pay, unemployment 
benefits, and pension coverage.
There already exist national welfare systems that take account of the 
particularities of self- employed workers. Examples include the health care system 
of the United Kingdom, which provides high- quality health care for all citizens 
without monthly contributions to be paid by the beneficiaries. Spain has a com-
prehensive legal framework related to its special system for the self- employed, 
including the establishment of benefits for the cessation of self- employment ac-
tivity and temporary sick leave, along with maternity/ paternity pay. In Austria 
and Germany, the self- employed can opt in to public unemployment insurance. 
However, as long as young self- employed are not concerned about their futures 
or if their business profits are too small to cover insurance contributions, they 
may not take this option.
This chapter has also highlighted that the job- creation potential associated 
with youth self- employment is only limited. The analysis based on EU- LFS 
data showed that only a few young people exit unemployment by means of be-
coming self- employed. At the same time, a non- negligible share of young self- 
employed become unemployed. A considerable share of young self- employed 
are categorized as bogus self- employed, and only a small share have employees. 
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Our case study findings in the creative and ICT sectors indicate that the main 
obstacles to hiring employees are financial costs and difficulties in finding 
candidates with appropriate skills and work ethic. Accordingly, policies that 
promote job creation should comprise measures to address these issues, such 
as wage subsidies, assistance in finding qualified personnel, or targeted training 
of job candidates.
Our findings related to bogus self- employment and the hiring of employees 
also point to the need for policymakers to specify the target groups of policies 
aiming at the promotion of self- employment (for details, see Sheehan et  al. 
2016). Likewise, evaluation of policy measures should consider different 
forms of self- employment. Furthermore, there is a need to carefully assess 
the employment status of the self- employed working in “human clouds” and 
organizations that rely on the self- employed for their competitive advantage. 
For example, Uber regards contracted drivers as “partners,” who are thus not 
protected by labor law. Despite the heavy critique coming from trade unions, 
Uber’s competitors, researchers, and the courts (for a summary, see Adam 
et al. 2016), presumably other firms will adopt this business model in the fu-
ture. In general, the so- called “collaborative” and “sharing” economy is in need 
of specification and regulation. Although the European Commission (2016a) 
has indicated general support for these rapidly growing forms of economy, 
new questions of social security arise. For instance, it is difficult to distinguish 
between those people who provide services on an occasional basis and those 
who do so in a professional way. However, those people who view their activi-
ties within the collaborative economy as a main source of earning a living face 
the problem that they lack both social protection and protection by labor law.
In summary, for some young people, self- employment presents an option that 
offers high- quality jobs, as perceived by the young self- employed themselves. 
In particular, young self- employed people report that they can use and further 
develop their skills, and they appreciate the high degrees of autonomy and flex-
ibility. However, job quality is impaired by poor social protection, with severe 
negative consequences especially in the long term. The actual volume of jobs 
created through self- employment lags behind what politicians had expected, 
and further policy measures are needed in order to realize existing job- creation 
potential in the future. Such policy measures would include mentoring and 
job- shadowing initiatives between established self- employed and young people 
exploring this career trajectory, as well as easier access to seed funding and other 
kinds of support for aspiring self- employed. Policies will also need to address 
the high risks associated with self- employment, especially in relation to unem-
ployment, health care, and pension benefits. Overall, given the large amount of 
resources targeted at promoting self- employment within the EU, there is an im-
portant need for policies that address the current and future well- being of the 
young self- employed.
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NOTES
1 We thank the following colleagues for dedicated and fruitful collabora-
tion:  Beata Buchelt, Begoña Cueto, Anna Fohrbeck, María C.  González 
Menéndez, Robin Hinks, Eneli Kindsiko, Andrea McNamara, Nigel 
Meager, Kadri Paes, Urban Pauli, Aleksy Pocztowski, Sam Swift, and 
Silvana Weiss. We are also grateful to Brendan Burchell and Traute Meyer, 
who provided helpful comments on previous versions of the chapter, as 
well as to Janine Leschke, Jacqueline O’Reilly, and Martin Seeleib- Kaiser 
for their guidance in preparing the text. Jaan Masso acknowledges finan-
cial support from the Estonian Research Agency project No. IUT20– 49, 
“Structural Change as the Factor of Productivity Growth in the Case of 
Catching Up Economies.”
2 Increases in youth self- employment rates can also reflect a decline in salaried 
employment. The absolute numbers of salaried employed and self- employed 
in Spain, Italy, Cyprus, and Greece for 2002 and 2014 based on EU- LFS data 
do not support this reasoning, however.
3 The means and confidence intervals are as follows: All self- employed: €1,588 
(1,533; 1,643); all young (aged 18– 24 years): €1,103 (1,087; 1,120); young self- 
employed (aged 25– 34 years): €1,272 (1,182; 1,361); and young self- employed 
women (aged 18– 34 years): €1,160 (1,041; 1,279).
4 The high share of young self- employed who indicated that they are not able to 
hire staff may have resulted from a misunderstanding because the respondents 
may have evaluated their (lacking) resources for hiring staff instead of the 
mere freedom to make a decision.
5 In 2015, the median gross labor income in Germany amounted to €1,928 per 
month (Eurostat 2017).
6 In 2015, the median gross labor income in Estonia amounted to €834 per 
month (Eurostat 2017).
7 In 2015, the median gross labor income in Ireland amounted to €2,246 per 
month (Eurostat 2017).
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APPENDIX
Wording of the items capturing working conditions and response categories 
considered in Figure 20.3, as taken from the EWCS:
Well paid for work:  “I am well paid for the work I  do”— strongly agree; 
agree (not: neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree).
Working at high speed less than half the time:  “Does your job involve 
working at very high speed?”— never; almost never; around ¼ of the 
time (not: around half of the time; around ¾ of the time; almost all of 
the time; all of the time).
Good fit between working hours and social commitments: “Do your working 
hours fit in with your family or social commitments outside work?”— 
very well; well; (not: not very well; not at all well).
Feeling at home in the organization: “I feel at home in this organization”— 
strongly agree; agree (not: neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly 
disagree).
Health and safety not at risk because of work: “Do you think your health or 
safety is at risk because of your work?”— no (not: yes).
Being able to do job at age 60:  “Do you think you will be able to do the 
same job you are doing now when you are 60 years old?”— yes, I think 
so (not: no, I don’t think so; I wouldn’t want to).
Job involves learning new things: “Generally, does your main paid job in-
volve learning new things?”— yes (not: no).
Job offers good prospects for career advancement:  “My job offers good 
prospects for career advancement”— strongly agree; agree (not: neither 
agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree).
Expect not to lose job in next 6  months:  “I might lose my job in the next 
6 months”— strongly agree; agree (not: neither agree nor disagree; disagree; 
strongly disagree).
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ARE THE WORK VALUES OF THE YOUNGER 
GENERATIONS CHANGING?
Gábor Hajdu and Endre Sik
21.1. INTRODUCTION
A common stereotype emerging in political speeches and everyday intellectual 
conversations about the younger generations paints them as increasingly less 
work oriented. Specifically, they are seen to be increasingly less motivated with 
regard to finding a job and working hard in the interests of developing a career. 
In comparison to older generations, the value of work as a significant part of 
personal identity is believed to be declining. It is often assumed that one of the 
consequences of increased labor market flexibility and precarious employment 
has been to create weaker incentives to build a career or invest in long- term 
human capital. The seeming impossibility of achieving what previous genera-
tions obtained in terms of career jobs (with attractive benefits and pensions) 
may generate attempts to reduce cognitive dissonance by rejecting the value of 
these achievements. It is thought that these attitudinal trends are likely to be 
exacerbated by the growing obstacles to labor market entry, lengthening spells 
of unemployment, and/ or the spread of precarious work. If these arguments are 
true, youth- oriented European Union (EU) or national labor market policies will 
fail because the new entrants to the labor market (and even more so those who 
cannot enter at all) will in any case not respond positively to them.
In this chapter, instead of testing the existing theories of generational 
differences, our research aim is exploratory: We test empirically whether work 
values indeed differ between birth cohorts (with an emphasis on the youngest 
cohorts), age groups, and time periods. Specifically, we analyze whether the 
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centrality of work varies by birth date, age, and time period,1 using large cross- 
national surveys from more than 30 countries (most of the European countries 
and some Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) 
countries from the Euro- Atlantic area).
Sections 21.2 and 21.3 describe the conceptual basis of the analysis, the main 
characteristics of the data, and the methodology applied. In Section 21.4, we 
first illustrate the trends for attitudes regarding the centrality of work and then 
test the role of age, time period, and birth cohorts with respect to these trends. 
Section 21.5 concludes that given the lack of evidence of significant gaps between 
birth cohorts with regard to relative centrality of work, there is not a generational 
divide in contemporary Europe with respect to work values.
21.2. BACKGROUND
21.2.1. Birth cohort versus generation
We decided to use the concept of birth cohort as opposed to generation for 
our analysis because the latter concept is rife with ambiguities. The term gen-
eration refers to individuals born at approximately the same time. From this, 
it follows that they experience more or less similar historical and life events 
during their early years. The underlying assumption is that because in their 
childhood and adolescent periods they are influenced by actors with similar 
value systems and are exposed to identical events and developments (news, 
economic or social booms and crises, technological innovation, policy and po-
litical influences, etc.), the values they hold will be rather similar, and they 
will be different from those of all other generations. It is also assumed that 
this impact is the strongest during an individual’s childhood and adolescence 
and remains relatively stable from then on (Harpaz and Fu 2002). The stability 
of such generation- specific values offers a chance for a generation to develop 
into a social group with a shared loose form of self- consciousness and identity 
(Diepstraten, Ester, and Vinken 1999).
The consciousness of a generation is a stochastic and dynamic social phenom-
enon. In other words, if it emerges at all, there should be a significant event such 
as a war or a revolution, a brand- new technology, or some other major phenom-
enon to lay the foundation of the new generation. If such an impetus is strong 
enough to mobilize a group of young people who are in a position to influence 
their fellows from the same cohort in identifying themselves as an “imagined 
generational community,” then the nucleus of a generation may appear. If such a 
feeling of generational community takes hold, then the shared set of values and 
goals becomes the common denominator of a generation.
The essence of this generation concept is well captured by the concept of 
generation subculture theory, which is defined by Egri and Ralston (2004) as 
follows:
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Significant macro- level social, political, and economic events that occurred 
during a birth cohort’s impressionable pre- adult years result in a gener-
ational identity comprised of a distinctive set of values, beliefs, expecta-
tions, and behaviors that remain relatively stable throughout a generation’s 
lifetime. . . . A generation’s values orientation becomes more pervasive in 
a national culture as it becomes the majority in societal positions of power 
and influence. (p. 210)
Although seemingly concise and elegant, there are several problems with the 
generation concept. For example,
 • It is much too loosely defined timewise, in that it sometimes covers more 
than a decade, which might be too long to assume that the members of a 
generation indeed have similar experiences.
 • The characteristics used to capture the main features of generations 
are often based on anecdotal evidence or on invalid and unreliable 
survey data.
 • The assumption that there are global generations (i.e., a generation can 
be defined by the same characteristics all over the planet) is very likely a 
myth.2 Even if generations are rather similar across different countries, 
they can be very different in terms of historical moment: Their period-
ization depends on a country’s specific timeline of technological, polit-
ical, and policy development.
Unlike the generational approach, the birth cohort is usually narrowly 
defined— in demography, for example, usually as a 5- year- wide “mini- 
generation.” Moreover, the birth cohort does not fluctuate according to vague, 
quasi- theoretical assumptions usually based on technological– political changes 
in the United States.
21.2.2. Work values
Work values form a core subset of the general value system (Wuthnow 2008; Jin 
and Rounds 2012). They have been the target of several large- scale comparative 
projects since the 1970s and 1980s that use quantitative databases to describe the 
differences between citizens from various countries with respect to the centrality 
of work in their lives (Roe and Ester 1999). Most of these studies have treated 
work- related values (Roe and Ester 1999)
as expressions of more general life values. . . . All definitions treat values as 
latent constructs that refer to the way in which people evaluate activities 
or outcomes. . . . Holders of values are not necessarily individuals but may 
also be collectivities, i.e. the people belonging to a certain occupational 
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group, a firm, a subculture, a community, a national category, or a country. 
(pp. 2– 4)
To understand the association between values and other socioeconomic char-
acteristics of society, as well as the relationship between value systems in gen-
eral and work values in particular, large quantitative data sets have been used 
since the 1980s for comparative analysis of work values (Wuthnow 2008). Since 
the late 1990s, a promising new direction in comparative quantitative research 
on values (cultural economics) has emerged, rephrasing old questions in a new 
format using large- scale surveys carried out in several countries (e.g., the World 
Value Survey, the European Values Study, and the International Social Survey 
Programme) to analyze the high inertia of culture.3
In the course of our analysis, we used “centrality of work” as the dependent 
variable. This term covers both paid and unpaid work and measures the atti-
tude of the respondent toward work in general— in other words, how impor-
tant work is for a respondent as a part of his or her life and identity.4 Centrality 
of work (under various names) is a core concept in organization, business, and 
management sciences, in which it is considered a crucial aspect of activity in 
a workplace. From the employees’ viewpoint, it is necessary to achieve higher 
income and subjective well- being, satisfaction, a career, and so forth; from the 
employers’ viewpoint, it is the primary source of commitment to hard work, ef-
ficiency, informal and on- the- job training, and so on (Hansen and Leuty 2012).
21.2.3. Previous literature
The most widely accepted hypothesis regarding the trend followed by centrality 
of work is that generations have different attitudes toward work to the extent that 
(Tolbize 2008)
the perceived decline in work ethic is perhaps one of the major 
contributors of generational conflicts in the workplace. Generation X 
for instance, has been labelled the “slacker” generation, and employers 
complain that younger workers are uncommitted to their jobs and work 
only the required hours and little more. Conversely, Boomers may be 
workaholics . . . while “Traditionals” have been characterized as the most 
hardworking generation. (p. 5)
This hypothesis dominates the discourse despite the fact that a meta- analysis of 
generation- specific work values (Costanza et al. 2012) found moderate or zero 
differences between generational membership and work- related attitudes.
Other research combining longitudinal panel data between 1981 and 1993 
and a representative survey of the Israeli Jewish labor force in 1993 analyzed how 
time period, cohort, and life course (in our vocabulary, age group) affect work 
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values (primarily the importance of work). The study concluded that in contrast 
to other developed countries, the centrality of work has strengthened in Israel 
since the early 1980s (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007, 103– 4).
Kowske, Rasch, and Wiley (2010) analyzed the role of time period, age, 
and cohort on work values (satisfaction with company/ job, recognition, ca-
reer, security, pay, and turnover intentions) among generations of Americans 
with a special focus on the so- called millennial generation. According to their 
research,
Work attitudes differed across generations, although effect sizes were rel-
atively small and depended on the work attitude. Compared to Boomers 
and GenXers, Millennials reported higher levels of overall company and 
job satisfaction, satisfaction with job security, recognition, and career 
development and advancement, but reported similar levels of satisfac-
tion with pay and benefits and the work itself, and turnover intentions. 
(p. 265)
According to these authors, the role of generations is significantly weaker than 
a set of labor- market sensitive individual factors such as gender, industry, and 
occupation (p. 273).
Regarding the impact of different generations, Kowske et  al. (2010) found 
curvilinear trends (i.e., U- shaped curves) in the case of all work values. This 
means that the least satisfied with the various aspects of work were the late baby 
boomers, whereas the “GI” (born around the time of World War II) and millen-
nial generations were the most satisfied (the latter especially with recognition 
and career). However, the most important conclusion of their analysis was that 
contrary to the popular view of the role of generation with respect to the labor 
market, “generational differences might be re- named ‘generational similarities’ ” 
(p. 275).
To conclude, we quote a more recent overview in which the authors convinc-
ingly summarize the theoretical and methodological state of the art of research 
on generations (Becton, Walker, and Jones- Farmer 2014):
Considering the extent to which generational stereotypes are com-
monly accepted, it is surprising that empirical evidence of generational 
differences is relatively sparse, and the research that exists is somewhat 
contradictory. . . . There exists a great deal of controversy about whether or 
not generational differences exist at all with some suggesting that perceived 
generational differences are a product of popular culture versus social sci-
ence. Scholars have also noted that observed generational differences may 
be explained, at least in part, by age, life stage, or career stage effects instead 
of generation. (pp. 175– 76)
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21.3. DATA AND METHODS
The basic problem in analyzing generations stems from the fact that the effects 
of age, time period, and birth cohort are closely intertwined. Any change over 
time can be determined by any of the three effects, as can be illustrated with the 
following fictional dialogue (based on Suzuki 2012, 452):
Endre: I’m very tired, I must be getting old. (Age effect)
Gábor: You’re no spring chicken indeed, but maybe you’re crawling into 
bed early every night because life is so stressful nowadays. (Period 
effect)
Endre: Could be, but you seem to be tired too. The truth is, you young 
people are not as fit as we used to be at your age. (Cohort effect)
21.3.1. the problem of decomposing the effects 
of age, period, and birth cohort
Because age, time period (year of the survey), and birth cohort (year of birth) are 
linearly interdependent, their effects cannot be simultaneously estimated using 
standard regression models (Firebaugh 1997; Yang and Land 2006, 2008). A pos-
sible solution to this identification problem is to use a hierarchical age– period– 
cohort (HAPC) regression model (Yang and Land 2006, 2008).5
To minimize the effect of multicollinearity between age, birth cohort, and pe-
riod, we defined fixed and equal- period (year of the survey) clusters.6 In this 
grouped data, age, period (with 5- year intervals), and birth cohort (year of birth) 
are not perfectly dependent. In other words, we are no longer able to directly cal-
culate the year of birth from age and period (with 5- year intervals); nonetheless, 
remarkable multicollinearity still remains.
Moreover, whereas age is an individual- level variable, period and cohort 
are macro- level variables.7 This means that we have a multilevel data struc-
ture assuming that the attitudes of the individuals in the same birth cohort, or 
interviewed in the same year, will be more similar than those from other periods 
or birth cohorts.
Yang and Land (2006, 2008) propose cross- classified hierarchical models to 
represent clustering effects in individual survey responses by period and birth 
cohorts when using repeated cross- sectional data. In this analysis, we use these 
models where it is assumed that individuals are nested simultaneously within 
the two second- level variables (period and cohort); thus, we use cross- classified 
hierarchical regression models.8
Bell and Jones (2014), however, argue that there is no statistically and math-
ematically correct solution to the age– period– cohort identification problem 
in the absence of preliminary theoretical assumptions:  “There is no technical 
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solution to the identification problem without the imposition of strong (and cor-
rect) a priori assumptions” (p. 335). They show with simulations that in several 
scenarios, the results of the HAPC model are biased:  For example, if there is 
quadratic age effect and linear cohort trend, these effects are estimated as a pe-
riod trend. In other words, the effects of the three time- related variables might be 
assigned to each other or be combined by the effects of the other two variables. 
However, Bell and Jones also show that the model works if there are no trends for 
periods or cohorts. Given that our results show that the cohort and period effects 
are quite small, our findings should be “probably justifiable,” according to Bell 
and Jones (i.e., because the results are not biased by strong cohort and/ or period 
effects, the use of the HAPC model is feasible).
Twenge (2010) recommends another solution to avoid the identification 
problem mentioned previously by taking one step backward. She suggests using 
the time- lag method, in which individuals of the same age at different points in 
time are compared: “With age held constant, any differences are due to either 
generation (enduring differences based on birth cohort) or time period (change 
over time that affects all generations)” (p. 202). Twenge argues that because the 
impact of period is often the weakest, a time- lag design should be able to isolate 
generational differences.
Here, we first provide a descriptive analysis in which we separately model age, 
period, and birth cohort effects on work values to illustrate the main trends. Some 
of these descriptive analyses are equivalent to Twenge’s (2010) time- lag method; 
however, the results might be biased by omitted variables because they are based 
on bivariate relationships in which the sociodemographic characteristics of the 
respondents are uncontrolled. In the second step, we develop HAPC regression 
models to avoid problems stemming from the linear dependency of these three 
dimensions of time (Yang and Land 2006, 2008). As part of this exercise, we also 
separately run models for the youngest respondents (aged 18– 40  years) so as 
to meet the requirements of the time- lag method recommended by Twenge; in 
other words, individuals with more homogeneous ages are compared.
21.3.2. Data
Given that our strategy of analyzing the changing (or unchanging) attitudes 
of generations toward work was based on secondary analysis of existing large, 
repeated cross- sectional, cross- national databases, we first had to select those 
precious few questions that were asked either similarly in these surveys or 
could be made identical by recoding and therefore be used as proxies of work 
values.9
Questions about the importance of work and other aspects of life were asked 
in the questionnaires of the World Values Survey/ European Values Study (WVS/ 
EVS). Respondents were asked to answer the question, “How important is [life 
aspect] in your life?” on a 4- point scale.10 We used four variables: importance of 
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work, importance of family, importance of friends, and importance of leisure 
time. We calculated the relative importance of work as the difference between 
the importance of work and the average importance of the other three life aspects 
(i.e., family, friends, and leisure time). Thus, positive values of the variable indi-
cate that work is more important in the respondent’s life than other life aspects, 
whereas negative values indicate that it is less important than other life aspects— 
in other words, that work plays a relatively minor role in the respondent’s life.
Our analysis covers most of the European countries and some OECD coun-
tries from the Euro- Atlantic area. Table A21.1 in Appendix 2 contains the list of 
countries (arranged into three groups:  post- socialist, EU15, and other OECD 
countries) included in the various waves.
Because the question was not asked in the first wave of WVS/ EVS and the 
number of observations between 2000 and 2004 was relatively low, we only have 
data from three periods.11 Because our analysis is extremely time sensitive to the 
year of the information the analysis is based on, we decided to use the year of the 
fieldwork country by country.12
The number of observations and the means of the variable of relative cen-
trality of work by period are shown in Table 21.1. The aggregate value of relative 
centrality of work is highest in 1990– 1994, somewhat lower in 1995– 1999, and 
lowest in the mid- 2000s. This means that compared to the importance of other 
aspects of life, work was more important in the 1990s and became less so in the 
second half of the 2000s.
In the descriptive analysis, the period, the age of the respondent, and the birth 
cohorts were coded into 5- year intervals, which are conventional in age– period– 
cohort analyses (Yang, Fu, and Land 2008) and significantly shorter than those 
used in the sociological or management literature on generations. The result of 
this operation was 12 age groups (from 18– 22 to 73+ years), 3 period groups 
(1990– 1994, 1995– 1999, and 2005– 2009), and 16 cohort groups (from – 1916 to 
1987– 1991).
In the multivariate models, age was allowed to have a nonlinear (curvilinear) 
effect (squared age is also included in the models), cohorts were included as birth 
year, and periods (year of the survey) were grouped into 5- year intervals as in the 
descriptive analysis.
Table 21.1 Number of observations and average relative 
centrality of work by period
Period N Mean SD Min Max
1990– 1994 36,370 0.050 0.805 – 3 3
1995– 1999 64,407 0.023 0.810 – 3 3
2005– 2009 65,563 – 0.105 0.832 – 3 3
Total 166,340 – 0.022 0.821 – 3 3
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To control for the changing composition along the basic socioeconomic char-
acteristics of subsequent generations in our multivariate models, we used the 
following control variables:
 • Gender (binary variable, 1 = female)
 • Education (binary variable, 1 = more than secondary education)
 • Marital status (married/ living with partner, divorced/ separated, 
widowed or never married)
 • Labor force status (binary variable, 1 = respondent has a job; i.e., his or 
her employment status is “working”)
 • Type of settlement (binary variable, 1 = respondent lives in a city (with 
population >100,000))
In addition, every model contained country- fixed effects in order to control for 
time- invariant country characteristics.
21.4. RESULTS
21.4.1. the cumulated impact of age and period 
on the relative centrality of work
Table 21.2 displays the mean relative centrality of work by age group and period. 
The last column (age effect) shows that the centrality of work increases until 
age 43– 52 years and then decreases continuously. In other words, people slowly 
“learn” the importance of work, but this (centrality of work) holds only as long 
as they are in their active years. If we focus on the bottom row, we find an ag-
gregate decrease in the mean relative centrality of work (period effect) between 
1995– 1999 and 2005– 2009. This can be interpreted as indicating that work in 
general is losing its importance.
The differences by age groups and birth cohorts (the final column in Table 
21.3) show that work seems to be relatively most important in the birth cohorts 
1947– 1961 and less important for the earlier and later cohorts.
To visualize the main differences and similarities of the trends between age and 
period, we designed two closely related figures (Figure 21.1a and Figure 21.1b). 
Figure 21.1a shows the trend of the relative centrality of work by age, controlling 
for period. The general pattern (the inverted U- curve) is rather similar in the 
three periods, but the highest level of the centrality of work lasts longer (from 
age 43– 47 to age 53– 57 years) in the first period than in the second or the third 
period. For every age group, the importance of work is lowest in the final period 
(2005– 2009). Among those aged older than 53 years, work is relatively more im-
portant in the first period (1990– 1994), whereas among the younger age groups, 
there is no real difference between the first two periods.
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Figure 21.1b focuses on the trend for the relative centrality of work by pe-
riod in six age groups.13 Although the general trend is a slight decrease between 
the first two periods and a steeper decrease after 1995– 1999, centrality of work 
declines sharply after 1990– 1994 in the two oldest age groups. In the middle age 
groups, the trend is similar to the average, and they have the highest level of rel-
ative centrality of work throughout all periods. As for the youngest age groups, 
there is a slight increase between 1990– 1994 and 1995– 1999 in the group aged 
23– 27 years, whereas subsequently the decrease for both age groups is less sharp 
than in general.
21.4.2. the haPC models of the relative centrality 
of work
The HAPC regression models (Table 21.4) contain the three time- related and all 
control variables. Whereas age and squared age are included as individual- level 
variables, period (year of the survey) and cohort (year of birth) are second- level 
predictors. Random period and cohort intercepts allow level 1 intercepts to vary 
randomly by cohorts and periods; that is, they allow variation from the mean for 
each cohort and period. The models in columns 0– 5 show results from the en-
tire sample, whereas the model in column 6 covers the young (age 18– 40 years) 
individuals only.14
Comparing the six models, the sign and the size of the coefficients are fairly 
stable. Age differences become smaller with the inclusion of the other variables, 
Table 21.2 Means of relative centrality of work by age group and period (cohort 
uncontrolled)
Age group 
(years)
Period
1990– 1994 1995– 1999 2005– 2009 Total
18– 22 – 0.095 – 0.115 – 0.236 – 0.155
23– 27 – 0.028 – 0.006 – 0.090 – 0.042
28– 32 – 0.008 0.028 – 0.035 – 0.004
33– 37 0.054 0.062 – 0.027 0.028
38– 42 0.120 0.128 0.037 0.091
43– 47 0.189 0.165 0.043 0.122
48– 52 0.181 0.170 0.049 0.123
53– 57 0.176 0.100 – 0.018 0.066
58– 62 0.111 0.009 – 0.113 – 0.018
63– 67 0.036 – 0.077 – 0.312 – 0.144
68– 72 – 0.038 – 0.116 – 0.334 – 0.186
73+ – 0.152 – 0.245 – 0.409 – 0.308
Total 0.050 0.023 – 0.105 – 0.022
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Table 21.3 Means of relative centrality of work by birth cohort and age group (period uncontrolled)
Age
Cohort 18– 22 23– 27 28– 32 33– 37 38– 42 43– 47 48– 52 53– 57 58– 62 63– 67 68– 72 73+ Total
– 1916 – 0.225 – 0.225
1917– 1921 – 0.107 – 0.250 – 0.190
1922– 1926 – 0.004 – 0.082 – 0.312 – 0.173
1927– 1931 0.056 – 0.073 – 0.081 – 0.429 – 0.138
1932– 1936 0.151 0.064 – 0.034 – 0.408 – 0.339 – 0.081
1937– 1941 0.154 0.118 0.032 – 0.403 – 0.300 – 0.056
1942– 1946 0.168 0.169 0.121 – 0.201 – 0.266 0.006
1947– 1951 0.107 0.168 0.185 – 0.106 – 0.073 0.074
1952– 1956 0.046 0.113 0.178 0.009 0.023 0.087
1957– 1961 – 0.028 0.059 0.141 0.036 0.068 0.069
1962– 1966 – 0.035 0.009 0.066 0.014 0.046 0.028
1967– 1971 – 0.097 – 0.042 0.042 – 0.057 0.048 – 0.004
1972– 1976 – 0.114 0.012 – 0.032 – 0.012 – 0.021
1977– 1981 – 0.112 – 0.095 – 0.036 – 0.079
1982– 1986 – 0.168 – 0.088 – 0.114
1987– 1991 – 0.268 – 0.268
Total – 0.155 – 0.042 – 0.004 0.028 0.091 0.122 0.123 0.066 – 0.018 – 0.144 – 0.186 – 0.308 – 0.022
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given that there is collinearity between age and other variables (e.g., labor force 
status or marital status). Focusing on the role of the three time variables, we 
find that although they have a significant impact on the centrality of work, this 
is small compared to the impact of the non- age individual variables and the 
country- fixed effects.
The visualized results (Figure 21.2) show that— controlling for period, birth 
cohort, and relevant sociodemographic characteristics— the centrality of work 
increases from age 18 years, reaches a peak at approximately age 50 years, and 
decreases thereafter. This result is similar to that of the uncontrolled inverted 
0.3
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Figure 21.1 Means of centrality of work by (a) age in the three periods and (b) period in seven 
age groups.
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Table 21.4 HAPC models of centrality of work
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All All All Youth 
(18– 40 years)
Individual effect B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Age – 0.0011*** (0.000) – 0.0008*** (0.000) 0.0024*** (0.000) 0.0021*** (0.000) 0.0026*** (0.000) – 0.0013 (0.003)
Age squared – 0.0004*** (0.000) – 0.0004*** (0.000) – 0.0004*** (0.000) – 0.0003*** (0.000) – 0.0003*** (0.000) – 0.0003*** (0.000)
Female – 0.0659*** (0.004) – 0.0646*** (0.004) – 0.0687*** (0.006)
Education: More 
than secondary
– 0.0710*** (0.005) – 0.0339*** (0.005) – 0.0676*** (0.006)
Employment 
status: Working
0.1831*** (0.005) 0.2064*** (0.005) 0.1160*** (0.006)
Type of 
settlement: City
– 0.0607*** (0.004) – 0.0491*** (0.004) – 0.0518*** (0.006)
Marital status
Single Ref. Ref. Ref.
Married/ living 
with partner
0.0122** (0.006) – 0.0007 (0.006) 0.0150** (0.007)
Divorced/ 
separated
0.0603*** (0.009) 0.0769*** (0.009) 0.1002*** (0.013)
Widowed 0.0051 (0.010) – 0.0381*** (0.010) 0.0623* (0.036)
Intercept – 0.0233*** (0.002) 0.0899*** (0.003) 0.0987** (0.040) 0.1294** (0.051) 0.0540 (0.046) 0.0236 (0.060) 0.0180 (0.044)
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Variance 
component
Variance SE Variance SE Variance SE Variance SE Variance SE Variance SE Variance SE
Individual 0.6822*** (0.001) 0.6661*** (0.001) 0.6613*** (0.001) 0.6600*** (0.001) 0.6510*** (0.001) 0.6175*** (0.001) 0.0028*** (0.001)
Period 0.0047*** (0.002) 0.0076*** (0.003) 0.0061*** (0.003) 0.0074*** (0.003) 0.0224*** (0.003)
Cohort 0.0055*** (0.002) 0.0030*** (0.001) 0.0024*** (0.000) 0.0004*** (0.000)
Country 0.0381*** (0.004) 0.5059*** (0.001)
N 166,340 166,340 166,340 166,340 166,340 166,340 70,664
AIC 408,443.9 404,466.7 403,287.3 403,187.4 400,861.9 392,271.8 152,622.9
Deviance (df) 408,439.9(2) 404,458.7(4) 403,277.3(5) 403,175.4(6) 400,835.9(13) 392,243.8(14) 152,594.9(14)
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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U- curve (Figure 21.1a) and is in accordance with a life course concept of eco-
nomic activity: Because younger people are not yet involved and older people are 
no longer involved in income- generating activities, it makes sense that their atti-
tude toward the importance of work should be lower compared to that of people 
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Figure 21.2 Age, period, and birth cohort effects on relative centrality of work in total sample 
and in young (aged 18– 40 years) cohorts (HAPC regression model).
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for whom work plays the central role in their identity (i.e., career- oriented, 
human capital investing, etc., individuals in (early) middle age), who are in their 
active household and labor market cycles (i.e., entering the labor market, be-
coming adults, establishing a family, having children, etc.).
The results shown in the second panel in Figure 21.2 confirm that— controlling 
for age, cohort, and relevant sociodemographic characteristics— the centrality of 
work is significantly lower in 2005– 2009 than in the 1990s. However, period ac-
counts for only 1.17% of the variance of the centrality of work; that is, the effect 
size is rather small.
Finally, after controlling for age and period and relevant sociodemographic 
characteristics, work is somewhat less important for birth cohorts born in the 
mid- 20th century compared to the earlier and later- born cohorts. This result 
may be interpreted as a generational effect:  For those who entered the labor 
market in approximately 1968, the centrality of work has temporarily decreased. 
However, because the effect size is quite small (cohort accounts for only 0.38% 
of the variance in the centrality of work), we are better to conclude that there is 
no generational effect.
The cohort and period differences among the youngest group (aged 18– 
40 years) are even smaller compared to those of the full sample. Period differences 
are slightly smaller than in the whole sample, suggesting that relative importance 
of work seems to have decreased less among the younger generation. However, in 
general, it seems that our findings regarding the full sample are valid in the case 
of the young subsample as well.
21.4.3. gender differences
To test whether the determinants of the relative centrality of work differ by 
gender, we ran the HAPC models for men and women separately. The results 
(the detailed results in Table 21.5 and the visualized effects of the three time- 
related variables in Figure 21.3) show that the differences by gender are very 
small.15 The effect of the three time- related variables does not differ between men 
and women, whereas cohort differences are somewhat larger among women, al-
though the effect size is very small.
There are, however, other significant gender differences, such as the following:
 • Being married or living with a partner has a positive but insignificant 
effect on the centrality of work among men, but it has a negative and 
significant effect among women.
 • The effect of employment status is larger among men than among women.
 • Work is more important for an average man than for an average woman.16
These findings might be explained by gender norms, such as the traditional pre-
scription that a man has to work more and has to be the main earner in the 
family.
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21.4.4. regional differences
We compared the impact of age, period, and birth cohort in two subgroups of 
European countries:17 post- socialist and EU15 countries.18 We hypothesized that 
because state socialism as a “natural experiment” influenced post- socialist coun-
tries for five decades in terms of their state- induced work- oriented ideology, we 
might detect path- dependent, cohort- specific characteristics for the value of 
work. For instance, the work values at least at the beginning of the post- socialist 
period might be stronger than those of people living in EU15 countries— that is, 
in societies without this socialist heritage.
The results of two HAPC models for the two groups of countries (the detailed 
results in Table 21.6 and the visualized effects of the three time- related variables 
in Figure 21.4) show that the coefficients of the control variables are mostly sim-
ilar: The centrality of work is significantly higher for men, for divorced people 
Table 21.5 HAPC models of centrality of work among men and women
Men Women
Individual effect B SE B SE
Age 0.0018*** (0.000) 0.0013*** (0.000)
Age squared – 0.0003*** (0.000) – 0.0003*** (0.000)
Education: More than 
secondary
– 0.0305*** (0.007) – 0.0388*** (0.007)
Employment status: 
Working
0.2313*** (0.007) 0.1926*** (0.006)
Type of settlement: City – 0.0392*** (0.007) – 0.0577*** (0.006)
Marital status
Single Ref. Ref.
Married/ living with 
partner
0.0144 (0.009) – 0.0277*** (0.008)
Divorced/ separated 0.0857*** (0.014) 0.0625*** (0.012)
Widowed – 0.0440*** (0.017) – 0.0518*** (0.012)
Intercept – 0.0350 (0.051) – 0.0349 (0.062)
Variance component Variance SE Variance SE
Period 0.0055*** (0.002) 0.0071*** (0.003)
Cohort 0.0270*** (0.003) 0.0509*** (0.006)
Country 0.0001*** (0.000) 0.0009*** (0.000)
Individual 0.6063*** (0.002) 0.6248*** (0.001)
N 76,477 89,863
AIC 178,982.0 213,068.7
Deviance (df) 178,956.0(13) 213,042.7(13)
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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Figure 21.3 Age, period, and birth- cohort effect on centrality of work among men and women 
(HAPC regression model).
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(compared to single individuals), and for working people, whereas it is lower 
for city dwellers and for more highly educated people in both country groups. 
However, there are system- specific differences as well, including the following:
 • In the EU15 countries, the overall level of centrality of work is lower.
 • In the EU15 countries, high education has a more negative effect on the 
centrality of work.
 • Being widowed has a negative effect in the EU15 countries but no effect 
in the post- socialist countries.
 • The signs of gender and higher education effects are the same in the two 
groups, but the sizes of the coefficients are twice as large in the EU15 
countries compared to the post- socialist countries.
 • The effect of being married or living with a partner is negative in the 
EU15 countries, whereas it is positive in the post- socialist countries.
Table 21.6 HAPC models of centrality of work in EU15 and post- socialist countries
EU15 Post- socialist
Individual effect B SE B SE
Age 0.0010*** (0.000) 0.0081*** (0.001)
Age squared – 0.0002*** (0.000) – 0.0005*** (0.000)
Female – 0.0761*** (0.006) – 0.0438*** (0.006)
Education: More than secondary – 0.0534*** (0.008) – 0.0196*** (0.007)
Employment status: Working 0.1918*** (0.007) 0.1966*** (0.007)
Type of settlement: City – 0.0316*** (0.007) – 0.0736*** (0.006)
Marital status
Single Ref. Ref.
Married/ living with partner – 0.0194** (0.009) 0.0263*** (0.009)
Divorced/ separated 0.0343** (0.014) 0.1154*** (0.013)
Widowed – 0.0863*** (0.016) 0.0101 (0.014)
Intercept – 0.0699 (0.067) 0.2159*** (0.075)
Variance component Variance SE Variance SE
Period 0.0045*** (0.002) 0.0141*** (0.006)
Cohort 0.0004*** (0.000) 0.0221*** (0.003)
Country 0.0436*** (0.008) 0.0085*** (0.002)
Individual 0.0436*** (0.008) 0.0085*** (0.002)
N 66,400 77,405
AIC 157,627.8 179,739.0
Deviance (df) 157,599.8(14) 179,711.0(14)
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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Figure 21.4 Age, period, and birth cohort effect on centrality of work in EU15 and post- socialist 
countries (HAPC regression model).
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If we compare the effects of the three time- related variables, we can see that 
age differences are smaller in EU15 countries, whereas the curve is more sim-
ilar to an inverted U- shape for post- socialist countries. However, the effect size 
is notable in EU15 countries as well: Work is 0.15 points less important for an 
18- year- old individual than for an individual in his or her fifties. This effect size 
is close to that of working people and higher than the effect of education. The 
period trends are similar in the two country groups, but the centrality of work 
declines somewhat more in the post- socialist countries than in the EU15 coun-
tries. Period accounts for 0.7% and 2.2% of the variance in the centrality of work 
in the EU15 and the post- socialist countries, respectively. Finally, centrality of 
work falls and remains very low among those born in the 1940s in post- socialist 
countries and starts increasing thereafter. In the EU15 countries, however, there 
are no real differences between cohorts. Cohort accounts for only 0.1% of the 
variance in the centrality of work in the EU15 countries and for 3.5% in the post- 
socialist countries. It is worth noting that cohort differences in post- socialist 
countries might not be detectable if we analyze single countries, but a more de-
tailed analysis goes beyond the scope of this chapter. However, some analyses in 
the working paper version of this chapter suggest that cohort differences within 
single countries do not exist (Hajdu and Sik 2015).
21.5. CONCLUSIONS
We did not find significant gaps between birth cohorts with respect to relative 
centrality of work and thus claim that in contemporary Europe, the generations 
are not divided significantly with regard to their work values. In this respect, our 
findings reinforce the results of Clark (2010), Kowske et al. (2010), Costanza et al. 
(2012), Jin and Rounds (2012), and Becton et al. (2014): Rather than pointing to 
generational differences, we should instead emphasize the lack of them.
There are, however, different trends in the centrality of work by age and birth 
cohort. The effect of the former is close to an inverted U- shaped curve— the cen-
trality of work is higher in the middle age groups than among the younger or 
older groups— whereas the effect of the latter is closer to a curvilinear curve— the 
centrality of work is higher in the earlier and in the later- born cohorts. However, 
it is worth noting that although this effect can be regarded as statistically sig-
nificant, the effect size is rather small. Regarding the impact of period, it is 
characterized by a linear and slightly decreasing trend.
The interpretation of the inverted U- shape of the relative centrality of work by 
age is rather straightforward: Because younger people are not yet involved and 
older people are no longer involved in income- generating activities, it is logical 
to find that work is less central for both of these groups compared to individuals 
in their active household and labor market cycles. The decreasing linear trend 
of the centrality of work by period fits well into what the literature proposes: It 
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indicates a shift from modernity toward postmodernity (Egri and Ralston 2004; 
Twenge et al. 2010).
The U- curve for the centrality of work by birth cohort might mean that work 
is less central for the cohort born between 1940 and 1959 compared to the earlier 
and later- born cohorts. This result may be interpreted as a rather weak genera-
tional effect in the sense that for those who entered the education system and the 
labor market in the 1960s and 1970s, intrinsic values became more important 
than work (or other extrinsic aspects of life). However, this change was quite 
quickly reversed, and the values of those who entered the labor market after the 
mid- 1970s became more extrinsically oriented again.
The first conclusion from a policy standpoint is that we could not identify any 
relevant gap between the birth cohorts. From this follows that the generational 
differences often referred to in public debates and used in political discourses are 
a myth. Kowske et al. (2010) quite rightly summarized their findings as indicating 
that instead of generational differences, we should speak about “generational 
similarities.” Our results imply that in contemporary Europe, generations follow 
a similar age trend: As the younger generations become older, their work values 
change similarly. Of course, this does not mean that within a country (and es-
pecially in smaller social units such as a region, a settlement, or a workplace) 
generational effects could not emerge, but these do not add up in our aggregated 
analysis as a generational trend.
If there are no significant differences between the generations, for 
policymakers this means that those social and economic efforts made in the in-
terest of decreasing youth unemployment will not be hindered by changing gen-
erational attitudes toward work.
In summary, our assumption that younger generations are increasingly less 
work oriented, have less faith that they will achieve a career, and are less opti-
mistic about getting a job and making ends meet on the basis of a salary turned 
out to be wrong. Therefore, if there sound EU policies are implemented to cope 
with youth unemployment, they will not fail because of generation- specific 
attitudes. Moreover, if the proposition of the management literature is correct 
that work values have a significant impact on values in general as well as on be-
havior in the workplace and on the labor market, then the unchanging nature of 
work values provides policymakers with firm ground to act.
The second conclusion is based on the fact that although birth cohort does 
not have a strong impact on work values, we did detect differences in work values 
by both age and time period. Thus, we should be aware that generational stability 
does not mean full- scale similarity. For example, the slow but steady decrease in 
the centrality of work by period might call for the development of policies that 
relax the association between life and work for future generations. It seems likely 
that instead of having work as the central social phenomenon that gives meaning 
to life, multiple centrality (having work as one important life aspect) is becoming 
increasingly more common among Europeans.
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NOTES
1 In the course of our analysis, we use “centrality of work” as the dependent 
variable because it refers to work in the widest sense (i.e., work as a basic 
human activity). As we note in Section 21.2.2, the working paper version of 
this chapter covers other variables of work values as well, such as employ-
ment commitment and extrinsic/ intrinsic values (Hajdu and Sik 2015).
2 Usually, political/ economic/ technological periodizations relating to the 
United States are the basis of these global generational definitions, as de-
fined, for example, by Twenge et al. (2010):
• Baby boomers by the civil rights and women’s movements, the Vietnam 
War, and the assassinations of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King
• GenX by the AIDS epidemic, economic uncertainty, and the fall of the 
Soviet Union
• GenY by being “wired” and “tech savvy,” liking “informality,” learning 
quickly, and embracing “diversity”
On the other hand, Diepstraten et  al. (1999), for example, identified 
“prewar,” “silent,” “protest,” “lost,” and “pragmatic” generations for the 
Netherlands on the basis of an entirely different national “story.”
3 For example, on redistribution, see Luttmer and Singhal (2011); on trust, see 
Dinesen (2013); on subjective well- being, see Senik (2014) and Hajdu and 
Hajdu (2016); and on female labor force participation, see Fernández and 
Fogli (2009) and Alesina and Giuliano (2010). The most notable example 
of illustrating the impact of ethnicity on work values is the analysis of the 
role of an ethnic border (the so- called Röstigraben) in Switzerland (Brügger, 
Lalive, and Zweimüller 2009).
4 In the working paper version of this chapter, employment commitment 
and extrinsic/ intrinsic work values were used as dependent variables as 
well. Employment commitment— that is, paid work only— was considered 
as a more restricted form of the centrality of work. From this viewpoint, 
work is conceptualized as the source of income, and the question is whether 
the respondents consider paid work as a standard economic resource (and 
therefore work only until its aggregate return does not start to decrease) or 
not (i.e., they do paid work for its own sake). Extrinsic/ intrinsic work values 
are widely used in the organization, business, and management literature. 
An extrinsic work value is “dependent on a source external to the imme-
diate task- person situation . . . such as status, respect, power, influence, high 
salary.” An intrinsic value, on the contrary, is “derived from the task per se; 
that is, from outcomes which are not mediated by a source external to the 
task– person situation. Such a state of motivation can be characterized as a 
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self- fulfilling experience” (Brief and Aldag 1977, 497– 98). In the working 
paper, we used three extrinsic work values (good income, security, and flexi-
bility) and two intrinsic values (interesting job and having a job that is useful 
to society) that are considered important by the respondents in evaluating a 
job (Hajdu and Sik 2015).
5 Hierarchical age– period– cohort (HAPC) regression models have been used 
to analyze repeated cross- sectional data by Yang and Land (2006, 2008) in 
examining verbal test scores; by Schwadel (2014) in examining the changing 
association between higher education and reporting no religious affiliation 
in the United States; by Down and Wilson (2013) in examining life cycle 
and cohort effects on support for the EU; and by Kowske et  al. (2010) in 
examining the effect of generation on job satisfaction and on satisfaction 
with other job aspects.
6 This can only be done artificially, so it is ultimately a subjective decision by 
the researcher. However, we grouped our data by taking account of waves 
of surveys so that data from each wave were grouped together into 5- year 
intervals, which can be considered the most “natural” (i.e., “theory- blind”) 
grouping principle.
7 Yang and Land (2008) argue that whereas the age variable is related to the 
biological process of individual aging, period and cohort effects reflect the 
influences of external (political, technological, economic, etc.) forces; thus, 
the latter two variables can be treated as level 2 (or macro- level) variables. 
Suzuki (2012, 453) shows a data structure in which individuals are nested si-
multaneously within periods and birth cohorts, whereas age is an attribute of 
individuals rather than a random sample of age categories from a population 
of age groupings.
8 Detailed descriptions of the models are provided in Appendix 1.
9 Other researchers using these variables created complex scales (Wollack 
et al. 1971; Ros, Schwartz, and Surkiss 1999; Den Dulk et al. 2013), but we 
wanted to keep our variables simple so as to ensure that they are understood 
identically by respondents in subsequent surveys and different cultures.
10 The coding was as follows: 1 (very important), 2 (quite important), 3 (not 
important), and 4 (not important at all).
11 Although the second wave of WVS/ EVS was conducted between 1989 and 
1993, the date of the fieldwork was between 1990 and 1993 in all but two 
of the participating countries. We excluded from this wave two countries 
(Poland and Switzerland)— where the year of the fieldwork was 1989— in 
order to avoid a small sample size for this year (or in the period 1985– 1989) 
and also to avoid results driven by only two countries. Moreover, because the 
number of observations between 2000 and 2004 is relatively low, given that 
the fourth (1999– 2004) wave of WVS/ EVS was conducted in most countries 
in 1999, we excluded this period from the analysis as well.
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12 The same applies to defining the age of the respondent:  It was calculated 
as the difference between the year of the fieldwork and the respondent’s 
birth year.
13 We show only six age groups (two of the youngest groups, two from the 
middle- aged groups, and two of the oldest groups) in order to have a less 
cluttered table.
14 Because we analyze respondents of similar age, this model can be 
conceptualized as a special form of the time- lag method recommended by 
Twenge (2010).
15 This lack of differences between men and women has also been found by 
other authors examining various work values (e.g., Clark 2010).
16 An “average man” is a man who has average characteristics (average values of 
the control variables among the men), and an “average woman” is a woman 
who has average characteristics (average values of the control variables 
among the women).
17 As Table A21.2 in Appendix 2 shows, the relative centrality of work differs 
significantly across countries. However, because a comparative analysis of 
the trend for relative centrality of work at the country level would require a 
separate paper, we restrict ourselves to a regional (i.e., semi- aggregated ver-
sion of country- specific) comparative analysis.
18 Germany is split into two parts: federal states from the former West Germany 
as an EU15 country and federal states from the former East Germany as a 
post- socialist country.
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APPENDIX 1
We use cross- classified hierarchical regression models. The level 1 model is as 
follows:
Y Ajk jk ijki ijk ijkGE AGE= +β β β β0 1 + + +2
2
3X
The level 2 model is
β0 0 0 0jk j ku v= + +γ
The combined model is
Y AGE AGE u v eijk ijk ijk ijk j k ijk= + + + + + +γ 0 1 2
2
3 0 0β β β X
where, within each cohort j and period k, respondents’ work attitude is a func-
tion of their age, squared age, and other individual characteristics (vector of X). 
This model allows level 1 intercepts to vary randomly by cohorts and periods. 
β0jk is the mean of the work- attitude variable of individuals in cohort j and pe-
riod k (cell mean); β1, β2, and β3 are the level 1 fixed effects; eijk is the random 
individual variation, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 
and within- cell variance σ2; γ0 is the grand mean (across all cohorts and periods) 
or the model intercept; u0j is the residual random effect of cohort j; and v0j is the 
residual random effect of period k. Both u0j and v0j are assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance τu and τv, respectively.
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APPENDIX 2
Table A21.1 Number of observations of relative centrality of work by country and year of fieldwork
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
EU15
AT 1,395 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,495 0 0 0 1,505 0 4,395
BE 2,578 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,785 0 0 0 0 1,490 5,853
DE- W 3,276 0 0 0 0 0 1,954 0 1,990 0 1,908 0 1,999 0 11,127
DK 994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 998 0 0 0 1,386 0 3,378
ES 3,404 0 0 0 1,202 0 0 0 1,193 0 0 1,175 1,483 0 8,457
FI 48 0 0 0 0 901 0 0 0 973 0 0 0 1,061 2,983
FR 786 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,541 0 963 0 1,484 0 4,774
GB 1,405 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 847 0 918 0 0 895 4,065
EL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,039 0 0 0 1,489 0 2,528
IE 991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 902 0 0 0 541 0 2,434
IT 1,960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,970 978 0 0 0 1,409 6,318
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,107 0 0 0 1,592 0 2,699
NL 976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 959 0 950 0 1,533 0 4,418
PT 1,088 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 995 0 0 0 1,527 0 3,610
SE 909 0 0 0 0 990 0 0 740 0 984 0 0 987 4,610
(continued)
 
656
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Post- socialist
BA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,178 0 0 0 0 1,356 0 2,534
BG 942 0 0 0 0 0 986 0 974 0 963 0 1,397 0 5,262
CS 0 0 0 0 0 1,455 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,455
CZ 770 2,082 0 0 0 0 0 1,084 1,879 0 0 0 1,696 0 7,512
EE 960 0 0 0 0 1,000 0 0 989 0 0 0 1,502 0 4,452
HR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 933 0 0 0 1,410 0 2,343
HU 0 981 0 0 0 0 0 630 975 0 0 0 1,506 0 4,093
LT 0 0 0 0 0 0 969 0 993 0 0 0 1,462 0 3,425
LV 813 0 0 0 0 1,160 0 0 984 0 0 0 1,488 0 4,445
PL 960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,082 979 0 0 1,448 0 4,469
RO 0 0 0 1,077 0 0 0 1,226 1,131 1,709 0 0 1,430 0 6,573
RU 1,000 0 0 0 2,007 0 0 0 2,454 0 1,865 0 1,442 0 8,769
SI 0 0 948 0 970 0 0 0 987 1,024 0 0 1,337 0 5,266
SK 381 1,104 0 0 0 0 0 1,037 1,323 0 0 0 1,493 0 5,337
UA 0 0 0 0 0 2,662 0 0 1,142 0 967 0 1,478 0 6,249
Other
AU 0 0 0 0 1,857 0 0 0 0 1,216 0 0 0 0 3,073
CA 1,675 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,015 0 0 0 3,690
CH 0 0 0 0 0 1,149 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,228 0 2,377
IS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 930 0 0 0 0 0 930
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 988 0 0 0 685 0 1,673
NO 1,139 0 0 0 0 1,114 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,096 0 4,349
NZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,025 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,025
US 1,662 0 0 0 1,379 0 0 0 1,184 0 1,163 0 0 0 5,388
Total 30,115 4,168 948 1,077 7,416 10,432 3,910 6,181 36,513 6,879 12,694 1,175 38,991 5,842 16,6340
Source: World Values Survey/ European Values Study.
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Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Post- socialist
BA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,178 0 0 0 0 1,356 0 2,534
BG 942 0 0 0 0 0 986 0 974 0 963 0 1,397 0 5,262
CS 0 0 0 0 0 1,455 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,455
CZ 770 2,082 0 0 0 0 0 1,084 1,879 0 0 0 1,696 0 7,512
EE 960 0 0 0 0 1,000 0 0 989 0 0 0 1,502 0 4,452
HR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 933 0 0 0 1,410 0 2,343
HU 0 981 0 0 0 0 0 630 975 0 0 0 1,506 0 4,093
LT 0 0 0 0 0 0 969 0 993 0 0 0 1,462 0 3,425
LV 813 0 0 0 0 1,160 0 0 984 0 0 0 1,488 0 4,445
PL 960 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,082 979 0 0 1,448 0 4,469
RO 0 0 0 1,077 0 0 0 1,226 1,131 1,709 0 0 1,430 0 6,573
RU 1,000 0 0 0 2,007 0 0 0 2,454 0 1,865 0 1,442 0 8,769
SI 0 0 948 0 970 0 0 0 987 1,024 0 0 1,337 0 5,266
SK 381 1,104 0 0 0 0 0 1,037 1,323 0 0 0 1,493 0 5,337
UA 0 0 0 0 0 2,662 0 0 1,142 0 967 0 1,478 0 6,249
Other
AU 0 0 0 0 1,857 0 0 0 0 1,216 0 0 0 0 3,073
CA 1,675 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,015 0 0 0 3,690
CH 0 0 0 0 0 1,149 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,228 0 2,377
IS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 930 0 0 0 0 0 930
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 988 0 0 0 685 0 1,673
NO 1,139 0 0 0 0 1,114 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,096 0 4,349
NZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,025 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,025
US 1,662 0 0 0 1,379 0 0 0 1,184 0 1,163 0 0 0 5,388
Total 30,115 4,168 948 1,077 7,416 10,432 3,910 6,181 36,513 6,879 12,694 1,175 38,991 5,842 16,6340
Source: World Values Survey/ European Values Study.
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HOW CAN TRADE UNIONS IN EUROPE CONNECT 
WITH YOUNG WORKERS?
Kurt Vandaele
22.1. INTRODUCTION
Trade union density has almost universally declined across Europe in recent 
decades (Visser 2016), although substantial cross- country variation still exists. 
Among the different categories of under- represented groups in unions, young 
workers are considered the “most problematic group” in this regard (Pedersini 
2010, 13). There is ample evidence that they are generally less inclined to un-
ionize (see Section 22.2). Three major (and not mutually exclusive) explanations 
for this group’s low unionization rate have been identified in the literature (Payne 
1989; Serrano Pascual and Waddington 2000).
The first involves the assumption that the propensity of young workers to un-
ionize has decreased because of intergenerational shifts in values and attitudes. 
The second explanation is that the opportunity to unionize has been structur-
ally hampered by the individualization of working conditions (driven by human 
resource management policies), new developments in work organization (e.g., 
telework), and changing labor markets for young workers (Blossfeld et  al. 
2008). These workers are more likely to be employed in nonstandard employ-
ment arrangements and in those workplaces, occupations, and economic sectors 
marked by weak union representation.1 Finally, the sociology of unionism 
matters:  In light of the developments outlined previously, the current policies 
and organizational structures of many unions are likely to be ineffective for en-
gaging and organizing young workers, and their predominant (decision- making) 
culture could be considered unattractive and unfavorable for youth participation 
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in union democracy and action (Vandaele 2012, 2015). We need to understand 
that the ways in which unions perceive and prioritize (or not) young workers 
play a pivotal role in shaping their efforts to address this problem (Esders, Bailey, 
and McDonald 2011). Moreover, given that there is a significant overlap between 
young workers and the phenomenon of precariousness, unions’ strategies toward 
precarious work have, by definition, important consequences for these workers 
(Murphy and Simms 2017).
Based for the most part on a literature review, the aim of this chapter is to 
explore what kind of strategies unions in Europe could develop to reconnect 
with the new generation on the labor market.2 In developing our main argu-
ment, we refer first to the main motives for union membership because their rel-
ative presence in a sector or country will influence unions’ strategies and policies 
for organizing young workers (Heery and Adler 2004). The chapter broadly 
focuses on three areas of motivation (Ebbinghaus, Göbel, and Koos 2011): the 
significance of union membership as a traditional custom embedded in social 
networks; instrumental/ rational motives that are influenced by a favorable in-
stitutional framework for unions to lower the costs of organizing and servicing 
(young) workers; and, finally, the principle of solidarity, the identity- forming 
function of union membership, and the ideological convictions promoted by 
unions. In the literature on youth unionization, each motive largely corresponds 
to a different research focus (as shown in Table 22.1), and the different sections 
of this chapter are accordingly built around this framework. Bearing in mind the 
diminishing impact of traditional motives and the pressure that employer organ-
izations or governments exert upon “union- friendly” institutional frameworks 
in the labor market, the argument will be made that union agency takes on a par-
ticular importance in the effort to counteract the deunionization trend. Decisive 
union action in the form, for instance, of comprehensive campaigning can be 
instrumental in reviving or strengthening these traditional and instrumental/ 
rational motives (Ibsen and Tapia 2017).
If the difficulties in organizing young workers continue unabated, this situa-
tion will represent an increasingly serious challenge for existing unions. It could 
impede their generational and imaginative renewal, exacerbate their already bi-
ased representation of today’s more diversified workforce, and even seriously call 
Table 22.1 The linkage between motives of union membership and the research focus
Motives of union 
membership
Research focus
Traditional social customs Young people themselves: Their believes and attitudes
Instrumental/ rational motives Young people in the labor market: School- to- work transitions
Union agency Young people and unions: Sociology of unionism
Source: Author’s own typology.
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into question their legitimacy vis- à- vis employers and political authorities, as 
well as their own organizational survival. Eventually, other or new organizations 
or social movements might emerge or gain further prominence for representing 
young (vulnerable) workers (and particularly in specific segments of the labor 
market such as the “gig economy”). At the same time, many young workers 
could potentially benefit from union representation. Since the Great Recession, 
inequalities in the labor market between adults and young people have accel-
erated, with labor market flexibility tending to disproportionally affect young 
workers (France 2016). Therefore, the idea will also be developed that young 
people’s early labor market experiences should be placed center stage in any 
union recruitment or organizing drive toward the young. However, young people 
entering the labor market are not a homogeneous bloc, a fact that becomes espe-
cially clear in their transition from school to work. This crucial phase in young 
people’s lives is marked by differences in the timing, duration, and sequence of 
labor market events. Distinctive trajectories in the school- to- work transition 
imply different challenges and opportunities for unions in terms of recruiting 
and retaining young workers, as well as engaging their participation in union 
activities, because their exposure to unionism is not uniform.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 22.2 explores the extent to which 
an individual’s age influences his or her decision to join a union, and it examines 
the patterns in youth unionization across Europe. Section 22.3 focuses on young 
people themselves in a discussion of their beliefs and attitudes toward unioniza-
tion. It then explores the demise of unionization as a traditional social custom as 
an alternative explanation to simple cohort effects. Section 22.4 examines the sig-
nificance of school- to- work transition regimes for organizing young people: The 
opportunities and costs of organizing are dependent on the degree of union inte-
gration in those regimes. The internal adaptation and diverse initiatives of unions 
across Europe toward engaging and organizing young workers are discussed in 
Section 22.5. Section 22.6 concludes the chapter.
22.2. YOUNG WORKERS AS A DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGE 
FOR UNIONS
In this section, we explore the relationship between age and unionization to as-
sess to what extent there exists an “age deficit” within unions. Based on a litera-
ture review on the determinants of unionization (of studies from the 1980s until 
the early 1990s), Riley (1997, 272)  found “conflicting evidence,” with age only 
sometimes having a significant effect on union membership. Some years later, 
however, in the UK context, Machin (2004, 430) claimed that age is “a more im-
portant determinant of who joins trade unions now than it used to be.” A sem-
inal study by Blanchflower (2007) concluded that union density in 34 of the 
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38 advanced economies investigated follows a similar pattern: An inverted U- 
curve in regard to age shows that workers in their mid- to late forties have the 
highest likelihood of being unionized, compared to lower membership rates for 
both younger and older workers. Controlling for existing cohort effects in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, Blanchflower found that the concave age 
effect on unionization remains. More recent research on individual countries 
or across countries has either confirmed the concave age/ unionization pattern 
(Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent 2012, 695; Turner and D’Art 2012, 47) or questioned 
it (Scheuer 2011; Schnabel and Wagner 2012). Thus, in the latter cases, it is found 
that the probability of unionization increases monotonically with age.
At first glance, the typical pattern of relatively low youth unionization should 
not, in itself, worry unions excessively because there might be an age effect at 
play. As young workers grow older and settle into (if it can be assumed) stable 
working careers, they might naturally “mature” into unionism. However, Figure 
22.1 illustrates that in most European countries considered in this study, the me-
dian age of union members increased between 2004 and 2014; the same cohort 
effect applies to union activists and representatives in many sectors.3 In fact, in 
some countries, the median age indicates that a great number of union members 
are in their mid- forties to early fifties. Because middle- aged workers currently 
dominate the overall union membership composition, the median voter the-
orem would suggest that their policy preferences are dominating union strategies 
(Ebbinghaus 2006). If indeed unions are primarily representing the interests and 
needs of “insiders” (i.e., older workers), they might appear relatively unattractive 
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to “outsiders” (i.e., young workers). However, such a rationale, based on assumed 
member preferences, ignores the structural context of labor market dualization 
and betrays a biased reasoning regarding statistical labor market outcomes. 
Apart from its rather manicheistic tendencies, this framework disregards “the 
constraints under which unions operate and the drivers of union strategies be-
yond their members’ interests” (Benassi and Vlandas 2016, 6).
Nevertheless, today’s smaller birth cohorts and young people’s later labor 
market entrance (due to higher tertiary education rates) might further con-
tribute to this “graying” of unions.4 Figure 22.2 provides evidence that, by and 
large, most unions in many countries are struggling to organize young people 
or, at least, cannot keep membership developments in line with growing em-
ployment rates. The figure compares the unionization rates among “youth” and 
“adults” at the aggregated level (thus masking sectoral differences) in 2004 and 
2014. Here, “youth” is defined as unionization until the age of 24  years and 
“adult” as unionization between 25 and 54 years. In practice, unions generally 
use a broader definition by setting the maximum age for “youth” at 35 years 
(Vandaele 2012, 208). Yet the definition of “youth” used in Figure 22.2 makes 
it easier to discern the possible difficulties unions have with attracting young 
people; it is also more in line with youth studies. Three observations can be 
made from the figure.
First, country differences in adult and youth unionization are generally per-
sistent over time. Looking at, for instance, the level of youth unionization, there 
is a strong positive relationship between the country rankings in 2004 and 2014 
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(rs(20)  =  .86, p < .00). Second, there is an equally strong positive association 
between youth and adult unionization in 2004, which still holds 10 years later. 
Although the youth/ adult gap in unionization in the Nordic countries is rela-
tively substantial because of the very high levels of adult membership, youth un-
ionization is still higher in those countries compared to the others. Finally, there 
is a drop in both youth and adult unionization rates in most, but not all, coun-
tries, with a relatively stronger decline in youth unionization. In other words, 
during the past 10 years in most European countries considered here, less young 
people have joined a union, more often than not resulting in a widening of the 
youth/ adult gap in unionization. The fall in youth unionization is especially con-
spicuous in Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden. Youth unionization has increased in 
only a small number of countries, notably Austria and Germany.
Figure 22.2 illustrates the strong self- perpetuating tendencies of early union 
membership and demonstrates that early unionization is key. Indeed, although a 
typical union member is middle- aged, the first experience with unionism is very 
likely to happen when a worker is still young (Booth, Budd, and Munday 2010a, 
48). Evidence from, for instance, Denmark (Toubøl and Jensen 2014, 150) and 
the Netherlands (Visser 2002, 416)  suggests that the likelihood of first- time 
union membership is higher when workers are young and entering the labor 
market than it is later on: They seem “sensitive to reputational effects even at 
low levels of workplace union density” (Ibsen, Toubøl, and Jensen 2017, 10). In 
other words, there are many “first- timers” but far fewer “late bloomers” in unions 
(Booth, Budd, and Munday 2010b). This essentially implies that the window of 
opportunity for unions to organize workers becomes decidedly smaller the older 
they get (Budd 2010). Moreover, the early stages of unionization are crucial be-
cause the first years of union membership are the period when the probability 
of member outflow seems to be at its highest (Leschke and Vandaele 2015, 3– 5). 
However, the crucial question for many (but not all) unions is not so much why 
young workers are resigning from membership but, rather, why so many of them 
“do not join a union (or at least join a union once they get a stable job)” at all 
(Peetz, Price, and Bailey 2015, 64).
Further contributing to this bleak picture of the continued existence of unions 
is the increasing percentage of workers who have never become a union member, 
a trend that has been evident in Germany (Schnabel and Wagner 2006), the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (Booth et al. 2010a), as well as across 
other European countries (Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent 2012, 695). The rise of 
never- membership can be considered a “demographic time bomb” for unions if 
organizing young workers is not prioritized. Crucially, although the employment 
shift— from the traditionally highly unionized manufacturing industries to the 
less unionized private service sector— has significantly contributed to the rise 
of never- membership, this is not the whole story. Deunionization would have 
occurred even in the absence of such a structural employment shift in the labor 
market (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999).
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22.3. THE YOUNG PEOPLE THEMSELVES: THEIR BELIEFS 
AND ATTITUDES TOWARD UNIONS
Among many other causes (see Vachon, Wallace, and Hyde 2016), intergen-
erational change in beliefs and attitudes toward unions is considered an addi-
tional explanation for deunionization. Cohort effects in attitudes and beliefs 
toward collectivism are consequently a central concern in this section, which 
investigates whether such effects can explain the low youth unionization rate. 
Many young people do actually seem to demonstrate trade union sympathies 
(although they have less knowledge about unions), but the traditional sources for 
the transmission of favorable attitudes and beliefs toward unionization are disap-
pearing. Therefore, instead of “problematizing youth,” it is important to under-
stand how young people develop their behavioral attitudes toward unions rather 
than simply comparing them to those of previous generations.
22.3.1. Framing young people’s attitudes and beliefs 
via cohort effects
Studies on youth unionization that focus on young people themselves predom-
inantly emphasize cohort effects. Such a social generation approach claims that 
young people’s attitudes and beliefs toward collective behavior diverge sharply 
from those of previous generations. There is no consensus here as to how a 
young worker should be defined, in the sense that different age boundaries are 
used; when these are too large, this entails the danger of masking significant in- 
group variance (Tailby and Pollert 2011), which in turn might be influenced by 
differences in school- to- work regimes (Booth et al. 2010b). Thus, it remains an 
empirical question whether the attitudes of very young workers, with little labor 
market experience, are always similar to those of older young workers with more 
experience.
Above all other factors contributing to the low level of youth unioniza-
tion, it has been speculated that young workers, being associated with increas-
ingly individualistic beliefs and values, are less motivated by the collective 
ethos of unionism compared to previous generations (Allvin and Sverke 2000; 
Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent 2012). However, there are good reasons to be cau-
tious about this claim. First, conceptually, individualism does not necessarily 
exclude the belief that collective behavior is required to achieve common 
goals (Goerres 2010). Nevertheless, collective behavior needs backing by col-
lective mechanisms, which are increasingly breaking down or are no longer 
supported by the state or employer organizations (Peetz 2010). Second, meth-
odologically, findings on differential intergenerational attitudes toward unions 
are often based on small- scale sociological studies, sometimes even of an an-
ecdotal nature, so generalizing them is problematic (Haynes, Vowles, and 
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Boxall 2005, 96). Finally, empirically, pointing to period effects, there is little 
evidence that young union members are more individualistic than their older 
counterparts, although there may be differences between the unionized and 
the nonunionized (Paquet 2005). Instead, employers’ hostility to union mem-
bership and a fear of victimization among young people may play an impor-
tant and dissuasive role (Mrozowicki, Krasowska, and Karolak 2015; Hodder 
2016; Alonso and Fernández Rodríguez 2017).
Although a narrow interpretation of young people’s individualism often nega-
tively associates it with “Thatcher’s children” (in the UK context; see Waddington 
and Kerr 2002; Bryson and Gomez 2005), recent studies referring to “millennials” 
cast young people in a good light in terms of political engagement (despite their 
individualism). Again assuming cohort effects, millennials are considered a gen-
erational group that is loosely defined as those people who reached adulthood 
after the onset of the new millennium. Thus, specific attitudes and beliefs have 
been attributed to this “tech- savvy generation,” especially concerning work, such 
as the minor importance of paid work in their value system. However, many of 
the intergenerational differences in the workplace could be explained by age and 
period as opposed to cohort effects (Hajdu and Sik, this volume). It has also been 
claimed that millennials constitute a new political generation whose differences 
from their predecessors have become especially apparent in the anti- austerity/ 
pro- democracy movements that have been active since the Great Recession 
(Milkman 2017).
Although the participants in the anti- austerity/ pro- democracy movements 
differ in their sociodemographic composition— being younger and more 
educated— and they are more likely to identify with the middle class, these youthful 
activists do share the same discontent and left- leaning political orientations as 
unionists (Peterson, Wahlstrom, and Wennerhag 2015). Still, tensions between 
them, if employed (and more often in vulnerable employment positions), and 
established union confederations rose notably in those European countries that 
were heavily affected by the Great Recession, such as Greece (Kretsos 2011) and 
Spain (Fernández Rodríguez et al. 2015; Köhler and Calleja Jiménez 2015). In 
these countries, the union confederations’ original strategy of political inclusion 
through co- managing the crisis has contributed to a general decline in trust in 
them or to a perception of them being “bureaucratic dinosaurs” (Hyman 2015). 
But the union strategies adopted in the early stages of the recession also show 
that the disconnection between millennials and unions in those countries should 
be considered in a specific context. In fact, compared to previous generations, 
there is little reason to believe that most young people today are born with an 
“antipathetic union gene.” Studies examining their attitudes toward unions paint 
a less negative picture than the assumed cohort effects suggest; in fact, strong an-
tagonistic attitudes toward unionism in principle are not at all common among 
young people.
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22.3.2. Virulent anti- unionism is not the problem
Studies actually point to an underlying and unmet demand for unionization 
among young workers. Basing their research on European Social Survey data, 
D’Art and Turner (2008) report largely positive attitudes toward unions, irre-
spective of age, and the persistence and even strengthening of this view among 
workers since the early 1980s. In fact, young workers seem even more inclined 
to join unions compared to their older counterparts. Such findings come 
from studies in Australia (Pyman et  al. 2009), Canada (Gomez, Gunderson, 
and Meltz 2002), New Zealand (Haynes et al. 2005), the United States (Booth 
et  al. 2010a), and the United Kingdom (Payne 1989; Serrano Pascual and 
Waddington 2000; Waddington and Kerr 2002; Freeman and Diamond 2003; 
Tailby and Pollert 2011). Also, as a corollary, a comparison between Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States concludes that “workers have 
broadly similar preferences for unionization across age groups and borders” 
(Bryson et al. 2005, 166).
Significantly, this pattern of unmet demand for unionization can be confirmed 
for a large range of very different countries beyond the Anglophone world, in-
cluding Belgium (Vendramin 2007), Denmark (Caraker et  al. 2015, 97– 111), 
France (Contrepois 2015, 94– 95), Germany (Oliver 2011, 246; TNS Infratest 
2015, 36– 37; Nies and Tullius 2017), the Netherlands (Huiskamp and Smulders 
2010), Sweden (Furåker and Berglund 2003; Bengtsson and Berglund 2011), and 
elsewhere across Europe (Turner and D’Art 2012); Hungary seems to be an ex-
ception (Keune 2015, 15). Furthermore, although results based on focus groups 
or individual interviews cannot readily be extended to young workers in general, 
such research methods do allow for a more enhanced differentiation between 
various youth segments in the labor market.5 Again, interview- based research 
in, for instance, Poland (Mrozowicki et al. 2015), Portugal (Kovács, Dias, and da 
Conceição Cerdeira 2017), and the United Kingdom (Hodder 2016; TUC 2017, 
25– 28; the latter confirming previous results) highlights the (critical) support 
toward unions among certain labor market youth segments.
Although young people’s attitude toward unionization is generally positive, it 
has been found that young workers possess very limited knowledge about unions 
(Fernández Rodríguez et al. 2015, 147; Hodder 2016, 13). Because young people 
are largely unaware as to what unions actually do, the overall majority of young 
people seem to be largely “blank slates” (Freeman and Diamond 2003, 40) when 
they enter the labor market. Even if they have some understanding about unions, 
it tends to be a stereotyped view, especially because the press and mass media 
are “biased toward selecting events about actual or impeding strike actions” 
(Gallagher 1999, 249).6 Unions’ negative public image might feed into the view 
that they are “representing a different type and culture of work and dynamics in 
employment to that experienced by young people” (Fernández Rodríguez et al. 
2015, 157). In Australia, for example, it was found that young people think that 
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only “victims” on the labor market need unions, being powerless to bargain ef-
fectively for themselves (Bulbeck 2008).
Young workers’ lack of knowledge about unionism is particularly evident 
when they experience concrete problems at work (Paquet 2005). When this 
is the case, at least in the Australian (McDonald et al. 2014, 321– 23) and UK 
contexts (Tailby and Pollert 2011, 511; Hodder 2016, 66), unions are rarely 
considered a source of advice. For basic information and assistance on 
employment- related matters, popular internet search engines are common 
resources.7 Young workers also informally approach management for advice. 
Finally, young workers rely on parental and family support and their circle of 
friends as a source of information to address job- related dissatisfaction. The lit-
erature on union attitude formation has specifically identified parents, family, 
and friends as socialization agents who could shape young people’s union 
attitudes prior to their labor market entrance; it is to these pre- employment 
sources that we turn now.
22.3.3. union attitude formation before labor  
market entrance
Two theoretical approaches are helpful for identifying sources that could influ-
ence young people’s attitudes toward unions before their first entry into the labor 
market. First, applying insights from marketing theory, the “experience- good” 
model of unionism emphasizes that workers can only truly appreciate unions 
if they sample membership or become a member (Gomez, Gunderson, and 
Meltz 2002, 2004; Gomez and Gunderson 2004; Bryson et al. 2005). Joining a 
union requires some degree of prior knowledge, given that most union- provided 
benefits are rather unclear for nonunion members; in particular, nonmembers 
may have difficulty discerning the nonpecuniary benefits of union membership. 
This problem is especially relevant for young people because most of them do 
not have first- hand experience with unions. Still, the importance of unionism 
as an “experience good” should not be overemphasized, for indirect experi-
ence through contacts and networks is also important for learning about union 
benefits. Second, social learning theory likewise highlights the importance of 
embeddedness in union- friendly social networks in which positive union 
attitudes are socialized (Kelloway and Newton 1996; Griffin and Brown 2011). 
Social interaction with parents, relatives, and friends who support unionization 
increases the probability of young people having favorable union attitudes, and 
this might also act as a counterbalance to the predominantly negative public 
image of unions.
Thus, if favorable attitudes toward unionism (as a social custom) are 
transmitted from one generation to another, family and parental socialization 
can be identified as a potential source for the development of positive union 
attitudes among young people (Blanden and Machin 2003; Oliver 2010, 515; 
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2011, 253; Ebbinghaus et al. 2011, 109). However, it can be expected that such 
intergenerational social learning has relatively lost its importance in most 
countries because, given the rise of never- membership in a union, parental 
union membership has itself diminished (Freeman and Diamond 2003, 33– 
35; Schnabel and Wagner 2006; Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent 2012, 699). Even in 
a high- union- density country such as Belgium, the traditional social custom 
of union membership has become a less important motive for unionization 
among the younger age categories (Swyngedouw, Abts, and Meuleman 2016, 
35). Favorable attitudes to unions can also come from young people’s union- 
friendly social networks (Griffin and Brown 2011, 95– 96); in fact, with regard 
to joining a union, peers seem to be a more important source of influence 
on young workers compared to older people (Freeman and Diamond 2003, 
45). Yet, particularly in low- union- density countries, it is again questionable 
whether such pro- union networks are still strong enough for sustaining the 
norm of union membership. Finally, social networks in the context of edu-
cation could also be a source of union attitude formation. Thus, students in 
certain fields of study, such as the arts and social sciences, seem to be partic-
ularly receptive to unionism (Oliver 2010, 515; 2011, 253; Griffin and Brown 
2011, 96). Whether this is a consequence of the self- selecting tendencies of 
these disciplines, which perhaps mainly attract students who already have 
pro- union attitudes, or whether other factors (e.g., the curriculum of certain 
courses) are more significant has yet to be ascertained.
One question that arises is whether the initial socializing agents con-
tinue to have an influence on young people’s union attitudes as they gain 
experience on the labor market. Based on the experience- good model of 
unionism, it is expected that the agents will lose their influence somewhat 
when young people have left full- time education and fully entered the labor 
market, for the youngsters will then gradually rely more on their own, in-
dividually accumulated “sampling history” (Gomez and Gunderson 2004, 
108). This point is confirmed by a study on labor market experiences via 
student employment in Australia (Oliver 2010, 2011): Once young people 
begin to gain experience on the labor market, norms and influences at the 
workplace seem to gain greater importance as determinants of union mem-
bership compared to parental socialization (Cregan 1991). As Figure 22.2 
indicates, the key period for unions to organize young workers is when 
they first enter the labor market because this gives unions a crucial op-
portunity to shape young workers’ attitudes (Booth et  al. 2010b, 66– 68). 
This timing does not necessarily correspond with the completion of edu-
cation or labor market entrance on a full- time basis; it could also concern 
student employment. Analyzing the influence of these early labor market 
experiences and transitions from school to work on union attitude forma-
tion is therefore vital.
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22.4. EARLY LABOR MARKET EXPERIENCES AND SCHOOL- 
TO- WORK TRANSITIONS
Concerning the timing of labor market entry, one event in the school- to- work 
transition that deserves special attention is student employment. It provides 
unions with an opportunity to specifically target students, and it enables students 
to gauge the benefits of union membership for themselves first- hand (Oliver 2010, 
2011). A crucial question is whether these first- time experiences with unionism 
in student employment serve as lasting impressions for when young people 
begin their careers after graduating. This exposure to unionism might be partic-
ularly different to what young people go on to experience in their future sectors 
of employment (Booth et al. 2010b, 61– 62). Although there are few studies on 
young people’s attitudes toward unionism during student employment, their de-
velopment does seem to be influenced by these formative experiences of work. 
Two conclusions can be made.
First, young people in lower quality (student) jobs or who have encountered 
concrete labor market difficulties (e.g., temporary or involuntary part- time em-
ployment or unemployment) seem to have a greater desire to become union 
members compared to their counterparts with higher quality jobs (Lowe and 
Rastin 2000; Vendramin 2007, 59– 61; Oliver 2010, 2011). This indicates that 
those in lower quality (student) jobs believe that unions could improve their job 
quality, which is especially the case among young workers with a longer involve-
ment in the labor market, suggesting that they realize that “exit and different 
jobs are not necessarily solutions to problems at work which repeat themselves” 
(Tailby and Pollert 2011, 514). Second, workers with previous union experi-
ence generally hold more positive views about the ability of unions to improve 
working conditions and job security compared to never- members (Kolins Givan 
and Hipp 2012). Likewise, those who were union members during their pe-
riod of student employment are more likely to join a union after finishing their 
studies compared to those young people who have never been a union member 
(Oliver 2010). However, confirming the experience- good model, it is not union 
membership per se that seems to matter but, rather, the positive experience of 
that membership during student employment. Communicating with new young 
members in a personal way and educating them about their social rights could 
contribute to such a positive experience (Paquet 2005).
Of great importance, naturally, is whether unions are embedded in the work-
place, because the extent of union representation influences (young) workers’ 
perception of the effectiveness of unions (Waddington 2014). It is no coinci-
dence that unions’ diminishing access to the workplace (linked to the firm size 
via legal eligibility requirements about union representation) is clearly associated 
with lower youth unionization (Spilsbury et al. 1987; Payne 1989). It is therefore 
crucial to map what proportion of those in student employment are exposed to 
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unionism and to analyze their experiences at work; the same principle, of course, 
applies for young workers in general (TUC 2016, 2017). It is certain that being in 
paid employment alongside studying has become widespread throughout Europe 
(especially for those in tertiary education) out of the need to finance costs or to 
improve the standard of living (Hauschildt et al. 2015, 95– 102). Notable varia-
tion in student employment rates exists between countries and between study 
disciplines, for instance, which alludes to different patterns in school- to- work 
transitions. At the same time, student employment is especially concentrated in 
the wholesale, retail, accommodation, and food sectors in most European coun-
tries (calculations based on Grotti, Russell, and O’Reilly, this volume)— the very 
sectors in which union density is far below the national average. Thus, in most 
countries, the odds are not very high that young people have direct experience 
with unions at the workplace for the first time during student employment, es-
pecially in low- union- density countries. But even in unionized workplaces, one 
particular finding is that nonunionized students or young workers are not al-
ways actively recruited: In other words, nobody asks them to join (Cregan and 
Johnston 1990, 94; Pyman et al. 2009, 12– 13; Oliver 2010, 511).
School- to- work transitions are marked not only by variation in young people’s 
labor market entry speed (via student employment or otherwise) but also by 
differences in the sequence and duration of employment statuses. The distinc-
tive patterns of school- to- work transitions are associated with different degrees 
of job stability and security, and they have long- lasting effects on labor market 
outcomes (Berloffa et al., this volume). Patterns depend on differences in educa-
tional and training systems, sectoral and national labor market institutions re-
garding employment regulation, and changing macroeconomic conditions such 
as the outbreak of the Great Recession (Grotti et  al., this volume). Individual 
characteristics such as gender and educational attainment also clearly influence 
young people’s early employment and career history. All of this explains why 
the dominance of certain patterns in school- to- work transitions varies across 
sectors and countries (Brzinsky- Fay 2007). Based on several institutional char-
acteristics, five country clusters or regimes of school- to- work transitions have 
been identified (Pohl and Walther 2007; Pastore 2016; Hadjivassiliou et  al., 
this volume). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore each regime in 
detail; rather, it is sufficient here to give an account of the degree of integra-
tion of unions into the institutional framework of these regimes and how they 
are (perceived as) helpful in smoothing young people’s entrance into the labor 
market. Thus, in the Northern European universalistic regime, unions play a 
role (together with public employment services) in the management of income- 
support schemes and active labor market policies, which increases the proba-
bility of young workers’ union exposure. Above all, union- managed voluntary 
unemployment insurance schemes (the “Ghent system”) act as a selective in-
centive for unionization in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden (Ebbinghaus et al. 
2011). However, the state- led “erosion” of this Ghent system or the promotion of 
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new institutional alternatives or both have weakened the close relationship be-
tween unions and insurance schemes, especially for new labor market entrants 
(Høgedahl and Kongshøj 2017). Nonetheless, these countries, together with 
Norway and Belgium (the latter a quasi- Ghent system country; Vandaele 2006), 
record high youth unionization in both selected years (see Figure 22.2).
While belonging to the employment- centered regime, Belgium has a fairly 
stable youth unionization rate, explained by the relatively unchanging de facto 
Ghent system and the quadrennial social elections in large firms in the private 
sector, which offer unions an opportunity to reach out to young workers (Faniel 
and Vandaele 2012). In other countries belonging to the employment- centered 
regime, especially Austria and Germany, the dual educational system plays a 
central role, helping young people gain specific occupational skills while still 
at school by providing vocational training opportunities via apprenticeships. 
Historically supported by a legal framework of firm- level representation (the 
Jugend- und Auszubildendenvertretung), apprenticeships have been unions’ dom-
inant and most successful channel for organizing young workers in Germany 
(Holst, Holzschuh, and Niehoff 2014). Since the late 1980s, however, vocational 
training has slowly lost its significance as an entry point into the labor market. 
German school- to- work transitions have become characterized by precarious 
employment or by tertiary education students entering the labor market di-
rectly or via dual studies, with those taking the latter route combining study with 
practical training or work experience in a company. These different school- to- 
work trajectories have prompted German unions to strategically rethink their 
organizing approaches; for instance, the different strategies toward organizing 
young workers of the IG Metall union have been identified as key to its success 
(Schmalz and Thiel 2017). Nevertheless, apprenticeships remain a significant 
recruitment channel for unions in large firms, especially in the manufacturing 
industry (which continues to be an important provider of employment in 
Germany). It has therefore been suggested that German unions would do better 
to focus on young people’s apprenticeships and traineeships within their field 
of study rather than on their possible experiences in non- study- related student 
employment because this is weakly clustered in particular sectors (Oliver 2011).
Finally, in the three other school- to- work transition regimes— with obvious 
differences between the liberal, subprotective, and post- socialist regimes— the 
education, training, and welfare systems generally allow less room for union in-
volvement. In the case of the subprotective regimes, it should be noted that unions’ 
associational power is less oriented toward organizing union members. Their 
power is predominantly based on their mobilization capacity for demonstrations 
and strikes (as in France, although it belongs to the employment- centered regime; 
Sullivan 2010) or on the social election results at the company level (as in Spain; 
Martínez Lucio, Martino, and Connolly 2017). Although these different union 
identities reveal the various ways in which unions prioritize the organization of 
young workers (and to what extent), it is important for all unions to renew their 
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base of union activists, candidates for social elections, or union representatives. 
In any case, across the five regimes, today’s school- to- work transitions are more 
often than not complex, unstable, and nonlinear. From a historical perspective, 
this level of complexity and nonlinearity is not typical for contemporary school- 
to- work transitions (Goodwin and O’Connor 2015). Even so, today’s employ-
ment has been increasingly plagued by precariousness and the quality of youth 
jobs has deteriorated, with an increase in part- time and temporary jobs since the 
Great Recession (Lewis and Heyes 2017; Grotti et al., this volume; Hadjivassiliou 
et al., this volume). In this respect, given young people’s turnover rates, it has 
been claimed that unions should opt for a life cycle approach to organizing in-
stead of a job- centered approach (Budd 2010).
22.5. UNION AGENCY: UNIONS REACHING OUT  
TO YOUNG PEOPLE?
Historically, and highlighting their weaknesses in terms of field- enlarging 
organizing strategies, unions have long found their relationship with young 
workers to be a challenge (Williams and Quinn 2014): The “generation gap” 
in unionization between young workers and their older counterparts is not 
new. But today’s positive attitude formation regarding unionization through 
socializing agents and union exposure at the workplace is becoming a less 
effective means of reaching out to all young workers. However, the shaping 
of union attitudes also depends on the agency of the union— in the efforts it 
makes toward developing the collective consciousness, identity, and actions 
of the young workers (Blackwood et  al. 2003). Unions across Europe have 
gradually (although too slowly) begun undertaking different (small- scale) 
actions to better engage with young people. Unions’ growing awareness of low 
youth unionization and the economic context of the Great Recession, with 
its increase in youth unemployment, have both enhanced this engagement 
(Vandaele 2013).
As illustrated by brochures on “good examples” from the United Kingdom’s 
largest union Unite (2014) and the European Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers (Lorenzini 2016), among others (Pedersini 2010; Keune 2015), 
several unions are using a vast array of (not necessarily new) tactics to engage 
young workers. Reach- out activities include visits to vocational schools, higher 
education institutions, and job- information conventions; self- promotion; and 
providing information about young people’s social rights and challenges in 
their school- to- work transitions where unions can provide specific services.8 
Fostering alliance- building between unions and relevant youth organizations, 
such as student organizations, is another way to achieve a better understanding 
of school- to- work transitions and young people’s problems, also outside the 
workplace. Some unions are also present at youth events such as music festivals 
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or advertise in cinemas. Furthermore, although face- to- face communication and 
traditional forms of mass communication continue to be of importance, young 
people’s media consumption is heavily oriented toward the internet and social 
media via apps on mobile computer devices. Although unions have increased 
their presence and activity in this regard, there is often a lack of strategic co-
herence, meaning that their potential communication power is underutilized 
(Hodder and Houghton 2015), especially because young people’s preferences to-
ward social media communications are based on the opportunities it offers for 
participation (Wells 2014).
There are also abundant examples of unions offering a reduced- price or free 
union membership so that students and young workers, often in low- paid or even 
unpaid work (e.g., in the creative industries), can sample the benefits of union 
membership. Meanwhile, some unions— for instance, in Italy, the Netherlands, 
and Slovenia— have set up separate organizations or networks for representing 
atypical or freelance workers, whose jobs are often characterized by precarious-
ness (Gumbrell- McCormick 2011; Lorenzini 2016). Furthermore, regarding re-
cent labor market developments, so- called “self- employed” workers in the “gig 
economy” (more likely to be younger) have been building solidarity outside of 
the traditional unions to deal with employment issues. They have set up their 
own grassroots campaigns, collective actions, (virtual) community- based self- 
organizations, and “labor mutuals” (Bauwens and Niaros 2017; Tassinari and 
Maccarrone 2017). Alliance- building between these self- organizations and ex-
isting unions, as well as imaginative and diversified union strategies that make 
innovative use of technology to connect spatiotemporally distributed workers, 
is needed now more than ever to “#YouthUp”— that is, to attract the millennials 
and future generations. However, apart from legal arrangements, current union 
statutes and representation structures might often act as obstacles to union 
membership for those workers who frequently change employment status (in-
cluding “gig workers”).
Furthermore, some unions have set up targeted campaigns demonstrating the 
benefits of collective representation and action in order to alter their media pro-
file and public image among potential (young) members and the wider public 
(Bailey et  al. 2010). Although the findings presented here are solely from the 
perspective of an observer, the relative success of the Dutch “Young & United” 
campaign illustrates the possibilities of union agency. In 2015, the Federatie 
Nederlandse Vakbeweging (Dutch Federation of Trade Unions), together with a 
diverse range of youth organizations, launched this campaign to reach a dispersed 
young workforce that is difficult to organize, given that many young people are 
employed in companies and sectors with a high turnover rate. Shining a spot-
light on age discrimination, the well- prepared Young & United campaign was 
launched with the aim of abolishing the low “youth minimum wage” for young 
workers aged between 18 and 23 years.9 Intriguingly, this issue- based campaign 
was successful in terms of political agenda setting and the partial abolishment 
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of the youth minimum wage, despite the fact that this low wage had not been a 
public issue in the Netherlands for several decades.
Because the sharing of media content is a social driver, and union- friendly 
networks are socializing agents for union attitude formation, one of the key 
challenges of any union youth campaign is “to tap into these networks of young 
people and provide information in a way that can be easily shared” (Geelan 2015, 
77; see also Johnson and Jarley 2005). The Young & United campaign seemed 
largely effective in gaining a foothold in youth networks by using a language, 
visuals, and messages that appealed to young people. Inspired by methods from 
the “community organizing model” (Lorenzini 2016, 24– 25), the campaign made 
heavy use of social media and escalating direct action, often with a festive di-
mension and led by a large and diverse group of young people who were engaged 
via like- by- like recruitment. However, research is needed on the extent to which 
the campaign succeeded in raising awareness among young people about un-
ionism and triggered an ongoing increase in youth union activism. Furthermore, 
new young members might develop false expectations if they think of unions 
as primarily social movements, for this ignores the realities of daily, routine 
union work and the fact that most unions are hardly permanent mobilization 
machines, especially in the Dutch context. Nevertheless, the Young & United 
campaign turned its attention in 2017 to problematizing temporary and zero- 
hour contracts for young workers and putting better employment contracts on 
the political agenda.
The Young & United campaign demonstrates that, if it is successful, com-
prehensive campaigning can forge a collective identity and sense of solidarity 
based on salient (workplace) issues that are politicized and could be addressed 
by better regulation (Murphy and Turner 2016). The potential for better regu-
lation is crucial, given that young people’s interest in unionism is based on the 
condition that “they feel that their contribution can make a difference” (Byford 
2009, 237). From the perspective of union membership as an experience good, 
campaigns that make sole or predominant use of formal advertising channels are 
likely to be relatively unsuccessful in influencing young people’s union attitudes 
(Gomez and Gunderson 2004, 107). The Danish “Are you OK?” campaign, 
launched in 2012, illustrates this point. Although this campaign highlighted 
the importance of collective organization and the concrete benefits of collec-
tive agreements, its network embeddedness among young people was weak be-
cause of its top- down character; thus, young people’s union attitudes were only 
marginally altered (Geelan 2015). In contrast to a simple marketing campaign, 
comprehensive campaigning combines a top- down approach with youth- led ac-
tivism at the workplace or beyond.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether campaigns that address young workers 
uniformly as an age- defined or homogeneous group will be successful. A dem-
ographic characteristic such as age might be a meager basis for identifying is-
sues of concern because young workers do not necessarily think of themselves 
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as a group with shared interests (Kahmann 2002). Given the variety of school- 
to- work transition regimes, young workers’ different labor market experiences 
give rise to different interests and needs, although not necessarily different from 
those of older generations; still, the precariousness of young people’s working 
conditions might be an issue that is salient and common across the different 
regimes.10 Although union campaigns might capitalize on issue- based forms of 
civic and political participation and the “resurgence in youth activism,” youth 
engagement seems largely to mirror existing national patterns of political par-
ticipation, which can be clustered into country groups that are similar to the 
school- to- work transition regimes (Sloam 2016; Bassoli and Monticelli 2018). 
This indicates that campaign strategies should be contextualized within these 
regimes.
Finally, if unions want to help young workers develop agency in their 
working lives, effective internal structures for youth representation are also a 
necessity, insofar as they make unions more responsive to and knowledgeable 
about the aspirations, interests, and needs of young people (Vandaele 2012, 
2015; Bielski Boris et  al. 2013). Increasing unions’ responsiveness toward 
young workers might help disprove the pessimistic stereotype that they are 
hostile to unions because of individualistic tendencies. In addition, although 
it could be speculated that “generational differences have perhaps been more 
apparent to activists than to academics” (Williams and Quinn 2014, 140), the 
possible misconception about young workers’ excessive individualism is cer-
tainly not without risk for unions; it could turn into a self- fulfilling prophecy 
if the resulting behavior of union officials and activists ends up impeding a 
satisfactory engagement with the new generation on the labor market (Esders 
et al. 2011). Similarly, certain groups of young workers, at least in the United 
Kingdom, have internalized the principles of today’s labor market flexibility 
(Bradley and Devadason 2008, 131), which indicates that “how they see the 
world differs from the union officials who seek to organise them” (TUC 2016, 
33). A simple replication of formal union decision- making structures via par-
allel structures for youth entails the danger of a ghettoization based on age, 
weakening the articulation of young workers’ own agendas and ideas (Dufour- 
Poirier and Laroche 2015). Furthermore, such age- based structures, unlike 
gender structures or those for under- represented groups such as migrants, 
would face regular changes in the membership composition (because of max-
imum age criteria). Integrating young workers into union activities solely 
through forms of representative democracy seems insufficient for instigating 
a more transformative change in union strategies and practices. New forms 
of participatory democracy and self- expression, informal engagement around 
issues (e.g., precariousness), and training and education (also via mentoring 
and union leadership development programs) may contribute to a greater— 
and more politicized— involvement of young unionists in union life and activ-
ities and also empower them (Laroche and Dufour- Poirier 2017).
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22.6. CONCLUSIONS
Demographic change is a fundamental issue for membership- based organi-
zations, and this is equally applicable to unions. Many of them are in trouble 
today because union membership is not only heavily skewed toward workers 
in industry and the public sector but also noticeably “graying.” Although youth 
unionization is persistently higher in the Northern European countries and 
Belgium than in all other European countries considered here, a decline in 
youth unionization, at the aggregated level, almost represents a common trend. 
This representation gap in unionization between younger and older workers 
is not new. However, it is often explained by attributing specific attitudes and 
beliefs to the new generation of workers. This is a recurrent popular narra-
tive:  Public perceptions, media representations, and political discourses tend 
to stress intergenerational shifts, although empirical evidence of cohort effects 
is often lacking. Rather than a deficiency of collectivist beliefs and values, there 
are other, more significant reasons for unions’ difficulties in engaging and 
organizing young workers.
Thus, socialization via parents and social networks is a less effective means of 
positive attitude formation for unionism than in the past. Furthermore, young 
workers are predominantly employed in workplaces, occupations, and sectors in 
which the social norm of union membership is simply weak. If union leadership 
continues to hold generational stereotypes about young people, the risk is that 
it will not be self- reflective or self- critical enough to tackle low youth unioniza-
tion. Apart from a broad strategic vision on the future of unions, a vast shift in 
resource allocation is needed for overcoming the widening representation gap 
and for turning small- scale, local initiatives into large- scale organizing efforts, 
especially in those growing occupations and sectors in which young workers are 
employed and need unions the most. In this area, early unionization and demon-
stration of the effectiveness of unions is crucial. The research on unions and stu-
dent employment highlights that only student workers with a positive experience 
have a higher probability of future membership, compared to workers reporting 
that unions made either a negative impression or little impression at all. Rather 
than providing historical accounts of the achievements of the labor movement, 
union activities for engaging young people would do better to emphasize how 
unions are addressing salient issues that matter to them today.
Furthermore, the continued cross- country variation in youth unionization 
points to the relevance of unions’ institutional embeddedness in school- to- work 
transitions, inter- related with different union approaches to organizing young 
workers. In other words, it appears that age itself is a less important factor for 
explaining low youth unionization; the decision to become a union member 
is rather “embedded in the context of an individual’s work history” (Lowe and 
Rastin 2000, 217). It is young people’s early experiences on the labor market and 
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their (workplace) issues— either via student employment or when they begin 
their career after graduating— that matter, along with their direct exposure to 
unions at the workplace. Analyzing in detail the institutional arrangements 
within education, training, and welfare systems could contribute to a better un-
derstanding of how unions can strengthen their relevance for school- leavers in 
their transition from school to work by designing tailor- made union strategies 
for young people in precarious work and other nonstandard forms of employ-
ment. Youth unionization is not doomed to failure because of an intergenera-
tional shift, and unions should therefore not resign themselves to such a fate but, 
rather, should recognize— it must be stressed, the sooner the better— that there 
is still room for maneuver.
NOTES
1 This latter issue has been the result of either a lack of legal provision for 
such representation or a lack of deliberate managerial or state strategies of 
avoiding or resisting union representation in the (fissured) workplace (due 
to contracting out and subcontracting).
2 I am very grateful for the constructive remarks and suggestions from Carl 
Roper, Mark Stuart, and the editors of this book.
3 Retired members and other categories of passive members are included in 
Figure 22.1 because they can also influence union decision- making. Notably 
in Italy, pensioners have an incentive to become or remain union members 
because specialized union offices help them access welfare benefits (Frangi 
and Barisione 2015). Obviously, the overall median age in each country 
drops slightly if only active union members are included in the count; the 
country trends over time remain, however.
4 Youth emigration could be another explanatory factor.
5 Disaggregating survey data within the young age group is seldom done be-
cause the size of the survey sample usually does not allow for this.
6 In particular, a public transport strike might disproportionally distress young 
people because they often make use of this means of transport (Schnake, 
Dumler, and Moates 2016).
7 It remains an open question whether unions are found at the top of the 
search engine results page.
8 In several countries, unions are legally prohibited from going to schools 
or campuses, but creative tactics can be employed to get around this 
restriction.
9 See https:// www.youngandunited.nl.
10 Those problems could include issues beyond the workplace, such as afford-
able housing.
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INTEGRATING PERSPECTIVES ON YOUTH LABOR 
IN TRANSITION
eConoMiC ProDuCtion, soCial reProDuCtion,  
anD PoliCY learning
Jacqueline O’Reilly, Janine Leschke, Renate Ortlieb,  
Martin Seeleib- Kaiser, and Paola Villa
23.1. INTRODUCTION
Youth unemployment has received considerable political and media atten-
tion since its staggering rise in certain areas of Europe in the wake of the Great 
Recession. In particular, the European Union (EU) flagship program, Youth 
Guarantee (YG), has been critically examined to assess its effectiveness in 
addressing youth unemployment and inactivity throughout the EU (Dhéret and 
Morosi 2015; O’Reilly et al. 2015; European Court of Auditors 2017). Using this 
program as a focus to understand how innovative policy practices have been de-
veloped, Petmesidou and González Menéndez (this volume) illustrate why this 
policy initiative has only been partially successful, with a significant distinction 
between active countries and regions and those exhibiting considerable inertia 
with regard to policy learning and innovation. The contributions to this volume 
also show that youth labor market challenges are by no means confined to youth 
unemployment and that a broader perspective on youth transitions is needed to 
inform policymakers.
In this concluding chapter, we provide an integrated analysis of the findings 
presented in the volume. First, we discuss the main challenges by comparing 
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youth transitions across countries, and we also discuss the importance of using 
a wider range of indicators and a more comprehensive policy focus. Second, we 
argue that the concept of economic production encapsulates some of the key 
dimensions and foci for policy initiatives related to labor market flexibility, mo-
bility, and reforms of vocational education and training (VET) systems; where 
appropriate, we also include some policy pointers.1 Third, we contend that an 
exclusive focus on this domain of economic production risks undervaluing the 
continued importance of the sphere of social reproduction and the role of family 
legacies and how these affect established and emerging forms of inequality. 
Fourth, we propose that given the complexity and variety of youth transitions, 
policy initiatives need to focus simultaneously on both dimensions so as to de-
velop multifocused strategies that will ensure successful youth transitions. We 
conclude by identifying key issues for future research and policy intervention 
resulting from this comprehensive analysis that take into consideration the 
consequences of increasingly precarious patterns of mobility and labor market 
transitions, the need to engage employers, and the effect of inequalities rooted 
in the family.
23.2. COMPARING YOUTH TRANSITIONS 
ACROSS COUNTRIES
A central tenet of European employment research is the value of cross- country 
comparisons (O’Reilly 2006). These are often motivated by a desire to under-
stand what drives similarities and differences between social and institutional 
arrangements, or what policies work better in different countries. Why do some 
countries perform better than others? What can we learn from these cases? How 
can this influence change where performance is weaker? And, is it possible to 
transfer best practice? These are some of the questions that catalyze an interest 
in conducting comparative research in the first place. However, how we go about 
conducting these comparisons raises a few methodological and empirical issues.
When faced with an array of potential sources of data, one of the greatest 
challenges to researchers is finding an analytical framework that will allow them 
to order this material in a coherent manner. For this reason, it has become in-
creasingly common for researchers to rely on comparative regime typologies, 
such as those proposed by Esping- Andersen (1990), Pohl and Walther (2007), 
Hall and Soskice (2001), and Wallace and Bendit (2009). These frameworks pro-
vide heuristic devices that enable comparisons across countries and between 
regime types. Typologies simplify and help us understand the complexities of 
institutional arrangements. They allow us to compare characteristics and trends 
between groups of countries seen as sharing key institutional characteristics 
and then to compare differences between these groupings. Typologies can also 
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help with the formulation of hypotheses concerning expected similarities and 
differences (Ferragina and Seeleib- Kaiser 2011).
23.2.1. the value and limits of youth transition 
typologies
One of the most popular typologies for examining youth transition regimes 
has been that of Pohl and Walther (2007). This is discussed extensively by 
Hadjivassiliou et al. (this volume) and is also used in several other chapters in 
this book. However, one of the doubts raised about typologies that were devel-
oped before the Great Recession is how well they can accommodate change. 
Hadjivassiliou et al. suggest that the recent economic crisis has led to a hybridiza-
tion of youth transition regimes as a result of policy learning, innovation, and re-
form; one catalyst for this development has been the implementation of the YG. 
Hybridization challenges the static picture suggested by established typologies. 
This does not imply second- or third- order regime change (Hall 1993), nor has 
it led to a process of “conversion” (Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005). But it 
does illustrate attempts at policy learning, adoption, and transfer that can result 
in “layering,” in which new policy elements are grafted onto existing institutions 
(Petmesidou and González Menéndez, this volume). The introduction of new 
policies targeting joblessness (i.e., unemployment and inactivity) among youth, 
such as the YG, creates a complex picture. On the one hand, policy initiatives 
recommended to all member states can propagate practices encouraging 
common elements toward convergence between regime types— for example, to-
ward the strengthening of apprenticeships— as well as encouraging the develop-
ment of a mode of governance that supports regional/ local partnerships between 
key stakeholders (Hadjivassiliou et al., this volume). On the other hand, the im-
plementation of these common goals illustrates the persistence of divergence in 
the institutional capability to make these policies effective. This has resulted in an 
increasing hybridization within regime types.
Examples of the values and limits of these typologies can be seen, for instance, 
in two chapters in this volume. First, Petmesidou and González Menéndez start 
out with the youth transitions typology to examine the role of policy innovation 
in building resilient bridges for youth transitions. However, they find that this 
established typology is less helpful for distinguishing between countries that fre-
quently experiment with new proactive measures and those exhibiting consider-
able inertia. The distinction between innovative and inert countries cuts across 
established youth transition typologies. Second, the chapter by Spreckelsen, 
Leschke, and Seeleib- Kaiser builds on the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall 
and Soskice 2001), which positions the United Kingdom and Germany as dia-
metrically contrasting labor markets. As a result, one might expect to find signif-
icant differences in the integration of youth EU migrant citizens in each country. 
In fact, the authors find that youth EU migrant citizens are well integrated in 
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both countries in terms of finding employment but that the quality of these jobs 
is hierarchically segmented and closely related to their region of origin. Intra- EU 
youth migration can provide new opportunities as well as reproduce existing 
inequalities in a new form. The authors suggest that the region of origin appears 
to have a stronger determining effect than the characteristics of the youth tran-
sition regime into which these young people enter. These findings raise novel 
questions that sometimes challenge established knowledge and assumptions 
when categorizing countries into particular “regime” types.
A further limitation with the use of typologies arises because some countries, 
such as France, sit awkwardly in “ideal types.” Others, such as the Netherlands, 
are sometimes relegated to different categories depending on the focus of the 
typology— that is, welfare systems versus labor market institutions— or because 
of the methods used to develop the typology (Arts and Gelissen 2002; O’Reilly 
2006; Ferragina and Seeleib- Kaiser 2011). There is also considerable diversity 
within types. For example, there is more variability among the Baltic states and 
other Eastern European countries than the “post- socialist” label would suggest 
(Deacon 2000). Established youth transition typologies can provide useful ab-
stract “regime” types, but once we move down the ladder of abstraction, we find 
a greater degree of diversity within regimes than the initial macro picture would 
suggest.
As a consequence, a number of chapters in this book employ alterna-
tive approaches to comparing countries that go beyond the established youth 
transitions regimes. Mazzotta and Parisi prefer to use the classification of EU 
member states into groups based on models of flexicurity as developed by the 
European Commission on the basis of principal component analysis in 2006. 
Hajdu and Sik are interested in comparing countries along an East– West di-
vide; they want to understand whether there is any difference in young peoples’ 
values regarding work and, to this end, examine differences by birth cohorts, age 
groups, and time periods. Other authors use geographical regions that largely 
correspond to the categories found in youth transition regimes without as-
suming that there will be institutional effects (Berloffa et al.). Others again prefer 
not to be constrained by any typology; for instance, the questions examined by 
Medgyesi and Nagy on how households pool resources between family members 
go beyond the dimensions usually considered in comparative approaches to 
youth transitions.
In other cases, the research focus encourages the authors to make comparisons 
of different measures that are universally experienced across the EU, albeit at 
different levels. So, for example, Leschke and Finn base their comparative anal-
ysis on benefit eligibility, levels of benefits, and forms of labor market regula-
tion; Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa compare the legacy of workless households 
on youth employment probabilities across the EU; and Mascherini examines the 
variation in NEET (not in employment, education, or training) rates and how 
this has been adopted as a policy target throughout the EU. Comparing which 
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economic sectors are more “youth friendly,” Grotti, Russell, and O’Reilly pro-
vide the added value of allowing more straightforward policy recommendations 
vis- á- vis how youth can be integrated more effectively in the labor market and 
what role employers can play. The units of comparison are not always common 
components of established typologies, but they are identified as having a de-
termining effect on youth transitions, and they draw our attention to shared 
experiences as well as identify country differences in outcomes and policy reach.
Two chapters focus their comparison on a single country. Ortlieb and Weiss 
examine the integration of Eastern European migrants across a range of economic 
sectors in Austria. By keeping constant the destination country, they are able to 
explore similarities and differences related to the types of young people recruited 
to different sectors. The second single- country study (Zuccotti and O’Reilly) 
compares the scarring effects of being a NEET by gender for five different ethnic 
groups in the United Kingdom. This choice is in part driven by the fact that the 
ethnic composition of the youth population varies significantly across countries 
in Europe so that it is difficult to find good- quality, comparable cross- national 
data on this issue that do not conflate ethnicity as a synonym for migrant or ex-
clude nationals of color. In this case, a national comparison of ethnic and gender 
differences provides a more refined understanding of differences between ethnic 
groups, including White nationals, than a simple White versus non- White or 
migrant versus nonmigrant comparison would provide.
Overall, the collection of chapters in this book illustrates both the strengths 
and the limits of using established cross- national typologies. The chapters also 
show how alternative approaches can be used, depending on specific research 
questions concerned with understanding the variety of existing youth labor 
transitions. These approaches are able to identify both country specificities and 
shared universal trends as they seek to distinguish between institutional effects 
and other influential factors.
23.2.2. using a wide range of indicators
To capture the diversity of youth labor transitions, we need to draw on a broad 
range of indicators. First, we need to go beyond conventional analysis focused 
solely on systems of vocational education and training. Hadjivassiliou et al. (this 
volume) show convincingly how this broader perspective involves examining 
recent changes in the underlying logic and design of school- to- work (STW) 
transitions. This requires analysis of the reach and effectiveness of both active 
labor market policies and specific policies targeted at NEETs, as well as employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) to complement our understanding of how dif-
ferent labor market institutions within the economic sphere of production shape 
transition trajectories for young people.
Second, we need to take account also of inactivity rather than a narrower focus 
only on those who are unemployed. This is particularly relevant from a youth 
and gender perspective, as illustrated by Mascherini’s (this volume) examination 
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and differentiation between various categories of NEETs. Likewise, Flek, Hála, 
and Mysíková (this volume) advocate that youth labor market transitions are dif-
ferent from those of prime- age workers, examining simultaneously movements 
between employment, unemployment, and inactivity.
Third, we need to develop a better understanding of youth early career inse-
curity. Several chapters in this volume use standard indicators to this end (Grotti, 
Russell, and O’Reilly; Akgüç and Beblavý; Spreckelsen, Leschke, and Seeleib- 
Kaiser). Examples on the outcome side are temporary employment, (solo) 
self- employment, and part- time or marginal employment shares. Examples on 
the policy side inspired by the flexicurity agenda are EPL, capturing job secu-
rity, and active and passive labor market policy indicators, capturing, respec-
tively, employability security and income security (Hadjivassiliou et al.; Smith 
et  al.; Leschke and Finn). Further distinctions are made between measures of 
job quality in terms of skill– occupation match and wages, as well as examining 
the effect of family background on successful transitions (Filandri, Nazio, and 
O’Reilly). Berloffa et  al. use a particularly innovative and comprehensive ap-
proach to capture early career insecurities. Rather than examining a specific em-
ployment status or a single transition at a fixed point in time, they develop a 
dynamic approach. This involves examining youth labor market integration by 
focusing on individual trajectories— that is, monthly sequences of employment 
statuses over at least 2 years— and considering the timing, order, and length of 
employment, unemployment, and inactivity spells. Smith et  al. emphasize the 
importance of not focusing only on objective measures of early career insecurity, 
such as temporary employment, but also including subjective measures, such as 
perceived vulnerability to job loss, underemployment, and concerns about fu-
ture prospects. By taking inspiration in the transitional labor markets approach 
(Schmid and Gazier 2002; Schmid 2008), the contributions to this volume go be-
yond standard indicators and conventional analysis of youth unemployment to 
illustrate how youth joblessness and early career insecurity are experienced and 
addressed from a policy perspective.
23.3. YOUTH TRANSITIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC 
PRODUCTION, SOCIAL REPRODUCTION, AND POLICY 
LEARNING
In the years preceding the Great Recession of 2008– 2009, there was evidence that 
the labor market for young people in Europe had been improving (Grotti, Russell, 
and O’Reilly, this volume, Figure 2.1). The Great Recession and the austerity years 
that followed knocked this trend off course: Where things were already difficult 
for young people, it made them even worse. Along with the worsening of labor 
market conditions, we can identify a structural shift in job opportunities for 
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young people between various economic sectors (Grotti, Russell, and O’Reilly, 
this volume). The economic crisis, in most countries, resulted in the nonrenewal 
of temporary contracts, followed by the destruction of full- time and perma-
nent jobs; in the recovery, job creation for youth has shifted toward temporary 
and part- time work in many countries. Moreover, the economic crisis amplified 
the differences in labor market outcomes between young adults and prime- age 
workers (Flek, Hála, and Mysíková, this volume), and thereby increased the pres-
sure on policymakers to act.
However, what we have learned about youth labor market transitions goes 
beyond the effects of the Great Recession, and it also reflects back on some 
more deep- rooted causes of inequalities among youth. Although there has been 
some improvement in countries that were least affected by the crisis, in others 
the situation has not improved significantly (O’Reilly et al., this volume; Grotti, 
Russell, and O’Reilly, this volume, Figure 2.2). Causes of youth joblessness and 
labor market insecurity are related not only to differences in VET systems, STW 
transition regimes, and EPL but also to socioeconomic inequalities rooted in 
families. The role of these factors, and the findings from this book, can be under-
stood in terms of the inter- relationship between three key domains: economic 
production, social reproduction, and policy interventions. These domains affect 
patterns of inequality, mobility, and the form of policy intervention.
23.3.1. economic production: labor market flexibility, 
mobility, education, and skills
The sphere of “economic production” (i.e., the locus of where labor is employed) 
in our approach is shaped, among other things, by labor market institutions as 
well as the quantity and quality of the new generations entering the labor market. 
More precisely, we define the sphere of economic production as including the 
impact of labor market flexibility, new labor resources made available through 
mobility and migration, as well as reforms of education and training.
23.3.1.1. Labor market flexibility
The idea that labor market flexibility had to be encouraged in order to improve 
the efficiency of the labor market and favor the smooth transition of young people 
into employment has failed to recognize the impact on increasing inequality 
among young adults (Smith et  al., this volume). Flexicurity, despite its ambi-
tion to achieve both increased flexibility and transition security (i.e., employ-
ment security instead of job security), has delivered only partly and continues 
to have different interpretations and unequal outcomes both across countries 
and for different labor market groups, including youth. Overall, only a fraction 
of school- leavers and university graduates manage to find a stable and satisfac-
tory job within a relatively short period of time, with noticeable differences by 
age group, gender, education level, ethnicity, and across countries (Berloffa et al., 
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this volume; Zuccotti and O’Reilly, this volume). Instead, many young adults ex-
perience unemployment or frequent job changes combined with repeated unem-
ployment spells, also later in their working life, when the turbulent STW period 
should already be overcome (Berloffa et al., this volume). Often, unemployment 
spells of young people are not sufficiently buffered with income security to allow 
them to search for an adequate job (Leschke and Finn, this volume). Youth are 
thus pushed into temporary and marginal employment as well as increasingly 
into (solo) self- employment (Ortlieb, Sheehan, and Masso, this volume). To ad-
dress this issue, forms of non- standard employment should be covered by un-
employment and other social security schemes (Leschke and Finn, this volume; 
Ortlieb, Sheehan, and Masso, this volume). The increasing diffusion and promo-
tion of flexible employment is likely to have long- term negative consequences for 
young people’s quality of employment and labor market attachment.
Labor market flexibility, often implemented via deregulation at the margins, 
means, first, that labor markets are increasingly characterized by young workers 
moving quite frequently between jobs, with possible unemployment/ inactivity 
spells in between; and, second, that one needs to consider not only the early years 
of working life (i.e., STW transition) but also the subsequent years (early career 
of young adults). This calls for a life course perspective that allows us to under-
stand how earlier experiences affect longer term trajectories both with regard 
to labor market outcomes and in establishing independent households. A shift 
from a focus on STW transitions to a life course perspective also widens the 
possible policy responses: In addition to career guidance and job search support, 
they should include comprehensive investment strategies geared at young people 
and their families, as well as new measures having a focus on aspirations and 
motivation and the development of soft skills.
23.3.1.2. Labor market mobility
Migration from Eastern and Southern Europe to the North and the West has sig-
nificantly increased during the past decade, since the EU enlargements (in 2004 
and 2007) and the economic downturn (in the years of the Great Recession and 
of austerity). Increasing geographic mobility within the EU is often viewed as 
one key instrument to address the consequences of asymmetric shocks, uneven 
economic development, and high youth unemployment, especially in Central– 
Eastern and Southern European countries. Intra- EU mobility, migration, and re-
turn migration have been supported by various EU policy initiatives and services 
(O’Reilly et al. 2015). These policy tools include the coordination of entitlement 
to social benefits, specific directives regulating the working conditions of groups 
of cross- border workers such as posted workers, and comprehensive informa-
tion for EU citizens and businesses on rights in the country of destination and 
support when these rights are breached by public authorities (SOLVIT centers).2 
The European job placement service, European Employment Services (EURES),3 
provides support for jobseekers, employers, and students, including information 
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on rules and regulations as well as living and working conditions in the country 
of destination (Masso et al., this volume).
The analyses in this book show that young EU migrant citizens are largely 
rather well integrated and that labor market intermediaries play an impor-
tant role in terms of reducing transaction costs, managing risks associated 
with the employment relationship, and building networks (Ortlieb and Weiss, 
this volume). However, labor market intermediaries are not necessarily neu-
tral and often serve interests of employers first, which is particularly the case 
for private labor market intermediaries such as temporary work agencies. This 
calls for careful monitoring and regulation of private intermediaries, as well as 
a strengthening and promotion of public labor market intermediaries such as 
EURES. There is also evidence that young EU migrant citizens are often over-
qualified and tend to have a higher risk of being employed in nonstandard em-
ployment relationships (Akgüç and Beblavý, this volume). The country of origin 
appears to contribute to the stratification of young people at least as much as the 
institutional arrangements in the countries to which they migrate (Spreckelsen, 
Leschke, and Seeleib- Kaiser, this volume).
The reintegration of young returnees into their country- of- origin labor 
markets also poses a policy challenge that is nearly uniform across countries 
(Masso et al., this volume). Of those who return “home,” some are able to reap 
the benefits of their time abroad, having developed their soft and hard skills. 
However, returnees might need additional support from public institutions, such 
as employment offices in the country of origin, given the fact that not all of them 
will be able to benefit from their experiences abroad. Also, access to services es-
pecially with respect to family- related issues (i.e., maternity benefits and health 
care) is part of the process leading to the return migration decision. The balance 
of rewards from migration, both for the individuals who left or returned and 
for the countries of origin and destination, is not a simple calculus (Fihel et al. 
2007). Without question, intra- EU mobility has reduced youth unemployment 
across Europe, and many young people value the opportunity to work and live in 
a different country. At the same time, however, some patterns of intra- EU migra-
tion have also contributed to labor shortages in specific occupations or sectors in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Polakowski and Szelewa 2016).
23.3.1.3. The role of education and training
It is the interaction between systems of education and training and labor de-
mand to absorb young people that lie at the heart of many of the problems in 
youth labor markets (McGuinness, Bergin, and Whelan, this volume). Many 
chapters in this book show that higher education is associated with a lower risk 
of being unemployed (Flek, Hála, and Mysíková, this volume), with having a 
higher job quality (Berloffa et  al., this volume; Filandri, Nazio, and O’Reilly, 
this volume), and with having a lower probability of returning to the family of 
origin’s household (Mazzotta and Parisi, this volume). However, young people 
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from lower class backgrounds often have less educational opportunities than 
their peers from higher class backgrounds, which perpetuates socioeconomic 
inequalities (Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa, this volume; Filandri, Nazio, and 
O’Reilly, this volume). The chapters in this book also show that VET as well 
as apprenticeships are considered to have been effective in smoothing the pro-
cess of STW transitions. In liberal (e.g., United Kingdom) and subprotective 
(e.g., Greece and Spain) countries, policymakers have recently begun to ex-
periment with various policy initiatives— for example, through the European 
Alliance for Apprenticeships (Hadjivassiliou et  al., this volume; Petmesidou 
and González Menéndez, this volume) and, in the United Kingdom, through 
the Apprenticeship Levy. 4 However, effective VET and apprenticeship schemes 
require a mode of policy governance that supports regional/ local partnerships, 
networks, and active involvement of all relevant stakeholders, which are occa-
sionally lacking and very difficult to emulate. In particular, measures need to 
focus on overcoming governance barriers that may result from excessive frag-
mentation of competencies between distinct partners as well as overcome 
rigidities created by overcentralization.
At the same time, there is evidence of overeducation for some young 
workers (McGuinness, Bergin, and Whelan, this volume), particularly among 
migrants (Akgüç and Beblavý, this volume; Ortlieb and Weiss, this volume; 
Masso et al., this volume). Core to the assessment of policy interventions in 
the VET system, it is necessary to understand how the supply of qualified labor 
will be absorbed by domestic or international labor demand. At the individual 
level, this translates into improving the quality and accessibility of information 
about potential education pathways and jobs. Also, increasing the practical 
aspects of degree programs can reduce the incidence of initial mismatch for 
graduates (McGuinness, Whelan, and Bergin 2016). Although there is greater 
understanding and recognition of EU qualifications across borders today than 
there was 20 years ago,5 there are still many obstacles for young EU migrant 
citizens and third- country nationals that are only beginning to be addressed.
Together, the three dimensions of flexibility, mobility, and education are key 
to understanding how youth unemployment in Europe can be examined under 
the rubric of the sphere of economic production. VET systems and STW regimes 
interact and engage employers and trade unions in concert with domestic and 
international policymakers. This approach provides a more comprehensive anal-
ysis to understand how youth opportunities are shaped by the demand for, and 
availability of, youth labor both at home and abroad.
23.3.2. social reproduction: Family legacies and new 
and emerging forms of inequality
Emerging patterns of segmentation in youth labor markets along the lines of ed-
ucation, gender, and ethnicity require a holistic analytical approach, including an 
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analysis of the legacy of family differences from the sphere of “social reproduc-
tion” (i.e., the locus where the labor force is produced) to understand how these 
interact with the sphere of “economic production” (i.e., the locus where labor is 
employed) (O’Reilly, Smith, and Villa 2017). The family provides an interface for 
youth transitions into the public realm: It acts as both a source of stratification 
and potentially as a source of protection.
23.3.2.1. Family legacies
Parental employment status plays a significant role in explaining youth labor 
market outcomes. A number of chapters in this volume show how employment 
probabilities, decisions to leave/ return to the parental home, and the pooling of 
household finances are differentially affected by the type of household in which 
young people grew up. Although some effects are universal (e.g., having grown 
up in a household in which no one was working increases the likelihood of that 
young person also being without work), the extent varies by country (Berloffa 
et al., this volume) as well as by different ethnic group (Zuccotti and O’Reilly, this 
volume). Without the role of families providing support and welfare for young 
people, it is very likely that the social consequences of the sharp increase in youth 
unemployment in Europe would have been much more severe. Families can pro-
vide support in difficult times, but this can also constrain young people’s steps 
toward economic independence and independent living. Also since the outbreak 
of the economic crisis, an increasing proportion of youth are staying longer in 
the family of origin or are returning to the family home after finishing educa-
tion and/ or not finding employment. Simultaneously, in some families, it is not 
only youth who benefit from cohabitation: Among some of the poorest families 
in Europe, youth employment is providing resources to be shared with other 
family members in need (Medgyesi and Nagy, this volume). Accrued workless-
ness across generations exacerbates household and youth inequalities between 
work- rich and work- poor households.
In summary, family legacies play a significant role providing support to their 
jobless children but with the side effect of increasing inequalities of opportunities 
among youth. Young people from higher social classes are better equipped to 
achieve good educational and labor market outcomes. Universal access to em-
ployment services— providing services also to less advantaged young people in 
low work- intensity households— might help address these inequalities. In ad-
dition, as some chapters suggest (Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa, this volume; 
Filandri, Nazio, and O’Reilly, this volume), the family of origin plays a crucial 
role in the transmission of gender roles during adolescence, shaping the attitudes 
of young women and men toward female participation. In order to enhance the 
participation of young women in particular, and youth employment in general, it 
is also crucial to strengthen policies focused on increasing parental employment, 
especially that of mothers.
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23.3.2.2. New contours of labor market segmentation: Gender, 
ethnicity, class, and migrant status
Although young women have been increasingly successful in education systems 
and in participating in higher education, the evidence in this book highlights 
the emergence of gender gaps opening up early in young people’s labor market 
experiences. Men and women (aged 16−34  years) have similar chances of 
accessing paid employment rapidly, but as Berloffa et  al. (this volume) show, 
young women’s labor market conditions deteriorate relatively quickly during 
their early working life in terms of both security and success, even before 
motherhood.
Young women also have a higher likelihood of becoming NEET (Mascherini, 
this volume), and young self- employed women often find themselves in more 
precarious situations compared to their male counterparts (Ortlieb, Sheehan, 
and Masso, this volume). These gaps reflect segregation of education and training 
choices and different sectoral choices (Grotti, Russell, and O’Reilly, this volume; 
Ortlieb, Sheehan, and Masso, this volume).
Specific gendered processes in the parental home and in the labor market 
(e.g., discrimination in recruitment, job allocation, and training) reinforce 
gender roles that subsequently produce lower quality labor market outcomes. 
Gender gaps emerging in early adulthood have long- term consequences over 
the life course. This suggests that well- known gender differences in labor market 
outcomes (not fully explained by early parenthood) have not yet been equalized 
for younger women, who are still encountering similar problems as those of 
older generations. A wide range of policies are needed to tackle the weaker posi-
tion of young women in the labor market— from policies aiming to ensure equal 
access to employment and career opportunities to reconciliation policies (e.g., 
paid leave for fathers and affordable care services and flexible working hours for 
parents with small children).
Gender impacts are also intertwined in different ways with the effects of other 
social dimensions, such as ethnicity and class/ family background. Zuccotti and 
O’Reilly’s (this volume) analysis of gender and ethnic differences in the United 
Kingdom found that young White British men and those of Caribbean origin 
are more likely to be affected than any other group by the negative consequences 
of being NEET; however, young Asian women, especially those from Pakistani 
communities, have lower employment probabilities. Patterns of gender 
inequalities are changing at the margins, but often as a result of the situation for 
young men deteriorating rather than that of young women improving.
Policies need to take account of such intersectionalities in order to be effective 
and thereby also consider that age is a significant dimension of intersectionality 
(Hanappi- Egger and Ortlieb 2015). However, analysis of the policy environment 
for young people reveals, for example, that such policies are often gender blind 
(Petmesidou and González Menéndez, this volume), and there is limited evidence 
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of consistent gender mainstreaming. The substantial variation in gender differences 
between countries is only partially captured by STW regime frames of analysis. 
Greater attention to the differential outcomes for specific categories of youth (e.g., 
in the United Kingdom, young White British men or some young women of specific 
ethnic minorities) could make policies more effective if they were used to inform 
targeted policymaking. Although there is some evidence of good practices that ac-
knowledge these differences, these policies are exceptions rather than the rule.
23.3.3. Policy transfer and policy learning
The third key component required to understand the form of youth transitions 
is related to the role of policymakers and to the possibilities for policy transfer 
and learning between countries. Across Europe, the policy architectures for 
addressing youth problems are very different: These range from countries with 
specific ministries, or transversal organizations, to those with no dedicated 
institutions (Wallace and Bendit 2009). Similarly, the design and capacity of 
public employment services vary significantly across Europe. It is frequently the 
case that policies affecting young people are spread across a range of very dif-
ferent institutions; but these often do not have consistent strategies, and they are 
frequently decentralized to local and regional levels (Petmesidou and González 
Menéndez, this volume).
We have argued that one of the distinctive characteristics of the current phase 
of youth unemployment has been an increased Europeanization of youth policies 
(O’Reilly et al. 2015), a process referred to as “transversalism” by Wallace and 
Bendit (2009). This reflects a broader project from the European Commission 
to encourage an exchange of information, good practice, and benchmarks. This 
includes, for example, the European Network of Public Employment Services,6 
which allows public employment services to collaborate, share good practice, and 
participate in learning events geared toward improving services for jobseekers. It 
also contributes to facilitating intra- EU labor mobility.
There have also been attempts to bring together a range of measures from 
different levels of government and ministries to develop a coherent and coor-
dinated employment strategy to foster youth employment, including technical 
support from the EU. However, EU intervention is often focused on softer policy 
instruments, such as guidelines, recommendations, periodic reporting through 
the open method of coordination (Smith et al., this volume), the EU Agenda for 
new skills and jobs, and, since 2013, through the initiative of the European YG. 
Since 2010, through the EU Agenda for new skills and jobs,7 there have been EU- 
level attempts to give new impetus to labor market reforms that help people gain 
suitable qualifications. The EU Agenda primarily aims at skills upgrading to cope 
with a shrinking working- age population and to stimulate young people to gain 
appropriate skills by prevention of early school leaving and increasing the number 
of young people in higher education or equivalent vocational education.
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The YG, launched in 2013, was held up as the flagship program to address youth 
unemployment, and in many countries it was linked to attempts to strengthen 
the dual vocational training system, in particular by mobilizing employers to 
play a more active role. In Greece, Slovakia, and Spain, EU influence regarding 
the dual VET system created “windows of opportunity” for domestic policy 
entrepreneurs (or for negotiated agreements at the regional level in the case of 
Spain) to experiment with novel practices that promote work- based learning. 
However, recent assessments of the YG by the European Court of Auditors 
(2017) have been quite critical. They suggest that although there has been some 
progress, the initiative falls short of the initial expectations raised when it was 
launched. In particular, none of the countries evaluated (Croatia, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain) had succeeded in ensuring that NEETs had 
taken up an opportunity within 4 months. Part of this problem was attributed 
to the lack of resources available from the EU budget. But part of the lack of 
success was due to the difficulties faced by member states in carefully planning 
the implementation of the YG on the basis of their national specificities and lim-
ited institutional capacities to carry out implementation by the established public 
employment services. The European Court of Auditors’ evaluation suggests that 
the YG was insufficient to provide paradigmatic shifts in the key STW transitions 
mechanisms, partly as a result of path dependency combined with cultural and 
institutional stickiness. Any policy transfer or policy learning will need to take 
into account these different dimensions and levels of policymaking in order to be 
more effective in the future (Petmesidou and González Menéndez, this volume).
Being sensitive to such differences makes any discussion of policy implications 
of our complex analyses a difficult task. Nevertheless, some generalizable 
observations with regard to the policy implications of our research can be made. 
First, we need to highlight that we are aware of the potential interaction effects 
of any policy recommendations aiming at the reduction of youth unemployment 
and the improvement of STW transitions with macroeconomic conditions as 
well as with other policies. For instance, in cases of a lack of demand for young 
workers (Grotti, Russell, and O’Reilly, this volume), it would seem very un-
likely that policies improving the supply side will be sufficient to address the 
issue of youth unemployment in the short term (Smith et  al., this volume). 
Second, austerity policies implemented immediately after the Great Recession 
have very likely limited the effectiveness of new labor market policy initiatives 
that required additional financial resources— in particular, investment in edu-
cation and training, in addition to active and passive labor market policies— as 
observed in a number of countries.
23.4. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In conclusion, the extensive evidence provided in this volume can be summarized 
in relation to three key features for future research encapsulated by our analysis 
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of the relationship between economic production, social reproduction, and 
policy interventions. These three areas capture increasingly precarious patterns 
of youth mobility and transition trajectories, the absence of employer engage-
ment, and emerging inequalities linked to family origins.
First, we have seen that new job opportunities are becoming increasingly pre-
carious. Where there has been job growth, it is more likely to be in temporary 
or part- time jobs, whereas more permanent full- time positions have been lost 
during the Great Recession. Our analysis of youth transitions has consistently 
indicated that many of these transitions are associated with a growing margin 
of precariousness. One dimension of this is also related to the encouragement 
of self- employment for young people, which can unleash a welcomed form of 
youthful entrepreneurship and creativity or can increase social insecurity and 
lead to indebtedness. The question as to whether some of these jobs are gen-
uine self- employment or a disguised form of dependent employment has been 
gaining increased media and legal attention in discussions of the expansion of 
the “gig economy.” The form and characteristics of future jobs for youth and their 
long- term consequences will clearly become an increasingly important area for 
research and policy.
Second, one key dimension that is insufficiently addressed in the vast body 
of research has been the role of employers. Much research approaches this 
issue tangentially, by illustrating how more stable pathways for young people 
to find better quality jobs are found where employers are more integrated into 
VET systems. These systems clearly reflect that employers see advantages to 
participating in the collective organization and the shared costs of recruiting 
young people through these channels. Where these systems are more fragile, 
employers do not perceive an advantage in being actively involved in collec-
tivist collaborations. Their ability to absorb young people coming onto the 
labor market is curtailed either because they do not perceive young people 
to have the skills they require or because they do not have the financial capa-
bility to integrate young people into their firms in a way that they would find 
profitable. This might be due to a lack of incentives in the policy instruments 
designed to integrate young people that sufficiently alleviate their anticipated 
long- term costs or because they have alternative sources of labor. Some 
country differences in this absorption capacity are related not only to firm size 
but also to the institutions encompassed in the sphere of economic production, 
including VET systems and EPL. Future research agendas clearly need to give 
this aspect more attention, alongside the uneven sectoral distribution of jobs 
for youth.
Third, we have also evidenced how the family plays a significant role both 
in contributing to the stratification of opportunities for young people and 
in protecting vulnerable youth in times of crisis. It is the interaction between 
inequalities in the sphere of social reproduction with an effect on which groups 
of youth labor are trained and employed in the sphere of economic production 
that provides a key nexus in the analysis presented in this volume.
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The evidence of growing inequalities can be seen in the polarization between 
NEETs and those experiencing the negative consequences of overeducation. 
The NEET population illustrates the fact that a significant proportion of young 
people “fall out of the system.” A  large proportion of these young people are 
more likely to come from already disadvantaged families. On the other hand, the 
consequences of overeducation for an increasingly better educated generation of 
young people run the risks of occupational mismatch and wage penalties in the 
long term. Evidence suggests that some of the negative effects of overeducation 
are also associated with coming from less advantaged parental backgrounds, as 
well as how young people are segregated into different educational pathways.
In addition to these polarizing trends, there is an emerging fragmentation 
of inequality between different subgroups of young people. This presents itself 
in new forms of inequalities that will shape young peoples’ attitudes and values 
around work, trade unions, and other collective organizations. Future analyses 
of youth labor market transitions need to take account not only of how reforms 
to VET institutions in the sphere of economic production will adapt to the 
challenges resulting from the growing digitalized and increasingly “personalized’ 
service economy but also of how disadvantages in the sphere of social reproduc-
tion affect where different groups of young people are able to access pathways into 
the field of economic production and where there are spaces for policymakers to 
intervene effectively.
NOTES
1 For more detailed information on the policy level, we refer our readers to the 
STYLE Policy Briefs that have been produced as part of the project: http:// 
www.style- research.eu/ publications/ policy- briefs.
2 http:// ec.europa.eu/ solvit/ index_ en.htm.
3 https:// ec.europa.eu/ eures/ public/ en/ homepage.
4 The Apprenticeship Levy was introduced on April 6, 2017, in the United 
Kingdom. This amounts to a compulsory tax on employers’ payroll that 
is to be used to fund apprenticeships, unless employers show evidence 
of creating these kinds of jobs for young people within their organiza-
tion. For an explanation of how this policy will work, see https:// www.
gov.uk/ government/ publications/ apprenticeship- levy- how- it- will- work/ 
apprenticeship- levy- how- it- will- work.
5 For example, through Erasmus+ (https:// www.erasmusplus.org.uk) or 
initiatives to recognize skills.
6 For more information, see http:// ec.europa.eu/ social/ main.jsp?catId=1100& 
langId=en.
7 The most recent update in 2016 particularly emphasized digital skills; see 
http:// ec.europa.eu/ social/ main.jsp?catId=1223.
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